Vinodh Raghubir, et al. v. Bonnie Jean Parrish, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11932
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
VINODH RAGHUBIR,
ALL U.S. CITIZENS WITHIN 11TH CIRCUIT BOUNDARIES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
BONNIE JEAN PARRISH,
Florida Attorney General’s Office,
ORANGE COUNTY CLERK,
5TH DCA,
WENDY BERGER,
USDC Orlando,
G. KENDALL SHARP,
USDC Orlando, et al.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11932
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-01883-GKS-GJK
____________________
Before W ILSON, R OSENBAUM , and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Vinodh Raghubir appeals
pro se the district court’s sua
sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint, as
well as the court’s subsequent orders denying his first Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion to vacate that dismissal, and deny-
ing his second motion to vacate, which had challenged the denial
of his first motion to vacate. After careful review, we affirm.
Raghubir argues that the district judge assigned to
Raghubir’s case erred in failing to recuse because the district judge
was a named defendant in the complaint. Raghubir also argues that
the district court erred in determining that absolute immunity pro-
tected the other named defendants, who were (1) an employee at
the Florida Attorney General’s Office; (2) the Orange County, Flor-
ida, Clerk of Court; (3) the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal;
and (4) other federal judges. Raghubir contends that he should
have been released from prison and should have received
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21-11932 Opinion of the Court 3
$65 million in damages. He also argues that all of the federal judges
within this Circuit should recuse themselves from his case.
First, we address whether all the federal judges in this Circuit
should recuse themselves from this case. Second, we discuss
whether the district judge should have recused himself. Third, we
discuss whether the district court erred in dismissing Raghubir’s
complaint and denying his motions for reconsideration.
I.
First, Raghubir argues that all the judges within this Circuit
should recuse themselves from his case. Under the “rule of neces-
sity,” we have held that a judge need not recuse himself or herself,
even if he or she is a named defendant, if all but one of the judges
on the court are also named defendants, such that the case cannot
be heard by a panel of judges who are not named defendants.
Bolin
v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). In
Bolin, we noted that the rule of necessity “is generally invoked in
cases in which no judge in the country is capable of hearing the
case.”
Id. at 1238. But because the plaintiffs in
Bolin indiscrimi-
nately named as parties all but one of the then-current judges on
our Court, regardless of whether any particular judge participated
in the plaintiffs’ prior appeals, we could not convene a panel in
which none of the judges had a personal interest in the case.
Id. at
1239. Thus, we determined that the rule of necessity allowed at
least a panel of judges who had not been involved in the plaintiffs’
prior appeals to hear the case.
Id.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11932
Here, the rule of necessity permits us to rule on Raghubir’s
case, as he has attempted to name every federal judge within this
Circuit as a defendant. We accordingly find that all of the federal
judges of this Circuit need not recuse themselves from Raghubir’s
case simply because he has named them as defendants.
II.
Second, Raghubir argues that the district court judge as-
signed to Raghubir’s case erred in failing to recuse because the dis-
trict judge was a named defendant. We review for an abuse of dis-
cretion a judge’s decision whether to recuse himself.
Thomas v.
Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2002)
(per curiam).
We have held that “a district judge must recuse himself ‘in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned.’”
Thomas, 293 F.3d at 1329 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)). A
district judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned when
“an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain signifi-
cant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
Id. (quotation marks
omitted). A judge must also recuse himself when, among other
circumstances, he “[i]s a party to the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(5)(i). Thus, § 455(b) “sets forth specific circumstances re-
quiring recusal, which establish the fact of partiality.”
United States
v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003).
We may review violations of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b), gov-
erning disqualification of federal judges, for harmless error.
Parker
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21-11932 Opinion of the Court 5
v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1988). But
harmless-error review “is neither categorically available nor cate-
gorically unavailable for all § 455(a) violations.”
Murray v. Scott,
253 F.3d 1308, 1313 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted, alterations adopted).
The district judge should have recused from this matter be-
cause he was a named defendant. But this error is harmless be-
cause, as discussed below, Raghubir’s complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.1
III.
Last, Raghubir argues that the district court erred in dismiss-
ing his complaint by finding that absolute immunity protected the
other named defendants.
We liberally construe
pro se filings.
Sconiers v. Lockhart,
946 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020). Section 1915A of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that the district court shall
pre-screen “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a gov-
ernmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Then, the district court
must identify any cognizable claims, or dismiss the complaint—or
1 Further, in his second motion to vacate (reconsider), Raghubir lists all the
judges in the district court to try to conflict out all the judges. Just as the rule
of necessity permits a panel of this Circuit to hear Raghubir’s appeal, despite
his efforts to conflict out all of the judges, the rule of necessity also allowed
the district judge to rule on his motion to vacate.
See Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239.
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11932
any part of it—if it, among other things, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from defend-
ants who are immune from such relief.
Id. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). A
dismissal for failure to state a claim under the PLRA may be with
or without prejudice.
See Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct.
1721, 1725 (2020). We review de novo a district court’s dismissal
of a complaint for failure to state a claim, “accept[ing] the allega-
tions in the complaint as true and constru[ing] them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948,
952 (11th Cir. 2021).
A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim based on the affirmative defense of judicial immunity “when
the defense is an obvious bar given the allegations.”
Sibley v.
Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). We review de
novo the grant of absolute judicial immunity.
Smith v. Shook,
237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001).
A judge acting within his judicial capacity2 is entitled to ab-
solute judicial immunity, and is not subject to civil suits for dam-
ages, unless he acted “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
Bolin,
225 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). Absolute ju-
dicial immunity applies “regardless of whether [the judge] made a
2 A judge’s actions were made within his judicial capacity if: “(1) the act com-
plained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the
judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending
before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to
the judge in his judicial capacity.”
Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070.
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21-11932 Opinion of the Court 7
mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded his authority.”
McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018). Court
clerks “have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising
from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or
at a judge’s direction.”
Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th
Cir. Unit A 1981).3 Similarly, a “prosecutor enjoys absolute im-
munity from allegations stemming from the prosecutor’s function
as advocate.”
Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
In Raghubir’s complaint he names the following as defend-
ants: (1) an employee at the Florida Attorney General’s Office;
(2) the Orange County, Florida, Clerk of Court; (3) the Florida
Fifth District Court of Appeal; and (4) three federal judges.
Raghubir largely complains about the outcome of his prior cases in
the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal and the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the as-
sociated judges harmed him while acting in their judicial capacities.
Thus, because Raghubir complains about actions that were taken
when they were acting in their judicial capacity, the defendant-
judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
See Bolin,
225 F.3d at 1239.
3 We are bound by decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before
October 1, 1981.
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981) (en banc).
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-11932
Because the Orange County Clerk of Court’s actions arise
from duties that were given by judge’s orders, the Clerk is entitled
to absolute immunity.
See Tarter, 646 F.2d at 1013. Because the
actions taken by Bonnie Jean Parrish from the Florida Attorney
General’s Office were prosecutorial actions, she enjoys similar
prosecutorial absolute immunity.
See Hart, 587 F.3d at 1295.
Also, Raghubir’s primary claim for release from detention
cannot be brought in a Section 1983 claim.
See Boyd v. Warden,
Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 865 (11th Cir. 2017) (A plain-
tiff seeking to invalidate “his conviction or sentence or change the
nature or duration of his sentence” must bring any such claims in a
habeas corpus action, not under § 1983.).
Raghubir also argues that the district court erred in denying
his motions to vacate its dismissal, which the district court con-
strued as motions for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). A district court may relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for reasons including “fraud . . .
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;” “the
judgment is void”; or “any other reason that justifies relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (4), (6). We generally review the district
court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion.
Grif-
fin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984).
In his motions, Raghubir restates his original claims or raises
unsupported allegations. None of those allegations meet any rea-
son under Rule 60 for the district court to relieve Raghubir from
the prior dismissal of his complaint.
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21-11932 Opinion of the Court 9
Thus, Raghubir’s complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted because all of the defendants were
protected by absolute immunity, and his primary claim was for re-
lease, which is unavailable under § 1983. Further, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Raghubir’s two motions to
vacate under Rule 60(b) because he did not show fraud, miscon-
duct, a judicial mistake, or any compelling justification under Rule
60(b) for the requested action.
AFFIRMED.4
4 We also deny Raghubir’s pending motions to take judicial notice.
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