USA v. Kellis Dion Jackson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________

No. 18-12895
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cr-00506-SCB-AAS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KELLIS DION JACKSON,
a.k.a. Chandler Dante Alexander,

Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 28, 2020)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
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2

Kellis Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals his conviction for making a false
statement in a U.S. passport application in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. On
appeal, Jackson raises a multitude of arguments which can be boiled down to three
issues. First, Jackson contends that there was a bona fide doubt as to his
competency at the time of his guilty plea, and the district court violated his due
process rights by failing to hold an adequate competency hearing. Second, Jackson
contends his guilty plea was not supported by a sufficient factual basis. Lastly,
Jackson contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
1

I. Background

1
Jackson also raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which implicate
both of the attorneys who represented him during the proceedings below. Notably, Jackson
twice filed pro se motions to dismiss his first attorney for ineffective assistance. Jackson
eventually withdrew the first motion before the court could enter any ruling, and the second was
terminated as moot after the district court granted an independent motion by Jackson’s first
attorney to withdraw as counsel. Jackson did not raise any ineffective assistance accusations
against his second attorney, and his arguments in his initial brief a s to the second attorney’s
incompetence rest in part on their interactions not detailed in the record. Accordingly, the
current record does not fully explain the issues he is raising here. “We will not generally
consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal where the district
court did not entertain the claim nor develop a factual record.” United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d
1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). Ineffective-assistance claims are better suited for a timely 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion in order that a more robust record can be established specifically on the
issue of ineffective assistance. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003)
(explaining that “in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for
deciding claims of ineffective assistance”). Accordingly, we dismiss without prejudice all of
Jackson’s ineffective-assistance claims.

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In June 2017, Jackson applied for a passport in the name of Chandler Dante
Alexander. At the time, Jackson was serving parole for a kidnapping offense
committed 30 years earlier. On his passport application he listed a birthdate, place
of birth, and social security number on the passport application that were not his
own. And as proof of identity, Jackson furnished a birth certificate and Florida
driver’s license in the name of Chandler Dante Alexander. The government
suspected fraud, investigated the matter, and declined to issue a passport. A grand
jury subsequently indicted Jackson for making a false statement in an application
for a passport. Then, with arrest and search warrants in hand, federal agents
intercepted Jackson outside his Florida apartment. After being Mirandized and
acknowledging that he understood his constitutional rights, Jackson admitted to the
federal agents that he “just got tired of living with an ‘X’ on [his] back, that’s why
[he] did it,”
2
and that he “applied for the passport to go on a cruise, and [he] ended
up not even needing one.” He also escorted the agents into his apartment and
helped them locate his Florida driver’s license and several credit and bank cards
issued in the name Chandler Dante Alexander.

2
Although the record is not perfectly clear regarding what Jackson meant by “living with
an ‘X’ on [his] back,” we note that the district court assumed Jackson meant being identified as
someone on parole. Further, Jackson admitted to federal agents at the time of arrest that “[he]
just got tired of it. [He] couldn’t get a job.”
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In January 2018, Jackson pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. During
the plea hearing, Jackson made a number of admissions, notably that he provided a
false birth certificate and date of birth in connection with the passport application.
On April 9, 2018, Jackson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, in part
because (1) he was unaware at the time of his plea hearing that he had a common
law right to adopt a new name as long as it was not done for a fraudulent purpose,
and (2) he was a “legally designated mentally disabled person who has been denied
badly needed psychiatric medications.” Jackson simultaneously filed a motion to
discharge his attorney (and his attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel).
Following a hearing, the district court granted Jackson’s attorney’s motion to
withdraw as counsel, appointed new counsel,
3
and ordered a competency hearing.
An appointed psychiatrist evaluated Jackson and determined he was
competent. At the subsequent competency hearing on June 20, 2018, Jackson’s
new counsel noted that Jackson “wants to proceed pro se eventually” but that “he’s
given me authority for purposes of today to stipulate to [the psychologist’s] report
of him being found competent for matters proceeding forward.” The magistrate
judge confirmed this stipulation with Jackson himself, and then found that Jackson

3
At the hearing regarding the motion to withdraw as counsel, Jackson stated that he had
legal experience, including a paralegal certificate, and would prefer to proceed pro se in spite of
the fact that he was also asserting that he was incompetent. The district court explained that it
would be appointing new counsel because Jackson could not represent himself if he was
incompetent.
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was competent to proceed. As well, the magistrate judge confirmed both with
Jackson’s attorney and Jackson himself that there was nothing “further from [their]
perspective that need[ed] to occur” at that hearing. Soon after the competency
hearing, the magistrate judge granted Jackson’s new counsel’s motion to withdraw
and appointed him as standby counsel to assist Jackson at the sentencing hearing.
Thereafter, the district court held a hearing to consider Jackson’s motion to
withdraw his plea and, if that was denied, to sentence him. Jackson, arguing pro
se, reiterated that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea on account of
the fact that he was unaware at the time of his plea of the lawful-name-change
defense, and because he was mentally incompetent at the time he entered his plea.
After a lengthy discussion with Jackson, the district court denied his motion to
withdraw his plea. As to the lawful-name-change defense, the district court found
that Jackson’s purpose in changing his name was fraudulent, and also that this
defense did not diminish his culpability under § 1542 because Jackson admitted to
furnishing a false birth certificate and date of birth in connection with his passport
application. As to the competency argument, the district court found that Jackson
was competent at the time of his plea in light of the fact that both of his attorneys, a
psychologist, the magistrate judge, and the district court judge herself all
concluded that Jackson was in fact competent. The district court then sentenced
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Jackson to time served plus three years of supervised release. Jackson timely
appealed.
II. Discussion
A. Due Process Challenge Regarding Competency
We first address Jackson’s contention that there was a bona fide doubt as to
his competency at the time of his guilty plea, and that the district court violated his
statutory and due process rights by failing to hold an adequate competency
hearing.
4

1. Jackson’s Competency to Enter a Plea
We review a district court’s failure to conduct a competency hearing
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 sua sponte for abuse of discretion.
5
United States v.
Wingo, 789 F.3d 1226, 1236 (11th Cir. 2015). “Every defendant has a substantive
fundamental right under the Due Process Clause not to be tried or convicted while
incompetent.” Id. at 1235 (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 363
(1996)). “Competence to proceed to trial or to enter a guilty plea requires the

4
By analyzing the issue in this manner, we assume arguendo that the June 20
competency hearing was insufficient for the purposes of establishing Jackson’s competence at
the time of his plea agreement. We note, however, that our holding should not be construed as a
comment upon the efficacy of a post-plea competency hearing to relate back to the time of a
plea.
5
18 U.S.C. § 4241 provides that the district court shall sua sponte order a competency
hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
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defendant to possess the ‘capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his
defense.’” Id. at 1234–35 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975)). Thus, “once the court learns of information that raises
a ‘bona fide doubt regarding [the defendant’s] competence,’ the court must apply
adequate procedures to ascertain whether the defendant is competent to proceed to
trial or the entry of a guilty plea.” Id. at 1235 (quoting James v. Singletary, 957
F.2d 1562, 1570 (11th Cir. 1992)).
A trial court must provide “adequate procedures” whenever “the court learns
of information that raises a ‘bona fide doubt’” regarding that defendant’s
competence to enter a guilty plea. Id. (quoting James, 957 F.2d at 1570). Under
our precedent, the bona fide doubt standard tracks the statutory standard of 18
U.S.C. § 4241(a), which requires federal courts, “[a]t any time after the
commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the
defendant, . . . [to] order . . . a [competency] hearing on its own motion[ ] if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent . . . .” Id. at 1236
(emphasis added). To determine whether the information known to a court is
sufficient to establish a bona fide doubt concerning a defendant’s competency, we
have set forth three factors to be considered: “(1) evidence of the defendant’s
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irrational behavior; (2) the defendant’s demeanor at [the plea hearing]; and (3)
prior medical opinion regarding the defendant’s competence to [enter a plea].”
Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 576 (11th Cir. 1990); accord Wingo, 789 F.3d at
1236. A hearing is required only if “these factors, taken together, were sufficient
to raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency.” Card v. Dugger, 911
F.2d 1494, 1518 (11th Cir. 1990). In conducting this three-factor analysis, we
“focus[] on what the trial court did in light of what it knew at the time of the . . .
plea hearing.” Tiller, 911 F.2d at 576.
Our independent review of the record confirms there was no bona fide doubt
as to Jackson’s competency at the time he entered his guilty plea. First, the district
court possessed no evidence of “irrational behavior” by Jackson prior to or during
the plea hearing.
6
Although Jackson filed a pro se notice of incompetence
approximately a week before the change-of-plea hearing, this notice was struck
because it violated the district court’s local rules that a defendant may not file pro

6
In his initial brief before this Court, Jackson points to “three occasions throughout his
life” in which he attempted suicide and the fact that he was “under Suicide Watch” at one point
during the proceedings below. His contention that he attempted suicide three times in his past
appeared nowhere in the record at the time of his guilty plea. Rather, the PSI indicates that
Jackson reported “one prior suicidal attempt” at some point before 2012, but that “the evaluator
indicated that the defendant appeared to be untruthful when discussing this event.” As for being
placed on suicide watch, there is no indication in the record that this occurred before he entered
his guilty plea in January 2018. Thus, the record does not demonstrate any relevant suicide
attempts indicating irrational behavior that were known to the district court at the time Jackson
entered his guilty plea.

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se pleadings while represented by counsel. Nevertheless, the district court
informed Jackson at the pre-trial hearing that such a notice would need to be filed
by counsel and explained to Jackson how the competency evaluation process
would work.
7
Despite this information, Jackson did not raise the issue of his
competency again prior to, or during, the subsequent change-of-plea hearing.
Second, Jackson’s demeanor during these hearings did not raise any bona
fide doubt as to his competence. Jackson engaged in lengthy colloquies with the
court, responded intelligently and appropriately to questions, and clearly exhibited
the “capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Wingo, 789 F.3d at
1234–35 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 171).
Third, the record bears no evidence of any medical opinion prior to
Jackson’s guilty plea that raises a bona fide doubt as to his incompetence.
8
Cf.

7
A t this same hearing, Jackson’s first attorney alerted the court that Jackson had bipolar
disorder, but in the four meetings counsel had with him, Jackson was “very lucid and very clear”
and there was “no incompetency issue at all.” At the subsequent change-of-plea hearing,
Jackson’s first attorney reiterated that he had no concerns regarding Jackson’s competency and
Jackson did not assert any competency issues at that time, which is persuasive evidence that
Jackson’s competency was not in doubt. See Wingo, 789 F.3d at 1238 (noting that “counsel’s
failure to raise the competency issue can be persuasive evidence that competency is not in
doubt”). And again at the actual plea hearing, after the magistrate judge had been informed of
Jackson’s medical condition and that he was not then taking his medication, Jackson’s first
attorney confirmed that he did not have “any concerns about Jackson’s competency.” See also
Wingo, 789 F.3d at 1238 (“[C]ases where counsel fails to bring the competency issue to the
court’s attention and the court abuses its discretion by not sua sponte raising it on its own are
perhaps rare.”).

8
Jackson points to several instances during the proceedings below in which the district
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Wingo, 789 F.3d at 1238 (finding that “copious, objective medical evidence of
organic brain damage, as well as medical and lay evidence suggesting
corresponding mental incompetence,” serves as “robust record evidence of
possible incompetency [which] necessarily eclipses counsel’s failure to raise [the
defendant’s] competency.”)
In sum, the record here simply does not establish a bona fide doubt that
Jackson was incompetent at the time of his guilty plea. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte ordering a competency hearing
before accepting Jackson’s guilty plea.
2. The June 20 Competency Hearing was Adequate
Jackson also argues that the June 20, 2018 competency hearing was
inadequate to establish his competency going forward and to be sentenced.
Jackson’s main quarrel with his competency hearing is the magistrate judge’s
characterization of Jackson’s stipulation to the psychologist’s report of his being
found competent as a “waiver” of a formal competency hearing in a subsequent
written order.
9

court and magistrate judge were made aware of his bipolar condition and his attendant need for
medication. But merely having a medical condition, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate
incompetence. See Card v. Singletary, 981 F.2d 481, 487 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[N]ot every
manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence
must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges.” (quoting United
States ex rel. Foster v. DeRobertis, 741 F.2d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 1985)).

9
The magistrate judge’s written formal order following the hearing stated the following:
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“At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and
prior to the sentencing of the defendant” either party or the court on its own may
motion for a “hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant.” 18
U.S.C. § 4241(a). The district court should grant the motion “if there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or to assist properly in his defense.” Id. Upon a district court’s determination that
a competency hearing is appropriate, the court has discretion to order “a
psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant.” Id. § 4241(b). At the
competency hearing itself, a defendant must be “represented by counsel” and “be
afforded an opportunity to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses on
his behalf, and to confront and cross-examine.” Id. § 4247(d); see also id.
§ 4241(c) (“The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of section
4247(d).”).
Here, the district court and magistrate judge fully satisfied the requirements
of an adequate competency hearing. First, the district court determined that a

“On June 20, 2018, the Court conducted a hearing [to determine Jackson’s competency to stand
trial], and as stated during the hearing, the parties have reviewed Dr. Goldsmith's forensic
report/evaluation and stipulated to Dr. Goldsmith's findings, and waived a formal competency
hearing.”

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competency hearing was appropriate in light of Jackson’s notice of incompetency.
The district court then exercised its discretion and ordered a psychological
examination. Then, at the subsequent competency hearing, Jackson was
represented by counsel. Jackson’s stipulation—through counsel—to the
psychologist’s determination that he was competent to proceed demonstrated that
he was afforded the “opportunity” to proffer testimony, evidence, witnesses, and
cross-examination demonstrating his incompetency but opted not to do so. After
receiving the psychologist’s report and the parties’ stipulations thereto, the
magistrate judge ruled that Jackson was competent and capable of proceeding. We
therefore find that the June 20 competency hearing was adequate to establish
Jackson’s competency at that time going forward unto sentencing.
B. Factual Basis to Support § 1542 Violation
Jackson also contends that his guilty plea was not supported by a sufficient
factual basis because he was never issued the passport he sought to obtain. Thus,
Jackson argues that the district court (1) violated Rule 11 by failing to inform him
of the true nature of the charged offense or its elements and to assure a factual
basis existed before accepting Jackson’s guilty plea;
10
and (2) violated the Due
Process Clause by accepting a guilty plea that was unknowing and involuntary.

10
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, “[b]efore the
court accepts a plea of guilty . . . the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands . . . the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading,” and
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But nothing in the text of § 1542 requires that a defendant actually obtain a
passport.
11
Indeed, we have explained that “Section 1542 proscribes ‘willfully and
knowingly’ making a false statement in a passport application. The crime is
complete when one makes a statement one knows is untrue to procure a passport.”
United States v. O’Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
Consequently, because Jackson’s interpretation of § 1542 is incorrect as a matter of
law, both his Rule 11 and Due Process Clause challenges automatically fail.
C. Denial of Motion to Withdraw Plea
Jackson contends that the district court improperly denied his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because he sought the passport using his adopted
alternative name and for a non-fraudulent purpose, which was a valid defense to
§ 1542, citing United States v. Cox, 593 F.2d 46, 49 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that
§ 1542 “is not violated by one who lists a legal adopted name on a passport
application” and that “[u]nder the common law a person may freely change his or
her name without any legal formalities”).
12

also, “the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).

11
In relevant part, § 1542 penalizes “[w]hoever willfully and knowingly makes any false
statement in an application for passport with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport
under the authority of the United States, either for his own use or the use of another, contrary to
the laws regulating the issuance of passports or the rules prescribed pursuant to such laws. . . .”
18 U.S.C. § 1542.

12
Jackson also argues that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been
granted because he was incompetent at the time of his plea and there was an insufficient factual
basis to adjudicate him guilty under § 1542. However, in light of our holdings above on the
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We review the district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw a
guilty plea for abuse of discretion. See United States v. McCarty, 99 F.3d 383, 385
(11th Cir. 1996). A district court may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea
before sentencing if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting
the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d). “There is no abuse of discretion unless
the denial is ‘arbitrary or unreasonable.’” United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291,
1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1328 n.8
(11th Cir. 2001)). “The good faith, credibility and weight of a defendant’s
assertions in support of a motion [to withdraw a guilty plea] are issues for the trial
court to decide.” United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jackson’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. As the district court observed, the false
statements on his passport application that served as a factual basis of his guilt
included his use of a false birth certificate, date of birth, place of birth, and social
security number, not just a different name. Thus, even assuming arguendo that
Jackson’s use of his alleged adopted name, Chandler Dante Alexander, in his
passport application did not violate § 1542, his use of other false statements and
documents clearly supported the charge. In fact, at the hearing for his motion to

merits of those claims, the district court properly rejected those grounds as a basis for allowing
Jackson to withdraw his plea.
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withdraw his plea, Jackson re-confirmed that his birth certificate and date of birth
listed on his application were false.
For all these reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that there was no fair and just reason to allow Jackson to
withdraw his plea.
13

AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.

13
The district court also found that Jackson’s adoption of an alternative name was
fraudulent because he was attempting to evade parole. Jackson argues that the district court
violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by questioning him about whether his adoption of
a new name was for a fraudulent purpose because he was not charged with any fraud count.
Because Jackson did not object to the district court’s inquiry during the hearing or at any other
time prior to his appeal, we review this the district court’s actions for plain error. United States
v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005). To satisfy the plain error standard, an
appellant must show: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected his substantial
rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Id. Jackson is not
entitled to relief on this ground. First, Jackson was not, as he contends, “held to answer” for a
crime (i.e., fraud) that was not charged by the grand jury. Second, in light of Jackson’s argument
that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because the name he provided on the
passport application was not false or for a fraudulent purpose, the district court was well within
its discretion to inquire and make a credibility determination of Jackson’s statements that he
lacked a fraudulent purpose in changing his identity. See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472. Third, even
if the district court did err in this regard, the error did not affect Jackson’s substantial rights, as
the district court denied his motion to withdraw his plea on the separate bases that he had not
refuted his use of a false birth certificate and date of birth on his passport application.
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