Amanda Mowell v. City of Milton, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-13635
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-00605-CAP

AMANDA MOWELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF MILTON,
GEORGIA, CHARLES IVY,

Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 23, 2020)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Following her arrest for various offenses under Georgia law, Appellant
Amanda Mowell sued Appellee Officer Charles Ivy of the Milton Police
Department and the City of Milton, Georgia, asserting several state-law tort claims
as well as a false-arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She now appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Ivy and the Milton
Police Department. Mowell argues the district court erred in concluding Officer
Ivy was entitled to qualified immunity. After review, we reverse the district
co urt’s grant of summary judgment, concluding there are issues of material fact
that preclude a determination as to Officer Ivy’s entitlement to qualified immunity.
I. BACKGROUND
The events that resulted in Mowell’s arrest were the culmination of an
ongoing dispute between Mowell and a coworker of hers, Brankica (Pavlov)
Ergotic, who at the time was renting a room from Mowell. While the facts relating
to the underlying feud are not in dispute, many of the salient facts surrounding the
arrest itself are. We briefly review the undisputed facts before laying out the
conflicting versions of the arrest itself.
A. The Dispute
Around September 2015, Mowell permitted her subordinate coworker,
Ergotic and Ergotic’s young son to rent the downstairs bedroom of her townhouse
for $600 a month. No formal lease agreement was signed, and Ergotic was not
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given a key to the residence. At the time, Mowell also lived with her two minor
children and her then-girlfriend Michelle Stump.
On January 24, 2016, Mowell discovered her washing machine (which
Ergotic also used) was broken when she attempted to use the machine, and it
flooded the floor of the laundry room. Believing Ergotic had overloaded the
machine the night before, Mowell texted Ergotic to inform her the machine was
broken, and asked her to chip in to replace the washing machine. What followed
was a series of increasingly hostile text messages and phone calls between the two.
While their correspondence began as a fight about the washing machine, it
devolved into an argument about their living situation in general, and culminated in
the two agreeing Ergotic would move out of the residence.
While the two originally agreed Ergotic would be out by the end of the
month (January), Ergotic, at a later point in the conversation, indicated she would
need more time to remove her belongings and that Mowell would have to evict her.
In response, Mowell advised she would place some of Ergotic’s belongings—
enough to get her through a couple of days—on the sidewalk outside the house that
day. According to Mowell, she decided to do this because Ergotic had threatened
her during the course of their telephone conversations, saying “you just wait till I
get home.”

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B. Mowell’s Arrest
Upon returning to the residence and finding her belongings on the sidewalk,
Ergotic called the Milton Police Department for assistance. Officer Ivy was the
first to arrive on the scene, where he observed several personal belongings placed
near the street in front of the residence. Officer Ivy approached the residence,
knocked, and, when Mowell answered the door, questioned her about why
someone’s personal property was in the yard. Mowell explained the argument with
Ergotic over the washing machine, and she told Officer Ivy she did not want
Ergotic in the house around her small children because Ergotic had threatened her
and Mowell believed she was on drugs. Officer Ivy believed Mowell smelled like
she had been drinking—which she has consistently denied—and he claimed that,
throughout their interaction and leading up to her arrest, she appeared upset and
angry, forcing him to order her several times to calm down and stop yelling.
1

At some point, Ergotic, driven by her sister-in-law, returned to the scene,
though she did not approach the residence, opting instead to park down the street.
Around the same time, another officer (and Officer Ivy’s direct supervisor), Sgt.
Ara Baronian, arrived on the scene. Upon Sgt. Baronian’s arrival, Officer Ivy went

1
Regarding Mowell’s demeanor toward Officer Ivy, while she does not dispute Officer
Ivy told her to stop yelling and cursing, she denies she was actually yelling, insisting she was
simply using an “outside voice.” And while she acknowledges some curse words “probably”
came out of her mouth, she claims she was merely cursing “at the situation,” not at any particular
person.

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over to speak with him about the situation before walking over to Ergotic’s vehicle
to speak with her. Officer Ivy then returned to speak with Mowell again. Officer
Ivy explained Mowell would need to go through a formal eviction process if she
did not want Ergotic to continue to live in the townhome.
To defuse the situation and because both officers could see how upset
Mowell was becoming, the officers suggested Ergotic stay at another location for
the night. Ergotic agreed, but insisted she needed to enter the residence to get her
diabetes medication—which she had been unable to find amongst her belongings
on the sidewalk—before she could leave for the night. Mowell, however,
maintained Ergotic’s medication was among the items she had placed on the
sidewalk and that Ergotic did not need to enter the house. Throughout this
conversation, Mowell was standing at or near the front entrance to her home. As
Officer Ivy and Ergotic approached the door (purportedly so that Ergotic could
enter the home to look for her medicine), Mowell put her hand up on the door
frame to physically block Ergotic from entering the home.
It is at this point that the parties’ versions of the events begin to diverge
significantly. According to Officer Ivy (and Ergotic), when Ergotic attempted to
enter the house, Mowell stood in front of her and physically pushed her away from
the door. It was at that point Officer Ivy decided to arrest Mowell. Officer Ivy
then grabbed Mowell’s arm, which she immediately jerked away, saying “I’m not
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going.” He informed Mowell she was under arrest and attempted to grab her arm,
but she again resisted what he considered to be a “lawful arrest.” Using what he
described as “soft techniques,” Officer Ivy guided Mowell to the ground and
placed her in handcuffs. Officer Ivy claims he then helped Mowell up off the
ground and escorted her to his patrol car.
2

Mowell, on the other hand, has consistently testified she never pushed
Ergotic, nor did Ergotic ever get close enough to the front door for Mowell to push
her. Instead, she claims after she put her hand on the doorframe and informed
Officer Ivy that Ergotic’s medicine was among the items she had placed outside,
Officer Ivy immediately and without provocation grabbed her hand off the
doorframe, placed it behind her back, cuffed her wrist, and performed a leg sweep,
slamming her to the ground face first. Officer Ivy then pushed his knee into
Mowell’s back as he cuffed her other wrist before pulling her up. She asked
Officer Ivy why he was handling her so roughly since she was “not resisting
arrest.”
After transporting Mowell to the Alpharetta Jail, Officer Ivy obtained
warrants for Mowell’s arrest for three offenses: (1) simple battery/family violence,

2
After arresting Mowell, Officer Ivy provided Ergotic with a witness statement, which
she completed and returned to him. That witness statement (as well as Ergotic’s deposition
testimony) largely corroborates Officer Ivy’s recitation of the events leading to Mowell’s arrest.
Officer Ivy also filed an incident report setting out his version of events.
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in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1; (2) disorderly conduct, in violation of
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39; and (3) obstruction/resisting an officer, in violation of
O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24. But before a formal indictment was filed, Mowell entered
into an agreement with the prosecutor, pursuant to which she entered a pre-trial
diversion program, which involved completing 40 hours of community service and
a one-hour anger management course. Upon completion of the pre-trial diversion
program, the charges against Mowell were dismissed.
C. District Court Proceedings
Based on the above-described events, Mowell sued Officer Ivy and the City
of Milton, Georgia (the City), asserting several state-law tort claims as well as a
Fourth Amendment false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3
Following
discovery, Officer Ivy and the City moved for summary judgment on all claims.
The district court granted the motions.
As to Mowell’s Fourth Amendment claim, the district court concluded
Officer Ivy was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court first concluded
there were issues of material fact precluding a finding that Officer Ivy had
probable cause to arrest Mowell; in other words, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Mowell established a constitutional violation. But the court went on

3
Mowell initially filed suit in the State Court of Fulton County, Georgia, but the City and
Officer Ivy removed the action to the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
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to conclude her right to be free from arrest without probable cause under the
circumstances was not clearly established, at least as to the disorderly conduct
count. The court focused on the undisputed fact Mowell had, in the midst of an
ongoing argument with Ergotic, placed Ergotic’s property outside, putting it “in
danger of being damaged or destroyed.” See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(a).
4
This
appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court’s disposition of a summary judgment
motion based on qualified immunity, applying the same legal standards as the
district court. Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 2015).
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In a case, like this one, involving qualified immunity, “[w]e resolve
all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff, and then determine the legal
question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under that

4
Having concluded Officer Ivy was entitled to summary judgment as to Mowell’s § 1983
claim, the district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Mowell’s remaining state-
law claims, as the sole basis for removal had been excised from the case. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Because we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling as to the § 1983
claim, it continues to have supplemental jurisdiction over Mowell’s state-law claims. See id.
§ 1367(a). We decline at this juncture to opine on the merits of those claims, which the district
court ought to address in the first instance.
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version of the facts.” Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th Cir.
2017) (quotation marks omitted).
Qualified immunity protects government actors performing discretionary
functions from being sued in their individual capacities.
5
See Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 609 (1999). The doctrine shields government officials “insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). It does not, however, offer protection “if an official knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].” Id. at 815
(quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
Our qualified immunity analysis proceeds in two steps, though we need not
necessarily address the two steps in this order. See Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d
1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2001). First, we address the question of whether the facts as
alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to Mowell, establish a constitutional
violation at all. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (receded from by
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009)). If no constitutional violation is
established, then the defendants prevail, and “there is no necessity for further

5
The parties here agree Officer Ivy was acting within the scope of his discretionary
authority when he arrested Mowell. We therefore do not address this initial issue here.
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inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id. But if a constitutional right would
have been violated under Mowell’s version of the facts, we will then determine
whether that right was clearly established. Id.
We first address whether, under Mowell’s version of the events leading to
her arrest, her right not to be arrested absent probable cause was violated before
addressing whether that right was clearly established at the time of her arrest.
A. Fourth Amendment Violation
A warrantless arrest is constitutionally valid only when there is probable
cause to arrest. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976); see also
U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). Probable cause exists if, “at the
moment the arrest was made, ‘the facts and circumstances within [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing’ that [the suspect] had committed
or was committing an offense.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir.
2002) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)), abrogated on other
grounds by Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 130 S. Ct. 1945, 1950, 1955 (2018).
Here, Officer Ivy ultimately obtained arrest warrants for three offenses under
Georgia law: simple battery/family violence battery, disorderly conduct, and
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obstruction/resisting an officer. We, like the district court, readily conclude that,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mowell—that is, crediting her
version of the events leading to her arrest—Officer Ivy did not have actual
probable cause to arrest Mowell. See Stephens, 852 F.3d at 1313. To recap,
Mowell has consistently maintained, both in her affidavit and deposition, that
(1) she never shoved or even touched Ergotic; (2) she was not yelling or
intoxicated, and never insulted or cursed at Ergotic or Officer Ivy; and (3) she
never resisted Officer Ivy once he decided to arrest her.
Assuming, as we must at this point, that Mowell’s recitation of the facts is
the correct one, Officer Ivy would not have had probable cause to arrest her for any
of the identified Georgia crimes. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a) (“A person commits
the offense of battery when he or she intentionally causes substantial physical harm
or visible bodily harm to another.”); id. § 16-11-39(a) (“A person commits the
offense of disorderly conduct when such person . . . [a]cts in a violent or
tumultuous manner toward another person whereby such person . . . [or] the
property of such person is placed in danger of being damaged or destroyed[,] . . . or
[w]ithout provocation, uses to or of another person . . . ‘fighting words’ . . . .”); id.
§ 16-10-24 (“[A] person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law
enforcement officer . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
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Officer Ivy urges us to essentially disregard Mowell’s sworn testimony in
favor of his version of events, arguing he was entitled to rely upon Ergotic’s
witness statement (which corroborates his version of events) as a basis for probable
cause. In support of this argument, he points us to two unpublished cases from our
Circuit, which he claims stand for the general proposition that a plaintiff–arrestee’s
denial of wrongdoing is insufficient to create an issue of fact in a false-arrest case,
at least where the arresting officer relies on witness statements or identifications.
See Rogers v. City of Orlando, 660 F. App’x 819 (11th Cir. 2016); Hendricks v.
Collier Cty. Fla., 492 F. App’x 90 (11th Cir. 2012).
6

But both Rogers and Hendricks were cases in which the arresting officer or
officers did not observe the allegedly illegal conduct, and, as a result, the sole
asserted basis for probable cause in each case was a witness statement or
identification. See Rogers, 660 F. App’x at 821–22; Hendricks, 492 F. App’x at
91–92. Here, in contrast, Officer Ivy has not claimed his decision to arrest Mowell
was based on Ergotic’s witness statement, nor could he, since Ergotic did not
prepare the statement until after Officer Ivy had conducted the warrantless arrest.
7

6
As these cases are unpublished, they do not constitute precedent we are bound to
follow. In any event, as we explain, we find these cases distinguishable from the instant case.

7
Indeed, Officer Ivy’s uncontroverted testimony is that he “decided to arrest [Mowell],”
“[a]fter she made contact with” Ergotic.
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Instead, Officer Ivy’s decision (i.e., his probable cause determination) was based
on his observation of Mowell’s conduct.
The problem for Officer Ivy is Mowell disputes his version of events in a
way that completely undermines his asserted basis for placing her under arrest.
See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1228–31 (11th Cir. 2004)
(reversing a grant of summary judgment to defendant officers where the actual
probable cause to arrest was based upon the defendant officers’ testimony against
the plaintiff–arrestee). Officer Ivy cannot resolve this factual dispute by pointing
to a witness statement prepared after he had already made the decision to arrest
Mowell.
8
The fact Ergotic’s witness statement and deposition testimony
corroborate Officer Ivy’s version of events goes to the weight a factfinder might
give his testimony vis-à-vis Mowell’s, not to whether her testimony should be
wholly disregarded at the summary judgment stage. See Jones v. UPS Ground
Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating a court “may not weigh
conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations” in considering a summary
judgment motion (quotation marks omitted)).

8
While it is true Officer Ivey subsequently obtained a formal arrest warrant, which may
ostensibly have been based on Ergotic’s witness statement, it is his decision in the moment to
arrest Mowell that is the operative event for purposes of our Fourth Amendment analysis. In any
case, Mowell asserts the subsequent arrest warrant was itself based on false affidavits sworn out
by Officer Ivy.
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Accordingly, we conclude, under Mowell’s version of the facts, that she was
arrested without actual probable cause, in violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
B. Clearly Established Right
Having concluded that, under Mowell’s version of the facts, no actual
probable cause existed for her arrest, we now turn to whether her right to be free
from arrest without probable cause was clearly established under the
circumstances. Again, we make this determination viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Mowell.
For a constitutional right to be clearly established, the contours of that right
“must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must
be apparent.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted).
In the context of a false-arrest case, another way of framing the “clearly
established” inquiry is whether, even if the officer lacked actual probable cause, he
nonetheless had “arguable probable cause” for the arrest. See Holmes v. Kucynda,
321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (“To receive qualified immunity protection,
an officer need not have actual probable cause but only ‘arguable probable
cause.’” (quotation marks omitted)). This inquiry boils down to whether the
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officer “reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed, in light of the
information the officer possessed,” even if, with the benefit of hindsight, it turns
out no actual probable cause existed. Id. (quotation marks omitted). In this way,
“[e]ven law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that
probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.” Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227
(quotation marks omitted).
While Mowell arguably has not identified a case that is “on all fours,” so to
speak, with the facts of this case, we nonetheless find Mowell’s version of events
would not leave a reasonable officer with the impression he had probable cause to
arrest Mowell for any of the charged crimes. See Holmes, 321 F.3d at 1078
(“[T]he fact pattern of prior cases used to show that a right is clearly established
need not be ‘fundamentally similar’ or even ‘materially similar’ to the facts
alleged. Rather, ‘officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
established law even in novel factual circumstances.’” (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 740–41 (2002))); see also Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753,
766 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting a plaintiff can show a right is clearly established by
demonstrating, inter alia, that “a broader, clearly established principle should
control” or that the “case fits within the exception of conduct which so obviously
violates [the] constitution that prior case law is unnecessary” (alteration in original)
(quotation marks omitted)).
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Again, if Mowell’s testimony is to be believed, she did little more than raise
her voice, express frustration with the situation, and put her arm out to block the
entrance to her home. She had also, earlier in the day, placed some of Ergotic’s
belongings on the sidewalk in front of the residence. There can be little doubt a
reasonable officer would not mistakenly believe a person who committed those
actions would be subject to arrest for battery, disorderly conduct, or resisting an
officer. See Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1233.
The relevant question here isn’t whether Officer Ivy was mistaken in what
he observed; it is whether, given what he observed—i.e., “the information [he]
possessed”—he was mistaken in believing he had probable cause. See Holmes,
321 F.3d at 1079. And the divergent testimony from Officer Ivy (and Ergotic) and
Mowell concerning Mowell’s demeanor and actions leading up to the arrest
precludes any determination, at this stage, as to what information Officer Ivy
actually possessed. We therefore must assume the events transpired as Mowell has
described them in her sworn testimony, and those facts simply would not lead a
reasonable officer to reasonably believe he possessed probable cause.
9

9
To the extent Officer Ivy argues he had arguable probable cause to arrest Mowell for
disorderly conduct based solely on her placing Ergotic’s belongings on the sidewalk earlier in the
day, we do not find this argument persuasive. As we have noted, Georgia’s disorderly conduct
statute—of which Officer Ivy was undoubtedly aware—provides in pertinent part that “[a]
person commits the offense of disorderly conduct when such person . . . [a]cts in a violent or
tumultuous manner toward another person whereby the property of such person is placed in
danger of being damaged or destroyed.” O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39(a)(2). There is no indication in
the record that Officer Ivy had within his possession any information from which he could have
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Officer Ivy was not entitled to
summary judgment as to Mowell’s § 1983 false-arrest claim based on qualified
immunity. We reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling and remand
for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
To be clear, we are not, by our decision today, definitively saying Officer
Ivy is not entitled to qualified immunity. But because the answer to that legal
question turns on a disputed set of facts, summary judgment is inappropriate. See
Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1144 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting, in the
context of a false-arrest case, that “[w]here . . . the resolution of disputed critical
facts determines on which side of this line [an] officer’s conduct fell, summary
judgment is inappropriate”) .
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

reasonably concluded Mowell placed Ergotic’s property outside while “[a]ct[ing] in a violent or
tumultuous manner toward” Ergotic or anyone else, as the statute requires.
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