USA v. James Medard

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10009
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES MEDARD,
a.k.a. James Menard,
a.k.a. James Joseph,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 1 of 12

-- 1 of 12 --

2 Opinion of the Court 22-10009
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20241-KMW-1
____________________
Before GRANT, LAGOA, and BRASHER , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Medard appeals his convictions and total sentence of
81 months’ imprisonment for wire fraud and aggravated identity
theft. He argues that his guilty plea and his waiver of the right to
appeal his sentence are invalid because neither was knowingly and
voluntarily entered, and he challenges his sentence on several
grounds. We conclude that both Medard’s guilty plea and his sen-
tence appeal waiver were knowing and voluntary, and we there-
fore affirm.
I.
A federal grand jury charged Medard with thirteen counts of
wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; seven counts of money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957; and four counts of ag-
gravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Medard
entered into a written plea agreement with the government in
which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of wire fraud (Count
9 of the indictment) and two counts of aggravated identity theft
(Counts 22 and 23), and the government agreed to dismiss the re-
maining charges. Medard also agreed to waive his right to appeal
his sentence except if the district court imposed a sentence above
the statutory maximum or above the Sentencing Guidelines range
calculated by the court at sentencing, or if the government
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 2 of 12

-- 2 of 12 --

22-10009 Opinion of the Court 3
appealed. Medard and his counsel each signed the plea agreement
and a supporting factual proffer.
The district court conducted a change-of-plea hearing pur-
suant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Medard was
competent and aware of the nature of the charges and the conse-
quences of pleading guilty; and that his plea was knowing, volun-
tary, and supported by an independent basis in fact satisfying each
of the essential elements of the offenses. The court therefore ac-
cepted his guilty plea and adjudicated him guilty as charged in
Counts 9, 22, and 23 of the indictment.
At sentencing, the district court calculated a Guidelines
range of 33–41 months in prison for Count 9, which carried a stat-
utory sentence of 0–20 years. Counts 22 and 23 each carried a man-
datory statutory penalty of two years in prison. The district court
imposed a total sentence of 81 months in prison, consisting of 33
months for Count 9 and 24 months consecutive for each of Counts
22 and 23, all followed by three years of supervised release. Medard
now appeals.
II.
A guilty plea may be invalid if it is not entered knowingly
and voluntarily.
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005);
United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005).
Rule 11 sets out steps that a district court must take during a
change-of-plea hearing to ensure that a defendant’s guilty plea is
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 3 of 12

-- 3 of 12 --

4 Opinion of the Court 22-10009
knowing and voluntary.
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58
(2002). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must spe-
cifically address the three “core principles” of Rule 11 by “ensuring
that a defendant: (1) enters his guilty plea free from coercion,
(2) understands the nature of the charges, and (3) understands the
consequences of his plea.”
Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019.
Medard does not contend that his guilty plea was coerced;
he argues that he was not adequately informed of the nature of the
charges against him and (to some extent) the consequences of his
plea. He failed to raise these issues in the district court, so our re-
view is for plain error only.
Id. at 1018–19. The failure to address
any of Rule 11’s core principles constitutes prejudicial plain error.
United States v. Telemaque, 244 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001).
Medard argues that flaws in the indictment and plea process
made it impossible for him to understand the nature of the charges
against him. Specifically, he argues that (1) the indictment was con-
fusing because Counts 22 and 23 (the aggravated identity theft
counts) each charged him with three counts of wire fraud, (2) the
district court failed to adequately explain the elements of the
charged offenses, and (3) the court erred in finding that the charges
were supported by a sufficient factual basis.
Whether the court adequately informed the defendant of
the nature of the charges against him “turns on a variety of factors,
including the complexity of the offense and the defendant’s intelli-
gence and education.”
Id. Rule 11 does not specifically require that
the court separately outline each element of each offense during
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 4 of 12

-- 4 of 12 --

22-10009 Opinion of the Court 5
the plea colloquy; a statement by the court that incorporates “the
substance of those elements” may be sufficient.
United States v.
Wiggins, 131 F.3d 1440, 1442–43 (11th Cir. 1997). For simple
charges, “a reading of the indictment, followed by an opportunity
given the defendant to ask questions about it, will usually suffice.”
Id. at 1443 (quotation omitted). In other cases, “a factual proffer
may set forth in such detail the facts of the crime that it effectively
incorporates the substance of the elements of the offense.”
United
States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2018).
The district court adequately addressed the Rule 11’s second
core principle here. The charges of wire fraud and aggravated iden-
tity theft were not complex, and Medard’s education and experi-
ence lend weight to his testimony at the plea hearing that he un-
derstood the charges against him. He has college and graduate de-
grees in business administration and business management, and he
has also owned or run several businesses, including businesses in
finance and tax preparation. During the plea colloquy, the court
questioned Medard about his background and education, and it ad-
vised him that he could ask questions of the court or consult with
his attorney at any time during the hearing. The court confirmed
that Medard had read the indictment and reviewed it and discussed
the charges, the government’s evidence, and his defenses with his
attorney. It read the portions of the indictment containing the fac-
tual allegations and charges that were the subject of Medard’s
guilty plea, and it confirmed that Medard understood those
charges. It also informed Medard in clear terms of the elements of
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 5 of 12

-- 5 of 12 --

6 Opinion of the Court 22-10009
wire fraud and aggravated identity theft and confirmed that
Medard understood what the government would have to prove.
Specifically, the court informed Medard that to prove the of-
fense of wire fraud charged in Count 9, the government would
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he knowingly
devised or participated in a scheme to defraud or obtain money or
property by using false pretenses, representations, or promises;
(2) the false pretenses, representations, or promises were about a
material fact; (3) he acted with the intent to defraud; and (4) he
transmitted or caused to be transmitted by wire some communica-
tion in interstate commerce to help carry out the scheme to de-
fraud.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1343;
United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d
1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009). Regarding the aggravated identity theft
charges, the court explained that the government would have to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Medard knowingly trans-
ferred, possessed, or used another person’s means of identification;
(2) he did so without lawful authority; (3) the other person was a
real person; and (4) Medard did these things during and in relation
to another felony alleged in the indictment—in this case, the wire
fraud offenses charged in Counts 7, 9, and 12.
See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A;
United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1192 (11th Cir.
2011). Medard confirmed under oath that he understood the
charges and their elements.
Contrary to Medard’s argument, the indictment did not
charge multiple crimes in each count of aggravated identity theft.
The indictment alleged that the four specific aggravated-identity-
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 6 of 12

-- 6 of 12 --

22-10009 Opinion of the Court 7
theft offenses charged in Counts 21–24 were committed “during
and in relation to” the felony wire fraud offenses charged in Counts
7, 9, and 12. The indictment then provided more specific details of
the charged offenses for each count, showing that the unauthorized
use of personal identifying information in various loan documents
described in the aggravated-identity-theft counts was related to the
electronic transmission of those documents alleged in the three
specified wire-fraud counts. Because one element of the offense of
aggravated identity theft is that the offense be committed “during
and in relation to” wire fraud or another enumerated felony of-
fense, the indictment’s allegation that each aggravated-identity-
theft count was committed during or in relation to the specified
wire-fraud offenses was necessary to fully charge a single offense of
aggravated identity theft; it did not make the count duplicitous.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5).
As to the factual basis for Medard’s guilty plea, the district
court referred Medard to the seven-page factual proffer that
Medard signed in connection with his plea agreement, confirming
that Medard had “thoroughly read and review[ed] it” and thor-
oughly reviewed it with his attorney—including asking any ques-
tions he might have had about the language in the document and
having those questions answered in full by his attorney—and that
Medard had signed the factual proffer and initialed any changes.
The court also confirmed that Medard agreed that the factual prof-
fer accurately described his conduct with respect to the crimes
charged.
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 7 of 12

-- 7 of 12 --

8 Opinion of the Court 22-10009
The factual proffer established an adequate factual basis for
Medard’s guilty plea. It described Medard’s scheme of knowingly
and intentionally submitting fraudulent loan applications to the
Small Business Administration using the SBA’s online portal—de-
spite the fact that, as a convicted felon who was on supervised re-
lease at the time, Medard was ineligible for the loans. The loan
applications contained material misrepresentations and falsified
supporting documents about who owned the relevant businesses,
the number of people employed there, or about the businesses’ fi-
nances. Two of the applications were granted, and Medard spent
the loan proceeds on personal expenditures.
With respect to Count 9 (wire fraud), the factual proffer
stated that as part of his scheme, Medard electronically submitted
an Economic Injury Disaster Loan application that concealed his
identity by (among other things) using the Social Security number
of a minor child (A.L.) as his own. Regarding Count 22, the proffer
stated that Medard electronically submitted a Paycheck Protection
Plan loan application that falsely identified J.M.—who Medard
knew to be a real person—as an employee of the company seeking
the loan, without J.M.’s permission. (The electronic submission of
the fraudulent loan application containing J.M.’s name was charged
as wire fraud in Count 7 of the indictment.) And in support of
Count 23, the proffer stated that Medard used the Social Security
number of A.L., a minor child, on an Economic Injury Disaster
Loan application that he submitted electronically (which corre-
sponded to the wire fraud charged in Count 9).
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 8 of 12

-- 8 of 12 --

22-10009 Opinion of the Court 9
As to the third “core principle,” ensuring that the defendant
understands the consequences of his plea, Rule 11 provides that be-
fore the court may accept a guilty plea, it “must inform the defend-
ant of, and determine that the defendant understands” any applica-
ble maximum or mandatory minimum penalty; any applicable for-
feiture; the court’s authority to order restitution; and the court’s
obligation to impose a special assessment. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(b)(1)(H)-(L). A court’s failure to advise a defendant of each
of the enumerated items, even if preserved, is harmless error if
there is no reasonable probability that the error affected his deci-
sion to plead guilty.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h);
Dominguez Beni-
tez, 542 U.S. at 81.
Medard argues briefly that the district court failed to accu-
rately inform him of the statutory term of imprisonment for aggra-
vated identity theft and of the applicable forfeiture, but his argu-
ment is contradicted by the record. The district court advised
Medard during the plea colloquy that each count of aggravated
identity theft carried a mandatory statutory penalty of two years in
prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. In discussing the plea agreement, the
court also confirmed that the parties had agreed to recommend
that the two-year terms of imprisonment for the two aggravated-
identity-theft charges run consecutively to each other and to the
sentence for wire fraud, so that Medard would be sentenced to at
least four years in prison regardless of what sentence the court im-
posed for the wire-fraud offense. The court also confirmed that
Medard had agreed to a forfeiture money judgment in the amount
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 9 of 12

-- 9 of 12 --

10 Opinion of the Court 22-10009
of $310,000 and to the forfeiture of certain real property. Medard’s
question during the plea colloquy about whether he would get an
interim accounting after the forfeited real property was sold did not
reflect any confusion about the forfeiture as a consequence of his
guilty plea.
III.
We turn next to Medard’s argument that the sentence ap-
peal waiver in his plea agreement was invalid, an issue that we re-
view de novo.
United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th
Cir. 2008). An appeal waiver is valid and enforceable if it was made
knowingly and voluntarily.
Id. The government can establish that
a waiver was knowing and voluntary by showing “either that:
(1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about
the waiver; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant other-
wise understood the full significance of the waiver.”
Id. For exam-
ple, we have held that an appeal waiver was valid where the waiver
was set out in the plea agreement and the defendant confirmed
during the plea colloquy that she had read and understood the en-
tire agreement, including the appeal waiver provision, and that she
had agreed to the waiver provision freely and voluntarily.
United
States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001). Our
“touchstone for assessing” whether a defendant entered a waiver
knowingly and voluntarily is whether the district court “clearly
convey[ed] to [the defendant] that he was giving up his right to
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 10 of 12

-- 10 of 12 --

22-10009 Opinion of the Court 11
appeal under
most circumstances.”
United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d
1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020) (alterations and emphasis in original).
We are satisfied, based on the plea agreement and the plea
colloquy, that Medard entered his sentence appeal waiver know-
ingly and voluntarily. The plea agreement clearly provided that
Medard was waiving his right to appeal any sentence imposed, un-
less the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum sentence or the
Sentencing Guidelines range calculated by the court. The provi-
sion also stated that if the government chose to exercise its right to
appeal the sentence, Medard would be released from the appeal
waiver. During the plea colloquy, the court confirmed that
Medard had thoroughly reviewed the plea agreement with his at-
torney and understood the parties’ respective obligations under the
agreement. The court specifically discussed the appeal-waiver pro-
vision with Medard, confirming that he understood that he was
generally giving up his right to appeal his sentence, except if the
sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or the guideline range
determined by the court. Medard’s sentence appeal waiver is
therefore valid, and since none of the enumerated exceptions ap-
ply, we decline to consider his arguments challenging the sentence
imposed.
See Weaver, 275 F.3d at 1333.
IV.
The district court here fully addressed Rule 11’s core princi-
ples during the change-of-plea hearing, ensuring that Medard’s
guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The plea col-
loquy and the written and signed plea agreement also establish that
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 11 of 12

-- 11 of 12 --

12 Opinion of the Court 22-10009
Medard entered his sentence appeal waiver knowingly and volun-
tarily, so that the waiver is valid and enforceable. We therefore
affirm Medard’s conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 22-10009 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 04/25/2023 Page: 12 of 12

-- 12 of 12 --