P. v. Sandoval

Filed 12/18/19 P. v. Sandoval CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MATTHEW SANDOVAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
G057558
(Super. Ct. No. 98NF0649)
O P I N I O N
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kimberly
Menninger, Judge. Affirmed.
Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney
General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Charles J. Sarosy, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *

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In 2001, defendant Matthew Sandoval was convicted of attempted murder
as an aider and abettor. In 2018, the Legislature limited accomplice liability for murder.
Generally, accomplices can no longer be convicted of murder under the felony-murder
rule or the natural and probable consequences theory. The Legislature also enacted a
statute allowing accomplices previously convicted of murder to petition trial courts to
vacate their murder convictions and be resentenced. (Pen. Code, § 1170.95.)1
Sandoval filed a petition under section 1170.95. The trial court denied
Sandoval’s petition because he was convicted of attempted murder, not murder.
Sandoval appeals, arguing the Legislature intended to include attempted
murder under section 1170.95. We disagree and affirm the order of the trial court.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 1998, Sandoval and two fellow gang members drove into a rival
gang’s territory. One of Sandoval’s accomplices fired a gun at a rival gang member.
A jury convicted Sandoval of attempted murder and related crimes; the jury also found
true related sentencing enhancements. The trial court imposed a sentence of 32 years to
life. This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.
In March 2019, Sandoval filed a section 1170.95 petition. Sandoval
declared, “I am eligible for relief . . . because I was convicted of attempted murder . . .
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . .” The trial court summarily
denied Sandoval’s petition. According to the court’s minutes order: “The petition does
not set forth a prima face [sic] case for relief under the statute. A review of court records
indicates defendant is not eligible for relief under the statute because the defendant does
not stand convicted of murder . . . .”
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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II
DISCUSSION
Sandoval argues section 1170.95 applies to convictions for attempted
murder. This is a pure legal issue involving statutory interpretation; therefore, our review
is de novo. (See People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)
A. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
When construing a statute, our goal is to ascertain legislative intent to
effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94.) The
words of a statute are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning. (Granberry v. Islay
Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744.) If the statutory language is unambiguous, “we
presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute
governs.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1111.)
Courts may neither insert words nor delete words in an unambiguous
statute; the drafting of statutes is solely a legislative power. (People v. Hunt (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 939, 945-946.) “In construing this, or any, statute, our office is simply to
ascertain and declare what the statute contains, not to change its scope by reading into it
language it does not contain or by reading out of it language it does. We may not rewrite
the statute to conform to an assumed intention that does not appear in its language.”
(Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253.)
“Statutory language is not considered in isolation. Rather, we ‘instead
interpret the statute as a whole, so as to make sense of the entire statutory scheme.’”
(Bonnell v. Medical Board (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1255, 1261.) We must also “interpret
legislative enactments so as to avoid absurd results.” (People v. Torres (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1158.)

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B. The Statutory Framework and Language of Section 1170.95
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Though under the felony-murder rule, a defendant can
be convicted of murder without malice if a victim is killed during a designated inherently
dangerous felony. (See CALCRIM No. 540A [“A person may be guilty of felony murder
even if the killing was unintentional, accidental or negligent”].)
Generally, a defendant may be convicted of a crime either as a perpetrator
or as an aider and abettor. (§ 31.) An aider and abettor can be held liable for crimes that
were intentionally aided and abetted (target offenses); an aider and abettor can also be
held liable for any crimes that were not intended but were reasonably foreseeable
(nontarget offenses). (People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1463.) Liability for
intentional, target offenses is known as “direct” aider and abettor liability; liability for
unintentional, nontarget offenses is known as the ““‘natural and probable consequences”
doctrine.’” (People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055.)
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature amended section 188
(defining malice), and section 189 (defining the degrees of murder).
As a result of Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature also added section
1170.95 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2019), which provides a procedure for
aiders and abettors to challenge their previous murder convictions. In relevant part, the
statute provides:
“(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court that sentenced the

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petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on
any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:
“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner
that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
“(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder
following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be
convicted for first degree or second degree murder.
“(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1170.95,
subd. (a), italics added.)
C. Analysis
Senate Bill No. 1437 affects murder convictions; it does not apply to
convictions for attempted murder. None of the added or amended sections make any
reference to attempted murder. (§§ 188, 189, 1170.95.) “If the plain language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, [the courts’] inquiry ends, and [one] need not embark
on judicial construction.” (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 244.)
Another appellate court recently held that Senate Bill No. 1437 does not
apply to the crime of attempted murder. (People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087,
1104-1105 (Lopez).) In Lopez, the appellate court concluded the “Legislature’s obvious
intent to exclude attempted murder from the ambit of the Senate Bill [No.] 1437 reform”
was evidenced by the language of section 1170.95 itself, as it limits its application to
murder convictions. (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1104-1105.) The court further
observed: “The plain language meaning of Senate Bill [No.] 1437 as excluding any relief
for individuals convicted of attempted murder is fully supported by its legislative
history.” (Id. at p. 1105.) The court noted the Legislature consistently referred to relief

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being available to only those defendants charged with first or second degree felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and to only
those defendants sentenced to first or second degree murder. (Ibid.)
We agree with the Lopez court. (See accord People v. Munoz (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 738, 753-754 (Munoz) [Senate Bill No. 1437 does not apply to
defendants convicted of attempted murder].) Thus, as Sandoval was not convicted of
murder, the trial court did not err by summarily denying his section 1170.95 petition.
Sandoval argues that People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59 (King), compels a
different result. We disagree. In King, there had been several changes over time to
interrelated statutes in the Penal Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code. Appellate
courts had interpreted the statutes in way that resulted in a sentencing anomaly: certain
juveniles convicted of first degree murder were eligible for commitment to the former
California Youth Authority (CYA), but similar juveniles convicted of attempted first
degree murder were required to be confined in prison. (Id. at pp. 64-70.) The California
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Legislature “did not intend a lesser included
offense to have potentially harsher penal consequences than the greater offense.
Defendant should not be penalized because one of his victims survived; he should not be
made to regret not applying the coup de grace to that victim.” (Id. at p 69.)
Here, unlike King, Senate Bill No. 1437 “is not the result of a disjointed
series of amendments over time . . . from which we might infer inadvertence or
irrationality [on the part of the Legislature]. Instead, the relevant provisions are
contained in a single cohesive bill.” (Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.) Further,
in the situation described in King, supra, 5 Cal.4th 59, “first degree murderers under 18
were eligible for CYA, whereas persons of the same age who committed attempted
murder were not. Here, in contrast, Senate Bill [No.] 1437 does not mandate that persons
convicted of attempted murder are punished more severely than persons convicted of
murder. Attempted murderers are statutorily subject to a lesser, not a greater, penalty

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than murderers. Senate Bill [No.] 1437 does not require that attempted murderers receive
a harsher sentence, or prohibit them from receiving a more lenient sentence, than
murderers.”2 (Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 759.) In sum, the California Supreme
Court’s holding in King, supra, 5 Cal.4th 59, does not alter our analysis.
Finally, Sandoval argues that Senate Bill No. 1437 violates equal protection
principles. We disagree. “‘“Persons convicted of different crimes are not similarly
situated for equal protection purposes.” [Citations.] “[I]t is one thing to hold . . . that
persons convicted of the same crime cannot be treated differently. It is quite another to
hold that persons convicted of different crimes must be treated equally.”’” (People v.
Barrera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1565.)
Here, through Senate Bill No. 1437 and section 1170.95, the Legislature
has determined that accomplices convicted of murder are to be treated differently than
those convicted of other crimes. This legislative judgment simply does not implicate
equal protection principles. (See Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 760 [“The remedy
for any potentially inequitable operation of section 1170.95 lies with the Legislature. If
the Legislature concludes it is unwise or inequitable to exclude attempted murderers from
Senate Bill [No.] 1437’s reach, it has only to amend the law”].)
2 Generally, “murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, imprisonment in the
state prison for life without the possibility of parole, or imprisonment in the state prison
for a term of 25 years to life.” (§ 190, subd. (a).) Further, “murder in the second degree
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life.”
(§ 190, subd. (b).) The punishment for attempted crimes is usually half of that for
completed crimes. “However, if the crime attempted is willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, as defined in Section 189, the person guilty of that attempt shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole. If the
crime attempted is any other one in which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or
death, the person guilty of the attempt shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison for five, seven, or nine years.” (§ 664, subd. (a).)

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III
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the section 1170.95 petition is affirmed.

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MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
THOMPSON, J.
DUNNING, J.*
*Retired Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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