Allen F. Stewart, et al v. Elizabeth Oneill Lastaiti, et al

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 28, 2010
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-12571
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cv-60565-PCH
ALLEN F. STEWART,
T.A.S.,
a minor child,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
ELIZABETH ONEILL LASTAITI,
JOHN LAWRENCE SULLIVAN,
SUSAN GREENHAWT,
JENNIFER SARAH WALKER,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(October 28, 2010)

-- 1 of 4 --

Before HULL, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Allen F. Stewart, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
motion to alter or amend judgment, brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). The
district court’s underlying judgment dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction Stewart’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of 28 U.S.C. §§
1738A-1738B and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
On appeal, Stewart argues that the district court erred in dismissing his motion
because the district court incorrectly concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, and that it has jurisdiction under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. After
careful review, we affirm.
We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. Lambert
v. Fulton County, Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2001). The only grounds for a
district court to grant a motion to alter or amend judgment are new evidence and
manifest error. Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). “A Rule 59(e)
motion cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence
that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Id. (quotation and
alteration omitted).
2

-- 2 of 4 --

District courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “empowered to hear only those
cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III of the
Constitution.” Univ. of S. Alabama v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th
Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). A district court must dismiss an action if it
“determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(h)(3). Although we are obligated to liberally construe a pro se complaint, that
obligation “is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write it for the plaintiff.” Snow v.
Direct TV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation and alteration
omitted).
Title 28, section 1331 of the United States Code provides, “[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Whether a claim arises under
federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is generally determined by the well-
pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded
complaint.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation
and alteration omitted). The Supreme Court has held that neither the Full Faith and
Credit Clause nor 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act
(“PKPA”), creates a federal cause of action for purposes of § 1331 jurisdiction. See
3

-- 3 of 4 --

Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). In announcing that holding, the Court
implied, in dicta, that its reasoning extends to 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, the Full Faith and
Credit for Child Support Orders Act (“FFCCSOA”). Id. at 182. (“[T]he Full Faith
and Credit Clause, in either its constitutional or statutory incarnations, does not give
rise to an implied federal cause of action.”).
In considering the claims in Stewart’s complaint, the district court properly
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
district courts. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and therefore, did not err in denying
Stewart’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend that judgment.
AFFIRMED
4

-- 4 of 4 --