P. v. Torres

Filed 2/18/09 P. v. Torres CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JUAN MATIAS TORRES,
Defendant and Appellant.
H032441
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. Nos. CC591335, CC629776)
Appellant pleaded no contest to all charges in two separate informations, one
related to an assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon and one related to a
stabbing of two people in downtown San Jose. Appellant also admitted the enhancing
allegations in both informations. The trial court sentenced appellant to a total state prison
term of 36 years, eight months, with a consecutive term of 25-years-to-life. Appellant
contends that two of the serious prior felony conviction enhancements imposed pursuant
to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a), must be stricken and that the trial court erred
in imposing certain fines. We modify the judgments and affirm.
Case No. CC591335/ Assault on an Officer
On May 6, 2005, a San Jose police officer pulled up next to appellant in his
vehicle and noticed "exceptionally loud music." Although appellant turned the music
down, the officer stopped appellant's vehicle. When the officer walked up to appellant's

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vehicle, it sped away. The officer followed, saw the vehicle parked erratically, and saw
appellant walking away at a "hurried pace." The officer followed appellant and
ultimately apprehended him after appellant took a combative stance and was tasered and
hit with the officer's baton. Appellant threw something at the officer who had to duck,
and the officer later determined that it was a curved knife. Appellant's blood alcohol
level, an hour and a half later, was .06.
As a result of these events appellant was charged with three felonies and five
misdemeanors. The felonies charged were assault on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (c)), exhibition of a deadly weapon at a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 417.8), and
carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(4)). The
misdemeanors were flight from an officer (Veh. Code, § 2000.1, subd. (a)); driving under
the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 or
more, (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), delaying a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd.
(a)(1)), and resisting a peace officer by threat (Pen. Code, § 69). The information also
contained enhancing allegations including that appellant had suffered two prior prison
term convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), two prior serious felony convictions
(Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)) and two prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds.
(b)-(i), 1170.12). The prior serious felony convictions that were alleged to have been
"brought and tried separately" were brandishing a firearm at a peace officer (Pen. Code,
§ 417.8) in Santa Clara County Superior Court docket no. EE117692 and accessory in
furtherance of gang activity (Pen. Code, § 32/186.22, subd. (b)(1)) in Santa Clara County
Superior Court docket no. EE117692.
Case No. CC629776/Downtown Stabbing
In the early morning hours of May 14, 2006, appellant was in downtown San Jose
when he became involved in an altercation after someone made an apparently offensive
comment about gloves that the man who was with appellant was wearing. Appellant
stabbed a woman once in the abdomen and stabbed a man seven times in his upper body.

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Appellant fled when police officers attempted to apprehend him and was struck three
times with an officer's baton before he stopped running. As a result of this incident,
appellant was charged with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148). The information
also alleged enhancing allegations including two prior serious felony convictions (Pen.
Code, § 667, subd. (a)(1)). The prior serious felony convictions alleged to have been
brought and tried separately were brandishing a firearm at a peace officer (Pen. Code
§ 417.8) in Santa Clara County Superior Court docket no. EE117692 and brandishing a
firearm at a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 417.8) in Santa Clara County Superior Court
docket no. EE117692.
Trial Court Proceedings
On April 25, 2007, as to both informations, appellant pleaded no contest to all of
the charges and admitted all of the enhancing allegations. As for the serious felonies
conviction allegations in the assault on an officer case, the trial court asked appellant if he
admitted "the five year prior under 667 of the Penal Code one for the personal use or
brandishing a firearm at an officer?" Appellant answered, "Yes." The court said, "and
you admit that another serious felony of 667A for accessory and furtherance of gang
activity?" Appellant answered, "Yes." In the stabbing case, the court asked appellant as
to his brandishing a firearm at a peace officer prior conviction, "And you admit the five
years serious felony prior on that same offense under 667A?" Appellant answered,
"Yes." The trial court also asked appellant if he "admit[ted] the second prior to accessory
in furtherance of gang activity? . . . And for that same offense five year prior under 667A
of the Penal Code, you admit that?" Appellant answered, "Yes."
The trial court further advised appellant, "at the time of sentencing we will have
you . . . complete a statement of assets, pay a $10 fine, actual restitution to the victims; a
restitution fund fine of not less than $200 no more than $10,000 and an equal amount
imposed but suspended. General funds fine not to exceed ten thousand."

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Appellant's case was set for a motion to dismiss prior strike convictions pursuant
to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Under consideration were
the brandishing a firearm at a peace officer conviction and the accessory in furtherance of
gang activity conviction. In support of this motion, defense counsel argued that
appellant's "strike priors were committed only six days apart. Although the cases were
plead separately, they were sentenced at the same time." The prosecutor's opposition to
this motion acknowledged, "The defendant's strike priors were originally charged in
separate docket[s], but were consolidated for purposes of trial." At the hearing on the
motion, defense counsel told the court that the two prior convictions had been
consolidated for sentencing and the prosecutor corrected him and stated that they were
"consolidated for trial." The probation report included appellant's arrest history which
showed that both prior convictions are listed under one District Attorney case no.
010409242.
On December 18, 2007, the trial court granted appellant's motion to dismiss one
prior strike conviction alleged in one count of case no. CC629776 (the stabbing case) and
one prior strike conviction as to each of three counts in case no. CC591335 (the assault
on an officer). The court said it was "going to base that on the family support the
defendant has, his age, the fact that he had stable employment and some prospects." The
court denied the motion to dismiss as to one of the prior strike convictions in. case no.
CC629776.
In case no. CC629776 (the stabbing) the trial court imposed a total state prison
term of 25-years-to-life consecutive to a 24-year term. This included two consecutive
five-year terms for the prior serious felony allegations imposed pursuant to Penal Code
section 667, subdivision (a). In case no. CC591335 (the assault on an officer), the court
imposed a total term of 12 years, eight months, including two consecutive five-year terms
for the prior serious felony allegations imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667,
subdivision (a).

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The court said, "Two hundred dollar restitution fund fine with an equal amount
imposed but suspended." The court then asked, "Actually, did we do the restitution fund
right?" The probation officer said, "It would be the maximum amount." The court said
that on case no. CC629776 (the stabbing), "it's 10,000 with an equal amount imposed but
suspended rather than 200." The court then said that on case no. CC591335 (the assault
on an officer), "it's the same . . . except that on twelve [years], eight [months] the
restitution fund fine would be—" The probation officer interjected, "4,800." The court
said, "4,800 with an equal amount imposed but suspended." Thus, pursuant to Penal
Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.45, the court imposed restitution fines and suspended
parole fines totaling $14,800.
Penal Code Section 667, Subdivision (a)
Appellant contends, "The court's imposition of two of the five-year enhancements
imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a), was error because the prior
felonies upon which the enhancements were based had not been brought and tried
separately."
Respondent, citing People v. Wrice (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 767, contends that
"Appellant has forfeited his claim because defense counsel did not object to imposition of
the serious felony prior enhancements." Respondent asserts that, because of the lack of
an objection, "the parties and this Court are relegated to divining facts from an
incomplete record and making determinations based on inferences therefrom."
Wrice said that the advisement of the penal consequences of admitting a prior
conviction is a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure and thus any claim of error
in failing to advise a defendant of the penal consequences of an admission is forfeited if
not raised at sentencing. (Wrice, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 770-771.) Appellant does
not claim that there was error in the advisements about the consequences of admitting his
prior convictions. Rather, appellant's contention is that his sentence was unauthorized.

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This is a claim we may review in the absence of an objection. (People v. Scott (1994) 9
Cal.4th 331, 354.)
Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part that "any person
convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious
felony . . . shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present
offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and
tried separately. The terms of the present offense and each enhancement shall run
consecutively." In In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131, the California Supreme Court
ruled that "the requirement in section 667 that the predicate charges must have been
'brought and tried separately' demands that the underlying proceedings must have been
formally distinct, from filing to adjudication of guilt." (Id. at p. 136.)
Here, the record shows that both defense counsel and the prosecutor recognized
that the prior convictions were charged separately but consolidated for trial.
Furthermore, the arrest report history shows one district attorney case number and one
court case number for both convictions. Respondent acknowledges, "Crediting
appellant's inferences from the record that the convictions were not brought and tried
separately because the convictions were consolidated for trial, respondent agrees that two
of the four five-year enhancements, pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision
(a)(1), should be stricken." We agree with respondent that "the trial court erred by
implicitly finding two separate and distinct prior serious felony convictions in each case,
and, therefore, only one of the prior serious felony allegations may remain. Accordingly,
one five-year enhancement should be stricken in each of appellant's cases and his
sentence reduced by 10 years."
Fines
At the time appellant entered his unconditional plea to two informations at one
hearing, the trial court advised him that one consequence could be "a restitution fund fine
of not less than $200 no more than $10,000 and an equal amount imposed but

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suspended." The probation department prepared one report and, at the one sentencing
hearing, the trial court, pursuant to Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.45, imposed a
restitution fund fine of $10,000 with an equal amount imposed but suspended in case no.
CC629776 (the stabbing), and on case no. CC591335 (the assault on an officer), a
restitution fund fine of $4,800 with an equal amount imposed but suspended. Appellant
contends, "The trial court was without authority to impose restitution and parole
revocation fines in excess of $10,000."
Respondent argues that appellant had forfeited his claim to "an otherwise
authorized sentence" because he "was adequately informed of the consequences of his
plea – including the restitution fund fines and suspended parole revocation fines – and his
sentence was in conformity with his unconditional plea." However, the actual fines
imposed exceeded what the trial court had advised appellant of at the time of appellant's
plea. Although appellant did not object to the imposition of the fines in excess of
$10,000, he did not forfeit his right to challenge them as unauthorized.1 (People v. Smith
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 851-852.)
Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(3)(A) provides that, in addition to any
other penalty provided or imposed under law, the court shall order a person convicted of
a crime to pay a restitution fine in accordance with Penal Code section 1202.4,
subdivision (b). Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b) provides, "In every case
where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional
restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and
states those reasons on the record." (Italics added.)
1 Although one need not object to an unauthorized sentence to challenge it on
appeal, it is settled that when a defendant has pleaded guilty in return for a specified
sentence, he or she may not challenge that sentence on appeal, even if it might otherwise
be statutorily unauthorized, as long as the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction.
(People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) Here, appellant pleaded no contest with
no conditions.

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In People v. McNeely (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 739 (McNeely), the court addressed a
claim similar to appellant's claim here. There, at separate hearings, the defendant pleaded
guilty to eight burglaries charged in one information and two burglaries charged in
another. At the next hearing, the court imposed sentence on all charges and also ordered
the defendant to pay $93,000 in restitution to the various victims under former
Government Code section 13967, subdivision (c), which applied at that time.2 On appeal,
the defendant claimed that restitution was limited to $10,000. (Id. at pp. 742-744.) The
reviewing court agreed. It explained that the statute "did not give the court authority to
order restitution up to $10,000 for each victim or on each count. Nor did it allow a
restitution order exceeding $10,000 where, as here, a defendant is sentenced in one
hearing on two or more cases." (Id. at p. 743, italics added.) Noting cases limiting
restitution fines to $10,000 limit regardless of the number of victims or counts, the court
observed that "[w]hile a trial court can separately sentence a defendant on different cases
at a single hearing [citation], here the court combined the charges in both cases in
imposing the prison term and ordering restitution. We do not believe this creates separate
sentencing proceedings on the two cases. When a penal statute is ambiguous, it must be
construed in the light most favorable to the defendant. [Citation.] When section 13967 is
construed in this light, a restitution order on a crime committed in 1989 is limited to
$10,000." (Id. at pp. 743-744.)3
2 The applicable version of former Government Code section 13967, subdivision (c)
provided, in pertinent part, "In cases in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a
result of the defendant's criminal conduct, and the defendant is denied probation, in lieu
of imposing all or a portion of the restitution fine, the court shall order restitution to be
paid to the victim. Notwithstanding subdivision (a), restitution shall be imposed in the
amount of the losses, but not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000)." (Stats.1988, ch.
975, § 1, pp. 3151-3152; italics added.)
3 It has long been judicial policy in California to give the defendant " 'the benefit of
every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true
interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.' " ( People v.
Ralph (1944) 24 Cal.2d 575, 581, quoting from Ex parte Rosenheim (1890) 83 Cal. 388,

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In People v. Ferris (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1272 (Ferris), the court addressed a
similar claim concerning restitution fines under sections 1202.4 and 1202.45. As in
McNeely, the defendant was charged in two cases with crimes committed on different
occasions. After the defendant pleaded not guilty, the prosecutor moved to join the cases
for trial under section 954. The court granted the motion but did not formally consolidate
the two cases under a single information and case number. Thereafter, the jury returned
separate verdicts of guilt in each case, and separate probation reports were prepared. At
sentencing, the court imposed $10,000 restitution and matching parole revocation fines in
each case. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the imposition of separate fines totaling
more than $10,000 was unauthorized because the two cases had been consolidated, and
sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 limited fines to $10,000 "[i]n every case" where a person is
convicted of a felony and the sentence includes a period of parole. (Id. at pp. 1274-
1276.) To resolve the defendant's claim, the court construed the meaning of the phrase
"in every case."4
391; accord, People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 312; see
United States v. Bass (1971) 404 U.S. 336, 347 [92 S.Ct. 515] [" '[A]mbiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity' "].) Thus, " '[w]hen
language which is susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law, the policy of
this state is to construe the statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the
circumstance of its application reasonably permit. The defendant is entitled to the benefit
of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a
statute.' " (People v. Snyder (2000) 22 Cal.4th 304, 314, quoting People v. Overstreet
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896.)
4 The phrase "in every case" was apparently taken from the 1982 voter initiative
called the Victim's Bill of Rights. The initiative added article I, section 28, subdivision
(b) to the California Constitution, which established the right of crime victims to receive
restitution directly from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) The new provision stated, "It is the unequivocal intention
of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of
criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the
crimes for losses they suffer. [¶] Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted persons
in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim

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Observing that "joinder" and "consolidation" are terms often used interchangeably,
the court first opined that under the facts of the case, any linguistic distinction was
irrelevant because clearly, the defendant was "substantively tried and sentenced in one
joint case." (Ferris, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) Finding the case similar to
McNeely, the court noted that sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 "do not specify whether the
phrase 'every case' means every separately charged and numbered case or every jointly
tried case." (Ferris, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) Given this ambiguity, the court
adopted the construction more favorable to the defendant and concluded that the phrase
in " 'every case' " "includes a jointly tried case although it involves charges in separately
filed informations." (Ibid.) The court noted that the charges had been joined for trial,
which "effectively" joined the two cases despite the fact that they retained separate case
numbers. Accordingly, the court held that it was error to impose restitution exceeding the
statutory maximum of $10,000. (Ibid.) The court further observed that allowing separate
restitution fines in a case involving separate informations but joint trials and sentencing
could lead prosecutors to seek numerous fines by filing multiple informations that allege
a single offense. The court declined to condone such an exercise of form over substance.
(Id. at p. 1278 & fn. 10.)
In People v. Enos (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1046 (Enos), at a single hearing, the
defendant entered into a negotiated disposition and pleaded guilty to charges alleged in
three separate cases. The trial court imposed separate restitution and parole revocation
fines in each case, totaling $1,800. Citing Ferris, the defendant claimed that the
imposition of three separate restitution fines was unauthorized because the three separate
cases were resolved in a comprehensive plea agreement at a single sentencing hearing.
The court disagreed, finding Ferris inapplicable for two reasons. (Id. at pp. 1048-1049.)
suffers a loss, unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary." (Ibid.,
italics added.)

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"First, the facts are different. Here, there was never a motion to join or consolidate
the three cases, and, even though there was a combined sentencing hearing, the cases
were not tried together, as they were in Ferris. Here, throughout the proceedings, the
trial court and the parties treated the cases as separate. In addition, three separate
appellate records were prepared, each corresponding to its own number. Separate minute
orders and separate notices of appeal were filed in each case." (Enos, supra, 128
Cal.App.4th at p. 1049.)
"Second, we think the Ferris court's primary concern was not with the trial court's
imposition of more than one section 1202.4, subdivision (b) restitution fine and more
than one suspended section 1202.45 parole revocation fine but rather with the resulting
total of the fines that exceeded the $10,000 statutory limit. [Citation.] The court cited its
earlier decision in [McNeely ] where it held that a restitution order cannot exceed $10,000
if the defendant is sentenced in multiple cases at a single hearing. [Citation.] Thus, in
our view Ferris stands for the proposition that a trial court cannot impose multiple
section 1202.4, subdivision (b) restitution fines and multiple section 1202.45 parole
revocation fines in nonconsolidated cases where the total fines exceed the statutory
maximum; the opinion does not address the question whether separate fines are proper
where the total does not exceed the statutory maximum. [Citation.]" (Enos, supra, 128
Cal.App.4th at p. 1049.)
Last, the court opined that nothing in the statutes prohibits multiple fines "in
consolidated cases disposed of at a single sentencing hearing. To read these statutes as
precluding separate fines that do not exceed the statutory maximum would result in a rule
of law with no practical effect, because a defendant could never show prejudice. A trial
court sentencing a defendant in consolidated cases would simply calculate the amount of
the restitution fines as a whole instead of breaking them down separately for each case.
This is in essence exactly what the trial court did here; it expressed an intention to impose
a total fine of $1,000, and then allocated that fine among the three cases so that the

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statutory minimum fine was imposed in each. Because the total fine would be the same,
whether imposed in the aggregate or portioned and separately imposed in each case, there
cannot be any prejudice to appellant." (Enos, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1049-1050,
fn. omitted, former italics added.)
In People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861 (Schoeb), the defendant entered a
negotiated settlement to five separate cases, pleading guilty to nine charges in exchange
for dismissal of the others. At a single sentencing hearing, the court imposed five
separate restitution fines, totaling $2,600. (Id. at p. 863.) On appeal, the court upheld the
separate fines. It distinguished Ferris, noting that the defendant's cases were never
consolidated for trial and that there were separate abstracts and minute orders in each
case. Moreover, applying Enos, the court found no error because the total amount of
restitution did not exceed $10,000. (Id. at p. 865.)
This case, like Enos and Schoeb, is distinguishable from Ferris because appellant's
two cases were not jointly tried. However, this distinction does not necessarily mean that
appellant's fines were authorized. The phrase "in every case" is no less ambiguous here
than it was under the circumstances in Ferris. In Ferris, the court's interpretation of the
phrase "in every case" was not controlled by the fact that the cases were not formally
consolidated, they retained separate numbers, and various administrative procedural
details reflected the separate status of the cases—e.g., separate jury verdicts and
probation reports in each case. Rather, focusing on substance rather than form, the court
viewed the phrase in a practical rather than technical way and considered it reasonably
susceptible of an interpretation based on how the numerous charges in multiple cases
were resolved. Implicitly, the court reasoned that a single trial on all the charges would
be the same regardless of whether the charges were alleged in one case or multiple cases.
In effect, therefore, the unified resolution of the charges consolidated the three
technically separate cases into one for the purpose of restitution under sections 1202.4
and 1202.45.

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Here, we do not consider the fact that appellant's two cases were not formally
consolidated under a single information or jointly tried controlling on the meaning of the
phrase "in every case." Moreover, the resolution of the two cases through an
unconditional no contest plea at a single hearing is functionally identical to the resolution
of multiple cases in a joint trial, and in each instance the resolution would have been the
same regardless of whether the charges had been alleged in one case or multiple cases.
Thus, we find no material basis to distinguish this case from Ferris. Moreover, we
cannot conceive a policy reason why a defendant who foregoes trial and resolves two
cases at once should be subject to restitution fines exceeding $10,000 when a defendant
whose multiple cases are joined for trial is not. In our view, the unified resolution of all
charges through an unconditional no contest plea to both informations at a single hearing
effectively consolidated appellant's cases into one case for purposes of restitution just as a
joint trial does.
Under the circumstances, we hold that the phrase "in every case" may reasonably
be construed to include two cases that are fully and completely resolved at the same time
through an unconditional no contest plea.
As noted, in construing ambiguous restitution statutes, the courts in McNeely and
Ferris adopted the construction more favorable to the defendant. Here, even if we
assume that the phrase "in every case" reasonably may be interpreted to limit restitution
fines to $10,000 only where there is one accusatory pleading and case number or where
multiple cases are jointly tried, we shall adopt the interpretation more favorable to
appellant. Thus, we hold that sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 limit fines to $10,000 not only
where there is one case number or where multiple cases jointly tried but also where the
charges in two cases are fully and completely resolved at the same time through an
unconditional no contest plea.
Finally, we note that in Enos, the court read Ferris to mean that "a trial court
cannot impose multiple section 1202.4, subdivision (b) restitution fines and multiple

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section 1202.45 parole revocation fines in nonconsolidated cases where the total fines
exceed the statutory maximum . . . ." (Enos, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049, italics
added.) Thus, even under the Enos court's view of Ferris, the imposition here of two
fines totaling $14,800 would be unauthorized.
We conclude that at sentencing, sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 permitted the
imposition of restitution and parole revocation fines up to $10,000. Thus, the imposition
of restitution fines and parole revocation fines totaling $14,800 was unauthorized.
Disposition
In Santa Clara County Superior Court case no. CC591335, the trial court is
directed to modify the abstract of judgment by striking one of the five-year Penal Code
section 667, subdivision (a), enhancements, thus reducing the term to seven years, eight
months. In Santa Clara County Superior Court case no. CC629776 the trial court is
directed to modify the abstract of judgment by striking one of the five-year Penal Code
section 667, subdivision (a), enhancements, thus reducing the determinate part of the
term imposed to 19 years. The trial court is directed to modify the judgments to reflect a
total restitution fine of $10,000 and total suspended parole revocation fine of $10,000.

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The superior court shall forward the amended abstracts of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgments are affirmed.
_____________________________
ELIA, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________
RUSHING, P. J.
_____________________________
PREMO, J.

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