John Doe v. Princeton University Trustees

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-2014

JOHN DOE,
Appellant

v.

THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
________________

Appeal from U.S. District Court, D.N.J.
Judge Zahid N. Quraishi, No. 3:24-cv-07125

Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MASCOTT, Circuit Judges
Argued Mar. 11, 2026; Decided: July 21, 2026

________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. Disciplinary proceedings in the
context of higher education are not a zero-sum game. Both
sides—students reporting misconduct and students accused of
misconduct—have legitimate interests that can coexist when
universities employ fair disciplinary procedures to seek truth
and accountability. There is a wide range of permissible
procedural safeguards that universities can implement to

2

accommodate both the vital protection of victims’ rights and
the essential fairness owed to respondents. Yet in their worthy
quest to erase the scourge of assault, particularly sexual assault,
from their campuses, many universities have struggled to find
the proper balance between these countervailing interests.
Princeton University is among them.
We have had occasion to consider concerns about
Princeton’s disciplinary procedures in the past, see Doe v.
Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2022)
(Princeton III), and Princeton has taken remedial steps in the
interim to address some of those issues. But the appeal before
us suggests others linger. In the underlying complaint filed by
John Doe, a student accused of misconduct by two female
students, John alleges that Princeton found him responsible and
suspended him for two years as a result of disciplinary
proceedings rife with hostility to John, disparate treatment of
witnesses, and unsupported credibility assessments.
1
The
District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding those
allegations were insufficient to support John’s state-law
contract claims or his sex discrimination claim under Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
Because we view the allegations as sufficient, we will reverse
and remand as to the dismissal of all claims included in this
appeal.

1
We use the term “proceedings” to refer to the entire
disciplinary process, including Princeton’s investigation and
live hearing.

3

I. BACKGROUND
A few weeks after classes began for the fall 2023 semester,
John Doe, a sophomore at Princeton, received an unexpected
message: A university investigator wanted to interview him as
soon as possible regarding unspecified allegations that he had
engaged in misconduct. When John met with the investigator
a few days later, he learned that two former friends, both
female students, had accused him of choking them in separate
incidents during the previous semester. He was interviewed
for the first and only time about those accusations and denied
them. Princeton proceeded to investigate the alleged assaults
as violations of its Personal Safety Policy by interviewing
student witnesses and compiling an evidence packet that was
eventually turned over to the decision-maker: Princeton’s
Committee on Discipline. After reviewing the evidence packet
and within hours of concluding a late-night disciplinary
hearing, the Committee found John responsible for the alleged
assaults and suspended him for two years.
We will describe the circumstances of each alleged assault,
Princeton’s investigation of those allegations, and its decision
to punish John for the charged misconduct. At this stage of the
proceedings, there has been no discovery or development of an
evidentiary record. We are simply reviewing the District
Court’s decision to dismiss John’s complaint for failure to state
a claim, so we must accept as true, and recount below, the
factual allegations as described in that complaint. See
Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 340. The following narrative, in other

4

words, “is one-sided because the posture of the case requires it
to be,” Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2019),
and “[d]iscovery might not bear out [John]’s account,”
Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 340. Our task at this stage is merely
to determine whether, assuming everything John alleges is
true, he has stated a claim for relief.
A. The Incident Between John Doe and Sarah
Smith
The first alleged assault took place at an on-campus party
on the night of March 3, 2023, against Sarah Smith, a female
student enrolled at Princeton. There, John “spoke closely and
loudly with Sarah, in part out of anger” that she had not upheld
her promise to keep a close eye on their mutual friend
(Student 3) who had recently been harassed at a different party.
App. 56. During that heated conversation, three female
bystanders asked Sarah if she was okay, but the nearby security
guard did not intervene. John denied making any physical
contact with Sarah, and although Sarah “almost immediately
complained to her roommates about how John had angrily
yelled at her,” those roommates later testified that Sarah did
not say “the incident ha[d] a physical component.” App. 56.
Sarah likewise did not mention anything about choking when
she confronted John the following day. Indeed, it was not until
four weeks later, after another friend, Jane Roe, claimed to
have been choked by John, that Sarah accused John of doing
the same to her.

5

B. The Incident Between John Doe and Jane Roe
The second alleged choking incident transpired on the night
of April 1, 2023, when John’s friend from high school, Jane
Roe, was visiting him at Princeton. The night began with a
group of friends—including John, Jane, Sarah, Student 3, and
Student 4—having drinks in John’s dorm room before they
ventured to an on-campus party, leaving John’s roommate
(Student 5) behind. The walk to the party was quickly derailed
by the fallout from a series of romantic interactions. First, John
kissed Jane, upsetting Student 3, who had romantic feelings for
John, and causing Student 3 and Student 4 to break off from
the group to process Student 3’s hurt feelings. Next, Jane
kissed Sarah, upsetting John, who had romantic feelings for
Jane. John and Jane then got into an argument about the second
kiss, while Sarah lay on the ground “in [a] drunken state.”
App. 58. In the middle of that argument, as Student 3 and
Student 4 were walking back towards the group, Jane—who
was also “highly intoxicated”—abruptly fell backwards into
John then dropped to the ground “screaming and crying
loudly.” App. 58. Among Jane’s cries were “words to the
effect of, ‘Z choked me,’ and, ‘He choked me,’” referencing an
ex-boyfriend who had choked Jane when they were dating.
App. 58.
After the group consoled Jane for one-to-two hours, they
made their way back to Sarah’s dorm, where they all agreed
Jane would sleep that night. But before parting ways, Jane
asked to speak to John alone in a common room and kissed him
for the second time that night. Despite the turbulent evening,

6

Jane stayed on Princeton’s campus for several more nights and
spent two of those nights in John’s dorm room.
In a text message to John on the day after the incident, Jane
acknowledged that Sarah had not seen the alleged choking.
Nonetheless, in the days and months following the incident,
Jane attempted to get John to admit that he had choked her.
John consistently denied any memory of doing so. The closest
Jane got to an admission was a text from John on the night after
the incident, delicately declining to accept her recollection of
the evening by stating, “it’s probably that it hasn’t fully soaked
in yet cause I haven’t processed what I must have done last
night,” App. 60, and a recording of a phone call, which Jane
allegedly coerced John to make and send to her—“under threat
of reporting him to the University” if he would not comply—
in which he told his parents that “on the night in question he
was ‘trying to pull [Jane] in to talk to her and, like, damaged
her windpipe ever so slightly,’” App. 61 (emphasis omitted).
Notwithstanding Jane’s accusations and John’s denials, Jane
and Sarah continued to spend time with John after the alleged
assaults, even vacationing with him at John’s family home for
several nights in late August 2023. A few weeks after that trip,
however, Jane learned that John had told another male friend
that he was “a little scared of her.” App. 62. As alleged in the
complaint, Jane then retaliated by making a complaint to
Princeton that John had choked her five months earlier.

7

C. Princeton’s Investigation
Princeton dutifully responded to Jane’s allegation by
appointing an internal investigator to obtain Jane’s full
account. In their initial interview, Jane told the investigator—
despite her previously texting John to the contrary—that Sarah
witnessed the alleged choking. She also provided a detailed
account of the alleged assault, reporting that John “grabbed her
by her throat, and lifted her off the ground” for “5-6 seconds,”
so she was “straining on her tip toes to get the pressure off of
her neck,” App. 70-71, and “having flashbacks and . . . PTSD
from her prior rape when she had been choked,” App. 58. But
that account changed when Jane was interviewed again later in
the investigation. On that occasion, Jane reported that John
had not “squeezed her neck at all, but rather just pressed from
the front as they talked.” App. 30 (citation modified).
In addition to interviewing Jane, the investigator contacted
some of the other students with relevant information about the
alleged assault, including Sarah, who said at that point that
John likewise had choked her on March 3, 2023. Now
responding to a second report of choking, Princeton decided to
conduct a joint investigation into the two incidents, eventually
culminating in a disciplinary hearing.
As with Jane, Sarah’s narrative evolved over the course of
the joint investigation. She initially told the investigator that
John put his hand on her throat and used that hand to hold her
in place, but in parallel fashion to Jane, later asserted that John
had not actually “meant to choke her” and that he did not

8

actually “grasp” or “squeeze” her neck, but “was more
pushing.” App. 75-76 (citation modified).
Compounding the inconsistencies in the complainants’
accounts was the investigator’s inconsistent manner of seeking
out evidence. She interviewed Jane and Sarah three times each,
giving them opportunities to respond to John’s statements. She
also, with assistance from Princeton’s Deputy Dean of
Undergraduate Students Joyce Chen, interviewed every female
and supportive witness identified by the complainants at least
once.
As it turned out, however, those witnesses provided little
by way of corroboration. Sarah’s roommates stated that Sarah
did not mention any physical component to her interaction with
John on the night she was allegedly choked; Student 3, who
had been walking back towards the group with Student 4 on
the night Jane was allegedly choked, confirmed that she did not
see what happened between John and Jane; and another female
witness asserted that Jane’s reaction on the night of her alleged
assault was likely due to Jane feeling triggered when John
brought up Jane’s ex-boyfriend during their argument. In
addition, the investigator asked several female witnesses—but
no male witnesses—who had seen Jane in the days following
the alleged assault about whether Jane had bruising on her neck
and received conflicting answers.
On the other hand, John’s initial interview with the
investigator, before he had notice of the allegations or formal
charges against him, was his only interview that preceded the

9

formal disciplinary hearing. John’s supportive witnesses, all
of whom were male, likewise went largely unheard. According
to the complaint, the investigator’s treatment of those
witnesses did not match the importance of the evidence they
had to offer. The investigator did not seek out statements from
two individuals with potentially relevant information. The first
was John’s roommate, Student 5, who, according to the
complaint, could have offered relevant information about
whether Jane slept in his and John’s shared dorm room during
the week after the alleged assault. The second was Student X,
a male student at another university who allegedly could have
provided evidence showing that Jane had also recently made
false choking allegations against him. The investigator did
conduct one interview with the sole eyewitness to Jane’s
alleged assault, Student 4. Student 4 advised that John did not
touch Jane during the interaction, and that, on the night after
the alleged assault, Jane told him that “John did not choke her,
but he put his hand on her neck and it brought back the memory
of her prior assault.” App. 75 (citation modified).
After several weeks of investigation, Dean Chen scheduled
a disciplinary hearing and formally charged John with
violating Princeton’s Personal Safety Policy, which prohibits
“[a]ny physical assault committed . . . on the premises of the
University or in the local vicinity, especially when unprovoked

10

and/or when injury results.”
2
App. 36. A Committee on
Discipline was then convened to adjudicate the charges
through a live hearing.
D. The Disciplinary Hearing
In advance of the hearing, John requested that Student 4 and
Student X be called as witnesses. Denying that request as to
Student X, Dean Chen explained that the hearing “would focus
only on the incidents at hand,” App. 81, and because Student X
“was not interviewed,” App. 66, “did not have firsthand
knowledge of the incident,” and “only knew about the
character of Jane,” App. 81, he would be an impermissible
character witness. John then availed himself of alternate
avenues to defend against the misconduct allegations. He
submitted multiple written statements responding to initial
drafts of the evidence packet and detailing Jane’s false
allegations against Student X, as well as text messages and
photographic evidence contradicting Jane and Sarah’s
statements about when they cut off contact with John, where
Jane slept for the rest of her time on Princeton’s campus, and
whether Jane had bruising on her neck following the alleged
assault. Among the text messages was an exchange between
John and Jane, in which Jane said she would lie under oath

2
John was also charged with violating Princeton’s Alcohol
Policy by serving alcohol to individuals who were underage on
the evening of April 1, 2023, but John does not challenge
Princeton’s resolution of that charge in this appeal.

11

about her false choking allegations against Student X, and that
she could get Sarah to lie for her, too.
John’s disciplinary hearing began at 7:27 p.m. on
November 6, but one critical party was conspicuously
missing—Jane. Dean Chen had informed John the day prior
that Jane had declined to attend the hearing and that the
proceeding would go forward in any event. At the outset of the
hearing, as alleged in the complaint, the Committee questioned
John for over ninety minutes. That questioning was
“one-sided” and “demanding,” indicating that the Committee
members were “hostile to [John’s] account,” App. 77-78, and
notwithstanding Dean Chen’s prior representation that the
hearing “would focus only on the incidents at hand,” much of
it “solely focused on whether or not [John] had good
character,” App. 81.
Student 4, whose testimony supported John and who was
the only eyewitness, was likewise questioned “in an incredibly
hostile manner” for forty minutes. App. 33. The Committee
homed in on a portion of the evidentiary packet, which
suggested Student 4 had said: “Perhaps it happened if she is
saying it and it triggered a memory in [Jane’s] head. I don’t
think it’s that bad. I don’t think [John] choked her really really
hard. I think it is being portrayed a lot worse than it was.”
App. 83. According to the complaint, the investigator verified
that the quoted statement matched her interview notes. Student
4, however, testified “unequivocally” that he did not make that

12

statement, and a Committee member cut him off as he was
trying to explain how he had been misquoted. App. 83.
In contrast, Sarah and the complainant-supportive
witnesses were allegedly treated “with kid gloves” and
questioned for less than thirty minutes each. App. 77.
According to the complaint, one Committee member,
Professor Elizabeth Harman, “did not ask Sarah even a single
question” and even fell asleep during her testimony. App. 85.
The late hour of the hearing and the Committee’s preference to
conclude that evening contributed to the brevity of the
questioning. For example, the Committee instructed Sarah to
“keep her answers as concise as possible” because the hearing
was taking longer than expected, and it did not press Sarah on
the inconsistencies in her statements. App. 85 (citation
modified). As with John, however, the Committee did elicit
testimony from her about John’s character.
E. The Committee’s Decision
Although the hearing did not conclude until around
11:30 p.m., the Committee communicated the results of its
“extremely limited” deliberations to Dean Chen by 10 a.m. the
following morning. App. 87. Dean Chen verbally informed
John that the Committee had found him responsible for the
charges against him, and the Committee then issued a formal
decision letter.
That letter included a statement that the Committee “had
considered all of the information obtained in the investigation

13

and presented at the hearing,” but it discussed only two pieces
of evidence: (1) what it described as “the women’s continued
and consistent descriptions of the incidents in communications
and conversations with others”; and (2) so-called “admissions
and acknowledgements [John] made in text messages.”
App. 88 (citation modified). The Committee also wrote that it
was not persuaded by John’s assertions that he was
blackmailed by Jane into making the purported admissions,
though it did not explain why it found John not credible in the
absence of any testimony, let alone contradictory testimony,
from Jane. Finally, the letter announced the Committee’s
decision to suspend John for two years—an unprecedented
sanction at Princeton for the charges at issue. That significant
penalty was supposedly justified by John’s ostensible pattern
of misconduct in these two incidents and a prior disciplinary
infraction that the Committee characterized—allegedly in
error—as an assault.
3

Nowhere in the letter did the Committee acknowledge Jane
or Sarah’s inconsistent descriptions of the alleged assaults or
specify which of those descriptions it believed were supported

3
According to the complaint, John’s prior disciplinary incident
occurred in March 2023, when John and Student 3—frequent
Muay Thai partners—were roughhousing. Although Student 3
told the investigating official that “everything that happened
between her and John in that incident was done with [her]
informed and continuous consent,” John was found responsible
for “endangering a student.” App. 90 (citation modified).

14

by the evidence. Nor did the Committee identify which text
messages it deemed to contain John’s admissions.
At some point following the hearing, John was informed by
“a source involved in the [Committee’s] deliberative process”
that “most of the [Committee] members had decided John was
guilty before the hearing even started,” and Professor Harman,
the Committee member who fell asleep during Sarah’s
testimony, “even gave an impassioned speech arguing not just
that John was guilty, but that it would be a ‘moral failing’ to
vote for anything other than expulsion.” App. 33 (emphasis
omitted).
F. John Doe’s Appeal
John subsequently filed an internal appeal of the
Committee’s decision on the grounds that the disciplinary
procedures were not “fair and reasonable” and the “imposed
penalty d[id] not fall within the range of penalties imposed for
similar misconduct.” App. 37. He raised various arguments,
including that Princeton’s investigator treated male and female
witnesses differently, that he was not provided the same
follow-up interview opportunities as Jane and Sarah, that
Princeton failed to obtain testimony from the witnesses he
identified, and that the hearing was improperly rushed.
Princeton’s appeal panel emailed John a set of questions
probing his critiques and, after reviewing John’s answers,
denied the appeal. Although the appeal panel did not comment
on several of John’s arguments, it addressed his core objection
by concluding that “no procedural irregularity existed in

15

[John’s] hearing” and that John received adequate
opportunities to “submit[] supplemental written materials”
relevant to the charges at issue. App. 92-93.
G. The Federal Complaint
John then filed the complaint underlying this appeal,
claiming sex discrimination in a federally funded education
program, in violation of Title IX,
4
as well as breach of contract,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and gross negligence under state law. The District Court
dismissed the complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim, and John filed
this timely appeal, challenging all but the dismissal of his gross
negligence claim.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction over John’s Title IX
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over his state-law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
grant of a motion to dismiss. See Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 341.
In conducting that review, “we accept all [the plaintiff’s]

4
Title IX states that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a).

16

allegations as true and draw all inferences in [his] favor, and
we will not dismiss a complaint merely because it appears
unlikely that the plaintiff[] can prove those facts or will
ultimately prevail on the merits.” Stringer v. County of Bucks,
141 F.4th 76, 84 (3d Cir. 2025) (citation modified). To survive
a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s complaint must include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is
entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” to state a plausible
claim—i.e., to “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
III. DISCUSSION
As we consider John’s Title IX and state-law contract
claims, we do not write on a blank slate. The legal standards
we apply are rooted in two of our prior decisions addressing
the sufficiency of a student’s complaints that his university
conducted biased and unfair disciplinary proceedings. See
Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 343; Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d
203, 209 (3d Cir. 2020) (USciences). We discuss those
decisions below, distilling their legal precepts before applying
those precepts to John’s complaint.
A. The Framework Established by USciences
and Princeton III
In both USciences and Princeton III, we concluded that the
complaint of the male undergraduate challenging the

17

university’s decision to discipline him for alleged sexual
misconduct against a female undergraduate was sufficient to
state a claim for violation of Title IX, breach of contract, and,
in Princeton III, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Our discussions of the factual allegations in
those cases are instructive.
1. Violation of Title IX
In support of their Title IX claims, both plaintiffs alleged
(1) that the university had “yielded to external pressure when
implementing and enforcing” its disciplinary policy, and
(2) that “sex was a motivating factor in [the university’s]
investigation and decision to impose discipline.” USciences,
961 F.3d at 209; Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 343. Specifically,
they pointed to the “more rigorous approach to campus sexual
misconduct allegations” ushered in by the United States
Department of Education’s 2011 Dear Colleague Letter (2011
DCL) and universities’ “alleged . . . overreaction” to that

18

federal pressure.
5
USciences, 961 F.3d at 209-10; see
Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345. We acknowledged the potential
relevance of such historical context and concluded that, even
though external pressure “cannot alone support a plausible
claim of Title IX sex discrimination,” USciences, 961 F.3d at

5
Princeton III, USciences, and most of our sister circuits’
Title IX decisions in the university-discipline context involved
complaints of sexual misconduct addressed under the
university’s Title IX policy. Here, Princeton instead charged
John with violations of its Personal Safety Policy. But our
Title IX framework still applies and we analogize to sexual
misconduct cases because John’s complaint is fairly read to
allege discriminatory discipline in response to complaints of
male-against-female violence with romantic overtones. See
Doe v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 67 F.4th 702, 705-06, 709
(5th Cir. 2023) (analogizing to sexual misconduct cases in a
Title IX challenge to disciplinary proceedings addressing
complaints of “mental or bodily harm” to the plaintiff’s former
romantic partner); Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ., 993
F.3d 230, 232-33, 235 (4th Cir. 2021) (same for proceedings
resolving complaints of physical assault against the plaintiff’s
former girlfriend). For the same reason, John’s allegations that
Princeton was under pressure to address complaints of sexual
misconduct provide background indicia of sex discrimination
that plausibly affected Princeton’s resolution of the nominally
non-sexual assault complaints against John. Universities
cannot insulate themselves from Title IX liability by
recharacterizing disciplinary complaints that, on their face,
indicate the alleged misconduct is of a sexual nature and
adjudicating those charges under disciplinary policies with
lower procedural protections for respondents.

19

210, it did “factor[] into the total mix of information supporting
a plausible Title IX claim,” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345.
Based on that total mix, we held that the alleged external
pressure, when combined with the plaintiffs’ allegations of
selective enforcement in their individual proceedings, stated a
plausible claim for relief.
These cases teach that, in the absence of direct evidence, a
Title IX plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss by alleging
both background indicia of sex discrimination (such as external
or internal pressure on the university for its handling of
complaints of male-against-female violence), and what is
sometimes called a “particularized ‘something more,’” Doe v.
Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2019),
namely, “other circumstantial evidence of bias in [his] specific
proceeding,” Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018).
Although the circumstantial evidence of bias in both
USciences and Princeton III involved assertions that the
university asymmetrically enforced its disciplinary policies
against male and female students, we also emphasized that
plaintiffs are “free to characterize their claims however they
wish” and are not limited to alleging a particular factual
scenario. USciences, 961 F.3d at 209. Instead, we look at the
“total mix of information” supporting a plaintiff’s claim,
Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345, which may include, among other
things, allegations that a similarly situated female was treated
more favorably by the university or, as here, allegations of
procedural irregularities in the university’s disciplinary

20

proceedings, see Doe v. Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th 302, 334
(1st Cir. 2022) (collecting cases).
2. Contract Claims
As for their state contract claims, the USciences and
Princeton III plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state plausible
claims that the universities breached promises in their
disciplinary policies to provide fair and unbiased conduct
proceedings. See 30 F.4th at 347; 961 F.3d at 211-12. In
Princeton III, as here, we applied New Jersey law to the
plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because New
Jersey law required that a university “follow its own
established procedures . . . and that those procedures be
fundamentally fair,” we held that the plaintiff stated a plausible
breach-of-contract claim by alleging facts showing the
university failed to follow its own requirements that policy
violations be established “by a preponderance of the evidence,”
and that its decision-makers be “impartial and unbiased.”
Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 346-47 (citation modified). And
though the plaintiff’s breach-of-implied-covenant claim
“share[d] facts with” his breach-of-contract claim, those claims
did not arise from an alleged contravention of the same code
provisions. Id. at 348 & n.16. Thus, the “factual overlap [was]
not fatal” and the plaintiff’s allegations of improper
performance and bad faith sufficed to state a claim. Id. at 348.
With those precedents in mind, we now consider the
allegations in John’s complaint.

21

B. Title IX
John contends that the investigation and resolution of Jane
and Sarah’s disciplinary complaints against him violated
Title IX by subjecting him to “the imposition of university
discipline when sex [was] a motivating factor in the decision
to discipline.” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 343. We apply a
“straightforward pleading standard” to Title IX claims: “The
alleged facts, if true, must support a plausible inference that a
federally-funded college or university discriminated against a
person on the basis of sex.”
6
USciences, 961 F.3d at 209
(citation modified).
Here, the parties do not dispute that Princeton is a federally
funded university and that John’s suspension excluded him
from participation in its educational programs and activities, so
the only question is whether John plausibly alleged that sex
motivated Princeton’s decision to suspend him for two years.
We address below the sufficiency of John’s allegations as to

6
By adopting that standard, we diverge from some of our sister
circuits that apply specific doctrinal tests, such as erroneous
outcome, selective enforcement, or deliberate indifference, to
analyze Title IX claims. See Doe v. Univ. of Scis., 961 F.3d
203, 209 (3d Cir. 2020) (USciences); see also, e.g., Doe v.
Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th 302, 332 (1st Cir. 2022)
(erroneous outcome and selective enforcement); Doe v. Miami
Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 590 (6th Cir. 2018) (deliberate
indifference). Nonetheless, plaintiffs remain “free to
characterize their claims however they wish.” USciences, 961
F.3d at 209.

22

(1) background indicia of sex discrimination, consisting in this
case of internal and external pressure on Princeton to
rigorously pursue allegations of male-against-female assault,
and (2) circumstantial evidence of bias, including procedural
irregularities, in his disciplinary proceedings.
7

1. Background Indicia of Sex
Discrimination
John argues that the 2011 DCL and related Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) investigations into Princeton’s handling of
sexual assault complaints formed a “backdrop of gender-based
pressure” on Princeton “to favor claims of assault brought by
women against men.” Opening Br. 47 (citation modified). But
the 2011 DCL was rescinded in 2017—years before John’s
disciplinary proceedings. Thus, standing alone, that allegation

7
While implicit in our prior decisions, we make clear today
that we reject the Second Circuit’s approach of applying a
lower pleading standard—requiring only “facts supporting a
minimal plausible inference of discriminatory intent,” Doe v.
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis
added)—to Title IX claims. As today’s decision reflects,
“Rule 8(a)’s liberal pleading standard is lenient enough to
allow meritorious discrimination claims to proceed while
preserving the gatekeeping function of pleading standards.”
Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.4 (9th Cir. 2019);
see Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 589. That is not to say that Title
IX cases from the Second Circuit have no persuasive value, but
we take into account the lower standard against which that
court assessed the pleadings.

23

carries little weight. See Doe v. Samford Univ., 29 F.4th 675,
692 (11th Cir. 2022) (stating that allegations about the 2011
DCL, “a government policy that has been rescinded and
replaced,” do not assist a Title IX plaintiff “in crossing the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief”
(citation modified)). As our sister circuits have observed (and
even John’s counsel recognized at oral argument), a plaintiff
must allege facts sufficiently close in time to the challenged
disciplinary proceedings to show that the pressure on the
university to favor certain complainants or respondents based
on their gender was active and ongoing.
8

John’s complaint meets that threshold by alleging specific
incidents suggesting the pressure on Princeton, precipitated by
the 2011 DCL, continued into the fall of 2023. Upon rescission
of the 2011 DCL, for example, “[a]dministrators immediately
stated that Princeton would not change its policies and

8
See, e.g., Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th at 336-37 & n.48
(recognizing the 2011 DCL’s rescission, rejecting evidence of
a two-year-old OCR inquiry as “too weak to create a plausible
inference [of] sex bias,” and noting that the plaintiff cited “no
contemporaneous attention to the issue”); Doe v. Univ. of
Ark.-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858, 863-66, 868 n.1 (8th Cir.
2020) (recognizing the 2011 DCL’s rescission but determining
that ongoing OCR and state legislative investigations into the
university’s handling of Title IX complaints, as well as a
“highly-publicized” lawsuit, supported a plausible claim of sex
discrimination); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir.
2018) (noting that consistent “public attention and [an]
ongoing investigation” provided a backdrop of gender bias).

24

procedures, insisting that its DCL-era procedures were
‘working well’ and were ‘fair.’” App. 43. Princeton also
allegedly submitted comments in 2019 to the United States
Department of Education opposing proposed regulations that
would increase procedural protections for students accused of
sexual misconduct. Then, when those regulations became law
in 2020, Princeton announced that “it would nonetheless strive
to adhere as closely as possible to its current system in
implementing that final rule,” App. 46 (citation modified),
labeling the new regulations “problematic in a number of
ways,” App. 47 (citation modified).
The complaint describes pressure that was internal, too,
including a slew of critical, student-authored articles in the
campus newspaper, a protest outside the University president’s
building by Princeton Students for Title IX Reform that lasted
more than two hundred hours, and objections to on-campus
speakers who had made controversial statements about the
treatment of campus sexual assault. The newspaper articles
specifically criticized Princeton’s investigations and hearings
in disciplinary proceedings involving male-against-female
assault. In 2022, for instance, a female student authored an
op-ed detailing her experience of being “choked and strangled
by a Princeton graduate student” and criticizing the subsequent
disciplinary process because Princeton officials had asked
difficult questions that “made her fe[el] shamed” and took
testimony from witnesses who accused her of lying. App. 50.
Another article, published six months before John’s
investigation, lamented that Princeton’s Title IX investigators

25

“often asked questions that were ‘difficult and personal,’ and
that complainants’ character were often questioned during the
process.” App. 52.
Together, these factual allegations suffice to plausibly
allege that Princeton was under pressure to crack down on male
respondents when enforcing its disciplinary policies against
John. See Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345; USciences, 961 F.3d
at 209. But because “allegations about pressure . . . cannot
alone support a plausible claim of Title IX sex discrimination,”
USciences, 961 F.3d at 210, we will next consider whether
John’s complaint adequately alleged “facts particular to his
case” that indicate bias in Princeton’s disciplinary process,
Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d at 855.
2. Circumstantial Evidence of Biased
Disciplinary Proceedings
To establish the “particularized ‘something more’” needed
to state a plausible Title IX claim, Columbia Coll. Chi., 933
F.3d at 856, John points to certain procedural irregularities in
his specific processes. Although procedural irregularities can
“provide strong support for [a] claim of bias,” Doe v. Oberlin
Coll., 963 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2020), and satisfy the “other
circumstantial evidence of bias in [his] specific proceeding,”
Baum, 903 F.3d at 586, they “are not inevitably a sign of sex
bias,” Stonehill Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th at 334 (emphasis added);
see Roe v. St. John’s Univ., 91 F.4th 643, 654 (2d Cir. 2024).
The ultimate test is whether the “total mix of information,”
including background indicia of sex discrimination, plausibly

26

supports the Title IX claim. Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345.
Those background indicia can provide the necessary “causal
connection” between the alleged procedural irregularities and
the university’s sex-motivated disciplinary outcome. Baum,
903 F.3d at 585 (citation modified).
9

Such is the case here. John’s complaint details several
procedural irregularities and statements by decision-makers
that—in the context of internal and external pressure on
Princeton to favor female complainants over male
respondents—state a plausible Title IX claim.

9
John urges us to adopt a sliding-scale approach whereby
“[t]he clearer and more significant that any one of these
‘procedural irregularities’ is in a plaintiff’s disciplinary
process, the less external support it needs to plausibly suggest
gender bias.” Opening Br. 41 (quoting Menaker v. Hofstra
Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 33 (2d Cir. 2019)). And he argues that the
procedural irregularities in this case “are egregious enough,
standing alone, to plausibly support an inference of gender
bias.” Opening Br. 42-43; see also Doe v. William Marsh Rice
Univ., 67 F.4th 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[A]t some point an
accumulation of procedural irregularities all disfavoring a male
respondent begins to look like a biased proceeding.” (alteration
in original) (quoting Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 23 F.4th
930, 941 (9th Cir. 2022)). But because John has adequately
alleged background indicia of sex discrimination and
procedural irregularities in his disciplinary proceedings, we
need not decide whether to adopt such a sliding-scale approach
or whether egregious procedural irregularities can ever,
standing alone, suffice to support an inference of gender bias.

27

First, John alleges that Princeton conducted its
investigation and hearing in an imbalanced manner,
prioritizing Jane and Sarah’s accounts and witnesses over
John’s. According to the complaint, Princeton interviewed
Jane and Sarah three times each and afforded them an
opportunity to respond to John’s statements about the alleged
assaults, but it interviewed John only once—and that was
without advance notice of the complainants’ allegations or the
charges against him. Princeton also gathered testimony from
at least five witnesses supportive of the complainants but only
one witness, Student 4, supportive of John. The investigator
did not interview two male students, Student 5 and Student X,
whom John had identified as having relevant information, and
when John asked to call Student X to testify at the hearing,
Princeton refused. Yet Student X allegedly would have
relayed that Jane had a history of making false choking
allegations, and Student 5 would have recounted that Jane slept
in John’s dorm room during the week after the alleged assault.
And while Princeton asked female witnesses whether Jane had
any bruising on her neck in the days after the assault, it did not
pose that question to any male witnesses.
According to the complaint, the slanted nature of the
investigation carried over to the hearing. The Committee
questioned John and his sole supporting, male witness for over
two hours combined and in a hostile manner, while it
questioned Sarah and the complainant-supportive witnesses for
less than thirty minutes each and “with kid gloves.” App. 77.
Though Princeton justified its refusal to hear from Student X

28

on the ground that “character witnesses were not permitted at
the hearing because it would focus only on the incidents at
hand” and Student X’s only relevant information was “about
the character of Jane,” the Committee asked questions of John
and other witnesses that “were solely focused on whether or
not he had good character.” App. 81.
We agree with our sister circuits that those types of
irregularities, at least where a university is subject to external
or internal pressure, support an inference of sex discrimination.
See, e.g., Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir.
2016) (holding that allegations that the university “declined to
seek out potential witnesses [the respondent] had identified as
sources of information favorable to him” supported, in part, an
inference that it was “motivated to favor the accusing female
over the accused male”); Vengalattore v. Cornell Univ., 36
F.4th 87, 107 (2d Cir. 2022) (explaining that the university’s
failure to “interview certain witnesses or ask certain questions
that could have produced information favorable to [the
respondent]” contributed to an inference of sex
discrimination); Schwake v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 967 F.3d 940,
951 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “allegations of the
[u]niversity’s one-sided investigation,” including that the
university “failed to . . . follow up with the witnesses and
evidence [the respondent] offered in his defense,” contributed
to an inference of sex discrimination).
Second, John contends that Princeton made credibility
determinations in a gendered manner. The complaint alleges

29

that Princeton credited the female complainants’ testimony
over his and Student 4’s testimony despite significant and
evolving discrepancies in the complainants’ narratives and
Jane’s total absence from the hearing. Cf. Purdue Univ., 928
F.3d at 669 (observing that the strongest fact demonstrating sex
discrimination was the decision-maker’s choice “to credit [the
complainant’s] account without hearing directly from her”).
He also notes that, while Princeton pressed him and Student 4
on inconsistencies in their statements, it “did not probe
inconsistencies in female witnesses’ stories,” App. 70, did not
allow Student 4 to explain what he insisted was a misquoted
statement in the investigator’s interview notes, and rejected
John’s argument that Jane had blackmailed him into making an
incriminating voice recording without even questioning Jane.
Similar allegations supported an inference of gender bias in
Baum, where the university “credited exclusively female
testimony (from [the complainant] and her witnesses) and
rejected all of the male testimony (from [the respondent] and
his witnesses).” 903 F.3d at 586. There, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that, “[w]hen viewed against the backdrop of external
pressure,” gender bias was “one plausible explanation” for the
university’s decision to “discredit[] all males, including [the
respondent], and credit[] all females, including [the
complainant].” Id. at 586-87. The same inference can be
drawn here: Princeton’s credibility determinations in favor of
the female complainants and their witnesses over the male
respondent and the sole eyewitness—notwithstanding the
unresolved inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts or

30

the Committee’s inability to question Jane at a hearing where
credibility was critical—provide circumstantial evidence of
gender bias in John’s disciplinary proceedings.
Third, recognizing that “statements by pertinent university
officials, . . . [including] decision[-]makers, can support an
inference of gender bias,” Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 23
F.4th 930, 939 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified), the
complaint alleges statements of Committee members
indicating they “held biased assumptions against male
respondents,” id., or “presumed [John] to be guilty before the
investigation had concluded,” Schiebel v. Schoharie Cent. Sch.
Dist., 120 F.4th 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 2024). It describes, for
example, how “a source involved in the [Committee]’s
deliberative process” reported that “most of the [Committee]
members had decided John was guilty before the hearing even
started, and one of them—Professor Elizabeth Harman—even
gave an impassioned speech arguing not just that John was
guilty, but that it would be a ‘moral failing’ to vote for anything
other than expulsion.” App. 33. This prejudgment, according
to the complaint, explains why Professor Harman fell asleep
during Sarah’s hearing testimony and why the Committee’s
post-hearing deliberations were “extremely limited.” App. 87.
Fourth, John alleges the outcome of the proceedings is so
lacking in factual support that “the merits of the decision itself,
as a matter of common sense . . . support an inference of sex
bias.” Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d at 588; see Doe v. Univ. of
Ark.-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d 858, 865 (8th Cir. 2020) (“A

31

decision that is against the substantial weight of the
evidence . . . may give rise to an inference of bias . . . .”);
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 57 (“When the evidence
substantially favors one party’s version of a disputed matter,”
but the decision-maker “conclu[des] in favor of the other side
(without an apparent reason based in the evidence), it is
plausible to infer . . . bias.”).
10
Here, the Committee found
John responsible largely based on (1) “the women’s continued
and consistent descriptions of the incidents in communications
and conversations with others,” and (2) “the admissions and
acknowledgements [John] made in text messages.” App. 88
(citation modified). Neither withstands scrutiny.
The complainants’ descriptions were far from “consistent.”
Jane’s account evolved dramatically through her three
interviews with Princeton’s investigator; starting with her
statement that John “grabbed her by her throat, and lifted her
off the ground” for “5-6 seconds,” so she was “straining on her
tip toes to get the pressure off of her neck,” App. 70-71, and
ending with her assertion that John did not “squeeze[] her neck
at all, but rather just pressed from the front as they talked,”
App. 30 (citation modified). And per Student 4’s testimony,
Jane told him, the night after the alleged assault, that “John ‘did

10
Courts applying more rigid doctrinal tests necessarily rely on
such evidence when considering the first element of a Title IX
claim under the erroneous outcome theory: whether the
alleged facts “cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of
the disciplinary proceeding’s outcome.” Baum, 903 F.3d at
585 (citation modified).

32

not choke her, but he put his hand on her neck and it brought
back the memory’ of her prior assault.” App. 75. Sarah’s
recollection was also inconsistent; she did not mention any
physical component when she debriefed her roommates the
night of her alleged assault. Nor did she reference any choking
when she confronted John the following day and “only
discussed the fact he had been screaming at her.” App. 57
(citation modified). And when she spoke to the investigator
months later, Sarah first stated that John “had his hand on her
throat and was using that hand to hold her in place,” App. 75
(citation modified), but later recounted that “John hadn’t
actually meant to choke her at all” and “did not actually grasp
or squeeze her neck, but was more pushing,” App. 75-76
(citation modified). In explicitly relying on these statements,
the Committee did not simply fail to address the

33

inconsistencies,
11
but mischaracterized them as “continued and
consistent,” App. 88 (citation modified), against the substantial
weight of the evidence.
The disciplinary record, as described in the complaint, also
belies the Committee’s assertion that John made “admissions
and acknowledgements . . . in text messages” about his
responsibility for the alleged assaults. App. 88. Instead, “John
repeatedly refused to agree that he had choked Jane,” App. 89,
and the Committee did not identify “any actual texts”

11
Several sister circuits have recognized that a university’s
insufficient or inexplicable rationale for imposing discipline
can support an inference of gender bias. See, e.g., Stonehill
Coll., Inc., 55 F.4th at 325, 333, 335 (identifying the
investigators’ “failure to provide a rationale in their report for
rejecting” the respondent’s explanation for his “mea culpa”
statements as a procedural irregularity); Oberlin Coll., 963
F.3d at 587-88 (describing as “remarkable” the “failure of the
hearing panel even to comment on the flat contradiction” in the
complainant’s testimony and labeling the panel’s decision
“arguably inexplicable”); Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 592
(determining that the hearing panel’s failure to “explain how it
resolved [an] inconsistency” in the complainant’s statement
contributed to an inference of gender bias). But cf. Doe v.
Samford Univ., 29 F.4th 675, 691 (11th Cir. 2022) (rejecting
an argument that the panel’s failure to mention evidentiary
inconsistencies in its rationale is evidence of bias because
“[w]e regularly permit factfinders to make unstated but
implicit credibility determinations” and “[w]e cannot hold the
hearing panel to a higher standard than we hold district
courts”).

34

containing admissions “because it couldn’t,” App. 96. The
most compromising text that John sent to Jane, the day after
the alleged assault, stated “it’s probably that it hasn’t fully
soaked in yet cause I haven’t processed what I must have done
last night.” App. 60. But that is plausibly read as a placation,
not as an admission of guilt. It references what “must have”
happened, accepting Jane’s account while making plain that it
did not accord with John’s. App. 60. And a decision-maker’s
choice to treat a respondent’s statement that he “may have”
done something “as an admission of guilt” supports the
inference that the “objective was to reach a finding of
responsibility rather than to determine what actually
happened.” Schiebel, 120 F.4th at 1102. Princeton’s alleged
reliance on unidentified text messages as admissions, “without
an apparent reason based in the evidence,” Columbia Univ.,
831 F.3d at 57, thus also supports John’s assertion that “sex
was a motivating factor in [Princeton’s] investigation and
decision to impose discipline,” USciences, 961 F.3d at 209.
12

In sum, the complaint alleges a series of procedural
irregularities—including an imbalanced investigation and
hearing, gender-based credibility determinations, and a
decision against the weight of the evidence—that are
commonly recognized in case law as indicative of gender bias,

12
The Committee’s boilerplate statement that it “had
considered all of the information obtained in the investigation
and presented at the hearing,” App. 88, is not sufficient to
assuage concerns about the accuracy of its outcome.

35

as well as statements evincing prejudgment by the
decision-makers. In view of those allegations and the internal
and external pressure on Princeton to rigorously pursue
allegations of male-against-female assault, we reject
Princeton’s argument that the complaint should be dismissed
because “[a]t most, [John] has suggested that Princeton had a
bias in favor of the complaining parties,” without “specifically
tying that favoritism to gender.” Answering Br. 49-50. At the
motion to dismiss stage, even if “anti-male bias is not the only
plausible explanation for the university’s conduct, or even the
most plausible, alternative explanations are not fatal.”
Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 344 (citation modified). Assuming
that inferences of both anti-male bias and anti-respondent bias
are supported by the allegations in the complaint, we still must
draw “all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
[the plaintiff],” USciences, 961 F.3d at 210—not give primacy
to the explanation that would relieve the university of liability.
Nor must the plaintiff refute alternative explanations for the

36

alleged procedural irregularities to satisfy the plausibility
standard.
13

Here, the “total mix of information” supporting John’s
claim, Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 345—namely, allegations of
procedural irregularities and statements suggesting
prejudgment by decision-makers, combined with internal and
external pressure on Princeton to favor female complainants
over male respondents—makes it reasonable to infer that “sex
was a motivating factor in [Princeton’s] investigation and
decision to expel [John],” and thus suffices to plausibly state a

13
In making this observation, which we see as an unremarkable
application of Iqbal’s plausibility standard, we join the Second,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, which have also applied this standard
in the Title IX context. See Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 57
(rejecting the district court’s reasoning that “any bias in favor
of [the complainant] could equally have been—and more
plausibly was—prompted by lawful, independent goals, such
as a desire . . . to take allegations of rape on campus seriously
and to treat complainants with a high degree of sensitivity”
because it “fails to recognize the court’s obligation to draw
reasonable inferences in favor of the sufficiency of the
complaint” (citation modified)); Baum, 903 F.3d at 587
(similar); Schwake v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 967 F.3d 940, 948
(9th Cir. 2020) (similar). We respectfully disagree with the
Eleventh Circuit’s method of declining to infer sex bias in a
Title IX case when “obvious alternative explanations,”
including “ineptitude, inexperience, and pro-complainant
bias,” are equally consistent with the facts. Samford Univ., 29
F.4th at 689 (citation modified).

37

claim of sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, USciences,
961 F.3d at 210.
C. Breach of Contract
In addition to his Title IX claim, John alleges that
Princeton’s conduct throughout his disciplinary proceedings
breached the terms of the Rights, Rules, and Responsibilities
(RRR) policy that governed their contractual relationship.
Under New Jersey law, “the relationship between [a] university
and its students should not be analyzed in purely contractual
terms,” Mittra v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 719 A.2d
693, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), so we should not
“rigid[ly] appl[y] . . . the law of contracts to students’
disciplinary proceedings,” Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton
Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
Instead, when a student disciplined for misconduct brings a
breach-of-contract claim under New Jersey law, we must
assess whether “the school ‘follow[ed] its own established
procedures,’” and whether “those procedures [are]
‘fundamentally fair.’” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 346 (quoting
Hernandez v. Don Bosco Preparatory High, 730 A.2d 365,
367, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)).
John alleges that (1) Princeton failed to follow its
established procedure under the RRR of requiring his guilt be
proven by “clear and persuasive” evidence, and (2) Princeton
denied his appeal without arranging for a “fair and reasonable”
investigation and resolution process. We agree on both points.

38

1. Application of the Established
Evidentiary Standard
The RRR requires that, before deciding a student has
violated the Personal Safety Policy, a majority of the
Committee members must “conclude that the evidence
presented constitutes a clear and persuasive case in support of
the charges.” App. 160. In Princeton III, we considered
whether Princeton satisfied its own standard of proof and
concluded it did not meet even the lower “preponderance of the
evidence” standard in the relevant RRR provisions when it
(1) “disregard[ed] evidence that tended to . . . exculpate” the
respondent; (2) “failed to consider the entirety of the evidence
with a neutral gaze”; and (3) “rendered inconsistent and
skewed credibility determinations.” Princeton III, 30 F. 4th at
347 (citation modified).
14
To be clear, we did not state that
these three categories of evidence are necessary to establish
that a university failed to apply its own standard of proof; we
simply acknowledged that they are sufficient.

14
The Intimate Relationship Violence provisions at issue in
Princeton III imposed different requirements than the Personal
Safety provisions at issue in John’s disciplinary proceedings.
Specifically, they stated that “the investigative panel will
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the
policy was violated,” and “the panelists will be impartial and
unbiased.” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 347 (citation modified).

39

In John’s case, the allegations in the complaint easily clear
that “preponderance” bar, let alone the “clear and persuasive”
standard applicable here, for the same three reasons.
First, John adequately pleads facts suggesting Princeton
“disregard[ed] evidence that tended to . . . exculpate [him],”
Princeton III, 30 F. 4th at 347, when it brushed aside evidence
related to Student 4, Student 5, and Student X. According to
the complaint, Student 4—the only eyewitness to the
interaction between John and Jane—testified that John did not
touch Jane during the alleged assault and that Jane told
Student 4 the following night that John “‘did not choke her, but
he put his hand on her neck and it brought back the memory’
of her prior assault.” App. 75. The Committee allegedly
overlooked this testimony when finding John responsible for
the alleged assaults.
15
John also contends that Princeton
disregarded testimony from Student 5 and Student X by failing
to seek it out, ignored evidence showing Jane had falsely
accused Student X of choking her, and failed to account for
Jane’s statement to John that she would lie about those

15
The facts alleged in the complaint alternatively support an
inference that the Committee discredited Student 4’s
eyewitness testimony because he was impeached as to whether
John had no physical contact with Jane or just did not “choke[]
her really really hard.” App. 83. But at the motion to dismiss
stage, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to
John, and consider the Committee’s unexplained disregard of
Student 4’s exculpatory statement to support John’s
breach-of-contract claim.

40

accusations if Student X sought to hold her accountable. Such
evidence suggests Jane had a “motivation[] to lie,”
Princeton III, 30 F.4th 347 (citation modified), and her
unwillingness to appear and be examined at the hearing
precluded any credibility assessment by the Committee. Yet
the Committee nonetheless credited her account.
Second, John sufficiently alleges that Princeton “failed to
consider the entirety of the evidence with a neutral gaze.” Id.
(citation modified). Notably, John pleads that “a source who
was involved in the [Committee’s] deliberative process said
the [Committee] had prejudged guilt” and that the Committee’s
deliberation period was “extremely limited”—occurring in the
few waking hours between 11:30 p.m. on the night of the
hearing and 10:00 a.m. the next morning. App. 87. In addition,
allegations about the Committee’s hostile and extended
questioning of John and Student 4, while treating “witnesses
supporting the complainants with kid gloves, if not total
disinterest,” App. 77, suggest Princeton was not neutral about
the outcome of the proceedings.
Third, the Committee’s failures to challenge Jane and
Sarah’s inconsistent narratives of the alleged assaults, their
reports to friends in the aftermath, and their time spent with
John after the alleged assaults—followed by its explicit
statement in its decision letter that it relied on “the women’s
continued and consistent descriptions of the incidents in
communications and conversations with others,” App. 88
(citation modified)—indicate that the Committee made

41

“skewed credibility determinations,” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at
347 (citation modified). No doubt, John had credibility issues
of his own, particularly related to the voice recording in which
he said he “damaged [Jane’s] windpipe ever so slightly.”
App. 61 (emphasis omitted). But without an opportunity to
question Jane about whether she did indeed coerce John into
making that recording, as John alleges, that recording is hardly
“clear and persuasive” evidence of John’s culpability.
2. Fundamental Fairness of the Procedures
John also asserts that Princeton breached its contractual
relationship with him by upholding the Committee’s decision
on appeal even though the disciplinary procedures were not
“fair and reasonable.” App. 97. The appellate panel allegedly
concluded “that no procedural irregularity existed in [John’s]
hearing,” App. 92, but as discussed above, that is not so. As
described in the complaint, John’s disciplinary procedures
were replete with asymmetries in credibility determinations
and the treatment of complainant-supportive versus
respondent-supportive witnesses. Just as those procedural
errors demonstrate that Princeton did not resolve the
disciplinary charges by “clear and persuasive” evidence at the
Committee level, by the same token, they show that it was error

42

to deny John’s appeal on the ground that those
Committee-level procedures were “fair and reasonable.”
16

D. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing
John’s final claim is that Princeton breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which exists in every
contract governed by New Jersey law, by failing to conduct a
fair investigation or hearing, and by neglecting to provide a
meaningful rationale for its decision. Opening Br. 35 (citing
Wade v. Kessler Inst., 798 A.2d 1251, 1259 (N.J. 2002)).
Before addressing the sufficiency of John’s allegations, we
consider Princeton’s argument that this claim should have been
dismissed because it is duplicative of John’s breach-of-contract
claim.
Princeton asserts that New Jersey law supports dismissal of
redundant breach-of-implied-covenant claims, see Answering
Br. 38-39 (citing Wade, 798 A.2d at 1261), but John’s
complaint lays out “several additional ways” that Princeton

16
The denial of a respondent’s appeal could raise particular
concerns if the appellate panel’s decision was so cursory as to
suggest that the panel did not address the merits of the
respondent’s arguments, but rather recharacterized those
arguments to conclude that the respondent failed to raise a
permissible ground for appeal. But that concern is not
implicated here: John’s account of the appellate panel’s
follow-up questions and reasoning shows that the panel
allowed, considered, and denied his appeal.

43

breached the implied covenant beyond failing to apply the
RRR’s “clear and persuasive” evidence standard and appeal
provisions, App. 98. Princeton III teaches that “factual
overlap” between these breeds of state-law contract claims “is
not fatal” at this early stage of litigation. 30 F.4th at 348. So,
although the allegations supporting John’s
breach-of-implied-covenant claim—i.e., facts related to the
Committee’s unfair proceedings and insufficient rationale—
overlap with those indicating Princeton breached the standard
of proof and appeal provisions of the RRR, dismissal on that
basis is not warranted. Cf. id. at 348 n.15 (noting that “New
Jersey courts permit the pleading and pursuit of alternative . . .
theories,” so long as they do not result in “double recovery”
(citation modified)).
We therefore consider the sufficiency of John’s allegations,
namely, whether he has stated a claim that Princeton’s conduct
had “the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other
party to receive the benefits of the contract,” regardless of
whether Princeton violated an express term of the RRR.
Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr.
Assocs., 864 A.2d 387, 396 (N.J. 2005) (citation modified).
Proof of the breaching party’s “bad motive or intention is vital
to an action for breach of the covenant,” id. (citation modified),
but bad faith does not require a blatant desire to harm the other
contracting party. Even “without regard to the harm caused to
[the] plaintiff,” id. at 397, New Jersey courts have found bad
faith in at least two circumstances: (1) where an actor employs
“subterfuges and evasions in the performance of a

44

contract . . . even [when] the actor believes his conduct to be
justified,” id. at 396 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 205 cmt. d (A.L.I. 1981)); and (2) where a party is
“vested with the exercise of discretion under a contract” and
“exercises its discretionary authority arbitrarily, unreasonably,
or capriciously, with the objective of preventing the other party
from receiving its reasonably expected fruits under the
contract,” Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121,
1128, 1130 (N.J. 2001).
Both pertain here. Princeton may have acted without desire
to harm John and believed its conduct was justified by the need
to balance complainants’ and respondents’ interests.
Nonetheless, its actions, as alleged in the complaint, plausibly
show bad faith under New Jersey law’s definition, and that
definition controls our analysis.
First, as to “subterfuges and evasions,” John contends that
Princeton sidestepped deciding “which version of Jane’s or
Sarah’s story” of the alleged assaults it believed to be true,
App. 88 (emphasis omitted), and speciously labeled the
complainants “consistent” despite their varying accounts of the
incidents and the contradictory testimony from an eyewitness
to Jane’s alleged assault, App. 88. Princeton also allegedly told
John that Student X could not testify at the hearing because
“character witnesses were not permitted at the hearing,” which
“would focus only on the incidents at hand,” then switched bait
by asking John and Sarah questions “solely focused on whether
or not he had good character.” App. 81.

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Second, the complaint’s allegations suggest Princeton
exercised its discretion to determine whether John violated the
RRR “arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously.” Wilson, 773
A.2d at 1130. Indeed, its allegations mirror the three we
deemed “sufficient, at this stage, to allege improper
performance” in Princeton III: that Princeton (a) “subjected
[the respondent] to a discriminatory disciplinary process,”
(b) “disregarded exculpatory evidence,” and (c) “construed all
discrepancies and inconsistencies in [the complainants’]
favor.” 30 F.4th at 348 (citation modified).
Here, John likewise asserts Princeton subjected him to a
“discriminatory disciplinary process,” id., by “[giving] Jane
and Sarah multiple interview opportunities to respond to
testimony before the hearing without doing the same for John,”
“[failing] to press Jane and Sarah as firmly as it did John,”
“[evincing] gender bias through the witnesses who were
pursued and what they were (and were not) asked,” and
“[engaging] in unbalanced questioning of the witnesses,”
App. 98-99. He contends that Princeton “disregarded
exculpatory evidence,” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 348 (citation
modified), by “[failing] to interview” and “[refusing] to call
relevant witnesses,” “[refusing] to accept relevant text message
evidence,” and “[conducting] a rushed investigation . . . that
devoted more resources to obtaining evidence for Jane and
Sarah than for John.” App. 98-99. Finally, the allegation that
Princeton “based its decision on a rationale that was almost
entirely conclusory, which falsely stated that Jane’s and
Sarah’s stories had remained consistent, [and] which refused

46

to identify (because it couldn’t) which of Jane’s stories was
more credible,” App. 100, signals that Princeton “construed all
discrepancies and inconsistencies in [the complainants’]
favor,” Princeton III, 30 F.4th at 348 (citation modified). It
did so, according to the complaint, because, rather than using
the disciplinary process for its intended truth-seeking purpose,
it “[p]rejudge[d] the outcome of [John’s] hearing before it even
started.” App. 99.
In sum, by alleging both evasive and arbitrary conduct that
deprived him of a fundamentally fair disciplinary process
under the RRR, John has stated a plausible claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The disruption of a student’s education and the
psychological scars of on-campus assault, particularly sexual
assault, are considerable. Universities understandably wish to
punish such misconduct when it occurs and to preempt further
incidents through penalties that result in general deterrence, but
those aims are not well served when disciplinary proceedings
are conducted in a manner that neither fairly airs both parties’
evidence nor weighs that evidence using the university’s own
standards. Because John’s factual allegations raise a plausible
inference that Princeton, however well-intentioned, conducted
gender-biased and unfair disciplinary proceedings, we will
reverse and remand the District Court’s dismissal of his Title
IX, breach-of-contract, and breach-of-implied-covenant
claims.

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Counsel for Appellant
Kimberly Blasey
Justin Dillon
Christopher C. Muha [Argued]
DILLON PLLC

Jamie Hoxie Solano
DYNAMIS LLP

Counsel for Appellee
James A. Keller [Argued]
Patrick F. Nugent
Amy L. Piccola
SAUL EWING LLP