Michael O. Mondy v. J.P. Boulee, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-12474
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-04989-RLH

MICHAEL O. MONDY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

J. P. BOULEE,
Individual and Official Capacity,
MAGNOLIA ADVANCED MATERIALS, INC.,
NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP,
ERIKA CLARKE BIRG,
PETER L. MUNK,

Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(March 12, 2020)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
Michael Mondy appeals pro se the dismissal of his amended complaint
against Judge J.P. Boulee of the Superior Court of DeKalb County and against
Magnolia Advanced Materials, Inc., its law firm, Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, LLP, and two attorneys from that firm. Mondy, an African-American
attorney, complained that he had a right to withdraw from the representation of a
client and that Magnolia, its counsel, and Judge Boulee, who ar e Caucasian,
interfered with his right to do so for racially discriminatory reasons. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. The district court entered a separate judgment in favor of Judge Boulee, the
appeal of which we have since dismissed as untimely. Mondy challenges the
dismissal of his claims against Magnolia and its attorneys for failure to state a
claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because Mondy’s complaint failed to allege a
plausible clam of racial discrimination, we affirm.
We accept the allegations of Mondy’s complaint as true and consider the
attached exhibits. See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th
Cir. 2010); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Magnolia sued Moses Langford in a Georgia court
for breach of contract and for violating trade secrets, and Mondy appeared on
behalf of Langford. After the trial court held Mondy in contempt for disclosing
confidential information and Magnolia moved for an award of attorney’s fees and
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to compel discovery, Mondy moved to withdraw from the representation. Magnolia
opposed Mondy’s withdrawal and argued that it “would delay trial” and would
“interrupt the orderly operation of the court.” See Ga. Uniform Superior Ct. Rule
4.3(1). Judge Boulee later granted Magnolia’s motions for attorney’s fees and to
compel discovery and reserved ruling on Mondy’s motion to withdraw until
Langford produced the discovery.
Mondy filed a complaint in the district court that Magnolia and its attorneys
interfered with Mondy and “Langford’s attorney-client contract” “because they
were African-American.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Mondy alleged that Magnolia
“had no factual reasons why Mr. Mondy should not be allowed to terminate the
contract” and that Magnolia had not “listen[ed] [to] or watched any audio or
video,” “sp[oken] to any person,” or “read any documents” that provided “a
reasonable good faith belief that” Mondy’s withdrawal “would delay a trial,”
“interrupt the orderly operation of the court,” or be “manifestly unfair [to] Mr.
Langford.” Mondy also alleged that his “race was a motivating fact why Magnolia
. . . wanted to interfere with Mr. Mondy’s right to terminate the contract.” Mondy
attached to his complaint an email in which he informed his client that his
withdrawal so close to trial might violate a Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct.
The district court dismissed Mondy’s complaint against Magnolia. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court stated that Mondy had “no right to withdraw[]
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on demand” and that he alleged no facts to support his “naked conclusion” that
Magnolia was “motivated by race or acted improperly in any respect” by opposing
Mondy’s motion to withdraw. The district court rejected as “conclusory nonsense”
Mondy’s allegations that the reasons Magnolia proffered for opposing his motion
“could not have been true” or “suggest[ed] something else must have been afoot.”
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.
Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint must contain “more than labels and
conclusions”; its well-pled allegations must “nudge[ ] the[ ] claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007).
Section 1981 “protects the equal right of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States to make and enforce contracts without respect to race.” Moore
v. Grady Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 834 F.3d 1168, 1171 (11th Cir. 2016) (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he term ‘make and enforce
contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of
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contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). “To state a claim of race
discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing: (1) that he is
a member of a racial minority; (2) that the defendant intended to discriminate on
the basis of race; and (3) that the discrimination concerned one or more of the
activities enumerated in the statute.” Moore, 834 F.3d at 1171–72 (alterations
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not err. Mondy had no absolute right to withdraw from
representing Langford. Their relationship was governed by the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct, which require “a lawyer [to] withdraw[] . . . in compliance
with applicable laws and rules” and “[w]hen ordered to do so by a tribunal, . . . [to]
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation.” Ga. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.16(c). And the allegations of
Mondy’s complaint failed to support a plausible inference of racial discrimination.
Magnolia and its attorneys opposed Mondy’s motion to withdraw because his
absence would make it more difficult to obtain discovery from his client and would
delay obtaining a judgment against him, which are legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons to contest a lawyer’s request to withdraw. See Ga. Unif. Superior Ct. R.
4.3(1) (giving a judge “discretion to . . . [deny a motion to withdraw if it] would
delay the trial or otherwise interrupt the orderly operation of the court or be
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manifestly unfair to the client”). Because “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces
. . . demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, Mondy’s conclusory allegation that Magnolia
acted with racial animus was insufficient to state a plausible claim.
We AFFIRM the judgment against Mondy’s complaint against Magnolia
and its attorneys.
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