Ceras Garcia, Carolina, Applicant v. KNIGHT-CALABASAS, LLC; INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE WEST, Defendants

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CAROLINA CERAS GARCIA, Applicant
vs.
KNIGHT-CALABASAS, LLC; INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE WEST, Defendants
Adjudication Number: ADJ20018307
Los Angeles District Office
OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
AND DECISION AFTER
RECONSIDERATION
Applicant seeks reconsideration of the Findings and Order (F&O) dated August 12, 2025,
wherein the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ) found, in relevant part, that
applicant was not an employee of defendant, Knight-Calabasas, LLC, during the period from
November 1, 2021, through September 13, 2024, and thus ordered a take nothing.
Applicant contends that pursuant to Labor Code1 sections 2775(b), 3351, and 2750, she
should be considered an employee of defendant during the period from November 1, 2021, through
September 13, 2024, and that lack of direct payment from defendant “does not negate an
employment relationship.” (Petition for Reconsideration (Petition), p. 2.) Applicant further
contends that she is not bound by the independent contractor agreement between defendant and JC
Cleaning (Exhibit E) since she was not a party to the agreement. (Ibid.)
We have received an Answer from defendant. The WCJ prepared 	a Report and
Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration (Report), recommending that the Petition be
denied.
We have considered the Petition, the Answer, and the contents of the Report, and we have
reviewed the record in this matter. For the reasons discussed below, we will grant the Petition,
1 All further statutory references will be to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.

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rescind the F&O, and return the matter to the trial level for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. When the WCJ issues a new decision, any aggrieved person may timely seek
reconsideration.
FACTS
Applicant claims she was employed by defendant as a cleaner during the period from
November 1, 2021 through September 13, 2024, and sustained an injury arising out of and in the
course of employment (AOE/COE) to the head, neck, back, shoulders, arms, wrists, hands, hips,
bilateral upper and lower extremities, psyche, and nervous system.
On February 4, 2025, defendant filed a Declaration of Readiness to Proceed to a mandatory
settlement conference on the issue of employment.
Thereafter, a hearing was set for March 12, 2025, and continued to an April 15, 2025 trial
date. The parties stipulated that applicant was allegedly employed by defendant, Knight-Calabasas
LLC, and the workers’ compensation carrier was Insurance Company of the West. There is no
information in the record as to whether JC Cleaning carried workers’ compensation insurance
coverage. The only issue listed for trial was whether applicant was an independent contractor or
an employee of defendant. (Minutes of Hearing and Summary of Evidence (MOH/SOE), April 15,
2025, p. 2.)
Applicant submitted as evidence, a copy of a check stub showing payment to JC Cleaning
Services for $6,000.00, dated June 26, 2024 (Exhibit 1), as well as text communications in Spanish
(Exhibit 2).
As relevant here, defendant submitted as evidence, 1099C wage forms prepared by Knight-
Calabasas, LLC DBA Calabasas Country Club for JC Cleaning for the 2022 and 2023 years
(Exhibit C), as well as text communications in Spanish (Exhibit D). Defendant also submitted an
independent contractor agreement (Exhibit E), which stated the following:
This agreement is between JC Cleaning and Calabasas Country Club, effective
January 1, 2021 and will go month to month. Either party may cancel at any time.
Calabasas Country Club will be using the cleaning services of JC Cleaning every
night for 4 hours and/or as needed to clean the areas specified by “The Club.”
Calabasas Country Club will pay JC Cleaning the sum of $4800.00 per month on
the 5 th of every month.

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The matter was then continued to a further trial, on May 27, 2025, at which time the matter
stood submitted.
On August 12, 2025, the WCJ issued an F&O which held, in relevant part, that applicant
was not an employee of defendant Knight-Calabasas during the period November 1, 2021, through
September 13, 2024, and thus ordered a take nothing. It is from this F&O that applicant seeks
reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
I.
Preliminarily, former section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed
denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab.
Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:
(a) 	A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals
board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge
transmits a case to the appeals board.
(b)
(1) 	When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial
judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals
board.
(2) 	For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report,
pursuant 	to 	subdivision 	(b) 	of 	Section 	5900, 	shall 	constitute
providing notice.
Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within
60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected under the
Events tab in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case
Events, under Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information
is the phrase “The case is sent to the Recon board.”
Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September
12, 2025, and 60 days from the date of transmission is November 10, 2025. This decision was
issued by or on November 10, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by
section 5909(a).
Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice
of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides
notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are

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notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to
act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall
constitute notice of transmission.
Here, according to the proof of service for the Report, it was served on September 12, 2025,
and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 12, 2025. Service of the Report
and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude
that the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1)
because service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual
notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on September 12, 2025.
II.
Turning now to the merits of the Petition, it is well established that California has a no-
fault workers' compensation system. With few exceptions, all California employers are liable for
the compensation provided by the system to employees injured or disabled, in the course, and
arising out of, their employment, "irrespective of the fault of either party." (Cal. Const., art. XIV,
§ 4.) The protective goal of California's no-fault workers' compensation legislation is manifested
"by defining 'employment' broadly in terms of 'service to an employer' and by including a general
presumption that any person 'in service to another' is a covered 'employee.'" (Lab. Code, §§ 3351,
5705(a)1; S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Ind. Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 354 [54
Cal.Comp.Cases 80].)
An “employer” is defined, in relevant part, as “every person including any public service
corporation, which has any natural person in service.” (Lab. Code, § 3300(c).) An “employee” is
defined as “every person in the service of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire
or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.”
(Lab. Code, § 3351.) Further, any person rendering service for another, other than as an
independent contractor or other excluded classification, is presumed to be an employee. (Lab.
Code, § 3357.) Once the person rendering service establishes a prima facie case of “employee”
status, the burden shifts on the hiring entity to affirmatively prove that the worker is an independent
contractor. (Cristler v. Express Messenger Sys., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 72, 84 [74
Cal.Comp.Cases 167]; Narayan v. EGL, Inc. (2010) 616 F.3d 895, 900 [75 Cal.Comp.Cases 724].)

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Consequently, unless the hiring entity can demonstrate that the worker meets specific criteria to
be considered an independent contractor, all workers are presumed to be employees.
The current evidentiary record suggests, at a minimum, that applicant was employed by JC
Cleaning. The record, however, contains no evidence that applicant was an owner of JC Cleaning.
The record also contains no evidence as to whether JC Cleaning had workers’ compensation
insurance coverage. Unless JC Cleaning was a sole proprietorship with no employees, it was
required to carry workers’ compensation insurance. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7125.2; Wright v. Issak
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1116 [72 Cal.Comp.Cases 438].) Additional discovery on these issues is
necessary. As such, the issue of whether applicant was an employee or independent contractor for
defendant, Knight-Calabasas, LLC, is premature.
III.
Preliminarily, however, we note that applicant established a prima facie case of employee
status under sections 3351 and 3357. The burden thus shifted to defendant to affirmatively prove
that applicant was an independent contractor.
In the case of Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903 [83
Cal.Comp.Cases 817], the court provided the “ABC” test, which was then codified in section 2775.
The ABC test allows a hiring entity to rebut the presumption that a person providing labor or
services for remuneration shall be considered an employee rather than an independent contractor.
Pursuant to section 3351(i), beginning on July 1, 2020, a failure to rebut the presumption by
satisfying all the factors outlined under section 2775 renders the worker an employee absent certain
exceptions. (Lab. Code, § 3351(i).) Section 2775(b) states, in pertinent part, that:
(1) For purposes of this code and the Unemployment Insurance Code, and for the
purposes of wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission, a person
providing labor or services for remuneration shall be considered an employee
rather than an independent contractor unless the hiring entity demonstrates that
all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in
connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for
the performance of the work and in fact.
(B) The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring
entity’s business.

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(C) The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work
performed.
(Lab. Code, § 2775(b)(1).)
As outlined above, all elements of the ABC test must be met for a worker to be found an
independent contractor. Further, it is well established that decisions by the Appeals Board must
also be supported by substantial evidence. (Lab. Code, §§ 5903, 5952(d); Lamb v. Workmen’s
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal.Comp.Cases 310]; Garza v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 500]; LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 16].) “The term ‘substantial evidence’
means evidence which, if true, has probative force on the issues. It is more than a mere scintilla,
and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion…It 	must 	be 	reasonable 	in 	nature, 	credible, 	and 	of 	solid 	value.” 	(Braewood
Convalescent Hospital v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Bolton) (1983) 34 Cal.3d 159, 164 [48
Cal.Comp.Cases 566].)
In the present case, with respect to section A, which pertains to defendant’s control and
discretion in the performance of applicant’s work, applicant contends that defendant “directed
what part of the club and when and how applicant was to clean[.]” (Petition, p. 3.) On page 3 of
his Report, the WCJ argued that “[w]ith no direct supervision, no performance reviews, and
communication consisting of roughly one or two messages per month, it cannot be argued that the
Defendant exercised any substantial control over how [applicant] performed work.”
In the case of Dynamex, the court remarked that “depending on the nature of the work and
overall arrangement between the parties, a business need not control the precise manner of or details
of the work in order to be found to have maintained the necessary control that an employer ordinarily
possesses over its employees.” (Dynamex, supra, at p. 958.) The right to control has been demonstrated
by evidence that the worker must obey instructions and is subject to consequences, including discipline
or termination, for failure to do so. (Toyota Motor Sales v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864,
p. 875; G. Borello, supra, at p. 350.) Moreover, “the unlimited right to discharge at will and without
cause has been stressed by a number of cases as a strong factor demonstrating employment.” (Toyota,
supra, at p. 875.) So long as the employer has the authority to exercise complete control “whether or
not that right is exercised with respect to all details, an employer-employee relationship exists.” (Id. at
p. 874.) Hence, when considering the right to control, the focus is on the necessary control, and an

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employment relationship for purposes of workers’ compensation may be found even when the
company “is more concerned with the results of the work rather than the means of its accomplishment.”
(JKH Enterprises v. Dept. of Ind. Relat. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1064-1065 [71 Cal.Comp.Cases
1257]; see also Borello, supra, at pp. 355-360; Air Couriers, Intl. v. Emp. Dev. Dept. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 923, 937.)
In the instant matter, based upon our review of the evidentiary record, including text
communications between applicant and defendant (Exhibit 2 & Exhibit D) and testimony by
applicant as well as defense witness, Veronica Parong, it appears that there is substantial evidence
of right to control by defendant. As demonstrated by the text messages and testimony, Mrs. Parong
provided applicant with instructions on what areas to clean and requested additional work and
ultimately made the decision to “part ways” with applicant. (MOH/SOE, May 27, 2025, p. 2:8-9.)
With respect to section B of the ABC test, which pertains to whether applicant performed
work outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business, applicant contends that “she did not
clean for anybody but Knight Calabasas.” (Petition, p. 4.) Further, despite the WCJ’s argument
that defendant is “running a golf range and dinner club, not a cleaning service[,]” Mrs. Parong
testified at trial that cleaning is part of the usual course of defendant’s business. (F&O and OOD,
p. 4.) She stated, in relevant part, that:
“The Calabasas Country Club is a private membership club. Its primary business is
golf with some amenities. The members dine and attend special events at the club
like weddings or bar mitzvahs. There is a dining area and fitness center. Members
expect the club to be clean and to enjoy a first class experience. Dirtiness would
impact the reputation of the club. Cleanliness is a core part of the experience for
members. The work done by the cleaning staff is part of the everyday business
operations of the club.”
(MOH/SOE, May 27, 2025, p. 2:14-19.)
Notwithstanding the above, Mrs. Parong alleged that “the work performed by Ms. Garcia and her
husband [were] not part of the core business operation.” (Ibid.)
With respect to section C of the ABC test, whether applicant is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the
work performed, applicant alleges that she “was not part of JC Cleaning and did not clean for
anybody but [defendant.]” (Petition, p. 4.) Applicant further contends that JC Cleaning was
“established by the applicant’s husband” and “applicant did not own any part of the company[.]”
(MOH/SOE, April 15, 2025, p. 5:11-12.) Unfortunately, applicant’s husband did not testify at trial

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and the current record contains no evidence which establishes that applicant was an owner or part
owner of JC Cleaning. As noted above, further discovery is necessary.
IV.
Lastly, on page 4 of the Petition, applicant raised the issue of a potential “general” and
“special” employment relationship. As noted above, it is unclear whether applicant worked for JC
Cleaning and whether JC Cleaning was required to have workers’ compensation coverage. As
such, the issue of whether there exists a general and special employment relationship is premature.
We note, however, that it is well established that California law recognizes a worker may
have two employers for workers' compensation purposes. (Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co. (1979) 23
Cal.3d 168, 174 [44 Cal.Comp.Cases 134].) The characteristics of dual employment include: an
employee sent by one employer (the general employer) to perform work for another (the special
employer); the work yields a benefit to each employer; and each employer has direction and control
over the details of the work. (Ibid.; see also Meloy v. Texas Co. (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 691 [18
Cal.Comp.Cases 313]; Ridgeway v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 841 [20
Cal.Comp.Cases 32]; Doty v. Lacy (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 73 [17 Cal.Comp.Cases 316]; Caso v.
Nimrod Prods. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 881.)
In the case of Kowalski, the Supreme Court explained the concept of “general” and
“special” employment as follows:
“Where an employer sends an employee to do work for another person, and both
have the right to exercise certain powers of control over the employee, that
employee may be held to have two employers -- his original or ‘general’ employer
and a second, the ‘special’ employer.” [Citation.] In Industrial Ind. Exch. v. Ind.
Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 130, 134-135 [156 P.2d 926], this court stated that “an
employee may at the same time be under a general and a special employer, and
where, either by the terms of a contract or during the course of its performance, the
employee of an independent contractor comes under the control and direction of
the other party to the contract, a dual employment relation is held to exist.
[Citations.]” If general and special employment exist, “the injured workman can
look to both employers for [workers’] compensation benefits. [Citations.]”
(Id. at pp. 174-175.)
Thus, when the general employer retains some right of control over the employee, a “dual
employment” arises, with the result that the general employer remains concurrently and
simultaneously, jointly and severally liable with the special employer for any injuries to the

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employee and an award may be made against both employers, jointly, or jointly and severally, for
the full amount of compensation benefits. (Ibid.; See also Caso, supra, at pp. 893-894; Marsh v.
Tilley Steel Co. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 486, 494-495 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 193].)
Although the Kowalski case indicates that control is the primary criterion in the
determination of the existence of a special employment relationship, the following other relevant
factors have also been enumerated: (1) whether the borrowing employer’s control over the
employee and the work he is performing extends beyond mere suggestion of details or cooperation;
(2) whether the employee is performing the special employer’s work; (3) whether there was an
agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds between the original and special employer; (4)
whether the employee acquiesced in the new work situation; (5) whether the original employer
terminated his relationship with the employee; (6) whether the special employer furnished the tools
and place for performance; (7) whether the new employment was over a considerable length of
time; (8) whether the borrowing employer had the right to fire the employee and (9) whether the
borrowing employer had the obligation to pay the employee. (Riley v. Southwest Marine, Inc.
(1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1250.) A special employment relationship may be negated, however,
by evidence that “[t]he employee [was] (1) not paid by and [could not] be discharged by the
borrower, (2) a skilled worker with substantial control over operational details, (3) not engaged in
the borrower's usual business, (4) employed for only a brief period of time, and (5) using tools and
equipment furnished by the lending employer.” (Marsh, supra, at p. 492.)
Given that the record is lacking on the issues of whether applicant was an employee of JC
Cleaning and whether JC Cleaning was required to have workers’ compensation insurance under
section 7125.2 of the Business and Professions Code and in fact carried workers’ compensation
coverage, we believe that a determination on the issues of whether applicant is an independent
contractor and whether there exists a general and special employment relationship is premature.
Accordingly, we grant the Petition, rescind the F&O, and return the matter to the trial level for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. When the WCJ issues a new decision, any
aggrieved person may timely seek reconsideration.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that applicant’s Petition for Reconsideration of the August 12, 2025
Findings and Order is GRANTED.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, as the Decision After Reconsideration of the Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board, that the August 12, 2025 Findings and Order is RESCINDED and
the matter RETURNED to the trial level for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
/s/ KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR
I CONCUR,
/s/ ANNE SCHMITZ, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
/s/ PAUL F. KELLY, COMMISSIONER
DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
NOVEMBER 10, 2025
SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT
THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.
CAROLINA CERAS GARCIA
LAW OFFICES OF TELLERIA, TELLERIA & LEVY, LLP
ALBERT AND MACKENZIE
RL/cs
I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board to this original decision on this date.
CS