United States of America v. Ricky Sirois

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1065
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
RICKY SIROIS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Selya and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
James S. Hewes on brief for appellant.
Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, and Margaret
D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for
appellee.
May 22, 2015

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Per Curiam. Defendant-appellant Ricky Sirois pleaded
guilty to a charge of conspiracy with intent to distribute
oxycodone. The district court set the guideline sentencing range
(GSR) at 41-51 months and imposed a mid-range sentence of 48
months' imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.
The appellant advances two claims of sentencing error.
We discuss them sequentially.
A.
The sentencing guidelines authorize a two-level reduction
in a defendant's offense level upon a finding that "the defendant
was a minor participant in [the relevant] criminal activity." USSG
§3B1.2(b). To obtain this discount, "a defendant must show that he
is both less culpable than most of his cohorts in the particular
criminal endeavor and less culpable than the mine-run of those who
have committed similar crimes." United States v. Meléndez-Rivera,
782 F.3d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 2015). The defendant bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to
a minor participant reduction. See id.; United States v. Quiñones-
Medina, 553 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2009).
Determining a defendant's role in the offense is a fact-
specific enterprise and — absent an error of law — appellate review
of such a determination is for clear error. See Quiñones-Medina,
553 F.3d at 22. Given this respectful standard, battles over a
defendant's role in the offense "will almost always be won or lost
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in the district court." United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 75
(1st Cir. 1995).
In this case, the sentencing court ruled that the
appellant had not shown by preponderant evidence that he was a
minor participant in the oxycodone-trafficking ring. This ruling
did not rest on any error of law and was not clearly erroneous.
The record makes manifest that the appellant was an active seller
of oxycodone and, in addition, allowed the drug ring to use his
residence as a drug-distribution facility. While he was not the
ringleader, the record offers no compelling reason to think that
the appellant was less culpable than the mine-run of street-level
oxycodone traffickers. It follows that the district court did not
clearly err in denying the appellant a minor role reduction. See
Meléndez-Rivera, 782 F.3d at 29; United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d
330, 333 (1st Cir. 1990).
B.
The appellant's remaining claim of error challenges the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence. A sentence is
substantively reasonable as long as it is linked to "a plausible
sentencing rationale" and exemplifies "a defensible result."
United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008). The
guidelines, though advisory, constitute a starting point for the
sentencing court. See United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d
514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc). Where, as here, the court
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imposes a sentence within a properly calculated GSR, a defendant
who asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable faces
a steep uphill climb. See United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588,
592-93 (1st Cir. 2011). On this record, the appellant cannot
complete that climb.
Although the district court rejected the appellant's
importunings to vary downward from the GSR, it did not do so
reflexively. Rather, the court carefully weighed all of the
relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, including the
appellant's troubled background, his history of abuse, his problems
with addiction, and the like. And after a full consideration of
the relevant sentencing factors, the court took pains in explaining
its reasons for choosing a sentence near the mid-point of the GSR.
We review a district court's choice of a sentence for
abuse of discretion, taking into account the totality of the
circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007);
Martin, 520 F.3d at 92. In conducting this tamisage, we must be
mindful that reasonableness is a protean concept; "there is not a
single reasonable sentence but, rather, a range of reasonable
sentences." Martin, 520 F.3d at 92. Here, the district court
articulated a plausible sentencing rationale and reached an easily
defensible result. The court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that a 48-month sentence was within the universe of
reasonable sentences for the appellant.
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C.
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the appellant's sentence is summarily
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).
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