Medina v. Hansen, et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________
DELANO MEDINA,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER HANSEN; THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO,

Respondents - Appellees.

No. 26-1172
(D.C. No. 1:24-CV-02524-PAB)
(D. Colo.)
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
*

_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Delano Medina filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the
district court denied. Mr. Medina then filed a series of post-judgment motions, including
two motions to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e),
which the district court also denied. As relevant to this appeal, the district court denied
Mr. Medina’s second Rule 59(e) motion as untimely. Mr. Medina now seeks a certificate
of appealability (“COA”) to appeal from the denial of his second Rule 59(e) motion.

*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

August 14, 2026

Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
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2

Because Mr. Medina has failed to show that the district court’s timeliness ruling is
reasonably debatable, we deny the application for a COA and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
Following a jury trial in Colorado state court, Mr. Medina was convicted of two
counts of felony menacing, one count of attempted assault in the first degree, one count
of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, and seven habitual criminal counts. The
Colorado court adjudged Mr. Medina a habitual criminal and sentenced him to forty-four
years’ imprisonment.
Mr. Medina later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, challenging his Colorado convictions. Two of his claims—one for constructive
denial of counsel and one for ineffective assistance of counsel—proceeded to the merits.
As relevant to this appeal, part of Mr. Medina’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
involved an allegation that his trial counsel failed to communicate a favorable plea offer.
The district court denied this claim, concluding that Mr. Medina had not pointed to record
evidence showing that any plea offer was made.
After the district court denied the petition, Mr. Medina filed an application for a
COA to appeal the district court’s order.
1
He also filed an initial series of post-judgment
motions, including a motion to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

1
Applications for a COA may be “accepted . . . as the functional equivalent of a
notice of appeal” where it gives the notice required by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 3(c). Arps v. Cormack, 170 F. App’x 27, 28 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); see
also Martin v. Rios, 472 F.3d 1206, 1207 (10th Cir. 2007) (treating an application for a
COA as the “functional equivalent” of a notice of appeal).
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3

Procedure 59(e) and a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b). Both
motions pointed to statements from record transcripts suggesting that the prosecution had
made a ten-year plea offer to Mr. Medina.
The district court denied each of the post-judgment motions and denied
Mr. Medina’s request for a COA. The court concluded that Mr. Medina’s claim alleging
that the prosecution had made a ten-year plea offer was different from the claim alleging
a five-year plea agreement in his original § 2254 petition. Determining that Mr. Medina
had never alleged a ten-year plea offer before the state court, the court thus denied the
claim as one that was unexhausted. Mr. Medina filed a notice of appeal from the denial of
his post-judgment motions. The appeals from the denial of Mr. Medina’s § 2254 petition
and initial post-judgment motions remain pending. We recently granted Mr. Medina a
COA and appointed counsel to represent him in those appeals.
However, in addition to initiating the above-mentioned appeals, Mr. Medina filed a
second set of post-judgment motions with the district court. As relevant here, Mr. Medina
filed a second motion to amend the judgment under Rule 59(e).
2
Mr. Medina contended
that the district court, in denying his first Rule 59(e) motion, misunderstood the nature of
his arguments. Specifically, he claimed that his § 2254 petition had always alleged the
existence of multiple plea offers, none of which were timely communicated to him.
These, he asserts, included both five-year and ten-year plea offers.

2
Mr. Medina also filed a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, which was denied in the same order disposing of his second Rule 59(e)
motion. However, Mr. Medina’s brief on appeal does not contest the district court’s denial
of sanctions.
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The district court denied the Rule 59(e) motion as untimely, concluding that it was
filed outside of the twenty-eight-day deadline for filing Rule 59(e) motions. Mr. Medina
again filed a notice of appeal, and the district court denied Mr. Medina a certificate of
appealability. The denial of the second Rule 59(e) motion is the subject of this appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A COA is generally a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of an issue decided
in a § 2254 proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). However, not all appeals from
matters decided in § 2254 proceedings require a COA. The Supreme Court explained that
§ 2253(c)(1)(A), the provision requiring a COA, “governs final orders that dispose of the
merits of a habeas corpus proceeding.” Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).
The “COA requirement applies to appeals from orders resolving motions under
Rule[ ] 59(e)” that challenge the district court’s resolution of the merits of a habeas claim.
See United States v. Gantt, 762 F. App’x 566, 568 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished)

;
3
see
also Thompson v. Benzon, No. 21-4114, 2022 WL 3041099, at *1–2 (10th Cir. Aug. 2,
2022) (unpublished) (requiring a COA to appeal from the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion
“rearguing the merits of the district court’s procedural default ruling”); Jackson v.
Standifird, 503 F. App’x 623, 625–26 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (requiring a COA to
appeal the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion alleging that the district court “misunderstood
the facts or his arguments”); cf. Farrow v. Colorado, No. 25-1022, 2025 WL 2396662,

3
We cite unpublished decisions for their persuasive value only and do not treat
them as binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

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at *2–3 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 2025) (unpublished) (denying a COA as unnecessary to
appeal from the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion “asking the district court to reconsider
extending or reopening the appeal window”); United States v. McIntosh, 723 F. App’x
613, 616 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (denying a COA as unnecessary to appeal from
the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion seeking “reconsideration of the district court’s
determination that [a] Rule 60(b) motion was untimely”).
Mr. Medina’s second Rule 59(e) motion effectively challenged the resolution of
his § 2254 petition on the merits. Although the second Rule 59(e) motion was aimed at
the court’s resolution of the first, the sum of Mr. Medina’s argument asked the court to
amend its resolution of his § 2254 petition on the merits because it had misunderstood the
arguments therein. A COA is therefore required for appellate review. Because the district
court denied Mr. Medina’s motion on a procedural ground as untimely, Mr. Medina may
obtain a COA only by showing “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000).

Mr. Medina fails to make the required showing. Motions to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59(e) must be filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). This deadline “is short . . . with no possibility of an
extension.” Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 507–08 (2020); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2)
(prohibiting extensions to Rule 59(e)’s deadline). Mr. Medina filed his second Rule 59(e)
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motion no earlier than September 23, 2025
4
—more than three months after the district
court entered judgment on June 10, 2025.
Yet Mr. Medina does not dispute the district court’s procedural ruling on appeal.
Rather, he disputes only the district court’s disposition of the merits of his § 2254 petition
and his first Rule 59(e) motion. Specifically, he argues “[t]here was an offer for [a] 10-
year plea that [he] was not advised about” and that the attorney general and the district
court either “lied or . . . didn’t even take a few minutes to read [his] claim.” Appellant’s
Br. at 2–3. Accordingly, Mr. Medina has failed to show that reasonable jurists could
debate the district court’s ruling that his second Rule 59(e) motion was untimely.
5

4
Mr. Medina dated his second Rule 59(e) motion September 23, 2025. Although
the motion is marked filed on September 29, 2025, Mr. Medina is entitled to the prison
mailbox rule, which provides that “a prisoner’s papers are considered filed as of the date
he delivers them to prison officials for mailing.” Hall v. Scott, 292 F.3d 1264, 1266 n.1
(10th Cir. 2002).
5
Mr. Medina’s arguments would fare no better if we were to construe his untimely
Rule 59(e) motion as one brought under Rule 60(b). See Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft
Co., 439 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that a district court may properly
construe an untimely Rule 59(e) motion as one brought under Rule 60(b)). Because
Mr. Medina’s motion effectively “asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from [his]
underlying conviction,” Mr. Medina’s motion would be construed as an unauthorized
second or successive habeas petition over which the district court lacked jurisdiction. See
Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[A] 60(b) motion is a second
or successive petition if it in substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for
relief from the petitioner’s underlying conviction.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)
(requiring authorization from the appropriate court of appeals before a district court may
consider a second or successive habeas application); In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251
(10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“A district court does not have jurisdiction to address the
merits of a second or successive § 2255 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claim until this court has
granted the required authorization.”).
And although we have discretion to treat an appellate brief as a request for
authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition, see United States v. Williams,
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Medina’s request for a COA as to the
district court’s denial of his second Rule 59(e) motion. We GRANT Mr. Medina’s motion
to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and fees. This matter is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court

Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge

790 F.3d 1059, 1077 (10th Cir. 2015), Mr. Medina does not “rel[y] on a new rule of
constitutional law” or previously unavailable evidence as required for such authorization.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

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