Larry G. Coker v. Corizon Medical Services, Inc., et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-11414
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-01028-SLB-TMP
LARRY G. COKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CORIZON MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.,
COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
BARRY BARRETT,
HUGH HOOD,
SAYHU,
DEBBIE HUNT,
HOOPER,
Nurse,
RANDY STUBBS,
JON FILYAW, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
AMBROSITY,
Nurse,
Defendant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(March 10, 2016)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Coker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on Coker’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
of deliberate indifference and violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Coker contends that (1) the district court improperly and
wrongly decided disputed issues of material fact when it granted summary
judgment as to Coker’s claims that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
several serious medical needs, (2) the district court erred in requiring Coker to pre-
pay a copying fee of 50 cents per page in order to obtain copies of his medical
records on file with the court, and (3) the district court erred in refusing to appoint
Coker counsel. After review,1 we affirm.
1 We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel in a civil case. Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1996).
We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. Craig v. Floyd
Cty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when,
viewing all of the evidence and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine factual dispute
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The district court did not engage in improper fact finding. Rather, the
district court relied upon unrebutted and inadequately rebutted summary judgment
evidence to conclude that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to essential
aspects of Coker’s claims. See Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292
(11th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted) (describing the non-movant’s burden to
identify rebuttal evidence that is “significantly probative of a disputed fact”).
Coker has failed to identify evidence corroborating his primary grievance,
that his major infection was caused by the Defendants’ refusal to provide Coker
with antibiotics during a prostate biopsy. In response to the Defendants’ producing
medical records indicating Coker had been given antibiotics before, during, and
after his prostate biopsy, Coker provided only his allegation that the records were
falsified and evidence suggesting Dr. Sahu did not believe that Coker needed
antibiotics. Neither Coker’s unsupported allegation nor evidence of Dr. Sahu’s
opinion create a genuine issue of material fact. Even if Dr. Sahu believed that
Coker did not need antibiotics, Coker’s medical records indicate that Dr. Barrett
prescribed them. Thus, Coker fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact
pertinent to the care he received from the Defendants relating to his prostate biopsy
exists if a jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.,
376 F.3d 1079, 1085 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
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and surgery.2 See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quotation omitted) (“[D]eliberate indifference entails more than mere
negligence.”); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation
omitted) (“Medical treatment violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment only when it is so
grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be
intolerable to fundamental fairness.”).
Coker has also failed to identify any evidence corroborating his claims
regarding the Defendants’ dental care and treatment of his staph infection. Coker’s
own summary judgment evidence indicates that Coker’s staph infection was
treated similarly to any non-prisoner patient presenting similar symptoms.
Likewise, Coker’s dental records indicate that the Defendants both identified and
offered to resolve Coker’s dental needs but that Coker refused the Defendants’
recommended treatment and demanded different treatment. At most, the summary
judgment evidence indicates that Coker and the Defendants disagreed regarding
the best way to treat Coker’s medical and dental needs. See Waldrop v. Evans, 871
F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that a difference in medical opinion
does not constitute deliberate indifference). Therefore, the district court properly
2 Much of the other evidence to which Coker refers establishes Coker’s serious medical
need and post-operative complications. The evidence does not, however, provide a basis upon
which a jury could find that the Defendants deviated from the standard of care applicable to a
deliberate indifference claim.
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and correctly concluded that a jury could not find in favor of Coker on his
deliberate indifference claims.
The district court did not err when it refused to provide Coker with free
copies of his medical reports. The court correctly applied the fee schedule set forth
by the Judicial Conference, and Coker’s in forma pauperis status did not require
the district court to provide free copies of discovery documents. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1914(b), 1915. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
appoint counsel to represent Coker. Coker’s case does not present exceptional
circumstances, and Coker has shown the ability to litigate the case without the
assistance of counsel. See Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)
(finding no exceptional circumstances warranting appointment of counsel when
“[t]he core facts of the case—the conditions of the plaintiffs' confinement—are not
in dispute, and their legal claims—violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments—are straightforward”); Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th
Cir. 1987) (“The appointment of counsel is instead a privilege that is justified only
by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel
or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.”).
AFFIRMED.
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