United States v. Compton 1 In the 2

15‐942
United States v. Compton
1
In the 2
United States Court of Appeals 3
For the Second Circuit 4
________ 5
6
A UGUST TERM , 2015 7
8
A RGUED: FEBRUARY 24, 2016 9
D ECIDED: JULY 19, 2016 10
11
No. 15‐942 12
13
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 14
Appellee, 15
16
v. 17
18
PETER COMPTON, 19
Defendant‐Appellant. 20
________ 21
22
Appeal from the United States District Court 23
for the Northern District of New York. 24
No. 8:13‐CR‐405 – Norman A. Mordue, Judge. 25
________ 26
27
Before: WALKER , R AGGI, and H ALL , Circuit Judges. 28
________ 29
30
Defendant‐Appellant Peter Compton appeals from the 31
judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern 32
District of New York (Mordue, J.) denying his motion to suppress 33

-- 1 of 19 --

2 No. 15‐942
145 pounds of marijuana discovered in his vehicle by United States 1
Border Patrol (“Border Patrol”) agents. Compton argues that the 2
agents seized him and searched his vehicle in violation of his Fourth 3
Amendment rights. We agree with the district court that the agents 4
had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of Compton, see 5
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and that the agents did not 6
unreasonably extend the stop. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district 7
court’s judgment denying the motion to suppress the physical 8
evidence. 9
________ 10
11
MOLLY K. C ORBETT, Research & Writing Attorney 12
(Paul J. Evangelista, Assistant Federal Public 13
Defender, on the brief), for Lisa A. Peebles, Federal 14
Public Defender for the Northern District of New 15
York, Albany, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant. 16
S TEVEN D. C LYMER , Assistant United States 17
Attorney (Katherine Kopita, Assistant United 18
States Attorney, on the brief), for Richard S. 19
Hartunian, United States Attorney for the 20
Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY, for 21
Appellee. 22
________ 23
24
JOHN M. WALKER , JR ., Circuit Judge: 25
Defendant‐Appellant Peter Compton appeals from the 26
judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern 27
District of New York (Mordue, J.) denying his motion to suppress 28

-- 2 of 19 --

3 No. 15‐942
145 pounds of marijuana discovered in his vehicle by United States 1
Border Patrol (“Border Patrol”) agents. Compton argues that the 2
agents seized him and searched his vehicle in violation of his Fourth 3
Amendment rights. We agree with the district court that the agents 4
had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of Compton, see 5
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and that the agents did not 6
unreasonably extend the stop. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district 7
court’s judgment denying the motion to suppress the physical 8
evidence. 9
BACKGROUND 10
On August 22, 2013, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Border Patrol 11
agents set up an immigration checkpoint near the Canadian border 12
on State Route 11 in Chateaugay, New York. Approximately .5 13
miles west of the checkpoint, at the crest of a hill and on the north 14
side of the road, there was a vegetable stand. The stand was “not 15
manned” and only “[i]ntermittently active.” App. 61, 79. Shortly 16
before passing the vegetable stand, eastbound drivers coming over 17
the hill would be able to see for the first time the vegetable stand 18
and a sign alerting them to the checkpoint. 19
At approximately 8:00 a.m., Compton and his brother were 20
traveling eastbound on Route 11 in their mother’s green Ford sport 21
utility vehicle (“SUV”). Compton sat in the front passenger seat 22
while his brother drove. 23

-- 3 of 19 --

4 No. 15‐942
Border Patrol Agent David Gottschall had parked his marked 1
Border Patrol vehicle on the north side of Route 11, facing the road, 2
between the checkpoint and the vegetable stand. From this 3
position—approximately .35 miles west of the checkpoint and 4
approximately .15 miles east of the stand—Gottschall could monitor 5
eastbound traffic through his passenger side window. He observed 6
Compton’s SUV come over the crest of the hill, abruptly slow down, 7
and veer into the U‐shaped driveway of the vegetable stand. 8
Gottschall then received a telephone call from fellow Border 9
Patrol Agent Daniel Taylor, who was stationed at the checkpoint. 10
Taylor told Gottschall that a motorist entering the checkpoint had 11
just reported that the SUV had passed her vehicle and then 12
immediately slowed down upon reaching the crest of the hill. 13
After receiving the call from Taylor, Gottschall drove to the 14
vegetable stand and parked behind the SUV. The SUV was 15
unoccupied. He then saw Compton and his brother walking away 16
from the vegetable stand approximately fifteen to twenty feet apart 17
from one another. Each of the two men held a pint of peppers. 18
Gottschall ordered Compton and his brother to return to their 19
vehicle, where he began to question them. Gottschall asked the men 20
for identification and tried to find out why they had turned off the 21
road so abruptly. Gottschall then walked back towards his Border 22
Patrol vehicle, intending to run checks on the brothers’ identities 23

-- 4 of 19 --

5 No. 15‐942
and the SUV’s license plate. As he passed the rear seat of the SUV, 1
he noticed a blanket in the back that appeared to be concealing 2
something. Gottschall later testified at the suppression hearing that, 3
in his experience, “blankets are commonly used to conceal humans,” 4
to “conceal cigarettes” or, more generally, “to prevent the plain view 5
observation of law enforcement.” App. 62. 6
Suspecting that the blanket in the SUV “either concealed 7
humans or narcotics or something to that effect,” id., Gottschall 8
contacted Taylor and asked him to bring a canine to the SUV. 9
Taylor brought his canine, Tiko, to the SUV in less than a minute. 10
Gottschall and Taylor informed the brothers that the Border 11
Patrol would be performing a canine sniff, removed the brothers 12
from the SUV, and led Tiko around the SUV. The canine sniff took 13
no more than five minutes, and during this time Compton and his 14
brother sat handcuffed inside separate Border Patrol vehicles. 15
Tiko alerted at the SUV’s rear door. After Taylor opened the 16
door, Tiko entered the SUV and alerted to four duffle bags. The 17
Border Patrol agents then informed Compton and his brother that 18
they were under arrest. The Border Patrol later found that the four 19
duffel bags contained approximately 145 pounds of marijuana. 20
On October 23, 2013, a grand jury indicted Compton and his 21
brother on two counts. Count One charged the brothers with 22
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 100 23

-- 5 of 19 --

6 No. 15‐942
kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) 1
and 846. Count Two charged the brothers with possession with 2
intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 3
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 4
On May 1, 2014, Compton moved to suppress statements as 5
well as physical evidence obtained during the stop and seizure. He 6
argued that the Border Patrol had lacked reasonable suspicion to 7
detain him and had extended the detention unreasonably. He also 8
argued that, when the agents handcuffed him and placed him in a 9
Border Patrol vehicle during the canine sniff, the detention became 10
an arrest without probable cause. 11
On September 9, 2014, following an evidentiary hearing, the 12
district court issued a decision and order denying the motion as to 13
the physical evidence. The district court rejected Compton’s 14
arguments as to the lack of reasonable suspicion and unreasonable 15
length of detention. The district court agreed that the detention 16
became an arrest without probable cause but determined that, 17
because the Border Patrol would have discovered the marijuana 18
without the arrest, the drugs did not need to be suppressed as fruit 19
of the poisonous tree. 20
On October 30, 2014, Compton and the government entered 21
into a conditional plea agreement in which Compton agreed to 22
plead guilty to Count Two of the indictment and both parties agreed 23

-- 6 of 19 --

7 No. 15‐942
that he reserved his right to appeal the district court’s decision not to 1
suppress the physical evidence. 2
On March 6, 2015, the district court dismissed Count One of 3
the indictment on the government’s motion and sentenced Compton 4
to thirty months of imprisonment followed by three years of 5
supervised release. On March 30, 2015, Compton filed a timely 6
notice of appeal. 7
DISCUSSION 8
Compton argues on appeal that Gottschall lacked reasonable 9
suspicion to detain him at the vegetable stand and that Gottschall 10
unreasonably extended the detention to perform the canine sniff, 11
errors that tainted his subsequent arrest and the vehicle search, 12
requiring the suppression of evidence obtained from the search. We 13
disagree. 14
I. Reasonable Suspicion 15
We review de novo a district court’s reasonable suspicion 16
determination. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996). “The 17
factual findings underlying that determination must be accepted 18
unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Padilla, 548 F.3d 179, 186 19
(2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 20
2015). 21
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 22
protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 23

-- 7 of 19 --

8 No. 15‐942
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 1
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “As this language indicates, the 2
ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a government search or 3
seizure is reasonableness.” United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322, 331 4
(2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonableness is 5
“generally determined by balancing the particular need to search or 6
seize against the privacy interests invaded by such action.” Id. 7
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may conduct a brief 8
investigatory detention (commonly known as a “Terry stop”) as long 9
as the officer has reasonable suspicion “that the person to be 10
detained is committing or has committed a criminal offense.” Id. at 11
332 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 12
Reasonable suspicion requires more than an “inarticulate 13
hunch[].” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The suspicion must derive from 14
“specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 15
inferences from those facts, provide detaining officers with a 16
particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrongdoing.” 17
Bailey, 743 F.3d at 332 (internal citation and quotation marks 18
omitted). 19
In assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion, we 20
must take into account “the totality of the circumstances” and must 21
“evaluate those circumstances through the eyes of a reasonable and 22
cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and 23

-- 8 of 19 --

9 No. 15‐942
training.” United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) 1
(internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Cortez, 449 2
U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (“[T]he evidence . . . collected must be seen and 3
weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as 4
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”). 5
Here, the district court properly rejected Compton’s argument 6
that Gottschall lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him at the 7
vegetable stand. Gottschall’s suspicion was reasonable due to the 8
combination of (1) the brothers’ avoidance of the checkpoint, (2) the 9
checkpoint’s proximity to the border, and (3) the brothers’ peculiar 10
attempt to conceal the avoidance. 11
A. Avoidance of the Checkpoint 12
The district court did not commit clear error in finding that 13
the SUV avoided the checkpoint, and the district court properly 14
determined that avoidance to be a factor supporting the 15
reasonableness of Gottschall’s suspicion. 16
1. Absence of Clear Error 17
We easily reject Compton’s argument that the district court 18
never made a factual finding that the SUV avoided the checkpoint. 19
The district court expressly included “the SUV’s avoidance of the 20
checkpoint” in a list of the “objective facts” supporting Gottschall’s 21
reasonable suspicion. App. 145. We review this factual finding for 22
clear error. See Padilla, 548 F.3d at 186. 23

-- 9 of 19 --

10 No. 15‐942
We find no clear error here. Gottschall testified that he 1
observed the SUV immediately slow down at the crest of the hill— 2
the exact point at which an eastbound driver would first be able to 3
see the checkpoint—and veer abruptly into the vegetable stand. 4
Gottschall further testified that he then received a call from a fellow 5
agent and learned that a motorist had reported that the SUV had 6
passed her before suddenly slowing at the crest of the hill. This 7
evidence supports the district court’s finding that the occupants of 8
the SUV performed an intentionally evasive maneuver to avoid the 9
checkpoint at the moment it came into view. 10
Compton’s evidentiary challenges warrant no different 11
conclusion. His argument that the district court inappropriately 12
construed the abrupt turn as evasive—insofar as the SUV did not 13
immediately drive away in the opposite direction—fails because 14
Gottschall testified that, although many “turnarounds” did involve 15
sudden U‐turns, other drivers would frequently pull into a location 16
“and simply sit there and wait.” App. 89. Compton’s challenge to 17
the reliability of the motorist’s report is also misguided: the motorist 18
provided an account of an event she had just observed, see Navarette 19
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689 (2014) (observing that a 20
contemporaneous report of a traffic incident based on personal 21
knowledge was “especially reliable”); her description of the SUV 22
was corroborated by Gottschall’s personal observations, cf. United 23

-- 10 of 19 --

11 No. 15‐942
States v. Elmore, 482 F.3d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that, while 1
“even a completely anonymous tip could support a finding of 2
probable cause with a sufficient degree of corroboration,” the extent 3
of corroboration needed to support reasonable suspicion “is 4
obviously less”); and she reported her observation to a law 5
enforcement official in person, cf. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1689‐90 6
(relying on ability of authorities to identify 911 callers to justify 7
reliance on information reported). Nor does Compton’s emphasis on 8
the number of possible “innocent” explanations for the abrupt turn 9
establish clear error. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 10
(2002) (“A determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need 11
not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”). 12
2. Avoidance and Reasonable Suspicion 13
Avoidance of a checkpoint alone is probably insufficient to 14
establish reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Murphy, 703 F.3d 15
182, 192 n.7 (2d Cir. 2012). Motorists may intentionally avoid a 16
checkpoint for any number of reasons unrelated to criminal activity. 17
See United States v. Ogilvie, 527 F.2d 330, 331‐32 (9th Cir. 1975). For 18
example, some may wish to “avoid the inconvenience and delay of 19
being stopped.” United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 20
2002). Others may find checkpoints stressful and prefer to avoid 21
interactions with law enforcement when possible. 22

-- 11 of 19 --

12 No. 15‐942
Avoidance of a checkpoint is, however, a factor that can 1
support a finding of reasonable suspicion when combined with 2
other relevant circumstances. A number of our sister circuits have so 3
held, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 585‐86 (4th Cir. 4
2005); United States v. Montero‐Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1139 (9th Cir. 5
2000) (en banc); United States v. Duguay, 93 F. 3d 346, 350‐51 (7 th Cir. 6
1996), while our own court has reached this conclusion summarily, 7
see United States v. Sanders, 208 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2000). Indeed, this is 8
consistent with Supreme Court precedent holding that “nervous, 9
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable 10
suspicion” and that an officer may base such a determination in part 11
on an individual’s “unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.” 12
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Flight from or intentional 13
avoidance of law enforcement “is not necessarily indicative of 14
wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” Id. 15
The district court thus properly characterized the SUV’s 16
avoidance of the checkpoint as one of multiple factors supporting 17
Gottschall’s reasonable suspicion. 18
B. Proximity to the Border 19
The checkpoint’s proximity to the border also supported 20
Gottschall’s reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court has held that, 21
as part of a reasonable suspicion determination, “[o]fficers may 22
consider the characteristics of the area in which they encounter a 23

-- 12 of 19 --

13 No. 15‐942
vehicle,” including “[i]ts proximity to the border.” United States v. 1
Brignoni‐Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884‐85 (1975); accord United States v. 2
Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995). This is so because national 3
borders uniquely implicate various criminal activities—including 4
contraband smuggling, see, e.g., United States v. Montoya de 5
Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537‐39 (1985), and illegal entry, see, e.g., 6
United States v. Martinez‐Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 551‐53 (1976); Brignoni‐ 7
Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878‐79. 8
Compton argues that the court could not rely on the proximity 9
of the border in this case because the government failed to establish 10
that proximity before the district court. This argument fails because 11
the government did present evidence establishing proximity. 12
Gottschall testified that he was “working an immigration 13
checkpoint,” which is a checkpoint set up “to capture anything 14
that’s crossing the border or any criminal activity in the area.” App. 15
51. He testified further that he called the checkpoint the “State Route 16
11 checkpoint,” and that, “[i]t’s in Chateaugay.” App. 71. In 17
Compton’s declaration in support of his motion to suppress, 18
moreover, Compton confirms that at the time of the encounter with 19
the Border Patrol, he was “traveling along route 11 in Chateaugay, 20
New York.” App. 28. It is beyond peradventure that the town of 21
Chateaugay, New York, is on the U.S.‐Canadian border—a fact that 22
we may judicially notice, see, Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1) & (2), and one 23

-- 13 of 19 --

14 No. 15‐942
recognized by the district court when it took “into account . . . the 1
checkpoint’s proximity to the border.” App. 145. The district court 2
did not err in considering that proximity in its reasonable suspicion 3
analysis. 4
C. Peculiar Concealment Attempt 5
A third circumstance supporting Gottschall’s reasonable 6
suspicion was his observation of the peculiar circumstances 7
surrounding the precipitous pepper purchase. When Gottschall 8
pulled up to the vegetable stand at 8:00 a.m., he saw the two 9
brothers walking back to their car at a significant distance from one 10
another, each holding a small packet of peppers. 11
Because Gottschall had already determined that the SUV had 12
made the abrupt turn into the vegetable stand in order to avoid the 13
checkpoint, Gottschall could reasonably interpret the pepper 14
purchase to be an attempt to conceal that avoidance. He could 15
reasonably discount the probability of an alternate explanation, such 16
as a sudden pepper emergency (such predicaments occur 17
infrequently) or a simple desire to avoid a delay (taking the extra 18
time to park a car and go shopping is hardly consistent with a 19
motorist who avoids a checkpoint because he or she is in a hurry). 20
And he could reasonably be suspicious of individuals who appeared 21
to be taking steps to actively deceive law enforcement. 22

-- 14 of 19 --

15 No. 15‐942
Moreover, the improbability of a pepper emergency occurring 1
immediately upon the appearance of a border checkpoint rendered 2
the brothers’ ruse even more suspicious. A person who resorts to an 3
odd and poorly conceived concealment measure to avoid contact 4
with law enforcement authorities is more likely to be desperate to 5
avoid detection of unlawful activity. 6
Accordingly, the avoidance of the checkpoint, the proximity of 7
the checkpoint to the border, and the rather peculiar attempt to 8
conceal the avoidance of the checkpoint together constituted a 9
sufficient basis for Gottschall’s reasonable suspicion and for the 10
ensuing Terry stop. 11
II. Reasonable Extension 12
Although we have determined that reasonable suspicion 13
justified Gottschall’s Terry stop of Compton at the vegetable stand, 14
we must still determine whether Gottschall’s “actual conduct fell 15
within the permissible scope of a Terry‐type detention.” United States 16
v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1992). 17
A Terry stop initially justified by reasonable suspicion may 18
still violate the Fourth Amendment if it is extended unreasonably. 19
This is because, “[i]f an investigative stop based on reasonable 20
suspicion continues too long . . . , it will ripen into a de facto arrest 21
that must be based on probable cause.” Id. Although the Fourth 22
Amendment places “no rigid time limitation on Terry stops,” United 23

-- 15 of 19 --

16 No. 15‐942
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985), “the detention can continue 1
only for the period of time necessary to either verify or dispel the 2
suspicion,” United States v. Watson, 787 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2015) 3
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 4
Here, the district court properly rejected Compton’s argument 5
that Gottschall unreasonably extended the Terry stop. Compton 6
maintains on appeal that Gottschall extended the stop in violation of 7
the Fourth Amendment when he ordered Compton and his brother 8
back into the SUV. Compton’s argument fails for two reasons: (1) 9
the Terry stop did not actually begin until Gottschall ordered the 10
brothers back into the SUV, and (2) the stop was reasonable in 11
duration from that point on. 12
A. Beginning of the Stop 13
During a consensual encounter, “officers may permissibly ask 14
questions, such as why the subject is at that location, and may make 15
requests for identification and permission to inspect luggage.” 16
United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 10 (2d Cir. 1996). A consensual 17
encounter becomes a Terry stop when “under the circumstances, a 18
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 19
leave.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 20
We reject Compton’s argument that the Terry stop began as 21
soon as Gottschall arrived at the vegetable stand. Gottschall testified 22
that, upon arrival, he pulled his Border Patrol vehicle in behind the 23

-- 16 of 19 --

17 No. 15‐942
SUV in the U‐shaped driveway and turned on his lights “for safety 1
reasons.” App. 82. Gottschall then saw the Comptons emerge from 2
the stand, addressed them, and asked them twice to return to the 3
SUV (the second request following the brothers’ refusal of the first). 4
Because the driveway was U‐shaped, Gottschall’s car did not block 5
the SUV’s egress from the vegetable stand, and he took no other 6
action to restrain the brothers’ movement. A reasonable person 7
would thus have believed that he was not free to leave only at the 8
point when Gottschall requested him to return to the SUV. (The 9
brothers’ initial refusal suggests that, even at that point, they 10
themselves may still have felt free to leave.) Accordingly, we 11
conclude that a consensual encounter began when Gottschall pulled 12
up to the vegetable stand and that the encounter became a Terry stop 13
only when Gottschall ordered the brothers back into the SUV. Cf. 14
Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 58 (recognizing that a police encounter remains 15
consensual “so long as the police do not convey a message that 16
compliance with their requests is required” (internal quotation 17
marks omitted)). 18
B. Duration of the Stop 19
If an investigation conducted during an initial stop 20
“enhance[s] suspicion[] of . . . criminal activities,” an officer may 21
extend the stop in order “to confirm or dispel” that enhanced 22
suspicion. See Bailey, 743 F.3d at 336‐37. 23

-- 17 of 19 --

18 No. 15‐942
Here, after ordering the brothers into the SUV, Gottschall saw 1
a blanket that “appeared to be concealing some objects” in the back 2
of the car. App. 62. See United States v. Aldaco, 168 F.3d 148, 149 (5th 3
Cir. 1999) (discussing the suspicious nature of “bulky objects 4
covered with blankets in the back of the vehicle,” later determined 5
to be concealing 503 pounds of marijuana). Gottschall’s professional 6
experience led him to suspect that the blanket concealed humans, 7
cigarettes, narcotics, or “something to that effect.” App. 62. We agree 8
with the district court that Gottschall reasonably extended the stop 9
in order to confirm or dispel this enhanced suspicion. 10
Gottschall conducted the extended investigation with 11
reasonable promptness. He radioed Taylor, who arrived with the 12
canine in under a minute. The canine sniff that confirmed the 13
presence of narcotics took no more than five minutes. The Fourth 14
Amendment permits a brief extension of a Terry stop in order to 15
conduct a canine sniff to resolve suspicions enhanced during the 16
initial stop. 17
The fact that the agents placed the brothers in separate police 18
vehicles and handcuffed them during the brief canine sniff does 19
alter our analysis. Compton has abandoned his argument that his 20
handcuffing constituted an arrest without probable cause requiring 21
suppression of the physical evidence under the fruit of the 22
poisonous tree doctrine. See United States v. Cacace, 796 F.3d 176, 188 23

-- 18 of 19 --

19 No. 15‐942
(2d Cir. 2015). Moreover, because the Border Patrol would have 1
discovered the marijuana without placing the brothers in handcuffs 2
in separate vehicles, the reasonableness of the agents’ actions is not 3
relevant to the admissibility of the physical evidence. 4
Accordingly, we find that Gottschall conducted a Terry stop of 5
Compton that was both justified by reasonable suspicion and 6
extended for a reasonable duration. 7
CONCLUSION 8
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district court’s 9
judgment denying the motion to suppress the physical evidence. 10

-- 19 of 19 --