Cornelius B. Murry v. United States Postal Service

NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition is not
citable as precedent. It is a public record.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-3117
CORNELIUS B. MURRY,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
Respondent.
______________________
DECIDED: April 6, 2005
______________________
Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and LINN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
DECISION
Cornelius B. Murry petitions for review of the decision of the Merit Systems
Protection Board affirming his removal from his position as a tractor-trailer driver for the
United States Postal Service (“USPS” or “agency”). Murry v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. CH-
0752-02-0353-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 31, 2002) (“Decision”). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Murry was employed as a tractor-trailer operator at the USPS in St. Louis,
Missouri. In December 2001, Michael Hagan, a USPS supervisor who investigated
Murry’s work performance, informed Murry that his removal was being proposed on the

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basis of two charges: (1) deviation from his work assignment, and (2) failure to perform
his duty in a satisfactory manner. Decision, slip op. at 2. Under the first charge, Hagan
stated that he had seen Murry operating his tractor, an agency vehicle, off his assigned
route on personal business during lunchtime without authorization on December 14,
2001. Id., slip op. at 4-7. Relating to the second charge, Hagan stated that on
December 19, 2001, Murry was untimely for a work assignment, did not deliver a pouch
of registered mail in accordance with USPS policy, and failed to clock out after his shift.
Id., slip op. at 7-8. In addition to his own personal observations, Hagan relied on the
statements and observations of various USPS employees, including other tractor-trailer
operators and Leland Stamm, Transportation Operations Supervisor. The agency
deciding official, George Nicholson, ultimately sustained the charges outlined by Hagan,
and the USPS removed Murry from his position, effective February 2002.
Murry appealed to the Board in March 2002, and the Administrative Judge (“AJ”)
to whom the case was assigned conducted a hearing in June 2002. Murry argued that
he had a car accident involving his personal vehicle on December 14, 2001, during his
lunch break and that he had not used his tractor for personal business. Murry also
claimed that he had not been properly trained on the handling of registered mail and
that he did in fact clock out after completing his December 19, 2001 shift. The AJ heard
testimony from several witnesses, including Hagan, Stamm, and Murry himself. Teddy
Goodman, another USPS tractor-trailer operator, and Lance Murphy, a police officer in
East St. Louis and a friend of Murry, also testified at the hearing.
In a lengthy and detailed opinion, the AJ determined that the agency had
established the factual bases of its charges by a preponderance of the evidence. The
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AJ found Murry’s explanation for using his tractor during his lunch break not credible.
Instead, the AJ determined that the story was apparently fabricated to conceal Murry’s
use of the tractor and the circumstances of the car accident because they could have
led to the discovery that he had been operating the tractor on an invalid, suspended
driver’s license. Id., slip op. at 23-24. Furthermore, the AJ determined that Murry knew
or should have known that he was violating USPS policy regarding the delivery of
registered mail. Id., slip op. at 25-26. The AJ also considered the agency’s evidence of
Murry’s past disciplinary actions in concluding that the penalty of removal was
reasonable, and he affirmed the agency’s action. Id., slip op. at 31-35.
Murry petitioned for review by the full Board, which denied his petition in October
2003, making the initial decision of the AJ final. See Loui v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 25
F.3d 1011, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b) (2004). Murry then timely
appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
DISCUSSION
The scope of our review in an appeal from a decision of the Board is limited. We
must affirm the Board’s decision unless it was: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures
required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2000); see Briggs v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A board decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence when it lacks “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750
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F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)).
On appeal, Murry argues at length that the AJ should have credited his testimony
and Murphy’s testimony over that of other witnesses, in particular Hagan and Goodman.
We disagree. We have stated previously that the evaluation of witness credibility is a
matter within the discretion of the AJ and is “virtually unreviewable.” King v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 133 F.3d 1450, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Clark v. Dep’t of
the Army, 997 F.2d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Here, the AJ discussed the testimony
of all witnesses in great detail. On the one hand, he found the testimony of Hagan and
Goodman to be credible and consistent; on the other hand, he found that Murry’s
testimony during the hearing was “vague, implausible, and inconsistent,” noting that it
sometimes conflicted with the statements that Murry made at a prior deposition.
Decision, slip op. at 14, 23. The AJ’s credibility determinations do not amount to an
abuse of discretion, and we decline to disturb them on appeal.
Murry also challenges the reasonableness of the penalty of removal, arguing that
it was too severe an action relative to what other USPS employees received for similar
misconduct. We have held that the “[d]etermination of an appropriate penalty is a
matter committed primarily to the sound discretion of the employing agency.” Hunt v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 758 F.2d 608, 611 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, the
government points out that the individuals that Murry argues were given preferential
treatment did in fact receive removal notices for their misconduct. Murry has not shown
that the agency imposed a penalty that is “so harsh and unconscionably
disproportionate to the offense that it amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Villela v.
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Dep’t of the Air Force, 727 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Power v. United
States, 531 F.2d 505, 507 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
Finally, Murry asserts that the AJ focused too narrowly on only some of the
factors set forth in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).
On the contrary, we determine that the AJ examined the totality of the circumstances,
including, for example, Murry’s past disciplinary record and the nature and seriousness
of the misconduct. We discern no error in the AJ’s thorough analysis.
We have considered Murry’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
and was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Board.
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