Eric K. Brooks v. D Miller

[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-10590
____________________
ERIC K. BROOKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
D MILLER,
Officer,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States district court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00524-MW-MAF
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
____________________
Before J ORDAN, ROSENBAUM , and NEWSOM , Circuit Judges.
R OSENBAUM , Circuit Judge:
Everyone’s heard the saying that “the camera doesn’t lie.”
That notion lies at the heart of
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Usually, on a motion for summary judgment, we view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—mean-
ing we accept the nonmoving party’s version of events if the parties
disagree about what happened. But in
Scott, a video told “quite a
different story” than the plaintiff there. And the Supreme Court
held that “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the
facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judg-
ment.”
Id. at 380. In other words,
Scott stands for the com-
monsense proposition that when a video proves that the plaintiff
can’t be telling the truth, we don’t accept the facts as he alleges
them, even for purposes of deciding a summary-judgment motion.
But
Scott’s rule has its limits. Most obviously, it applies only
when the video actually proves that the plaintiff’s version of the
facts cannot be true. When the action happens off camera and the
audio doesn’t clearly contradict the plaintiff’s story,
Scott’s rule be-
comes irrelevant. Under those circumstances, we default to the
usual rule: we accept the nonmoving party’s version of the facts in
determining whether to enter summary judgment.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 3
This appeal from an order granting summary judgment re-
quires us to apply both the default rule and
Scott’s rule in evaluat-
ing the evidence supporting Plaintiff-Appellant Eric K. Brooks’s
various claims. Brooks alleges that Defendant-Appellee Officer Da-
mon Miller falsely arrested him, used excessive force in doing that,
and then was deliberately indifferent to Brooks’s alleged medical
needs.
The dash-cam recording from Brooks’s interaction with Of-
ficer Miller proves definitively that Miller did not falsely arrest
Brooks. And though the dash-cam recording does not resolve
Brooks’s deliberate-indifference claim, Brooks hasn’t shown that
any violation Officer Miller may have committed was clearly estab-
lished. So Officer Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on that
claim as well. As for Brooks’s excessive-force claim, the recording
did not capture Officer Miller’s physical arrest of Brooks, so we
must rely on the default summary-judgment rule and assume the
truth of Brooks’s attestations that Miller used excessive force in ar-
resting him. And when we do that, we must conclude that
Brooks’s excessive-force claim survives summary judgment.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s entry of sum-
mary judgment in part and reverse in part. And we remand this
matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
As we’ve mentioned, the record contains different versions
of the facts. To keep track of them, we set them out separately
below.
1. Brooks’s Version
Brooks filed a verified complaint, so we treat his allegations
as his testimony.
Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir.
2019).
According to Brooks, on November 12, 2016, he was stand-
ing around with other people, when Officer Miller arrived on the
scene. Officer Miller stepped out of his car and “demand[ed] to talk
to whomever it was that drove the black Kia” located nearby.
When Brooks started to walk away, Officer Miller stopped
him and asked for Brooks’s identification. But Brooks said he had
“nothing to talk to [Officer Miller] about and he did not know who
was driving” the Kia.
Officer Miller responded by grabbing Brooks by the shirt and
“slam[ming] him into [Miller’s] patrol vehicle.” Then Officer Mil-
ler “handcuffed [Brooks] so tight that sharp pain shot through
[Brooks’s] arms” and Brooks lost “all circu[]lation in his [w]ris[t]
and arms.”
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 5
With Brooks handcuffed, Officer Miller searched him and
found drugs in Brooks’s right pocket. So Officer Miller arrested
Brooks.
Brooks complained to Officer Miller that “the handcuffs
were to[o] tight and that he could not feel his hands.” He also asked
Officer Miller for medical attention “because he thought his
[wrists] were broke[n] or damaged.” Instead of taking Brooks for
medical care, though, Officer Miller drove him to the Leon County
Jail.
When Brooks arrived at the Jail, he again complained of
pain. But the nurse at the Jail prescribed only Tylenol and ibu-
profen.
Brooks filed grievances about these events.
In his complaint, Brooks did not allege that his wrists were,
in fact, broken or damaged. Nor did he assert that he suffered any
ongoing, extended, or permanent damage from the handcuffs.
2. Officer Miller’s Version
Officer Miller filed a probable-cause affidavit in support of
his arrest of Brooks. In it, (as relevant here) he said that he saw
Brooks driving a black Kia, which Brooks parked at the scene of the
incident. After Brooks pulled in, he got out of the car and walked
towards others who were gathered in the area.
Officer Miller then parked in the area, left his patrol car, and
asked Brooks for his driver’s license. Brooks answered that he
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
didn’t have a valid license. So Officer Miller arrested him for oper-
ating a motor vehicle without a valid license.
In connection with the arrest, Officer Miller searched
Brooks. In Brooks’s left front jacket pocket, Officer Miller found
crack cocaine. Immediately, Brooks said he didn’t know that the
crack was in his pocket.
Officer Miller took Brooks to the Leon County Jail “without
incident,” and Brooks was also charged with possession of cocaine.
3. The Video
As it turns out, Brooks and Officer Miller weren’t the only
witnesses to Brooks’s arrest and transport to the Jail. Officer Mil-
ler’s patrol vehicle was equipped with a dash cam that recorded at
least part of the events.
The video shows another officer’s patrol vehicle following a
black Kia as the Kia turns into a dead-end street and parks. The
Kia’s door opens, and a man wearing a black and grey hoodie exits
the car through the driver’s door. The parties agree that that man
is Brooks, though Brooks disputes he was driving the Kia. No one
else leaves the car or appears to remain in it.
Brooks then walks out of view of the camera, and Officer
Miller gets out of his patrol car and follows in the same direction.
While both men remain outside the camera’s view, Officer Miller
begins to make casual conversation with what sounds like a group
of people. He asks one of these individuals (who the parties agree
is Brooks) whether he has a driver’s license with him. Brooks
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 7
audibly responds that he does not. So Officer Miller asks whether
Brooks has a driver’s license at all. Although we can’t distinctly
hear Brooks’s response, Officer Miller asks Brooks a couple times,
“Why you ain’t got a driver’s license?” Again, to the extent that
Brooks answers, we can’t really hear what he says.
Officer Miller then instructs Brooks to put his hands behind
his back and tells Brooks, “Just relax.” We hear a very brief bit of
what sounds like friction on Officer Miller’s body microphone, and
Officer Miller places Brooks under arrest for driving without a
driver’s license.
Officer Miller notices crack and a pipe on the ground and
asks Brooks whether he dropped them. Brooks denies knowing
anything about them.
Then Officer Miller and Brooks, walking side by side with a
few inches between them, reenter the dash cam’s view. Although
Brooks is handcuffed behind his back when he reenters the dash
cam’s view, he does not appear to be uncomfortable or hurt in any
way, and at this point, Officer Miller is not touching him. Officer
Miller directs Brooks to stand in front of Miller’s car and asks
Brooks whether he has anything in his pockets that Miller should
know about. Brooks responds that there’s nothing that will hurt
Officer Miller, and Miller calmly reaches into each of Brooks’s
pockets. In Brooks’s left front hoodie pocket, Officer Miller finds
crack cocaine. Brooks takes a look and says, “It damn sure is!” But
he insists that he “didn’t even know that was in there.”
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
At this point, Officer Miller tells Brooks he’s under arrest for
driving without a driver’s license and for possession of cocaine.
When Officer Miller reads Brooks his rights, Brooks indicates that
he understands. Throughout the entirety of the encounter that un-
folds before the dash cam, both men calmly interact with each
other.
Officer Miller, another officer, and Brooks then walk in front
of the patrol car and out of the dash cam’s view once again. Shortly
after that, we hear what sounds like a car door opening and Officer
Miller and Brooks talking. About a minute later, the video screen
goes black but we still hear audio. Officer Miller says he’s going to
take the handcuffs off so Brooks can take his jacket off, and he in-
structs Brooks to “please [not] try anything.” The two talk some
more, and Officer Miller directs Brooks to put his hands “straight
up in the air” and “pull it off,” presumably referring to Brooks’s
hoodie. Of course, these are things Brooks could not have done if
he remained handcuffed at that time.
Then Officer Miller tells Brooks he is going to put the cuffs
back on and says, “You’ve been straight-forward with us so far.”
He explains, “When you sit in the car—a little trick—put your
hands facing that door over there, so that way your hands don’t go
numb. And try not to change it at all ‘cause if you change it, that’s
gonna change up the way it’s gonna feel.” With that, Officer Miller
directs Brooks to “have a seat,” and we hear what sounds like a car
door closing.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 9
Next, we hear Officer Miller speaking with others outside
the car and on the scene.
After this, Officer Miller returns to his patrol car and asks
Brooks whether he dropped the pipe the officers found. Brooks
denies having done so. Officer Miller goes back and speaks to oth-
ers again. Then Brooks yells, “Hey, Sir!” And Officer Miller seem-
ingly returns to Brooks. Once Officer Miller responds, Brooks
pleads with him not to take him to jail. Officer Miller explains that
he has no leeway because the crack offense is a felony.
After this occurs, and about sixteen minutes after the picture
on the dash-cam video goes black, the video feed comes into view
for about fifteen seconds, before blacking out again. At this time,
Officer Miller’s car is still parked at the scene. Soon after that, we
hear Officer Miller on his police radio. Then Officer Miller speaks
to Brooks again, explaining further that, under the governing pro-
cess, he can’t let Brooks go without taking him to the jail. At this
point, we begin to hear what sound like driving-related noises (cars
going by, possible wind sounds, and the metronome-like beating of
what sounds like a car signal).
After a period of silence, Officer Miller and Brooks discuss
Brooks’s biographical information. Officer Miller then comments
on traffic.
Officer Miller asks Brooks whether they’ve met before, and
Miller and Brooks discuss that Miller has previously arrested
Brooks for hitting Brooks’s mother and possessing drugs.
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
As the drive continues, Officer Miller asks Brooks whether
there’s too much wind for him. It sounds like Brooks says no.
Other than the wind and some additional announcements from Of-
ficer Miller’s police radio, the recording is quiet for a few minutes.
And for a fraction of a second here and there (and about two sec-
onds at one point), the video picture returns in whole or in part.
Several more minutes pass, and Officer Miller again asks
Brooks about the crack cocaine in his pocket. Although we hear
Brooks’s voice, we can’t discern what he says. During this period,
it sounds as though the car has stopped.
A few minutes later, Officer Miller asks Brooks to confirm
some of his biographical information, and Brooks does. Soon after
that, we hear the sounds of a car door opening and closing. Officer
Miller instructs Brooks to step out and walk to a door, and the
video picture returns long enough for us to catch a glimpse of what
appears to be the Leon County Jail. The picture blacks out again,
and a few seconds later, the recording ends.
About twenty-five minutes go by between the earliest point
when Officer Miller could have been driving and the time that Mil-
ler directs Brooks to get out of the police cruiser.
At no point in the recording do we hear Brooks make sounds
of pain or distress. Nor do we hear him ever complain about pain
or physical distress or even hear him mention his handcuffs. In fact,
all interactions that we can hear throughout the 51-minute record-
ing sound calm and low-key.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 11
B. Procedural Background
As we’ve mentioned, Brooks was charged with possession
of cocaine and driving without a valid driver’s license. But the
Leon County State Attorney’s Office eventually dismissed those
charges in exchange for Brooks’s guilty plea in an unrelated case.
Almost two years later, Brooks, proceeding
pro se, sued Of-
ficer Miller under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brooks asserted claims for false
arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; excessive force, in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and deliber-
ate indifference to medical needs, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
In a nutshell, Brooks alleged in his false-arrest claim that
without probable cause, Officer Miller arrested him for driving
without a license and for possession of drugs, and that Miller un-
lawfully searched Brooks in the process. He made a tagalong claim
that Officer Miller’s search of Brooks’s pockets at the time of
Brooks’s arrest also violated Brooks’s Fourth Amendment rights.
As for his excessive-force claim, Brooks contended that Officer Mil-
ler “slammed [Brooks] against his patrol vehicle [in arresting him]
and hand cuff[ed] [Brooks] so tight that both hands, [wrist] and
arms resulted in los[s] of circu[]lation and excruciating pain when
there were no need for any violence.” And finally, in his deliberate-
indifference claim, which he referred to as a denial-of-medical-care
claim, Brooks alleged that he “made several request[s] that he was
hurt and needed medical attention because he could not feel his
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
hand[] and [wrists] due to the evil intent of squeezing the handcuffs
as tight as [Officer Miller] could.” But, Brooks continued, Officer
Miller “refuse[d] to allow [Brooks] to see any medical person[nel]
and waited some time before taking [Brooks] to jail where he again
[sought] medical attention.”
Six months after Brooks filed his complaint, Officer Miller
moved for summary judgment. He argued that he was entitled to
qualified immunity because he did not violate any of Brooks’s con-
stitutional rights, and even assuming he did, any rights were not
clearly established. In further support of his position, Officer Miller
asserted that the dash-cam video completely contradicted Brooks’s
claims and showed that his allegations were false.
Soon after filing his motion for summary judgment, Officer
Miller moved to stay discovery pending a ruling on his motion for
summary judgment. Noting that qualified immunity is a defense
not only from liability but also a “limited ‘entitlement not to stand
trial or face the other burdens of litigation,’” (quoting
Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)), the magistrate judge granted the
motion.
Brooks objected to the entry of the stay of discovery.
Among other things, Brooks sought his medical records, if any,
from Leon County Jail’s medical records. Brooks contended that
these records would “bolster [Brooks’s] description of the type and
extent of his injuries” from being handcuffed by Officer Miller.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 13
The magistrate judge denied Brooks’s discovery requests
without prejudice until after the court resolved Officer Miller’s mo-
tion for summary judgment. That said, the magistrate judge did
allow Brooks to file a response to the order, explaining why any
specific discovery he sought was necessary for him to adequately
respond to Officer Miller’s motion for summary judgment.
Brooks filed a motion for review of the magistrate judge’s
order staying discovery. Upon review, the district judge overruled
Brooks’s objections and affirmed the magistrate judge’s order.
Brooks then responded to Officer Miller’s motion for sum-
mary judgment. He argued first that the video recording left gen-
uine issues of material fact in dispute. In particular, Brooks alleged
that Officer Miller had used excessive force against him outside the
camera’s view but that the audio portion of the recording picked
up the interaction. Brooks also contended that the video portion
of the recording cut out before Officer Miller tightened Brooks’s
handcuffs, so Officer Miller could not rely on it to prove that he
hadn’t tightened Brooks’s handcuffs. As for Brooks’s alleged pleas
to loosen the handcuffs because they were hurting him, Brooks said
the audio part of the recording did not pick those up because they
were drowned out by Officer Miller’s patrol-car radio. Finally,
Brooks asserted that “clear evidence of tampering” with the dash-
cam video existed. In support of this proposition, Brooks relied
solely on things he observed while watching the recording itself,
like the portions where the video went black.
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
(“R&R”), recommending that the court grant Officer Miller’s mo-
tion for summary judgment.
See Brooks v. Miller, No. 4:19-CV-
00524, 2020 WL 8258414, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2020). First, the
magistrate judge concluded that the video refuted Brooks’s ac-
count of the events that transpired because (1) the dash-cam video
showed two police cars in pursuit of a black Kia for several blocks,
and Brooks was the man who exited the Kia from the driver’s side;
(2) the recording gave no indication that Officer Miller employed
any force in arresting Brooks; (3) Officer Miller and Brooks walked
towards the patrol car calmly, and Brooks had no apparent injury;
and (4) Officer Miller gave Brooks instructions on how to wear the
handcuffs comfortably, and Brooks never complained of pain or in-
jury.
Then the magistrate judge determined that Brooks’s false-
arrest, excessive-force, and deliberate-indifference claims each
failed.
Id. at *5–*8. Starting with Brooks’s false-arrest claim, the
magistrate judge found that Officer Miller had probable cause to
arrest Brooks for driving without a license when he saw Brooks
driving and leaving the Kia and Brooks admitted he did not have a
driver’s license. As for Brooks’s excessive-force claim, the magis-
trate judge viewed the dash-cam video as “refut[ing] [Brooks’s]
claims” that Officer Miller “slam[med]” Brooks into the car when
he was arresting Brooks. But even if Officer Miller did “shove”
Brooks, the magistrate judge reasoned, that action did not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation because the alleged force was
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 15
de minimis. On the deliberate-indifference claim, the magistrate
judge said that Officer Miller used no force, and Brooks suffered no
injury. And even if he did use force, the magistrate judge con-
cluded in the alternative, Brooks failed to put Officer Miller on no-
tice of a risk of serious harm because Brooks made no complaints
of “injury, pain, or discomfort” that would have alerted Officer Mil-
ler that Brooks required medical attention.
Id. at *8. Because Of-
ficer Miller violated none of Brooks’s rights, the magistrate judge
reasoned, Miller was entitled to qualified immunity.
Id.
The district judge adopted the report.
Brooks v. Miller, No.
4:19CV524, 2021 WL 230059, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2021). He
then noted that Brooks’s sworn complaint was testimony, so if Of-
ficer Miller’s statements were the only other evidence in the rec-
ord, material facts would be in dispute and the case would survive
summary judgment. But on this record, the district judge ex-
plained, the court had the benefit of the dash-cam video. And in
the district court’s view, that recording discredited Brooks’s allega-
tions. So the district court granted Officer Miller’s motion for sum-
mary judgment and dismissed Brooks’s case for failure to state a
claim.
Id. at *2.
Brooks now appeals the district court’s order adopting the
magistrate judge’s R&R. He also appeals the stay of discovery.
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16 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable factual
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—here, Brooks.
Chap-
man v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “no genuine issues [of]
material fact” exist and the law entitles the movant to judgment on
the record.
Id.;
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Universe of Applicable Facts
Because the facts are everything in this appeal, we begin
with them. But before we can determine the operable facts, we
must discuss
Scott. When opposing parties disagree about the rel-
evant facts,
Scott is the Supreme Court case that tells us how to
identify the applicable facts for purposes of ruling on a summary-
judgment motion.
In
Scott, to end a high-speed chase, the defendant officer hit
the plaintiff’s car from behind, causing the plaintiff to lose control
of his car and crash.
Scott, 550 U.S. at 375. The plaintiff sued, al-
leging that the officer had violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from the use of excessive force.
Id. at 376. In
support of his claim, the plaintiff said that, throughout the chase,
he had remained in control of his car, slowed for turns and inter-
sections, and used his turn signals.
Id. at 379. He also claimed he
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 17
hadn’t run anyone off the road and wasn’t a threat to pedestrians
or other motorists.
Id. But when the Court viewed a recording of
the incident, it concluded that “[t]he videotape t[old] quite a differ-
ent story.”
Id. In fact, the Court said, the plaintiff’s “version of
events [was] so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable
jury could have believed him.”
Id. at 380. For that reason, the
Court held that the district court should not have relied on the “vis-
ible fiction” that was plaintiff’s version of events in ruling on the
officer’s summary-judgment motion.
Id. at 380–81.
As the Court explained (and as we’ve mentioned), “[w]hen
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Id. at 380. Our review
of
Scott teaches us that two important requirements must be met
before we can disregard the non-moving party’s version of events:
(1) the recording (or other evidence) must “so utterly discredit[]”
the party’s story “that no reasonable jury could have believed” that
party,
id.;
see also Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th
Cir. 2013);
Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007)
(refusing to extend
Scott to police photographs that failed to depict
“all of the defendant’s conduct and all of the necessary context”);
and (2) there must be no evidence that the recording has been “doc-
tored or altered,”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. So if a valid recording
completely and clearly contradicts a party’s testimony, that testi-
mony is not credible, and the court should disregard it.
See
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
Morton, 707 F.3d at 1284. But if the recording renders a party’s
story merely unlikely yet does not necessarily contradict it, the de-
fault rule kicks in: we must accept the party’s version for purposes
of considering the motion for summary judgment.
Applying
Scott’s rule here, we conclude that the material
facts for purposes of summary judgment are as follows1:
Officer Miller followed the Kia until it stopped on a dead-
end road. When the Kia parked, Brooks got out of the driver’s seat.
No one else appeared to be in the car.
Soon after Brooks left the Kia, Officer Miller walked over to
a group of people where Brooks was standing and asked Brooks
whether he had a license. Brooks said he did not. So Officer Miller
arrested Brooks for driving without a license. We must use this
universe of facts because the video recording “so utterly
1 Brooks asserts that the video recording was tampered with. We need not
address that because his allegations of tampering apply to only the parts of the
recording dealing with Brooks’s excessive-force and deliberate-indifference
claims, and we reverse the entry of summary judgment on the excessive-force
claim and don’t rely on the recording to affirm the entry of summary judg-
ment on the deliberate-indifference claim. As for Brooks’s false-arrest claim,
Brooks agrees that the recording accurately represents the events from the
time that it began through at least when Officer Miller arrested Brooks for
driving without a license. Indeed, Brooks himself relies on that part of the
recording in advocating for reversal of summary judgment on the false-arrest
claim. And that is what we rely upon as well in our analysis of that claim.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 19
discredit[s]” Brooks’s version of this part of the story that “no rea-
sonable jury could . . . believe[] him,”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
As for the arrest itself, that occurred outside the camera’s
view. So we can’t see Officer Miller “grab[bing] [Brooks] by the
shirt and slam[ming] him into the patrol vehicle,” as Brooks al-
leged. But during the arrest, we can hear what sounds like friction
on Officer Miller’s microphone. We can’t say that sound is Officer
Miller slamming Brooks against the patrol car, but we also can’t
rule out the possibility because the friction obscures the audio. To
be sure, when we see Brooks walking with Officer Miller to Miller’s
patrol car soon after we hear the friction, Brooks does not appear
at all hurt. But it’s not necessarily the case that we would have
been able to see any injuries slamming Brooks against the car to
arrest him might have caused. The long and short of these circum-
stances is that the recording doesn’t preclude the possibility that a
reasonable juror could conclude that Officer Miller “grab[bed]
[Brooks] by the shirt and slam[med] him into the patrol vehicle”
when Officer Miller arrested Brooks. So we accept that version of
the story for purposes of reviewing the summary-judgment order.
Next, we consider the facts as they relate to Brooks’s claims
that Officer Miller overtightened Brooks’s handcuffs and ignored
his pleas for assistance. Again, nearly all Brooks’s time in handcuffs
occurred outside the camera’s view (not to mention, the video pic-
ture was also black for most of that time). Add to that the fact that
we can’t clearly distinguish Brooks’s statements while sitting in the
police cruiser. And again, we must conclude that we can’t rule out
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20 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
the possibility that a reasonable juror could find that Brooks com-
plained about the tightness of the handcuffs and Officer Miller did
not respond. Even if, given the rest of the recording, we might not
reach that conclusion, the bottom line is that the recording does
not “so utterly discredit” Brooks’s version of this part of the story
that “no reasonable jury could . . . believe[] him.”
Id. So for pur-
poses of reviewing the summary-judgment order, we accept
Brooks’s claims that Officer Miller overtightened the handcuffs and
did not respond to Brooks’s complaints while they rode to the Leon
County Jail, and that his hands and wrists were numb and hurt.
Now that we’ve identified the relevant facts, we turn to the
legal analysis.
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government employees from
suit in their individual capacities for discretionary actions they per-
form while going about their duties. The thought behind the doc-
trine is the “balanc[ing of] two important public interests: ‘the need
to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irre-
sponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distrac-
tion, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’”
Da-
vis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Under the balance that qual-
ified immunity strikes, “all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law” enjoy its protection.
Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 21
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, we en-
gage in a burden-shifting analysis.
See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). At the first step, the public-employee
defendant must show that he was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when he committed the challenged acts.
Once the defendant does that, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who
must show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.
Id. To do
that, the plaintiff must establish two things: (1) the defendant vio-
lated a constitutional right, and (2) that constitutional right was
“clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s actions.
Powell
v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920 (11th Cir. 2022).
A plaintiff can show that a violation is “clearly established”
in any of three ways: (1) by relying on a “materially similar decision
of the Supreme Court, of this Court, or of the supreme court of the
state in which the case arose;” (2) by invoking “‘a broader, clearly
established principle [that] control[s] the novel facts’ of the case;”
or (3) by persuading us that the officer’s acts “so obviously violate[]
th[e] [C]onstitution that prior case law is unnecessary.”
Id. (citation
omitted) (fourth alteration in original; other alterations added). If
a plaintiff proceeds under the first or second method, he must point
to a court decision.
Id. The second and third methods require “ob-
vious clarity.”
Id. That is, the principle must be so apparent that,
even without a case with similar facts to light the way, any compe-
tent officer would know that his conduct crossed the line.
See id.
In sum, the “clearly established” part of the qualified-immunity in-
quiry asks whether the law when the officer engaged in the
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
challenged conduct gave him “‘fair warning’ that his conduct was
unlawful.”
Id. at 921 (citation omitted).
Courts have “discretion to decide which of the two prongs
of [the] qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.”
Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). And since a plaintiff must show both
prongs to overcome qualified immunity, if the prong the court con-
siders first is not satisfied, the court need not consider the other
prong because the officer is entitled to qualified immunity, regard-
less.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Here, the parties agree that Officer Miller acted within his
discretionary authority during the alleged conduct Brooks chal-
lenges. For that reason, we turn to the questions of whether the
alleged conduct violated Brooks’s rights and whether, at the time
of the alleged violations, the law was clearly established.
1. Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks and
properly searched Brooks’s pockets incident to Brooks’s arrest.
We begin by addressing Brooks’s claim that Officer Miller
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by falsely arresting him.
Brooks asserts that Officer Miller lacked probable cause to arrest
him for two reasons: (1) because Brooks never conceded to driving
the black Kia, and (2) because even if Brooks drove the Kia, “driving
without a valid license is a non-criminal traffic infraction for which
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 23
one cannot be arrested.”2 Appellant’s Br. at 13. Both reasons lack
merit.
To be sure, a warrantless arrest without the existence of
probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms a basis
for a § 1983 claim.
See Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th
Cir. 1996);
see also Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1382
(11th Cir. 1998). To succeed on a false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must
establish (1) a lack of probable cause and (2) an arrest.
See Rich-
mond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180 (11th Cir. 2022). Probable cause
exists when “a reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there [is]
a substantial chance of criminal activity.”
Washington v. Howard,
2 Brooks also argues that when Officer Miller approached Brooks and asked
whether he had a license, that was pretextual because Miller was allegedly
there investigating possible drug crimes. But Brooks, who was not detained,
voluntarily answered Officer Miller’s question about whether Brooks had a
license.
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–201 (2002) (“Law en-
forcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of un-
reasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other
public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen . . .
Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may . . . ask for identification . . . provided they do not induce
cooperation by coercive means.”).
See also United States v. Caraballo, 595
F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Law enforcement officers do not violate the
Fourth Amendment simply by approaching an individual on the street or in
some other public place and asking a question or asking for identification.”).
Because Brooks said he did not have a license and the video shows Brooks
driving, Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks for driving without
a license, regardless of what Officer Miller was investigating before Brooks’s
arrest.
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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24 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). And proba-
ble cause is an “absolute bar” to a § 1983 false-arrest claim.
Rankin
v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998).
The problem for Brooks is that the record undoubtedly re-
flects that Officer Miller had probable cause to arrest Brooks for
driving without a license.
First, as we’ve noted, the video recording clearly shows
Brooks exited the driver’s door of the Kia immediately after the car
was parked. And Brooks was the only one to leave the car. Because
Brooks’s claim that he was not driving the Kia is “blatantly contra-
dicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it,”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, the district court correctly dismissed his at-
testations to that effect and concluded that Brooks was driving the
Kia.
Second, probable cause supports the arrest. Besides the fact
that Brooks was driving the Kia, the recording shows that after
Brooks left the car, Officer Miller walked over to a group where
Brooks was standing. And we hear a microphoned Officer Miller,
who, at that point, was not in view of the camera, ask Brooks
whether he has a driver’s license with him. Brooks admitted that
he did not. Officer Miller then repeatedly asked Brooks why he
didn’t have a driver’s license. And when Brooks didn’t answer, Of-
ficer Miller arrested Brooks for driving without a license.
Florida Statutes § 322.03(1) makes it a misdemeanor for any
person to operate a car without a driver’s license. So given that
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 25
Officer Miller saw Brooks driving the Kia without a license and that
Brooks admitted he had no license, Officer Miller had probable
cause to arrest Brooks for violating that law. Indeed, “[i]f an officer
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed
even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, with-
out violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”
Atwa-
ter v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
And because Officer Miller’s arrest of Brooks was lawful, the
search Officer Miller conducted of Brooks’s pockets incident to that
arrest was also lawful.
See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232
(2011).
2. Brooks’s excessive-force claim that Officer Miller slammed
him into the car and overtightened his handcuffs survives sum-
mary judgment.
Next, Brooks argues that Officer Miller used excessive force
in violation of the Fourth Amendment when Miller allegedly
“slam[med]” Brooks into the car at the time of the arrest and “over-
tightened Brooks’s handcuffs, causing “excruciating pain” and
numbness, and refused to adjust the cuffs. As we’ve explained,
these events do not appear in the video of the recording. And based
on the audio portion, we can’t rule out the possibility that Officer
Miller “slam[med]” Brooks into the patrol car when he arrested
him. Nor can we say with certainty that Brooks did not complain
to Officer Miller that his handcuffs were too tight and were causing
him pain and numbness. Given these facts that we must accept for
purposes of considering Officer Miller’s summary-judgment
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26 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
motion, we conclude that summary judgment is not appropriate
on Brooks’s excessive-force claim.
“[T]he right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it
the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof
to effect it.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). But the
Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free from the use of
excessive force during an arrest.3
Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262,
1266–67 (11th Cir. 2014). Under the Fourth Amendment, we eval-
uate whether force is excessive by applying an objective reasona-
bleness standard.
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96. That is, we ask
“whether the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable in light of
the facts confronting the officer.”
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d
1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002). This inquiry requires us to balance the
“nature and quality” of the acts on the individual against the gov-
ernment’s justification for using force.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. In
making this assessment, we employ “the perspective of a reasona-
ble officer on the scene, rather than . . . 20/20 . . . hindsight.”
3 Brooks asserted in the district court that Officer Miller’s alleged use of exces-
sive force violated Brooks’s Eighth Amendment rights. But Brooks was not in
prison at the time of the events here. And we evaluate a “free citizen’s claim
that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of making an
arrest” under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness standard.”
Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. We apply Eighth Amendment case law when an
incarcerated person alleges excessive force.
See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,
35–38 (2010).
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 27
Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243,
1248 (11th Cir. 2004).
Our cases identify some non-exclusive factors that help us
assess whether an officer’s use of force was objectively reasonable:
(1) how severe the underlying crime was; (2) the type of threat, if
any, a suspect presented to the safety of the officers or others; and
(3) “whether [the suspect] actively resist[ed] arrest or attempt[ed]
to evade arrest by flight.”
Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217,
1229 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). We’ve
recognized that “[n]onviolent misdemeanors are crimes of minor
severity for which less force is generally appropriate.”
United
States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
When we apply these factors to the facts we’ve identified for
summary-judgment purposes, we conclude that Brooks’s exces-
sive-force claims survive. First, Officer Miller arrested Brooks for
the misdemeanor crime of driving without a license. We can’t say
that this crime “rise[s] to the level of criminal conduct that should
have required the use of force.”
Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d
1298, 1322 (11th Cir. 2017). Second, no evidence so much as sug-
gests that Brooks posed any threat to Officer Miller or anyone else.
In fact, Officer Miller’s probable-cause affidavit expressly notes that
the “arrest was without incident.” And third, Brooks neither re-
sisted arrest nor tried to flee.
Under these circumstances, it was objectively unreasonable
to “slam[]” Brooks into the car while arresting him. Similarly, it
was objectively unreasonable for Officer Miller to
unnecessarily
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28 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
overtighten Brooks’s handcuffs as part of this same arrest and re-
fuse to make any adjustments when Brooks complained of numb-
ness and “excruciating pain.” So if these events occurred, they vi-
olated Brooks’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Brooks’s right to be free from the use of this type of exces-
sive force was also clearly established when Officer Miller arrested
him on November 12, 2016. In
Lee v. Ferraro, a plaintiff alleged
that the defendant officer slammed her head onto the car when he
arrested her for improperly honking her horn. 284 F.3d at 1191.
Under her version of the facts, the plaintiff posed no risk to anyone
and she did not attempt to resist or flee.
Id. at 1198. We said that,
in those circumstances, it was “abundantly clear . . . that [the of-
ficer] used force that was plainly excessive, wholly unnecessary,
and, indeed, grossly disproportionate . . . .”
Id.
We think
Lee provides clear guidance to officers that they
use excessive force if they slam a person into a car during an arrest
for a relatively minor offense when the suspect does not endanger
anyone else, does not resist, and does not attempt to escape. And
if an officer cannot slam a person into a car under these circum-
stances, the officer certainly cannot engage in additional unneces-
sary force, such as gratuitously overtightening handcuffs and refus-
ing to adjust them in response to complaints of “excruciating pain”
followed by numbness. For these reasons we conclude that, under
the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Brooks as the non-
moving party, Officer Miller is not entitled to qualified immunity
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 29
on the excessive-force claim that he “slam[med]” Brooks into the
car and unnecessarily overtightened Brooks’s handcuffs.
Because we hold that Officer Miller is not entitled to quali-
fied immunity on Brooks’s excessive-force claim at the summary-
judgment stage, we direct the district court to remove the stay on
discovery as it pertains to this claim and to reconsider Brooks’s re-
quest for his medical records from the Leon County Jail.
3. The district court properly granted summary judgment on
Brooks’s deliberate-indifference claim.
That leaves Brooks’s other handcuff-related claim: that Of-
ficer Miller was deliberately indifferent to Brooks’s alleged serious
medical needs arising from his being handcuffed too tightly. But
unlike with the excessive-force claim, we conclude that the district
court properly found that Officer Miller was entitled to qualified
immunity on this claim.
We begin with the facts. As we’ve mentioned, at no point
during any of the audio portion of the recording can we hear
Brooks complain about pain or numbness from the handcuffs. But
during the car ride, the recording includes some portions of garbled
audio that preclude us from ruling out the possibility that Brooks
complained at some point about pain and numbness from the cuffs.
Besides that, Brooks alleges that Officer Miller turned up the radio
to cover up Brooks’s complaints of injury. And we do hear the ra-
dio in portions of the recording.
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30 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
So while we can’t hear Brooks complain about the cuffs, the
audio does not “blatantly contradict[]” Brooks’s version of events.
Because the audio offers only some support for Officer Miller’s ver-
sion of the incident, we must accept Brooks’s allegations for pur-
poses of ruling on the summary-judgment motion. As a result, we
assume that Brooks complained to Officer Miller during the car
ride that the handcuffs were too tight and they were making his
wrists and hands numb.
As for the substance of Brooks’s deliberate-indifference
claim, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires government officials to provide medical care to those
who’ve been injured during arrest.
City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). To prevail on a § 1983 claim alleg-
ing a violation of that right, a plaintiff “must satisfy both an objec-
tive and a subjective inquiry.”
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265,
1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
First, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of an objec-
tively serious medical need.
Id. A “serious medical need” is “one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Kuhne v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
745 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2014). Or a serious medical need can
exist if a delay in treating the need exacerbates the condition.
Mann
v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009). But in ei-
ther scenario, the need “must be one that, if left unattended, pos[es]
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 31
a substantial risk of serious harm.”
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235,
1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Second, as to the subjective inquiry, the plaintiff must prove
that the officers were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
need.
Id. More specifically, the plaintiff must present evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) the officer knew
facts that should have allowed him to draw the inference that a
substantial risk of serious harm existed; (2) the officer actually drew
that inference; (3) the officer nonetheless disregarded the risk of se-
rious harm; and (4) the officer’s conduct amounted to more than
negligence of a specified degree.4
The district court concluded that Officer Miller was entitled
to qualified immunity on this claim. As we’ve explained, to over-
come qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the officer “vi-
olated a statutory or constitutional right” that “was clearly estab-
lished” at the time of his challenged conduct.
Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at
735.
4 As of the time we issue this opinion, arguably, some uncertainty exists in our
precedent as to whether the standard is “more than mere negligence” or
“more than gross negligence.”
Compare,
e.g.,
Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537
(11th Cir. 1995),
and Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir.
2010). Luckily for us, we need not wade further into this sticky wicket here
because, as our analysis of Brooks’s claim shows, it makes no difference
whether the standard is “mere” or “gross.”
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32 Opinion of the Court 21-10590
On Brooks’s deliberate-indifference claim, we start with the
“clearly established” prong because it resolves the question of qual-
ified immunity. In determining whether Officer Miller violated a
clearly established constitutional right, we must focus on the spe-
cific facts and context of this case.
See Perez v. Suszczynski, 809
F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016). So we ask whether, when Officer
Miller transported Brooks to the Jail on November 12, 2016, it was
clearly established that an officer acted with deliberate indifference
to a transported person’s complaints that his handcuffs were caus-
ing numbness and injury, if he drove about twenty-five minutes to
a jail where the transported person could receive medical attention,
instead of stopping on the road or driving to a nearby hospital for
medical assistance. We conclude that, even if these facts state a
constitutional violation, any such violation was not clearly estab-
lished when Officer Miller transported Brooks.
To support the opposite conclusion, Brooks relies on case
law that establishes the general proposition that if an officer “actu-
ally know[s] about a condition that poses a substantial risk of seri-
ous harm and yet do[es]
nothing to address it, [he] violate[s] the
Constitution.” Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 34 (quoting
Patel v. Lanier
Cnty., 969 F.3d 1173, 1190 (11th Cir. 2020)). And to be sure,
Patel
states the general rule. But that case does not get to the heart of
the allegations here.
Even assuming without deciding that Brooks had a serious
medical need, the general principle Brooks relies on does not pro-
vide clear notice to a reasonable officer in Officer Miller’s position.
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21-10590 Opinion of the Court 33
It does nothing to clarify whether driving about twenty-five
minutes for medical attention in response to an arrestee’s state-
ment that handcuffs are too tight, instead of stopping roadside to
provide medical attention or finding a hospital and obtaining care
in a local emergency room, would violate a detainee’s rights. And
we do not see how
Patel’s general principle would have provided
Officer Miller with “‘fair warning’ that his conduct was unlawful.”
Powell, 25 F.4th at 921. Because Brooks failed to point to any prec-
edent or a generally established rule that would give Officer Miller
fair warning that his specific conduct was unconstitutional, Officer
Miller is entitled to qualified immunity on Brooks’s claim for delib-
erate indifference to a serious medical need.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s grant of Officer Miller’s mo-
tion for summary judgment on Brooks’s false-arrest and deliberate-
indifference claims, and we reverse the district court’s summary-
judgment ruling on Brooks’s excessive-force claim. So we remand
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
PART.
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1 J ORDAN, J. Concurring 21-10590
J ORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
When it comes to matters of technology and science, the
courts frequently lag behind society.
See John G. Roberts,
2014
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, United States Supreme
Court, at 3, (Dec. 31, 2014) (“[T]he courts will often choose to be
late to the harvest of American ingenuity.”); Lillian R. BeVier,
The
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A
Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of AT&T, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1049,
1061–62 (1999) (“For many reasons, the pace of legal change can
never keep up with the pace of technological evolution.”). And
that reality is probably more true today than in years past given the
current pace of technological innovation.
In a world of artificial intelligence, video and picture editing
software, and video and image generators—to only name a few—
we must “tread carefully . . . to ensure that we do not ‘embarrass
the future’” when assessing video footage like the dash-cam record-
ing in this case.
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206,
2220 (2018) (quoting
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322
U.S. 292, 300 (1944)). To “keep pace with the inexorable march of
technological progress,”
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
285 (6th Cir. 2010), we must be confident that a video or photo-
graph is truly what it purports to be before accepting it as gospel.
Some of today’s smart phones, like the Google Pixel—with its
“Magic Eraser” feature—can edit or erase persons and objects from
photographs with a couple of clicks and replace them with AI-
generated imagery that fills the gap. Similar technology, I am sure,
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2 J ORDAN, J. Concurring 21-10590
will likely soon be available for the editing of videos. Indeed, there
are reports that the next version of “Magic Eraser” will allow users
of Google Pixel phones to remove audio (like background noise)
from videos.
See Brad Linder,
Audio Magic Eraser Feature May
Debut With the Google Pixel 8 (Liliputing - August 12, 2023).
Mr. Brooks asserts that the dash-cam recording was tam-
pered with. That may or may not be true. But, as the court’s opin-
ion explains, we need not decide the matter. The tampering alle-
gations apply only to the parts of the recording relating to Mr.
Brooks’ excessive-force and deliberate-indifference claims, and “we
reverse the entry of summary judgment on the excessive-force
claim and don’t rely on the recording to affirm the entry of sum-
mary judgment on the deliberate-indifference claim.” Maj. Op. at
18 n.1.
With these thoughts, I join Judge Rosenbaum’s opinion for
the court in full.
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