United States v. Jacques

1
11-2142-cr
United States v. Jacques
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
August Term, 2011 3
(Argued: May 31, 2012 Decided: July 9, 2012) 4
Docket No. 11-2142-cr 5
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 7 Appellant, 8
v. 9
MICHAEL JACQUES, 10 Defendant-Appellee. 11
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12
B e f o r e: WINTER, CHIN, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges. 13
Interlocutory appeal from pre-trial orders of the United 14
States District Court for the District of Vermont (William K. 15
Sessions, III, Judge) excluding evidence that the government 16
sought to offer in the punishment phase of a capital case. We 17
affirm in part and vacate in part. 18
WILLIAM B. DARROW, Assistant United 19 States Attorney (Craig S. Nolan, Paul 20 J. Van De Graaf, and Gregory L. 21 Waples, Assistant United States 22 Attorneys, on the brief,) for Tristram 23 J. Coffin, United States Attorney for 24 the District of Vermont, Burlington, 25 Vermont, for Appellant. 26
27
28
29

-- 1 of 17 --

2
DAVID A. RUHNKE (Jean D. Barrett, 1 Ruhnke & Barrett, Montclair, New 2 Jersey, and Michael L. Desautels and 3 Barclay T. Johnson, Office of the 4 Federal Public Defender, Burlington, 5 Vermont, on the brief), Ruhnke & 6 Barrett, Montclair, New Jersey, for 7 Defendant-Appellee. 8
9
WINTER, Circuit Judge: 10
The government appeals from Judge Sessions’s in limine 11
ruling excluding certain evidence from the penalty phase of a 12
death penalty case. After obtaining an indictment against 13
Michael Jacques for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 14
12-year-old girl, the government filed a Notice of Intent to Seek 15
the Death Penalty (“Notice”). Included in the Notice, as 16
required by the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3591, et 17
seq., were allegations of aggravating factors the government 18
proposed to put before the jury in the penalty phase that would 19
follow a conviction. These factors included allegations of six 20
prior rapes and an attempt to obstruct justice by influencing 21
the testimony of a juvenile witness/victim. 22
In pre-trial orders, Judge Sessions struck allegations of 23
three of the prior rapes from the Notice under 18 U.S.C. § 24
3593(c) and suppressed evidence of the attempt to obstruct 25
justice as having been obtained in violation of the Sixth 26
Amendment. The government appealed. 27
We affirm the exclusion of evidence of two of the alleged 28
prior rapes, remand the third for reconsideration but leave the 29

-- 2 of 17 --

3
outcome to the district court’s discretion, and vacate the 1
exclusion of evidence of the attempted obstruction of justice. 2
We address each issue in turn. 3
a) Prior Rapes 4
1) Relevant Facts 5
In the Notice, the government alleged several prior rapes by 6
Jacques. The alleged victims included four juveniles and two 7
adults, whom we refer to as J1-J4 and A1-A2, respectively. The 8
district court ruled that evidence of the rape of J1 was 9
admissible during the penalty phase. Briefly stated here, and 10
more fully discussed infra, defendant’s sexual contacts with J1 11
occurred over several years and were in part contemporaneous with 12
the kidnapping/rape/murder in the present matter which is alleged 13
to have occurred in 2008. Moreover, defendant is alleged to have 14
used J1 to lure the murdered 12-year old to her encounter with 15
Jacques. 16
The court also allowed the admission of evidence of the rape 17
of A2 in the penalty phase. This crime occurred in 1992 and 18
resulted in a kidnapping and rape conviction. A1 has died, and 19
the government no longer seeks to introduce evidence with regard 20
to her. 21
The court excluded evidence concerning J2, J3, and J4, and 22
the government has appealed. We turn now to these rulings. 23
In January 1985, J2, a younger relative of Jacques, sought 24
an abortion, which came to the attention of law enforcement 25

-- 3 of 17 --

4
authorities. J2 told the Vermont State Police that she was 1
pregnant as a result of being raped by Jacques, who was then 18. 2
Jacques admitted that he had “experimented” with J2 and was 3
arraigned on various charges; however, the case was dismissed 4
after the family decided not to pursue the case. 5
Jacques is accused of raping J3 around the same time. She 6
was a young girl who spent the night at Jacques’s residence with 7
a younger sibling. J3 never reported this incident to the police 8
because she feared that they would not believe her. 9
Finally, Jacques is alleged in 1987 to have raped J4, 10
another young girl, who was a friend of one of Jacques’s younger 11
siblings. The rape is alleged to have occurred after Jacques 12
provided alcohol to her at his apartment. J4's school nurse 13
learned of the rape and called the police. Following an 14
investigation, Jacques was arrested and charged. After pleading 15
guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct, he was given a three-year 16
deferred sentence. 17
The district court struck the allegations concerning J2, J3, 18
and J4 from the Notice, concluding that, because the conduct 19
alleged was unadjudicated and over twenty years old, their 20
probative value was outweighed by their potential prejudice. 21
2) Discussion 22
Evidentiary rulings under 18 U.S.C. § 3593© are reviewed 23
only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Fell, 531 24
F.3d 197, 209 (2d Cir. 2008). 25

-- 4 of 17 --

5
The government argues that the exclusion of these 1
allegations will deprive the jury of a full picture of Jacques’s 2
personal characteristics and his past conduct as a serial rapist. 3
The government also argues that the district court based its 4
ruling with regard to the allegations concerning J4 on an 5
erroneous finding of fact because those allegations were in fact 6
adjudicated. Section 3593© provides that in the penalty phase of 7
a capital case, “[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its 8
admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at 9
criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its 10
probative value is outweighed by the danger of . . . creating 11
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the 12
jury.” The standard for exclusion of evidence under this Section 13
is broader than under Fed. R. Evid. 403, which allows the 14
exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is 15
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 16
confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” (emphasis 17
added). 18
Generally, “more evidence, not less, should be admitted on 19
the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors” in 20
the penalty phase of a capital case. Fell, 531 F.3d at 219 n.12 21
(emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 22
135, 143 (2d Cir. 2004)). Nevertheless, district courts “retain 23
the discretion to exclude any type of unreliable or prejudicial 24
evidence.” United States v. Pepin, 514 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir. 25
2008)(quoting Fell 360 F.3d at 145). 26

-- 5 of 17 --

6
Defendant’s alleged conduct toward J2, J3, and J4 is alleged 1
to have occurred almost, or over, twenty-five years ago. Such 2
remoteness reduces the reliability of testimony as to the events’ 3
occurrences. In the case of J2 and J3, the danger of 4
unreliability is somewhat enhanced by the lack of a relatively 5
contemporaneous adjudication. In the case of J4, there was an 6
adjudication, but the resultant judgment was not for rape. There 7
is, moreover, murkiness as to each with regard to whether, or how 8
much, coercion was involved. Finally, the remoteness of the 9
allegations also reduces their probative value with regard to 10
Jacques’s character because he was a youth himself at the time. 11
Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) (suggesting that the probative weight of 12
prior crimes used to impeach character is less reliable once 13
significant time has passed); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 14
934, 942 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[B]oth Rule 609 and Rule 403, which is 15
pertinent here, oblige the trial court to assess the probative 16
value of every prior conviction offered in evidence and the 17
remoteness of a conviction, whatever its age, is always pertinent 18
to this assessment.”). 19
Therefore, although we might well have ruled otherwise were 20
we in the district court’s position, we conclude that the court 21
acted within its considerable discretion to rule that the lack of 22
reliability of the allegations with regard to J2, J3, and J4 23

-- 6 of 17 --

1 We note that the district court is free to alter these rulings, if
appropriate, as the case progresses. See Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136,
139 (2d Cir. 1996) (A ruling in limine “is subject to change when the case
unfolds.” (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984))). Such a
change may be in the court’s discretion if these allegations become necessary
to rebut evidence offered by the defense concerning Jacques’s past. See,
e.g., Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42 (change of in limine ruling may be appropriate
where defendant introduces testimony contrary to statements given in a
proffer).
7
outweighed their probative values. 1 However, the district court 1
based its order concerning J4 in part on the assumption that 2
those allegations were unadjudicated. In fact, Jacques pleaded 3
guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct in connection with his 4
conduct with J4. We vacate the order with regard to the 5
allegations regarding her and remand for the district court to 6
reconsider its ruling in light of that adjudication. We add, 7
however, that the district court would still be within its 8
discretion to conclude that the age of these allegations and the 9
ambiguity of the plea as to rape is sufficient to warrant their 10
exclusion under § 3593©. 11
b) Obstruction of Justice 12
1) Relevant Facts 13
Because the obstruction of justice relates to evidence of 14
the underlying offense, we briefly set out pertinent allegations 15
with regard to those charges. 16
The government alleges that in 2003 Jacques concocted a 17
scheme to sexually abuse the then nine-year-old J1. This scheme 18
involved making J1 believe that a fictitious organization named 19
“Breckenridge” would kill her and her family if she did not 20

-- 7 of 17 --

8
follow the group’s instructions. Jacques allegedly sent e-mail 1
messages from two accounts seemingly owned by members of 2
Breckenridge named “Charles” and “Eric.” The e-mails told J1 3
that Jacques was to act as her “sexual trainer” and advised her 4
to engage in various sex acts with Jacques. When J1 protested, 5
she received e-mail threats that included the killing of family 6
pets. Jacques’s exploitation of J1 through “Breckenridge” 7
continued until 2008, when J1 was 14 years old. 8
In May 2008, J1 received messages from Breckenridge that a 9
12-year-old named Brooke needed to be terminated and that J1 was 10
to help in the termination by inviting Brooke to a party. On the 11
morning of the party in late June 2008, Jacques and J1 picked 12
Brooke up and drove to a convenience store about ten minutes from 13
Jacques’s home. Once there, Jacques dropped Brooke off in front 14
of the store’s surveillance camera but told her to walk to a 15
nearby spot where they would pick her up. Jacques and J1 then 16
allegedly left but circled back to pick Brooke up. The 17
government alleges that Jacques then drugged, raped, and murdered 18
Brooke. 19
Four days later on June 29, 2008, police discovered the e- 20
mails from Eric and Charles to J1 and traced them to Jacques’s 21
computer. Jacques was then arrested and detained on a state 22
charge of sexually assaulting J1. On July 1, 2008, a federal 23
criminal complaint was filed charging Jacques with the kidnapping 24
of Brooke, and, on July 2, her body was discovered. At his 25
initial appearance on July 7, the court appointed the Office of 26

-- 8 of 17 --

9
the Federal Public Defender to represent Jacques on the federal 1
kidnaping charge. 2
On July 4 and 8, while in custody, Jacques sent letters to 3
his friend Michael Garcia. These letters asserted Jacques’s 4
innocence and asked Garcia for help. On July 10, Jacques called 5
Garcia and asked him to come from Arizona to Vermont, stating 6
that he could not talk to Garcia on the monitored prison phone. 7
He also suggested that Garcia pose as Jacques’s attorney in a 8
civil matter and call on the attorney line, which was not 9
monitored. The next day, Garcia contacted the authorities. The 10
government obtained a recording of the phone conversation between 11
Jacques and Garcia. A “taint team” consisting solely of 12
government agents and attorneys not working on the case pending 13
against Jacques was assigned to investigate. 14
On July 13, Jacques called Garcia again and asked him to 15
call on the prison’s attorney line, stressing that time was of 16
the essence and that Garcia was Jacques’s last hope. Jacques 17
followed up with another letter, dated July 14, requesting 18
Garcia’s help and assuring him that it would require only a few 19
e-mails and text messages. 20
On July 16, FBI agents met with Garcia and helped him place 21
a recorded telephone call to Jacques on the attorney line. 22
Prior to the call, the agents instructed Garcia not to ask 23
Jacques anything about the crimes charged. During the call, 24
Jacques told Garcia that he was being framed by some “bad guys” 25
who were involved with J1. Jacques said that he needed Garcia to 26

-- 9 of 17 --

10
send messages to J1 telling her that the bad guys were still out 1
there. To accomplish this, Jacques gave Garcia J1’s cell phone 2
number and suggested what he should say in messages to her. 3
After this conversation, Jacques again sent Garcia letters 4
begging for his help and expressing dismay that Garcia had not 5
contacted him again. 6
Garcia called Jacques on July 22, a call again recorded by 7
the FBI. Jacques stated that the “plan” to contact J1 needed to 8
be carried out soon because the indictment had not yet issued. 9
He also instructed Garcia to take precautions, such as using a 10
secondary hard drive or sending e-mail messages from internet 11
cafes, to prevent the messages from being tracked back to Garcia. 12
Garcia made yet another recorded call to Jacques on July 24, 13
during which Jacques again asked Garcia to contact J1 and told 14
Garcia that he had mailed a package to him that would explain 15
what steps he should take. 16
The package of instructions told Garcia to send J1 messages 17
in the names of Eric and Charles from Breckenridge. The messages 18
would instruct her to inform the authorities and the media that 19
Jacques had been framed and to tell Jacques’s wife that he had 20
been framed. Garcia was instructed, if necessary, to e-mail J1 21
as Eric, telling her to send “editorials” to major newspapers 22
stating that Jacques was innocent. Jacques also gave 23
instructions on the timing of these steps and recommended that 24
Garcia send these e-mails from public computers in other states. 25
26

-- 10 of 17 --

2 As noted by the district court, when Jacques stated that the actual
killers had planted evidence, Garcia asked “[W]hat did they do? What, what
kind of evidence?”, to which Jacques was largely unresponsive. Garcia also
asked whether Jacques’s arrest occurred at the time Brooke’s body was found.
11
The next recorded conversation between Jacques and Garcia 1
took place on July 28. Garcia told Jacques that he was flying to 2
Vermont to meet him. Jacques instructed Garcia on how to visit 3
the facility posing as his attorney. The FBI again instructed 4
Garcia not to initiate any inquiries about the charges pending 5
against Jacques or to talk about Jacques’s lawyers. On July 30 6
and 31, Garcia visited Jacques in prison, where their 7
conversations were recorded by the FBI. During these 8
conversations, Jacques sought confirmation of Garcia’s receipt of 9
the package, reiterated that Garcia should use a second hard 10
drive or public computer to send the messages to J1, and told 11
Garcia to expect to be contacted by the authorities. 12
Throughout these telephone calls and meetings, Jacques 13
frequently asserted that he was innocent; that he was set-up by 14
Breckenridge, who planted evidence in the form of Google 15
searches, e-mails, and orders of items such as handcuffs; and 16
that he had simply dropped Brooke off at the convenience store 17
the morning that she had gone missing. Garcia asked two 18
clarifying questions and told Jacques that he would assist with 19
the plan. 2 On one occasion, contrary to the FBI’s instructions, 20
Garcia actively sought information unrelated to what Jacques was 21
already telling him. The question concerned Jacques’s prior 22
criminal conduct allegedly committed during the early 1980’s 23
about which Garcia was curious. 24

-- 11 of 17 --

3 The government also disputes the district court’s conclusion that,
based on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the suppression of evidence
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment applies to the penalty as well as
the guilt phase of a capital case. Given our disposition of this matter, we
need not, and do not, address this issue.
12
After these meetings, the taint team sent copies of 1
Jacques’s packet of instructions and transcripts of the phone 2
calls to Jacques’s defense counsel, along with a letter 3
explaining the events and giving counsel ten days to object 4
before the taint team provided the materials to the prosecution. 5
The defense did not object within the ten days. 6
Jacques moved to suppress this evidence as obtained in 7
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Noting that kidnapping 8
and obstruction of justice were separate charges, the district 9
court stated that this evidence would “clearly be admissible at a 10
separate trial for obstruction of justice” but nevertheless 11
concluded that the evidence was inadmissible in the present 12
prosecution. 13
The district court concluded that the government had 14
knowingly circumvented Jacques’s right to counsel on the 15
kidnapping/rape/murder charges under Massiah v. United States, 16
377 U.S. 201 (1964). The court reasoned that it was foreseeable 17
that Jacques would confide in Garcia due to their longstanding 18
friendship and that incriminating evidence about the current 19
charges would be obtained because the obstruction plan was 20
focused on avoiding those charges. 3
21
22

-- 12 of 17 --

13
2) Discussion 1
The facts pertinent to Jacques’s Sixth Amendment claim are 2
embodied in correspondence and recorded conversations and are, 3
therefore, undisputed. The question of whether the district 4
court applied the correct legal standard to those facts is a 5
question of law to be resolved de novo. See United States v. 6
Vasquez, 389 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2004). We turn, therefore, to 7
that standard. 8
“[A]fter the . . . right to counsel attaches and is invoked, 9
any statements obtained from the accused during subsequent 10
police-initiated custodial questioning regarding the charge at 11
issue . . . are inadmissible.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 12
171, 179 (1991). This exclusionary rule applies not only to 13
questioning by identified police officers, but also to statements 14
obtained where the government uses “an undercover agent to 15
circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Illinois v. 16
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990). 17
However, “a defendant does not make out a violation of [the 18
Sixth Amendment] simply by showing that an informant, either 19
through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his 20
incriminating statements to the police.” Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 21
U.S. 436, 459 (1986). Rather, a defendant’s rights are violated 22
only when the government uses “investigatory techniques that are 23
the equivalent of direct police interrogation.” Id. Therefore, 24
the Sixth Amendment does not “forbid[] admission in evidence of 25

-- 13 of 17 --

4 Prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cobb, several circuits had
interpreted the opinions in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), and
Moulton to suggest that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right extends to charges
under investigation that are “so inextricably intertwined . . . that the right
to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated from the
right to counsel for the uncharged offense.” United States v. Covarrubias,
179 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). That conclusion
was explicitly rejected by the Court. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168, 172-73.
However, incriminating statements relating to a charged offense obtained
during an investigation of a separate offense are “inadmissible at the trial
of [the charged offense], . . . if, in obtaining this evidence, the State
violated the Sixth Amendment by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to
the assistance of counsel.” Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180.
14
an accused’s statements to a jailhouse informant who was ‘placed 1
in close proximity but [made] no effort to stimulate 2
conversations about the crime charged.’” Id. at 456 (alteration 3
in original)(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 4
n.9 (1980)). Instead, a “defendant must demonstrate that the 5
police and their informant took some action, beyond merely 6
listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating 7
remarks.” Id. at 459. 8
Moreover, the government does not violate the Sixth 9
Amendment rights of a defendant charged with a crime by 10
investigating or interrogating that defendant with regard to a 11
separate crime that has not been charged. See Maine v. Moulton, 12
474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). This is true even where the latter 13
crime is “‘factually related’ to a charged offense,” so long as 14
the offense being investigated is not considered the “same 15
offense” for the purposes of determining the applicability of the 16
Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. Texas v. Cobb, 532 17
U.S. 162, 168, 172-73 (2001). 4
18

-- 14 of 17 --

15
Therefore, it is not enough to show a foreseeability that 1
Jacques’s friendship with Garcia would lead Jacques to say things 2
he would not say to someone identified as a law enforcement 3
agent. To prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment, Jacques must 4
also show that Garcia took actions amounting to an “indirect and 5
surreptitious [interrogation]” of Jacques with regard to the 6
kidnapping/rape/murder offenses. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 458 7
(internal quotation marks omitted). In our view, Garcia took no 8
such actions. 9
Unlike Henry, where a jailhouse informant who was paid for 10
producing only useful information on pending charges had 11
ingratiated himself with a fellow prisoner through conversations, 12
447 U.S. 264, 270, 274 n.12 (1980), or Moulton, where a 13
cooperating defendant feigned forgetfulness and reminisced with a 14
co-defendant about the charged conduct, 474 U.S. at 165-66, 15
Garcia never took any initiative that elicited information from 16
Jacques concerning the charged offense. To be sure, Jacques 17
invited conversations with Garcia because of their friendship, 18
but these conversations were at Jacques’s initiative -- actually, 19
insistence -- not Garcia’s. Indeed, Garcia was entirely passive 20
while Jacques was insisting on explaining to Garcia how to help 21
him. 22
Nor were the few questions that Garcia asked during his 23
conversations with Jacques of a probing nature with regard to the 24
kidnapping/rape/murder charges. We have previously declined to 25

-- 15 of 17 --

5 Garcia’s inquiry concerning the charges against Jacques in the early
1980’s clearly elicited information; however, that information concerned a
crime other than those charged. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175 (the Sixth
Amendment is offense specific).
16
decide whether “limited follow-up questions could be found to 1
‘stimulate’ discussion,” United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 2
136 (2d Cir. 2007), and need not do so here. Garcia’s infrequent 3
questions did “not alter the fundamental nature of the exchange 4
between the two men: namely, [Jacques] enlist[ing] [Garcia’s] 5
help.” Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 896- 6
97 (3d Cir. 1999). From beginning to end, the conversations 7
focused on Jacques’s using Garcia to influence J1’s statements 8
and providing Garcia with the information that Jacques believed 9
was necessary to accomplish that goal. Id. (finding no 10
deliberate elicitation when an incarcerated defendant asked a 11
friend to retrieve evidence and the telephone calls concerning 12
that request were recorded by the government with the friend’s 13
consent). 5
14
To be sure, the FBI actively assisted Garcia in making calls 15
on the attorney line and in visiting Jacques in prison. However, 16
those acts are not “the equivalent of direct police 17
interrogation.” Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459. When prison 18
authorities place an informant in close proximity to a defendant, 19
even when expecting the defendant to divulge incriminating 20
information, id. at 456, the Sixth Amendment is not violated 21
unless the informant actively elicits statements that are 22
incriminating with regard to charged crimes. Id. at 459. 23

-- 16 of 17 --

17
Moreover, neither Garcia nor the FBI selected use of the 1
attorney line or prison visits as the means of communication. 2
Rather, it was Jacques who selected them. Garcia and the FBI 3
simply allowed Jacques to undertake his own chosen course of 4
action. 5
Finally, the fact that Garcia represented that he was 6
willing to assist in the obstruction scheme did not violate 7
Jacques’s rights with regard to the underlying charges. Garcia’s 8
assent did not seek to elicit a response, because merely 9
expressing agreement is not comparable to “engaging the defendant 10
‘in active conversation.’” Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 (quoting 11
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177, n.13); see also Matteo, 171 F.3d at 12
895-97. 13
In sum, Jacques shared information on his own initiative and 14
on his own terms. Therefore, the government did not take any 15
“action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately 16
to elicit incriminating remarks.” Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459. 17
CONCLUSION 18
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the exclusion of the 19
allegations with regard to J2 and J3, vacate and remand with 20
regard to the allegations concerning J4, and vacate the order 21
suppressing evidence of the alleged plan to obstruct justice. 22

-- 17 of 17 --