in Re Redondo Construction Corporation v. Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1817
IN RE REDONDO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
Debtor.
____________________
REDONDO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
Claimant, Appellee,
v.
PUERTO RICO HIGHWAY AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
Respondent, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Enrique S. Lamoutte, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge]
Before
Lynch, Selya and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Héctor Benítez Arraiza and Quiñones & Arbona, P.S.C. on brief
for appellant.
Freddie Pérez-González and Freddie Pérez-González & Assoc.,
P.S.C. on brief for appellee.

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March 30, 2016

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Per Curiam. This is the latest in a seemingly endless
stream of appeals arising out of litigation between a contractor,
Redondo Construction Corporation (Redondo), and the Puerto Rico
Highway and Transportation Authority (the Authority). The sole
remaining issue in this appeal involves the accrual date for the
commencement of prejudgment interest under Article 1061 of the
Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 3025. That
issue, however, has now been definitively resolved in a separate
appeal involving the same parties. See P.R. Highway & Transp.
Auth. v. Redondo Constr. Corp. (In re Redondo Constr. Corp.), ___
F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 2016) [No. 15-1397, slip op. at 13-15].
That case held — as did the district court in this case — that the
accrual date was determined by the date of substantial completion
of a particular contract. See id. at ___ [slip op. at 15]. Because
this ruling is directly on point, it is dispositive here. See
United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir. 1991) ("We
have held, time and again, that in a multi-panel circuit, prior
panel decisions are binding upon newly constituted panels in the
absence of supervening authority sufficient to warrant disregard
of established precedent.").
The Authority claims that our decision in this case is
controlled instead by language in one of our earlier opinions.
See Redondo Constr. Corp. v. P.R. Highway & Transp. Auth. (In re
Redondo Constr. Corp.), 700 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2012). That

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language does not salvage the Authority's claim and, in all events,
it is dictum. It is apodictic that dictum, unlike a holding, does
not bind a future panel. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d 453, 459 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Dictum constitutes
neither the law of the case nor the stuff of binding precedent").
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the judgment of the district court is summarily
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).

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