Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. 1

06-1494
Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist.
1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 2
3
August Term 2006 4
(Argued: November 27, 2006 Decided: May 30, 2007) 5
Docket No. 06-1494-cv 6
-----------------------------------------------------x 7
ANTHONY GAGLIARDO and ADELE GAGLIARDO, 8
9
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 10
11
-- v. -- 12
13
ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 14
15
Defendant-Appellant. 16
17
-----------------------------------------------------x 18
19
B e f o r e : Jacobs, Chief Judge, Walker and Raggi, Circuit 20
Judges. 21
Defendant-appellant Arlington Central School District 22
appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for 23
the Southern District of New York (Colleen McMahon, Judge) 24
entered March 24, 2006, granting summary judgment in favor of 25
plaintiffs-appellees Anthony and Adele Gagliardo on their claim 26
brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education 27
Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., for reimbursement of tuition 28
expenses incurred in educating their child at a private school of 29
their choosing. 30
REVERSED and REMANDED. 31

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2
JEFFREY J. SCHIRO, Kuntz, 1
Spagnuolo, Scapoli & Schiro, P.C., 2
Bedford Village, New York for 3
defendant-appellant. 4
5
ROSALEE CHARPENTIER, Attorney, 6
Family Advocates, Inc., Kingston, 7
New York, for plaintiffs-appellees. 8
9
10
JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge: 11
This is not the usual lawsuit brought under the Individuals 12
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et 13
seq., in which the parents of a disabled child demand 14
reimbursement for the costs associated with sending their child 15
to a private school while the school district defends its 16
decision to provide the child a public school education. In the 17
present action, plaintiffs-appellees Anthony and Adele Gagliardo 18
(the “Gagliardos” or “parents”) and defendant-appellant Arlington 19
Central School District (the “School District”) agree that the 20
Gagliardos’ child, S.G., belonged in a private school for his 21
senior year. They differ only as to the school. 22
Upon competing motions for summary judgment, the United 23
States District Court for the Southern District of New York 24
(Colleen McMahon, Judge) granted the parents’ motion. Gagliardo 25
v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 418 F. Supp. 2d 559, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 26
2006). The district court held principally that the private 27
school chosen by the School District in formulating S.G.’s 28
individualized education program (“IEP”) would not afford the 29

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3
“free appropriate public education” required by the IDEA and that 1
the parents’ placement was appropriate; accordingly, it ordered 2
the School District to reimburse the parents for the tuition 3
expenses they incurred in sending S.G. to the private school they 4
chose. In doing so, the district court rejected the conclusions 5
reached by an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) and a State 6
Review Officer (“SRO”) to deny reimbursement. 7
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district 8
court’s decision to reject the IHO’s determination regarding the 9
appropriateness of the private school chosen by the parents is 10
not supported by the record; we thus reverse the judgment of the 11
district court and remand the case with instructions to enter 12
judgment in favor of the School District. 13
Statutory Background 14
This lawsuit is set against the backdrop of the statutory 15
scheme provided in the IDEA and applicable New York laws and 16
regulations as to which we offer this brief overview. 17
The IDEA “is the most recent Congressional enactment in ‘an 18
ambitious federal effort to promote the education of handicapped 19
children.’” Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 20
119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 21

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1 The Supreme court in Rowley interpreted the Education for 1
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which was subsequently 2
amended and renamed the IDEA. For consistency and ease of 3
comprehension, we refer to the statute throughout its history as 4
the IDEA. 5
4
176, 179 (1982)).1 Under the IDEA, states receiving federal 1
funds are required to provide “all children with disabilities” a 2
“free appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 3
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180-81. To meet these requirements, a school 4
district’s program must provide “special education and related 5
services tailored to meet the unique needs of a particular child, 6
and be ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 7
educational benefits.’” Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122 (quoting 8
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207) (citation omitted). Such services must 9
be administered according to an IEP, which school districts must 10
implement annually. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). 11
“To meet these obligations and to implement its own policies 12
regarding the education of disabled children, [New York] has 13
assigned responsibility for developing appropriate IEPs to local 14
Committees on Special Education (‘CSE’), the members of which are 15
appointed by school boards or the trustees of school districts.” 16
Walczak, 142 F.3d at 123 (citing N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402(1)(b)(1) 17
(McKinney Supp. 1997-98) and Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 152 18
(2d Cir. 1992)). In developing a particular child’s IEP, a CSE 19
is required to consider four factors: (1) academic achievement 20
and learning characteristics, (2) social development, (3) 21

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5
physical development, and (4) managerial or behavioral needs. 1
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. [hereinafter “N.Y.C.C.R.R.”] tit. 2
8, § 200.1(ww)(3)(i). 3
In formulating an appropriate IEP, the CSE must also be 4
mindful of the IDEA’s strong preference for “mainstreaming,” or 5
educating children with disabilities “[t]o the maximum extent 6
appropriate” alongside their non-disabled peers. 20 U.S.C. § 7
1412(a)(5); see Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132. New York defines this 8
least restrictive environment as one that (1) provides the 9
special education needed by the student (2) to the maximum extent 10
appropriate with other students who do not have handicapping 11
conditions, and (3) is as proximate as possible to the student’s 12
place of residence. N.Y.C.C.R.R. tit. 8, § 200.1(cc). 13
New York parents who disagree with their child’s IEP may 14
challenge it in an “impartial due process hearing,” 20 U.S.C. § 15
1415(f), before an IHO appointed by the local board of education, 16
see N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1). The resulting decision may be 17
appealed to an SRO, see N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(2); see also 20 18
U.S.C. § 1415(g), and the SRO’s decision in turn may be 19
challenged in either state or federal court, see 20 U.S.C. § 20
1415(i)(2)(A). 21
Factual and Procedural Background 22
With regard to the academic year at issue, 2002 to 2003, 23
S.G. was a high school senior who was eligible for special 24

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6
educational services on account of his classification as a 1
student with an emotional disturbance; specifically, he suffered 2
from depression and social anxiety. While this lawsuit involves 3
the parents’ request for tuition reimbursement for that period, 4
the relevant history of S.G.’s emotional disturbance begins 5
several years earlier. 6
S.G. first exhibited symptoms of depression in the fifth 7
grade and began seeing a therapist on a weekly basis in the sixth 8
grade school year from 1996 to 1997. By April 1999, S.G. was 9
receiving more advanced treatment for his depression, including 10
antidepressants. In the fall of 1999, S.G. attended Arlington 11
High School as a ninth grader and started the school year 12
performing quite well. But after being threatened by another 13
student in October of that year, he began to experience anxiety 14
about attending school. Feeling overwhelmed, he found himself 15
skipping classes, and as a result, his grades declined. 16
S.G. returned to Arlington High School for tenth grade, but 17
as the year passed, his anxiety mounted. In February of 2001, he 18
refused to attend school. Soon thereafter, his parents admitted 19
him to the Adolescent Intensive Outpatient Program at St. Francis 20
Hospital where he underwent a mental status examination and 21
problem appraisal. The social worker at St. Francis, while 22
recognizing that the goal was to get S.G. back in school, opined 23
that he would need a structured educational setting before 24

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7
transitioning back. The social worker recommended extended home 1
tutoring; the School District began providing it in early March 2
2001. 3
On March 16, 2001, the Gagliardos referred S.G. to the CSE. 4
In April 2001, they consented to an evaluation of their son and 5
completed a social history that indicated he had been teased and 6
bullied by other students, had a history of depression, and did 7
not want to attend school. The School District’s psychologist 8
administered a set of standard intelligence tests, which revealed 9
that S.G. had an IQ in the high average range, average 10
achievement in reading and writing, and superior achievement in 11
mathematics. Additional testing confirmed S.G.’s anxiety, 12
depression, and exclusion from social interaction. 13
In June 2001, the CSE convened for an initial examination 14
into S.G.’s situation. After reviewing all of the evaluations, 15
the CSE classified S.G. as having an emotional disturbance. 16
Consistent with that classification, the CSE developed an IEP for 17
S.G.’s 2001 to 2002 school year, his junior year in high school. 18
It recommended that he receive resource room services one period 19
each day, individualized counseling once a month, and various 20
testing modifications. The parents consented to the IEP. 21
S.G. returned to Arlington High School for his junior year, 22
but by September 20, 2001 he refused to attend classes. On 23
October 16, his treating psychiatrist concluded that S.G. could 24

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8
not attend school due to his severe anxiety and depression. The 1
School District thereupon arranged for home schooling. 2
In November 2001, the Gagliardos arranged for a psychiatric 3
evaluation of their son by Dr. Keith Ditkowsky, Director of 4
Clinical Services at New York University’s Child Study Center. 5
Also in that month, they withdrew their consent to S.G.’s IEP on 6
the basis that his needs had changed since the IEP had been 7
developed six months earlier. The parents requested a CSE 8
meeting and an extension of home instruction. 9
Dr. Ditkowsky transmitted his evaluation and recommendation 10
to the Gagliardos in a letter dated December 5, 2001. In the 11
letter, Dr. Ditkowsky recommended that: 12
In light of the continued symptoms of his anxiety 13
disorder, coupled with his history of recurrent 14
depression, it appears that [S.G.] would benefit from 15
an alternative placement. Such a setting should have a 16
smaller teacher to student ratio, and be in a more 17
supportive or therapeutic environment. Hopefully this 18
will allow [S.G.] to re-integrate into a school 19
setting. It is also important that the academic 20
curriculum be at an appropriate level given [S.G.]’s 21
clear ability. 22
23
Dr. Ditkowsky further emphasized the urgency with which S.G. 24
needed to reintegrate into a school setting and that prolonged 25
home instruction would aggravate his problems. 26
The CSE met a week later to review the December 5, 2001 27
letter from Dr. Ditkowsky. Based on the information before it, 28
the CSE described to the parents several alternative high school 29
programs, including that of the Karafin School, a small day 30

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9
school in Mt. Kisco, New York. The CSE agreed to reconvene at a 1
later date to review further information. 2
In January 2002, S.G. and his parents began visiting the 3
various alternative high school programs. At the same time, the 4
parents sought independent advice from a private organization 5
regarding other private schools. This organization recommended 6
Oakwood Friends School, a Quaker school in Poughkeepsie, New 7
York, that was not approved for the provision of special 8
education services by the New York State Department of Education. 9
Dr. Ditkowsky submitted his final report to the CSE on 10
February 7, 2002. In it, Dr. Ditkowsky provided a more detailed 11
description of S.G.’s disorder: 12
[S.G. has] a history of recurrent symptoms of 13
depression and anxiety, which have interfered in his 14
ability to function well in school. The persistent 15
pattern of symptoms with occasional exacerbations is 16
consistent with a diagnosis of Dysthymia with 17
intermittent Major Depressive Episodes. . . . [H]is 18
school refusal, coupled with his numerous concerns 19
about running into peers in the school, and social 20
withdrawal is suggestive of social anxiety, most likely 21
consistent with Social Phobia. 22
23
Largely echoing his December 5, 2001 recommendations, Dr. 24
Ditkowsky stated that academically S.G. did not appear ready to 25
return to Arlington High School and that he would benefit from 26
placement into a “smaller, therapeutic or more supportive program 27
with a good academic component in order to help him again 28
function in a school setting.” Dr. Ditkowsky explained that 29
“[t]his is especially important, as [S.G.] needs not only the 30

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10
credit, but also the social interaction.” 1
On February 11, 2002, the CSE reconvened, with Dr. Ditkowsky 2
participating by telephone. In response to questions regarding 3
how much psychological support S.G. needed during the school day, 4
Dr. Ditkowsky explained that the environment he recommended would 5
include staff with expertise in anxiety disorders that would be 6
able to work with S.G. should issues associated with his 7
emotional disturbance manifest themselves in the course of the 8
school day. At the same CSE meeting, the parents authorized the 9
release of S.G.’s file to Karafin and the other schools that had 10
been discussed at the previous CSE meeting. 11
The following month, S.G. and his parents visited Karafin 12
and met with the school’s associate director, Dr. Bart Donow. 13
According to the Gagliardos, the visit went poorly. Shortly 14
after the visit to Karafin, the parents hired counsel to assist 15
them in their dealings with the School District. Counsel 16
recommended that neuropsychologist Dr. Marian Rissenberg evaluate 17
S.G. 18
On April 29, 2002, the parents asked for another CSE 19
meeting. In a letter to the School District, they represented 20
that they had visited the various schools discussed in the 21
February 2002 meeting and considered all of them inappropriate 22
for their son. At about the same time, the parents applied for 23
S.G.’s admission to Oakwood and authorized the release of his 24

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11
information to that school. The parents had not mentioned 1
Oakwood to the School District earlier and did not notify the 2
School District that they were taking this step; they did, 3
however, tell Dr. Rissenberg that they hoped their son would 4
attend Oakwood. 5
In a letter dated May 16, the parents notified the School 6
District that its “evaluations of [their] son are not correct in 7
diagnosing his disability, [and] therefore not correct in 8
educating or treating him.” The parents also requested that Dr. 9
Rissenberg evaluate S.G., and the School District agreed. 10
The CSE met on June 7, 2002 to conduct S.G.’s annual review. 11
They reviewed the Gagliardos’ letter explaining their 12
dissatisfaction with the schools they had visited, including 13
Karafin. The parents were asked for suggestions but provided 14
none. The parents were also asked to consent to additional 15
academic skills testing, but they refused because the same 16
testing was to be administered by Dr. Rissenberg. 17
On July 8, 2002, Oakwood accepted S.G. Three days later the 18
CSE met to finalize S.G.’s placement for his senior year. At 19
this meeting, the CSE recommended that S.G. be placed at Karafin, 20
with various program modifications, testing accommodations, and 21
once a week counseling. The CSE continued to request additional 22
academic skills testing, and the parents consented. On July 18 23
and again on July 23, 2002, S.G.’s father wrote to the School 24

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12
District demanding an IEP based on the discussions at the July 11 1
meeting, which the School District furnished on July 29. 2
On August 15, 2002, the parents requested an impartial due 3
process hearing, asserting that Karafin was an inappropriate 4
setting for S.G. He commenced attendance at Oakwood in September 5
2002. 6
In October 2002, while the due process proceedings were 7
pending, Dr. Rissenberg completed her report on S.G.’s 8
evaluation. Her report, in substance, was consistent with that 9
of Dr. Ditkowsky. She found evidence in S.G. of superior 10
intellectual ability, social anxiety, inflexibility, poor social 11
perception, and depressed mood. She opined that his situation 12
was consistent with a diagnoses of Asperger’s syndrome — a mild 13
autistic spectrum disorder — in the context of very superior 14
intellectual capacity. Dr. Rissenberg recommended an alternative 15
academic placement with small classes and an individualized 16
approach, instruction at a high level of conceptual complexity 17
with students whose intellectual capacity was similar to S.G.’s, 18
and discussion-based learning and group participation. She also 19
recommended that S.G. be protected from bullying and ostracizing 20
by peers. Dr. Rissenberg further recommended various supports 21
consistent with an attention deficit disorder, including extended 22
time for tests, preferential seating, help with planning and 23
organization, and individual instruction as needed. Last, she 24

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13
recommended both individual and group therapy. 1
After a total of nine days of hearings, the IHO rendered a 2
final decision dated June 19, 2003. It found that (1) the 3
proposed IEP was reasonably calculated to enable S.G. to receive 4
educational benefits and therefore appropriate; (2) the parents 5
did not meet their burden of demonstrating that Oakwood was an 6
appropriate placement; and (3) equitable considerations weighed 7
against granting the parents’ reimbursement request. 8
Accordingly, the IHO denied the parents’ request for tuition 9
reimbursement. The SRO affirmed the IHO’s decision based on the 10
IHO’s conclusion that the IEP was appropriate to S.G.’s needs. 11
Because this conclusion was sufficient to affirm the IHO, the SRO 12
did not address findings (2) and (3). 13
The parents filed this reimbursement action pursuant to 20 14
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). Both parties moved for summary judgment on 15
the amended complaint. The district court granted the 16
Gagliardos’ motion. Gagliardo, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 578. The 17
district court found, based on its own review of the 18
administrative record and certain additional evidence, that the 19
proposed IEP that specified Karafin was not appropriate 20
principally because Karafin was not the least restrictive 21
environment in which to educate S.G. See id. at 572-75. It 22
further found that Oakwood was an appropriate placement, id. at 23
575-76, and that the parents were equitably entitled to 24

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14
reimbursement, id. at 576-78. Accordingly, the district court 1
awarded the parents tuition reimbursement. Id. at 578. Judgment 2
was entered on March 24, 2006, and this appeal followed. 3
DISCUSSION 4
As we have noted earlier, in order to receive federal 5
funding under the IDEA, a state must provide to all children with 6
disabilities “a free appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 7
1412(a)(1)(A); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180-81. If parents believe 8
that the state has failed their child in this regard, they may, 9
at their own financial risk, enroll the child in a private school 10
and seek retroactive reimbursement for the cost of the private 11
school from the state. See Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington 12
v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985); M.S. ex rel. S.S. v. 13
Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2000). In determining 14
whether parents are entitled to reimbursement, the Supreme Court 15
has established a two part test: (1) was the IEP proposed by the 16
school district inappropriate; (2) was the private placement 17
appropriate to the child’s needs. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 18
370; Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 364 (2d Cir. 2006). 19
The party who commences an impartial hearing — in this case, the 20
parents — bears the burden of persuasion on both Burlington 21
factors. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 57-58 (2005). If 22
parents meet their burden, the district court enjoys broad 23
discretion in considering equitable factors relevant to 24

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15
fashioning relief. See Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. 1
Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993). 2
In this case, the question of whether the Gagliardos carried 3
their burden of demonstrating that the IEP proposed by the School 4
District was inappropriate is a close one. We need not answer 5
it, however, because this case is easily disposed of under part 6
two of the Burlington test. 7
Parents who seek reimbursement bear the burden of 8
demonstrating that their private placement was appropriate, even 9
if the IEP was inappropriate. See M.S., 231 F.3d at 104. 10
Subject to certain limited exceptions, “the same considerations 11
and criteria that apply in determining whether the [s]chool 12
[d]istrict’s placement is appropriate should be considered in 13
determining the appropriateness of the parents’ placement. . . . 14
[T]he issue turns on whether a placement — public or private — is 15
‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 16
benefits.’” Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. 17
at 207 and identifying certain exceptions). A private placement 18
meeting this standard is one that is “likely to produce progress, 19
not regression.” Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 (internal quotation 20
marks omitted). In Frank G., we explained: 21
No one factor is necessarily dispositive in determining 22
whether parents’ unilateral placement is reasonably 23
calculated to enable the child to receive educational 24
benefits. Grades, test scores, and regular advancement 25
may constitute evidence that a child is receiving 26
educational benefit, but courts assessing the propriety 27

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16
of a unilateral placement consider the totality of the 1
circumstances in determining whether that placement 2
reasonably serves a child’s individual needs. To 3
qualify for reimbursement under the IDEA, parents need 4
not show that a private placement furnishes every 5
special service necessary to maximize their child’s 6
potential. They need only demonstrate that the 7
placement provides educational instruction specially 8
designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped 9
child, supported by such services as are necessary to 10
permit the child to benefit from instruction. 11
12
459 F.3d at 364-65 (citations and internal quotation marks 13
14
omitted). 15
In conducting our de novo review of the district court’s 16
holding, we are mindful that the role of the federal courts in 17
reviewing state educational decisions under the IDEA is 18
“circumscribed.” Muller v. Comm. on Special Educ., 145 F.3d 95, 19
101 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 20
427 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In reviewing the 21
administrative proceedings, it is critical to recall that IDEA’s 22
statutory scheme requires substantial deference to state 23
administrative bodies on matters of educational policy.”). 24
Although the district court must engage in an independent review 25
of the administrative record and make a determination based on a 26
“preponderance of the evidence,” Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of 27
Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1120 (2d Cir. 1997), the Supreme Court has 28
cautioned that such review “is by no means an invitation to the 29
courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational 30
policy for those of the school authorities which they review,” 31

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17
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. To the contrary, federal courts 1
reviewing administrative decisions must give “due weight” to 2
these proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally “lack[s] 3
the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve 4
persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” Id. 5
at 206, 208 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6
We applied the Rowley deference standard in Walczak, in 7
which we overturned a district court’s reversal of an SRO’s 8
decision under the IDEA. We noted that, in order for the 9
district court to conduct an “independent” review of the 10
sufficiency of an IEP under the IDEA that does not “impermissibly 11
meddl[e] in state educational methodology,” it must examine the 12
record for “objective evidence” that indicates “whether the child 13
is likely to make progress or regress under the proposed plan.” 14
Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 (quoting Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1121). 15
And in Frank G., we recently noted that the district court is 16
required to employ the same objective evidence standard when 17
ascertaining the appropriateness of a parent’s private placement, 18
see 459 F.3d at 364, always being mindful, of course, that 19
deference to the administrative proceedings is particularly 20
warranted when the district court’s decision is based solely on 21
the administrative record, see id. at 367. 22
In the present case, the district court identified several 23
reasons why it believed that Oakwood was a proper placement for 24

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2 The district court afforded the IHO’s findings on Oakwood no 1
weight, evidently because the SRO discussed only the School 2
District’s proposed placement at Karafin. If a final state 3
determination conflicts with an earlier decision, the earlier 4
decision may be afforded diminished weight. See Karl v. Bd. of 5
Educ., 736 F.2d 873, 877 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that courts owe 6
deference to the final agency determination where the review 7
officer disagrees with the hearing officer); Heather S. v. State, 8
125 F.3d 1045, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding the same and noting 9
that “the ‘due weight’ which the court must give to the hearings 10
below is . . . to the decision of the hearing officers . . . 11
[which] is an easier task where . . . the hearing officers are in 12
accord”). Here, however, the SRO did not reject the IHO’s 13
findings or analysis. To the contrary, the SRO’s decision 14
explicitly noted that the IHO’s findings were supported by the 15
record. 16
18
S.G. Gagliardo, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 575-76. The district court 1
pointed out that Oakwood provided S.G. small classes, with twelve 2
to fifteen students; that Oakwood was “supportive” of his 3
emotional needs because, in addition to the Quaker values of 4
tolerance and respect that it promoted, the school did not allow 5
teasing, bullying, or ostracism; that the traditional classroom 6
setting at Oakwood allowed S.G. to benefit from the sort of group 7
activities and discussions that Dr. Ditkowsky and others who 8
evaluated S.G. deemed crucial to both his academic success and 9
his development of social skills; and that S.G. achieved 10
promising grades while at Oakwood. Id. 11
The district court reached its conclusion despite the fact 12
that the IHO, confronted with the same evidence, found that 13
Oakwood was not an appropriate placement for S.G.2 The IHO 14
explained that the testimony of the parents’ own experts showed 15
that S.G. required a therapeutic setting in order to reasonably 16

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19
assure that he would receive educational benefits as required by 1
Rowley. Such a setting, the IHO noted, required a staff trained 2
in dealing with the special needs attributable to S.G. on account 3
of his emotional disorder. See Frank G., 459 F.3d at 364 (In 4
order for the parent’s private placement to be appropriate under 5
Rowley, it must provide “educational instruction specially 6
designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, 7
supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 8
to benefit from instruction.”). Because Oakwood lacked such a 9
therapeutic setting, the IHO found that it was an inappropriate 10
placement for S.G. 11
The district court’s grounds for disturbing the IHO’s 12
reasoned conclusion are not supported by the record. In 13
rejecting the IHO’s conclusion, the district court emphasized 14
that, according to Dr. Ditkowsky, S.G. did not require a school 15
with a “therapeutic” setting; instead, he needed a school with an 16
environment that was either “therapeutic or supportive.” 17
Gagliardo, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 576. Importing its own view on the 18
latter notion, the district court found that a supportive 19
environment was achieved at Oakwood through a combination of its 20
Quaker values and S.G.’s private therapy. See id. 21
The district court’s reasoning ignores the substance of Dr. 22
Ditkowsky’s recommendations. In the February 11, 2002 CSE 23
meeting, Dr. Ditkowsky clarified what he meant by a “supportive 24

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20
or therapeutic environment” when responding to a CSE member’s 1
question regarding how much psychological support S.G. needed 2
during the school day. Dr. Ditkowsky explained that his 3
recommendation did not hinge on any clinical meaning ascribed to 4
the words therapeutic or supportive; the thrust of his 5
recommendation, rather, was that S.G. be placed in a school where 6
trained professionals could work closely with him and assist him 7
as issues associated with his disorder surfaced throughout the 8
day. At the due process hearing, Dr. Ditkowsky reiterated these 9
comments. He testified that S.G. needed to be placed in a school 10
that had staff trained in dealing with anxiety disorders so as to 11
“help him . . . survive through the day if he really was 12
struggling or suffering.” The record shows, as the IJ noted, 13
that Oakwood did not have a staff of such professionals, and 14
while his private therapy may have been able to help him after 15
school, it was not available throughout the school day. 16
The district court also found that the IHO was incorrect in 17
stating that Oakwood did not have any special education services 18
because literature from the school explains that Oakwood provides 19
students in S.G.’s position with certain forms of academic 20
support. Gagliardo, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 576. The district court 21
further observed that teachers certified in special education are 22
not required for a parental placement to qualify as an 23
appropriate placement for tuition reimbursement. Id. (citing 24

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21
Carter, 510 U.S. at 14). The context of the IHO’s discussion of 1
this issue demonstrates, however, that he was not suggesting 2
Oakwood did not provide special education services as a general 3
matter, but instead that Oakwood did not provide the special 4
education services specifically needed by S.G. — namely, an 5
educational setting consistent with Dr. Ditkowsky’s 6
recommendation. Oakwood’s own Upper School Head supported this 7
finding in her testimony at the due process hearing to the effect 8
that Oakwood does not provide the kind of special education 9
services that S.G.’s condition required. 10
In sum, the IHO’s finding that Oakwood was not an 11
appropriate placement for S.G. is reasoned and supported by the 12
record, including the history of S.G.’s struggle with his 13
emotional disturbance and his resulting inability to attend 14
school. We see no reason for the district court to have 15
disturbed it. Because tuition reimbursement is available only 16
for an appropriate private school placement, we reverse the 17
district court’s judgment ordering the School District to 18
reimburse the parents for the cost of S.G.’s tuition at Oakwood. 19
We finally add a word about the position a district court 20
finds itself in where, as here, it is called upon to review a 21
case in which parents have enrolled their disabled child in a 22
private school, believing it to be the best thing for the child, 23
and can point to their child’s record of success at the school 24

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22
they chose. It is understandable that a district court would be 1
receptive to parents under these circumstances; a child’s 2
progress is relevant to the court’s review. But such progress 3
does not itself demonstrate that a private placement was 4
appropriate. See Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 5
522 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[E]vidence of academic progress at a 6
private school does not itself establish that the private 7
placement offers adequate and appropriate education under the 8
IDEA.”); Rafferty v. Cranston Pub. Sch. Comm., 315 F.3d 21, 26-27 9
(1st Cir. 2002) (same). Indeed, even where there is evidence of 10
success, courts should not disturb a state’s denial of IDEA 11
reimbursement where, as here, the chief benefits of the chosen 12
school are the kind of educational and environmental advantages 13
and amenities that might be preferred by parents of any child, 14
disabled or not. A unilateral private placement is only 15
appropriate if it provides “education instruction specifically 16
designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child.” Frank 17
G., 459 F.3d at 365 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89) 18
(emphasis added). 19
CONCLUSION 20
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the 21
district court and REMAND with instructions to enter judgment in 22
favor of the School District. 23

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