In re Cruz R.

Filed 4/20/17 In re Cruz R. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re CRUZ R., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CRUZ R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
F073755
(Super. Ct. No. JW135986-00)
OPINION
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. William D.
Palmer, Judge.
Randall Conner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Lewis A.
Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
*Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Peña, J. and Smith, J.

-- 1 of 17 --

2.
INTRODUCTION
Following a contested hearing, the Kern County Juvenile Court found proven
allegations of attempted extortion (Pen. Code,1 § 524) and disorderly conduct (§ 647,
subd. (j)(3)(A)) against then 16-year-old Cruz R. The court declared Cruz a ward of the
court, placed him on probation not to extend past his 21st birthday, and committed him to
the custody of Camp Erwin Owen for three years two months. (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§§ 602, 725, subd. (b).)
On appeal, Cruz challenges a probation condition barring him from using,
accessing, viewing, or participating in any social networking websites. He contends the
condition is unconstitutionally vague because the court did not define the term “social
networking site” and because the condition does not contain an express knowledge
requirement; it is unconstitutionally overbroad because the court did not narrowly tailor
the condition to its purpose; and the condition is unreasonable because it has no
relationship to the deterrence of future criminal activity. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 27, 2016, Angelina G. hosted her younger half brother, Cruz, at her
home. Cruz asked if he could use his PlayStation in Angelina’s bedroom. Angelina said
no. Later that day, Angelina began to take a shower. She noticed the door to her
bathroom open slightly, but assumed it was her two-year-old son. Then, she saw Cruz’s
face through the crack in the doorway. She yelled at him to get out.
The following day, Angelina received a text message from an unknown number.
The message told Angelina to “send me at this time [nude] pictures or I will send a nude
video of you to your co-workers and boss.” Angelina did not respond. Later that day,
Angelina received a second message threatening, “if [she] didn’t send [nude] pictures that
1All further undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

-- 2 of 17 --

3.
[her] daughter may find herself in an accident on the way to work.” At that time,
Angelina’s daughter was on her way to work. Angelina did not respond.
After Angelina returned home, she received a third message wherein the sender
noted she had returned home. Angelina responded, but wrote nothing in the message.
She noticed Cruz was holding his phone and she saw his phone light up. Angelina then
received a fourth message, in which the sender told her that her blank message “[was] not
good enough.” Angelina and her father took Cruz’s phone away from him. Angelina
sent a message from her phone to the sender of the text messages. About a minute later,
Cruz’s phone indicated it had received a message. Angelina repeated the experiment in
front of her stepmother. Cruz left the house.
A few days later, Angelina found two videos saved on Cruz’s phone. The first
video showed Angelina in her shower, behind the curtain. The second video, shot from
the bathroom windowsill, showed Cruz positioning the camera, and showed Angelina’s
head and shoulders after she got out of the shower.
On March 22, 2016, Angelina showed the videos to Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy
Jose Perez. With the participation of Perez, Angelina called Cruz. Cruz said he had
taken the videos and threatened Angelina because she had angered him by not allowing
him to use his PlayStation in her bedroom. Cruz said he would not have hurt Angelina’s
daughter and claimed he had not sent the videos to anyone.
On April 5, 2016, Perez interviewed Cruz. Cruz admitted filming Angelina and
sending the text messages that Angelina had received. Cruz had concealed his identity in
the texts by using an application that misrepresented the phone number of the sender.
During the interview, Cruz admitted he had taken videos of Angelina in the shower
because he wanted to see her naked.
DISCUSSION
Cruz challenges the constitutionality of the probation condition prohibiting him
from using, accessing, viewing, or participating in any social networking site. He claims

-- 3 of 17 --

4.
the condition is vague, overbroad, and it is not reasonably related to the deterrence of
future criminal activity. We conclude Cruz’s claims are without merit.
A. The Social Networking Website Ban Is Sufficiently Specific
Cruz initially contends the social networking probation condition is
unconstitutionally vague because it is not reasonably specific and it lacks an express
knowledge requirement. We disagree.
1. Forfeiture
The Attorney General contends Cruz’s claim is forfeited because he did not object
to the challenged probation condition in the juvenile court below. A Court of Appeal
may review the constitutionality of a probation condition, even when the condition has
not been challenged in the lower court, if the question can be resolved as a matter of law
without reference to the sentencing record. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–
889 (Sheena K.).) Because Cruz’s vagueness challenge raises a pure question of law and
may be resolved without reference to the sentencing record, he is not foreclosed from
raising his claim on appeal.
2. Analysis
a. The Condition Is Reasonably Specific
“[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair
warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of
preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential
offenders’ [citation], protections that are ‘embodied in the due process clauses of the
federal and California Constitutions.’” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) As such,
a probation condition must be “‘sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is
required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated.’”
(Ibid.) Our examination of a challenged condition is further “guided by the principles
that ‘abstract legal commands must be applied in a specific context,’ and that, although

-- 4 of 17 --

5.
not admitting of ‘mathematical certainty,’ the language used must have ‘“reasonable
specificity.”’” (Ibid.)
Here, the term “social networking website” has a plain commonsense meaning that
renders it capable of being defined with reasonable specificity. According to the Oxford
English Dictionary, “social media” includes “websites and applications which enable
users to create and share content or to participate in social networking.” (Oxford English
Dict. Online (2017) < http://www.oed.com> [as of Apr. 20, 2017].) Further, “social
networking” is defined as “the use or establishment of social networks or connections;
(now esp.) the use of websites which enable users to interact with one another, find and
contact people with common interests, etc.” (Ibid.) Finally, a “social network” is defined
as “a system of social interactions and relationships; a group of people who are socially
connected to one another; (now also) a social networking website; the users of such a
website collectively.” (Ibid.)
A probation condition is sufficiently specific “‘“if any reasonable and practical
construction can be given its language or if its terms may be made reasonably certain by
reference to other definable sources.”’” (People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615,
630.) Because definition of the term “social networking website” can be ascertained by
reference to readily available sources, we reject Cruz’s assertion the term cannot be
defined with reasonable specificity.
Cruz contends that although the term “social media” has been defined in the Labor
Code (Lab. Code, § 980, subd. (a)) and the Education Code (Ed. Code, § 99120), this
does not cure the vagueness of the term “social networking site.” In finding the term
“social media website” reasonably specific, we do not rely on the Education Code’s and
Labor Code’s definitions of the term “social media.”
The term “social media” pursuant to Labor Code section 980 is defined as follows:
“As used in this chapter, ‘social media’ means an electronic service or account, or
electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos, still photographs, blogs, video

-- 5 of 17 --

6.
blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or accounts, or Internet
Web site profiles or locations.” (Id., at subd. (a), italics added.) Education Code section
99120 employs a similar definition of the term “social media” and also limits application
of its definition to a particular chapter of the Education Code: “As used in this chapter,
‘social media’ means an electronic service or account, or electronic content, including,
but not limited to, videos or still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and
text messages, email, online services or accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or
locations.” (Ibid., italics added.) Applying these definitions to Cruz’s probation
condition would restrict him from much more than using, accessing, viewing, or
participating in social networking websites. For example, these definitions would
arguably prohibit him from participating in online classes. This could not have been
what the juvenile court intended given the nature of Cruz’s offenses.
Cruz asserts some websites, such as Google+, WordPress, Tumblr, and various
Blogger platforms, cannot be excluded as social networking websites with a reasonable
degree of certainty. As such, he contends this shows the term is vague. We disagree.
Some websites, such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Tumblr, and Google+, clearly fall
within the definition of a social networking website. In contrast, e-mail or text messaging
applications, such as Gmail, may have social components but are not generally
considered to be social networking websites. While other websites may not be so easily
categorized, we emphasize “the mere fact that close cases can be envisioned” does not
“render[] a statute vague.” (United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 305–306.)
“Close cases can be imagined under virtually any statute.” (Id. at p. 306.)
Cruz further contends two cases—Doe v. Jindal (M.D.La. 2012) 853 F.Supp.2d
596 (Jindal) and Doe v. Nebraska (D.Neb. 2012) 898 F.Supp.2d 1086—demonstrate the
term “social networking site” is vague. Cruz’s reliance on Jindal and Nebraska is
misplaced.

-- 6 of 17 --

7.
In Jindal, supra, 853 F.Supp.2d 596, a Louisiana statute prohibited registered sex
offenders from “‘using or accessing … social networking websites, chat rooms, and peer-
to-peer networks.’” (Id. at p. 599.) A first time violation of the statute was punishable by
a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up to 10 years. (Id. at p. 600.) The statute
defined a “social networking website” as “an Internet website that has any of the
following capabilities: [¶] (a) Allows users to create web pages or profiles about
themselves that are available to the general public or to any other users. [¶] (b) Offers a
mechanism for communication among users, such as a forum, chat room, electronic mail,
or instant messaging.” (Ibid.) The federal district court held the statute was
unconstitutionally vague because it did not sufficiently clarify which websites are
prohibited. (Id. at p. 606.) Although the statute contained definitions of selected phrases,
the court held such definitions were not sufficiently defined given the criminal sanctions
imposed. (Ibid.)
Jindal is nonbinding on this court. (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902,
925 [“Even on constitutional issues, we are not bound by federal circuit court
decisions”].) Insofar as it may be considered as persuasive authority, we note Jindal
involved a criminal statute, not a probation condition applied to a juvenile. Under Penal
Code section 1203.1, when a person is placed on probation, the trial court has broad
discretion to impose “reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to
the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of
the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and
specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer ….” (Id., at subd.
(j); see People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) Provided a given probation
condition serves these purposes, it may permissibly “impinge upon a constitutional right
otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is ‘not entitled to the same degree of
constitutional protection as other citizens.’” (People v. Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at
p. 624.)

-- 7 of 17 --

8.
Further, “courts have broader discretion in formulating conditions of probation for
minors in order to guide them away from crime and violence.” (In re Victor L., supra,
182 Cal.App.4th at p. 925.) Because juvenile probation is a form of rehabilitation, it is
not an act of leniency in lieu of punishment. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) In
contrast to an adult offender, “‘[N]o choice is given to the youthful offender [to accept
probation].’” (Ibid.) Thus, “‘a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or
otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the
supervision of the juvenile court.’” (Ibid.) Consequently, Cruz’s reliance on Jindal,
which considered a challenge to a criminal statute banning the use of social networking
websites, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks, is inapposite.
Cruz’s reliance on Doe v. Nebraska, supra, 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 is similarly
unpersuasive. Doe v. Nebraska involved several criminal statutes, one of which
prohibited sex offenders from “‘knowingly and intentionally us[ing] a social networking
web site, instant messaging, or chat room service that allows a person who is less than
eighteen years of age to access or use its social networking web site, instant messaging,
or chat room service ….’” (Id. at p. 1094.) The statute defined the term “‘[s]ocial
networking web site’” as “‘a web page or collection of web sites contained on the
Internet (a) that enables users or subscribers to create, display, and maintain a profile or
Internet domain containing biographical data, personal information, photos, or other
types of media, (b) that can be searched, viewed, or accessed by other users or visitors to
the web site, with or without the creator’s permission, consent, invitation, or
authorization, and (c) that may permit some form of communication, such as direct
comment on the profile page, instant messaging, or email, between the creator of the
profile and users who have viewed or accessed the creator’s profile ….’” (Id. at p. 1095.)
The court held the statute was “so expansive and so vague that it chills offenders
and their associates … from using those portions of the Internet that the defendants claim
are open to them.” (Doe v. Nebraska, supra, 898 F.Supp.2d at p. 1112.) The court

-- 8 of 17 --

9.
explained, “no one knows what a ‘collection of web sites’ is, and without that
understanding, the whole of the Internet could be banned.” (Id. at p. 1123.) However,
while the court found the term “collection of web sites” used within the term “social
networking web site” to be vague, it did not specifically find vague the term “social
networking web site.” (Id. at p. 1115.) Further, as in Jindal, the court in Nebraska
considered constitutional challenges to several criminal statutes rather than a probation
condition. (Nebraska, supra, at p. 1093.) Thus, Nebraska does not assist Cruz.
Cruz asserts the social networking website restriction must be interpreted in view
of another probation condition imposed restricting him from accessing pornography.
Among other conditions, the juvenile court imposed the following probation condition:
“The minor shall not use, access, download, receive, view, copy or reproduce in any form
any material known to the minor to be pornographic in nature nor associate or initiate
contact with anyone known to the minor to be involved with or in possession of the
same.” In view of the pornography restriction, Cruz asserts a probation officer might
erroneously interpret the social networking site restriction to ban him from accessing
“‘any’ website that offers opportunities for social networking, such as … Linkedin, a
Google+ page, or a blog with social networking features.” According to Cruz, this raises
a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because the pornography restriction
was intended only to inhibit his communication with persons interested in pornography.
As such, “a police or probation officer might overlook [Cruz’s] access to a site that offers
social networking opportunities, but bears no obvious connection to the court’s concern
regarding pornography.” Cruz’s argument is unpersuasive. There is no evidence the
condition banning him from accessing pornographic materials was intended to have any
bearing on the social networking website restriction. Assuming, arguendo, the conditions
are related, we see no reason why Cruz would be unable to communicate with persons
interested in pornography through websites such as LinkedIn, Google+, or a blog with

-- 9 of 17 --

10.
social networking features. Thus, the court’s restriction banning Cruz from “any social
networking site” (italics added) is appropriate.
Cruz contends this case is similar to In re Ana C. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 333 (Ana
C.), disapproved on other grounds by People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 503, footnote
2 (Hall). In Ana C., the Court of Appeal examined a probation condition ordering the
minor “‘not [to] possess or utilize any program or application, on any electronic data
storage device, that automatically or through a remote command deletes data from that
device.’” (Ana C., supra, at p. 350.) The Court of Appeal found the condition
unconstitutionally vague “[b]ecause all computing devices are ‘electronic data storage
devices’ and virtually all software programs available to consumers for those devices
have the capability to ‘automatically’ delete data—which is the purpose of the ‘delete’
key … and the ‘delete’ command …—the Data Deletion Tools Ban, plainly read, bans
Minor from using or possessing any smartphone or computer.” (Id. at pp. 350-351.)
Because it was unclear whether the Data Deletion Tools Ban was designed to prevent the
minor from using applications destroying all evidence that a communication has
occurred, such as Snapchat, or to prevent the minor from using devices having remote
erase capability, such as an iPhone, the Court of Appeal struck the condition and invited
modification on remand. (Id. at p. 351.)
Here, unlike Ana C., what is prohibited under the social networking website
restriction may be ascertained by reference to other sources. We need not speculate as to
what conduct the juvenile court intended to prohibit because the condition is sufficiently
specific: Cruz is prohibited from using, accessing, viewing, or participating in any social
networking websites. We therefore conclude the social networking website restriction is
sufficiently specific so as to give him fair warning of the nature of the websites he is
prohibited from, and to permit the juvenile court to determine whether the condition has
been violated. (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)

-- 10 of 17 --

11.
b. The Knowledge Requirement Is Implied
Cruz further contends the probation condition is unconstitutionally vague because
the condition lacks a scienter requirement. Because Cruz could enter a social networking
site inadvertently by clicking on a link taking him to such a website, he asserts the
condition must be modified to read that he must not knowingly use, access, view, or
participate in any social networking websites. We conclude modification of the condition
is unnecessary.
In Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th 494, our Supreme Court considered whether a probation
condition prohibiting the possession of firearms, illegal drugs, and other contraband must
be modified to include an express requirement of knowing possession of the prohibited
items. The court explained, “[r]evocation of probation typically requires proof that the
probation violation was willful.” (Id. at p. 498.) The court further explained that in the
context of conditions barring the possession of contraband, revocation requires
knowledge. (Id. at p. 499.) The Hall court noted that criminal statutes prohibiting the
possession of contraband are generally construed to contain an implicit knowledge
requirement even where the statute is silent. (Id. at p. 501.) According to the court, this
reasoning applies to probation conditions: “Just as most criminal statutes—in all their
variety—are generally presumed to include some form of mens rea despite their failure to
articulate it expressly, so too are probation conditions generally presumed to require
some form of willfulness, unless excluded ‘“‘expressly or by necessary implication.’”’”
(Id. at p. 502, quoting In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 872.) As such, the court
held no express requirement was necessary. (Id. at p. 503.)
Although the probation condition here is different from the possessory condition at
issue in Hall, we are guided by the court’s reasoning. As to the condition banning Cruz
from using, accessing, viewing, or participating in any social networking websites, we
conclude modification of the condition to include an express knowledge requirement is
unnecessary. The requirement that Cruz must knowingly use, access, view, or participate
in such a website is implicit in the condition.

-- 11 of 17 --

12.
B. The Social Networking Site Ban Is Not Impermissibly Overbroad
Cruz further contends the probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad
because it bars him from significant forums of association and expression, and the nature
of his offense does not justify significant curtailment of his access to the Internet. We
conclude Cruz’s claim is without merit.
1. Forfeiture
The Attorney General contends Cruz forfeited his overbreadth claim because he
failed to lodge a timely objection below, and because Cruz’s claim requires reference to
the sentencing record. Cruz directs us to multiple cases wherein the appellants raised
overbreadth arguments for the first time on appeal. (People v. Martinez (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 759, 765-766 [reaching defendant’s argument that probation condition was
unduly overbroad without discussion of whether defendant’s argument relied on facts in
sentencing record]; People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1347 [defendant’s
failure to object to a probation condition did not forfeit overbreadth argument on appeal
because the argument presented pure question of law]; In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1149, 1153, fn. 1 [same]; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 712-713 [reviewing
overbreadth claim made for first time on appeal because condition represented a
“sweeping limitation” on minor’s liberty]; In re Justin S. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 811, 815
[concluding appellant was not foreclosed from raising constitutional claims on appeal
since they presented “‘pure questions of law that [could] be resolved without reference to
the particular sentencing record’”].) Although Cruz marshals facts from the sentencing
record to support his argument, we will nonetheless address his claim to explain why it
lacks merit.
2. Specificity
“A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights
must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being
invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
“The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the

-- 12 of 17 --

13.
legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s
constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is
impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O.,
supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1153.)
Cruz contends the social networking website restriction is overbroad. We find In
re Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 902 instructive. There, the minor was convicted of
possession of a dangerous weapon. (Id. at p. 908.) The juvenile court imposed the
following Internet restrictions pursuant to the minor’s probation conditions: (1) the
minor “‘shall not access or participate in any Social Networking Site, including but not
limited to Myspace.com’”; (2) the minor shall “‘not use, possess or have access to a
computer which is attached to a modem or telephonic device’”; and (3) the minor “‘shall
not be on the Internet without school or parental supervision.’” (Id. at p. 909.) Although
the Court of Appeal noted inconsistencies between the conditions, the first and third
conditions were upheld. (Id. at pp. 925, 927.) The conditions, aimed at reducing the
minor’s temptation and ability to communicate with gang members, imposed a minimal
burden on his constitutional rights. (Id. at p. 926.)
Here, as in Victor L., any limitation of Cruz’s constitutional rights is closely
tailored to the purpose of the condition. By limiting Cruz’s access to social networking
websites, the condition serves at least two conceivable purposes: it impedes Cruz’s
ability to anonymously target other victims, and it reduces his temptation and ability to
communicate with individuals the probation officer referred to as “criminal associates,” a
risk factor to his recidivism, or individuals who may cause him to violate his probation.
Contrary to Cruz’s assertions, the juvenile court was not required to find he was a gang
member (In re Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 902) or a collector of child pornography
(People v. Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th 1341) to impose the social networking website
restriction.

-- 13 of 17 --

14.
Cruz further claims the restriction improperly bars him from significant forums of
association and expression. While social networking websites are significant forums of
association and expression, the restriction here stands in stark contrast to a blanket
prohibition restricting him from accessing the Internet altogether. (In re Victor L., supra,
182 Cal.App.4th at p. 925 [courts “tend[] to reject complete Internet bans except in the
most aggravated cases, unless they contain a clause allowing Internet access with prior
approval of the supervising authority”].) Moreover, we do not read the social networking
website restriction to prohibit Cruz from using text messaging or e-mail, provided he
does not use those applications to communicate with individuals he is prohibited from
contacting under the terms of his probation. In our view, the social networking restriction
imposed is minimally burdensome.
Cruz urges this court to follow In re Stevens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1228 and
find there are “more focused prohibitions” available that would serve the same goals of
supervision and public safety. He does not suggest what more focused prohibitions or
restrictions might include, nor does Stevens provide us with meaningful guidance on this
issue.
In Stevens, an adult parolee objected to a parole condition prohibiting the use of
his computer and Internet access. (In re Stevens, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231.)
The parolee’s commitment offense, child molestation, had not involved computer use,
however, the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) imposed the condition based on the concern
that a child molester’s unfettered computer and Internet access might result in future
criminal conduct. (Id. at pp. 1231, 1239.) The BPT subsequently modified the condition
to allow the parolee limited use of the Internet, restricting him from pornographic
websites and communicating with minors. (Id. at p. 1232.) Because the condition was
modified, the Court of Appeal denied the parolee’s habeas petition as moot. (Id. at p.
1240.) Stevens does not suggest the social networking website condition here could or
should be more narrowly drawn.

-- 14 of 17 --

15.
C. The Social Networking Site Ban Is Reasonable Under Lent
1. Forfeiture
Finally, Cruz contends the probation condition is invalid because it is not
reasonably related to the deterrence of future criminality. Cruz concedes no objection to
the probation condition was raised on this basis in the juvenile court. However, he
asserts this court is not foreclosed from reviewing his claim because his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to lodge a timely objection.
We conclude Cruz has forfeited his claim on appeal. Our analysis of Cruz’s claim
necessarily requires reference to Cruz’s probation report and sentencing record. (In re
J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, 802 [“[W]hether a probation condition is reasonably
related to a specific minor’s future criminality is necessarily intertwined with the facts
and circumstances surrounding the minor in question”].) Nonetheless, because Cruz
raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will address his claim. We conclude
Cruz has failed to show his “defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” for failing to object to
the probation condition. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.)
2. Analysis
Courts have broad discretion in setting conditions of probation in order to “‘foster
rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to … section 1203.1.’” (People v.
Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 624, quoting People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th
1114, 1120; see § 1203.1, subd. (j).) However, the court’s discretion is not boundless.
Under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, a probation condition is “invalid [if] it
‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to
conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not
reasonably related to [the deterrence of] future criminality.’” “This test is conjunctive—
all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation
term.” (People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.)

-- 15 of 17 --

16.
The Attorney General concedes the first two elements are met. The use of social
networking websites was not involved in the commission of the instant offense, nor is the
use of such websites in itself a criminal offense. The thrust of the issue here is whether
the probation condition is reasonably related to the deterrence of future criminality. We
conclude that it is.
According to Cruz, this condition was likely intended to prevent him from
accessing websites where he might encounter, influence, or be influenced by others with
sexual proclivities similar to his own. The Attorney General posits the condition was
intended to prevent Cruz from using a fake social media profile to target other victims
and to disseminate nude photographs of other victims. (RB 9, 20)! Both objectives
arguably support imposition of the probation condition.2
In People v. Navarro (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1294, the defendant pleaded guilty
to attempted kidnapping of a 13-year-old girl. (Id. at p. 1296.) Among other conditions,
the court imposed an Internet restriction which, in part, banned the defendant from using
“any Internet-based communication where [he may post] content to the Internet, such as
instant messaging or social media.” (Id. at p. 1301.) Although other wording within the
restriction rendered the condition vague, the court rejected the defendant’s contention the
prohibition was unreasonable. (Id. at pp. 1300, 1302.) The court explained that while the
condition was not related to the crime itself, it was reasonably related to preventing future
criminality because it sought to deter the defendant from using certain technology to prey
on young victims. (Id. at p. 1300.)
Here, as in Navarro, the social networking website restriction is related to
deterring future criminality. Although Cruz did not commit the instant offense using
social networking websites, the fact that he used a spoofing application to make his text
messages appear to come from an unknown number demonstrated his aptitude with
2Because Cruz declined to challenge the condition in the juvenile court below, the court’s
purpose in imposing the condition is unclear.

-- 16 of 17 --

17.
technology. While Cruz is not prohibited from sending text messages or e-mails, and
could presumably reoffend by downloading a similar texting application, the probation
condition will impede his ability to anonymously target other victims, particularly
individuals who are unknown to him. Further, the probation condition reduces his
temptation and ability to contact individuals who might cause him to violate his
probation. We therefore conclude the social networking website restriction is reasonable
under Lent.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

-- 17 of 17 --