Arlene Faye Hatten v. United States

NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ARLENE FAYE HATTEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1558
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:24-cv-01303-ZNS, Judge Zachary N. Somers.
______________________
ON MOTION
______________________
Before TARANTO, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM.
O R D E R
In this appeal from the United States Court of Federal
Claims, Peter Joseph Polinski submits a “brief” on behalf
of, and signed by, Arlene Faye Hatten, seeking various re-
lief. ECF No. 8. The United States opposes those requests
and moves for summary affirmance. ECF No. 15. Mr.
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HATTEN v. US 2
Polinski and Ms. Hatten reply out of time and oppose sum-
mary affirmance. ECF No. 22.1
In her complaint filed with the Court of Federal
Claims, Ms. Hatten alleges, among other things, that her
home was “wrongfully taken without due process” and
names several state and local government officials and pri-
vate entities as defendants.2 She asserts they committed
various federal crimes (U.S. Code, title 18), violated title 42
and her constitutional rights, made “defamatory state-
ments against the plaintiff,” and committed “gross negli-
gence.”3 The United States moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
In granting the United States’s motion, the Court of
Federal Claims read the complaint as being directed
against state and local officials and private entities rather
than the United States and therefore concluded that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. More generally, it held
that Ms. Hatten’s claims cannot serve as a basis for invok-
ing its jurisdiction, reasoning that (1) it lacked jurisdiction
over criminal matters and torts; (2) jurisdiction over claims
under title 42 lies in federal district court, not the Court of
Federal Claims; (3) the constitutional provisions invoked
other than the Takings Clause are not money-mandating;
and (4) Ms. Hatten failed to plead that the federal govern-
ment had anything to do with the taking of her property or
1 ECF No. 22 supersedes a prior version of the docu-
ment docketed as ECF No. 21. No action will be taken on
ECF No. 21.
2 ECF No. 15 at Appx13, 16, and 19.
3 Id. at Appx25–26.
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HATTEN v. US 3
any of the other alleged violations of law.4 On December
20, 2024, the Court of Federal Claims entered judgment.
On February 20, 2025, Mr. Polinski filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court’s December 2024 judgment.
That same day, the Court of Federal Claims ordered the
motion stricken from the docket because Mr. Polinski was
not barred in that court, ECF No. 15 at Appx1 (citing Rules
11(a) and 83.1(c) of the Court of Federal Claims (RCFC)).
On March 17, 2025, a formal notice of appeal, signed only
by Mr. Polinski, was filed from the February 2025 order.
On April 7, 2025, a “brief” signed by Ms. Hatten was filed
in this appeal, ECF No. 4, which we liberally construe as
her notice to also appeal from the final judgment. See
Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829, 830–31 (7th
Cir. 1986).
This court lacks jurisdiction to review the Court of Fed-
eral Claims’s December 2024 judgment, because Ms. Hat-
ten did not file an appeal from that judgment within the
60-day deadline provided by 28 U.S.C. §§ 25225 and
4 Although recognizing that her filings discussed the
Takings Clause, the court found that the “Plaintiff does not
plausibly allege a taking by the United States” since, in Ms.
Hatten’s own words, “her property was taken, not by the
United States, but by private entities and local officials.”
ECF No. 15 at Appx7.
5 Section 2522 provides: “Review of a decision of the
United States Court of Federal Claims shall be obtained by
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the Court of Fed-
eral Claims within the time and in the manner prescribed
for appeals to United States courts of appeals from the
United States district courts.”
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HATTEN v. US 4
2107(b),6 see Marandola v. United States, 518 F.3d 913, 914
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding deadline to be jurisdictional); cf.
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 438–39 (2011) (indi-
cating materially identical language in 38 U.S.C. § 7292 is
jurisdictional), and there was no timely filing of one of the
post-judgment motions that can toll the time to appeal the
underlying judgment.
We have jurisdiction to consider the order striking the
motion for reconsideration as the notice of appeal was
timely filed from that order (but the appeal of that order
“does not bring up the underlying judgment for review,”
Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7
(1978)). We agree with the government, however, that
summary affirmance of the order denying reconsideration
is appropriate because there is no “substantial question re-
garding the outcome.” Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d
378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The Court of
Federal Claims’s rules require that plaintiffs proceed pro
se or be “represented by an attorney . . . admitted to prac-
tice before [that] court,” RCFC 83.1(c); see also RCFC 11(a)
(requiring papers filed at that court to be signed by counsel
or the party if unrepresented). That rule fully accords with
the practice of Article III courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
There is no dispute that Mr. Polinski was attempting to
represent Ms. Hatten but is not a barred attorney. See
ECF No. 1-2.
The opening brief makes no non-frivolous, cogent argu-
ment that could support a different conclusion than the one
reached by the trial court in this case. The opening brief
appears to argue that RCFC 83.1(c) unfairly restricts Mr.
Polinski’s ability to serve as a “Private Attorney General
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” ECF No. 9 at 6. But nothing in
6 Section 2107(b) provides that in district court cases
involving the United States, the time to appeal as to all
parties is 60 days from the entry of judgment.
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HATTEN v. US 5
that statute authorized Mr. Polinski to act on behalf of oth-
ers as he sought to do here. See Class v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, 734 F. App’x 634, 636 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[N]othing
about the ‘private attorney general’ doctrine’s fee-shifting
provision authorizes non-attorneys to bring claims on be-
half of others.”). We have considered the remaining argu-
ments raised in the brief and find them unavailing.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) ECF No. 22 is accepted for filing.
(2) The United States’s motion for summary affir-
mance is granted to the extent that the appeal is dismissed
as to final judgment and summarily affirmed as to the
Court of Federal Claims’s order striking the motion for re-
consideration.
(3) All other pending motions are denied.
(4) Each party shall bear its own costs.
August 12, 2025
Date
FOR THE COURT
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