Carrillo, Humberto, Applicant v. CITY OF SALINAS, permissibly self-insured, administrated by CORVEL, Defendants

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
HUMBERTO CARRILLO, Applicant
vs.
CITY OF SALINAS, permissibly self-insured, administrated by CORVEL, Defendants
Adjudication Numbers: ADJ9237916, ADJ8651488, ADJ8073759,
ADJ7672461, ADJ8651494
Salinas District Office
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Defendant City of Salinas seeks reconsideration of the Second Amended September 5,
2025 Findings and Award, wherein the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ)
found, in relevant part, that applicant’s injuries caused permanent disability of 100%.
Defendant contends that applicant is not entitled to one permanent disability award;
instead, it argues that applicant’s multiple injuries should be awarded separately. Defendant further
contends that the 100% permanent disability award is not substantiated even if all the disabilities
are attributed to one date of injury. Defendant also contends that the September 5, 2025 Second
Amended Findings and Award is not clear as to the credit defendant is to take from past paid
permanent disabilities.
We received an answer from applicant Humberto Carrillo. Applicant contends that he is
entitled to the heart trouble presumption in Labor Code1 section 3212 and the anti-attribution
clause contained in section 4663(e).
The WCJ prepared a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration
(Report), recommending that the Petition be denied.
1 All statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration, the Answer, and the contents of the
Report, and we have reviewed the record in this matter. For the reasons discussed below, we deny
reconsideration.
FACTS
As stated in the Report:
There are 5 injuries plead. Three of these are specific injuries. [ADJ7672461] is
an admitted 1/21/2021 specific injury to the heart, hypertensive heart disease,
arrhythmia, coronary atherosclerosis, eyes/retinopathy, vision, and psyche, and
all body parts are admitted as AOE/COE by both parties. In [ADJ8073759],
Defendant has admitted injury to the low back but denies Applicant’s claim to
have also injured his heart, hypertensive heart disease, arrhythmia, coronary
atherosclerosis, eyes/retinopathy, and psyche. In [ADJ8651488], Defendant
admits injury to the psyche but denies injury to the heart, hypertensive heart
disease, arrhythmia, coronary atherosclerosis, and eyes/retinopathy.
The remaining 2 injuries are cumulative. The first, ADJ8651494, alleges injury
during the period 1/3/1994 through 10/[22]/2012 to Applicant’s his right
shoulder, hypertensive heart disease, arrhythmia, coronary atherosclerosis,
eyes/retinopathy, and psyche. Defendant admits injury only to the right shoulder
and psyche. The second CT claim is ADJ9237916. In that case, Defendant
admits injury to Applicant’s low back, left hand, left thumb, and right hand
during the period 1/3/1994 through 8/7/2013.Applicant proved that in addition,
he sustained injury to his heart, hypertensive heart disease, arrhythmia, coronary
atherosclerosis, eyes/retinopathy, and psyche. After trial, the two CT injuries
were amended to show the same dates of injurious exposure and to include all
injured body parts. ADJ 8651494 was then dismissed as duplicative. This
brought the pleadings into accord with the evidence.
All of these injuries are agreed to have taken place as the result of actual events
of Applicant’s employment with Defendant City of Salinas as a firefighter.
…
The 	main 	dispute 	in 	this 	case 	lies 	in 	the 	interaction 	between 	Section
4664/Benson apportionment and the effect on apportionment in cases involving
multiple injuries where each injury involves at least one body part compensable
under a Section 3212 presumption [and] the anti-attribution statutes. Applicant’s
position at trial and since has been that such a case requires a single award
including all body parts including those not subject to the presumption.
Defendant claims that Benson requires separate awards for each claim of injury,
with separate treatment for presumed and non-presumed injuries.

3
A Findings and Award was filed on 8/4/2025 which contained multiple errors.
Defendant filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration pointing out some of these
errors, and so the Award was withdrawn and a Second Amended Findings and
Award on 9/5/2025. This F&A followed recent multiple Board cases holding
that under these circumstances a combined Award was warranted and awarded
100% PD in all cases, with benefits to begin after the last payment of TD under
the most recent case. The Award specified that Defendant was permitted credit
for all payment previously made on account. From this F&A, Defendant
[brought] the instant Petition for Reconsideration. (Report, pp. 2-5.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Former section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless
the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (§ 5909.) Effective
July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:
(a) 	A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals
board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a
case to the appeals board.
(b)
(1) 	When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial
judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
(2) 	For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing
notice.
Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within
60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in
the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under
Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase
“The case is sent to the Recon board.”
Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September
26, 2025 and 60 days from the date of transmission is November 25, 2025. This decision is issued
by or on November 25, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by section
5909(a).
Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice
of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides
notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are

4
notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to
act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall
be notice of transmission.
Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers’
compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on September 26, 2025, and the
case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 26, 2025. Service of the Report and
transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that
the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because
service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as
to the commencement of the 60-day period on September 26, 2025.
II.
We adopt and incorporate the following from the Report:
Petitioner’s first contention is that Labor Code Section 4664 as interpreted by
the Benson decision requires a separate Award for each case. There are four
cases at issue here (Defendant has not taken issue with the dismissal of the
duplicative CT case, so I will discuss the four remaining cases). Defendant
concedes that as to body parts covered by a Section 3212 et seq, [sic] in this case
the heart arrythmia and hypertension, the anti-attribution statute precludes
division of the PD covered by a presumption among several injuries. Defendant
claims that the PD must be divided in a way that the heart presumption PD be
covered in one case, and that the PD produced by ‘non-presumption’ body parts
be attributed to separate injuries.
There are several problems with this approach, none of which can be solved by
Defendant’s proposed method. First, the approach itself violates Benson.
Benson, as cited by Defendant, requires separate awards for separate injuries.
Defendant proposes that [these] cases be separated by body part, not by injury.
When more than one body part is involved in an incident which causes disability,
the law deals with the situation as one injury, and not as multiple injuries, one
for each injured body part. In the name of [Benson’s] requirement that each
injury gets its own Award, Defendant requests a scheme in which PD is divided,
not by injury but by body part. In effect, Defendant claims that it was error to
fail to follow Benson in a manner that favors Applicant and instead proposes a
way of violating Benson that favors Defendant.
Of course, the main problem with this approach is that it has been considered by
the Board and rejected a number of times in the recent past. There have been a
number of panel decisions, as well as at least one writ denied case (Santiago, 87
CCC 1011 (2022, writ denied), which rely on Delia v. County of Los Angeles,
2010 Cal. Wrk. Comp. PD LEXIS 282. This case states “where two or more

5
presumptive injuries contribute to permanent disability, a joint award of
permanent disability is appropriate, even if non-overlapping, non-presumptive
body parts are involved”. This language is cited in several cases, verbatim, as a
well-settled rule of law. It is true that none of these cases are en banc, or
significant panel decisions, or published Court of Appeal decisions, and are thus
not binding and may only be cited for their persuasive value. They do have the
virtue of being recent rulings by the WCAB, which are not refuted by contrary
precedent. The language cited above from Delia appears to describe the
circumstances of the instant case perfectly.
Petitioner claims that language in Delia requires that the ‘non-presumptive’
body parts be inextricably intertwined before Delia may be applied. This claim
is a weak one. First, the language cited forms no part of the holding in [Delia].
More importantly, the evidence in this case contains Joint Exhibit CCCC, a
report from Dr. Segal that states that the psychiatric disability in these cases is,
indeed, inextricably intertwined. Dr. Anderson, at Joint Exhibit FFFF, states that
orthopedic, cardiac, and psychiatric disabilities do not overlap and have
synergistic effects. No medical report claims to be able to disentangle this
synergism.
Petitioner next claims that the Award is untenable because the Opinion on
Decision does not contain a string rating. This contention is correct, but
irrelevant. The parties were asked to supply proposed ratings with their pre-trial
briefs, and [both] complied. In all important respects, these ratings were so
similar as to be functionally identical. Either could have been adopted (as to the
ratings for each body part) without any change in the final result. I would be
remiss if I failed to note that the result was also supported by the vocational
evidence of Mr. Westman, although those reports were not heavily relied upon.
Defendant next claims to be confused as to [which] case the Award was entered
in. The plain answer is that the Award was issued in ALL cases listed. The [anti-
attribution] statute and the medical evidence attributing heart trouble to all four
injuries prevented issuance of the amalgamated PD in one case only. Therefore,
the Award was made in all four cases.
Petitioner claims to be confused about its claim to credit for amounts paid for
PD prior to the Award. This complaint is very difficult to understand. These
advances were not [at] issue [in] trial, and the Award specifically allows credit
for all sums paid on account. I am unable to understand the problem.
Finally, Petitioner points out a typographical error on one of the dates of injury
in the Opinion on Decision. This is correct. I confess error. The Opinion on
decision does not form part of the Award and Petitioner is not aggrieved by the
error, particularly since the error was spotted and resulted in no actual confusion
as to what was awarded and why. (Report, pp. 5-6.)

6
Defendant contends that we should follow Benson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board (Permanente Medical Group) (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1535 [74 Cal.Comp.Cases 113] and
award separate awards for each injury. We note that Benson did not address the anti-attribution
clause in section 4663(e). Even then, Benson acknowledged that “there may be limited
circumstances, not present here, when the evaluating physician cannot parcel out, with reasonable
medical probability, the approximate percentage to which each distinct industrial injury causally
contributed to the employee’s overall permanent disability. In such limited circumstances, when
the employer has failed to meet its burden of proof, a combined award of permanent disability may
still be justified. [citation omitted.].” (Id. at p. 1560.)
On the other hand, Delia v. County of Los Angeles (July 23, 2010, ADJ2246339,
ADJ4352653, ADJ2131157) [2010 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. LEXIS 282] specifically addressed
apportionment with respect to the anti-attribution clause of section 4663(e) and in relation to the
holding in Benson. The “anti-attribution provisions of sections 3212 and 3212.3 preclude
apportionment of the causation of permanent disability pursuant to section 4663. [citation omitted.]
For that same reason, the permanent disability caused by each of applicant’s three injuries cannot
be separately apportioned to separate awards pursuant to section 4663 as described in Benson.”
(Id.) In Delia, the three injuries at issue were (1) a specific injury to the cervical and lumbar spine,
(2) a specific injury to the lumbar spine and both hands, and (3) a cumulative trauma injury to the
cardiovascular system, abdominal wall (hernia), bilateral hands and auditory system (loss of
hearing). (Id.) The Appeals Board panel in Delia concluded that because of the anti-attribution
clause, the applicant was entitled to one award even though the applicant’s first two injuries were
not the subject of section 3212 et seq. presumptions.
Defendant erroneously contends that the conclusions in Delia relied on the defendant’s
failure to prove overlap and that a single award is only justified when the non-presumptive body
parts are inextricably linked with presumptive body parts. (Petition, pp. 5:24-6:1.) The discussion
on overlap and inextricably linked body parts in Delia was in relation to apportionment under
section 4664 between the three injuries at issue and two past injuries that were the subject of a
stipulated award. (Delia, infra.) There is no issue regarding apportionment between the current
injuries and past awards.
As to the issue of substantiating the 100% award, we agree with the WCJ that the Agreed
Medical Evaluators have presented substantial evidence as to the addition of the many disabilities.

7
In his August 31, 2013 report, Jonathan Ng, M.D., opined that the most accurate combination
method of applicant’s cardiovascular condition and other conditions such as his orthopedic,
psyche, and neurological conditions, is to add them. (Join Exhibit ZZ, Dr. Ng’s report dated August
31, 2023, p. 48.) Perry Segal, M.D., opined that “simple addition of a psychiatric impairment to
those deriving from the medical and orthopedic disabilities is the most accurate way of deriving
Mr. Carrillo’s resulting total disability.” (Joint Exhibit CCC, Dr. Segal’s report dated January 16,
2022, p. 3.) Mark A. Anderson, M.D., opined, applicant’s “difficulties essentially set up a
cascade/waterfall effect and the problems simply amplify and stack up on each other. Is an
individual with one problem less disabled than an individual with 12 or more difficulties, no, the
more problems you add, the more synergism is required because each problem amplifies the
other.” (Joint Exhibit GGG, Dr. Anderson’s report dated January 30, 2025, p. 2.) “It is my belief
referable to orthopedic complaints that this is yet a further restriction, which is more appropriately
treated with addition than combination. . . . If there is any restriction that seems the least intrusive,
it is that for the left eye injury . . . this would be the only finding that I would combine and not
add.” (Id. at p. 3.)
Accordingly, we deny reconsideration.

8
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant City of Salinas’ Petition for Reconsideration of the
Second Amended September 5, 2025 Findings and Award is DENIED.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
/s/ KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR 	/
I CONCUR,
/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER 	/
/s/ PAUL F. KELLY, COMMISSIONER 	/
DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
NOVEMBER 25, 2025
SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT
THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.
HUMBERTO CARRILLO
DILLES LAW GROUP PC
YRULEGUI & ROBERTS
LSM/ara
I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board to this original decision on this date.
CS