Angela Lynn Zareas v. Luis Bared-San Martin; Ana Maríabared-Espinosa

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1180
ANGELA LYNN ZAREAS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
LUIS BARED-SAN MARTIN; ANA MARÍA BARED-ESPINOSA,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Héctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Juan José Nolla-Acosta, with whom Nicolás Nogueras-Cartagena
was on brief, for appellant.
Luis Sánchez-Betances, with whom Sánchez-Betances, Sifre,
Muñoz-Noya & Rivera, P.S.C., was on brief, for appellees.
December 15, 2006

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Per Curiam. Plaintiff-Appellant Angela Lynn Zareas
("Zareas") appeals the dismissal of her complaint against Luis
Bared San Martin and Ana Maria Bared Espinosa (together, the
"Bareds"), pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. Dismissal of
Zareas's civil RICO claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) was
recommended by a magistrate judge, and the dismissal was granted by
the district court below. The magistrate judge found that the
claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations on civil
RICO claims. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc.,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 155 (1987). The magistrate judge also
concluded that even had the claim not been time barred, Zareas
neither pled with specificity pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) nor
adequately established a causal nexus between the Bareds' alleged
activities and the purported injury. After evaluating these
findings, we affirm.
Although this appeal has not raised difficult questions
of law, we feel compelled to address the inadequacy of Zareas's
alleged injury. In order to recover under a civil RICO claim, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant(s) not only conducted
an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, but that
the alleged activity has caused injury to the plaintiff's "business
or property." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-97
(1985). Here, Zareas has alleged that the Bareds engaged in the

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fraudulent sale of duty-free goods. Her alleged injuries, however,
are emotional distress, and deprivation of property owed her
pursuant to her former marriage to the Bareds' son.
The alleged injuries fail for four reasons. Three of
these reasons were addressed by the magistrate judge. The fourth
is our own observation. First, claims for personal injuries, such
as emotional distress, are not "business or property" and are not
cognizable under RICO. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of
California, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass. 1982)
(concluding that personal injury cases are not within the ambit of
the RICO statute); see also Martin v. Fleet Nat. Bank, 676 F. Supp.
423, 432 (D.R.I. 1987)("concerning plaintiffs' claims of personal
psychic injuries and emotional distress, this court can only note
that civil RICO does not provide a remedy for such harms").
Second, the ownership of the disputed property was addressed in
Zareas's divorce proceedings by the Puerto Rico Court of First
Instance and the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals. Both courts found
that Zareas has no ownership interest in the property. This Court
is bound by these state court decisions pursuant to the full faith
and credit clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Third, even if the
allegations against the Bareds were true, there is no causal effect
between their alleged activity and Zareas's purported injury. See
Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 1991)(there
must be a causal relationship between the injury asserted and the

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predicate acts under the RICO statute). The fraudulent sale of
duty-free goods could in no way cause injury to Zareas's purported
property. In fact, the only possible connection between the
alleged RICO activity and Zareas's purported injury could be that
the property was attained by or paid for with profits from the
alleged activity. This leads us to the fourth ground for rejecting
Zareas's purported injury: if we are to believe that Zareas's
allegations are sincere, then she is asking the court to recognize
and enforce an interest in property that was ill-gotten or paid for
by ill-gotten monies. Such claims are not cognizable. We award
standard costs to the appellees.
Affirmed.

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