Contreras v. Green Thumb Produce Inc.

Filed 12/15/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MANUEL CONTRERAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GREEN THUMB PRODUCE, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
D085440
(Super. Ct. No. CVRI2101337)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge. Reversed with instructions.
Law Office of Alfredo Nava Jr. and Alfredo Nava; Kyle Todd for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of J. Patrick Ragan and J. Patrick Ragan; Arias &
Lockwood and Christopher D. Lockwood, for Defendant and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2020, Manuel Contreras mistakenly determined his former
employer, Green Thumb Produce, Inc. (Green Thumb), was violating the
Equal Pay Act (EPA; Lab. Code,1 § 1197.5) by paying him less than other
coworkers performing similar duties. However, Contreras did not believe
1 All further undesignated section references are to the Labor Code.

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Green Thumb was paying him less because of his gender, race, or ethnicity.
But, “ ‘[t]he [EPA] does not prohibit variations in wages; it prohibits
discriminatory variations in wages.’ ” (Allen v. Staples, Inc. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 188, 194.)2 This meant the EPA did not protect Contreras
from the wage difference of which he complained. When Contreras, relying
on the EPA, described to supervisors his dissatisfaction with being paid less
than others who did the same work, Green Thumb terminated his
employment.
In turn, Contreras sued Green Thumb, asserting three causes of action
for wrongful termination. His second cause of action was based on section
1102.5, subdivision (b) (section 1102.5(b)), which prohibits employers from
retaliating against employees who report legal violations.
At trial, the jury found in Contreras’ favor on all three of his causes of
action. Green Thumb filed a motion for partial judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV) claiming the verdict on the whistleblower cause of action
was unsupported because Contreras misunderstood the EPA, and his
misunderstanding of the law could not provide a proper basis for liability
under section 1102.5(b).3 The trial court agreed, granted the motion, and
entered an amended judgment.
On appeal, Contreras challenges the JNOV ruling asserting the
evidence at trial adequately supported the jury’s verdict on his whistleblower
cause of action. We agree, finding substantial evidence supported the jury’s
2 Specifically, the EPA states, “[a]n employer shall not pay any of its
employees at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite
sex [or of another race or ethnicity] for substantially similar work.” (§ 1197.5,
subds. (a) & (b).)
3 Green Thumb did not challenge the jury’s damage award. The
section 1102.5(b) claim allows Contreras to receive attorney’s fees.

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conclusion that Contreras had reasonable cause to believe Green Thumb
violated the EPA, notwithstanding his misinterpretation of that law. We
therefore reverse the JNOV ruling and direct the trial court to amend the
judgment consistent with the jury’s verdict.
II. BACKGROUND
From 2016 to 2020, Contreras worked at Green Thumb. Green Thumb
packaged produce for retailers, and Contreras primarily worked in their
sanitation department driving forklifts.
During his employment, Contreras discovered that Green Thumb paid
him less than other employees performing similar duties, some of whom had
less seniority at the company. Contreras mentioned the pay disparity to his
supervisors several times, but they took no action.
In August 2020, Contreras started researching his legal rights because
he thought the law required equal pay for equal work. Contreras contacted
the Labor Commissioner’s Office of San Bernardino County and spoke to a
deputy labor commissioner who stated that Green Thumb might be violating
the law. The deputy labor commissioner referred Contreras to the EPA and
told him he could obtain more information about that law on the Labor
Commissioner’s website.
Contreras went to that website, printed out a document titled
“California Equal Pay Act: Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQ), and read it.
The FAQ is a seven-page document with 32 questions and answers. It
provides general background information about the EPA and how to file a
claim. Based on his discussion with the deputy labor commissioner and his
understanding of the FAQ, Contreras believed that Green Thumb violated
the state’s equal pay laws.

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On September 3, 2020, Contreras brought the Labor Commissioner’s
FAQ sheet with him to work intending to present it to human resources after
his shift and to ask for a raise. During his lunchbreak on that day, with the
FAQ in hand, Contreras spoke to coworkers attempting to get one of them to
be a witness for his meeting with human resources. Miguel Ramos,
Contreras’s manager, approached Contreras and asked what Contreras had
in his hand. Contreras replied that it was literature from the Labor
Commissioner’s Office that he intended to use to secure a pay raise. Ramos
then brought Contreras to the office of Sendy Ochoa, the human resources
manager.
Once inside Ochoa’s office, Ochoa asked Contreras what paperwork he
had with him. Contreras told Ochoa it was for her, handed her the FAQ, and
asked for a raise. Contreras looked over the FAQ and returned it to
Contreras. She told him he should not be showing the FAQ to employees and
asked him why he contacted the Labor Commissioner. Contreras explained
that he was trying to get information to prove that he should be getting paid
the same as others doing similar work.
After Ochoa denied Contreras’s request for a raise, Contreras stated
that he would no longer be driving a forklift, intending that statement to
mean additional responsibilities that he accrued due to another employee’s
absence. He did not intend his statement to convey that he would no longer
be driving his own assigned forklift. In response, Ochoa accused Contreras of
insubordination.
After about 10 minutes, Contreras left Ochoa’s office. Ramos followed
Contreras and instructed him to go home. When Contreras showed up for
work the next day, a security guard escorted Contreras off the premises,
informing him that he had been terminated from his job. When Contreras

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got home, he received a letter from Green Thumb informing him Green
Thumb terminated his employment there. The letter stated that Contreras
violated company policies and procedures by refusing to follow the lunch
schedule, talking to coworkers instead of working, disrupting work by
showing coworkers paperwork, refusing to go back to work after discussing
his job performance with human resources, and refusing his manager’s
instructions by stating “ ‘I am not operating the forklift.’ ”
Contreras sued Green Thumb in 2021. In the operative first amended
complaint filed in 2023, Contreras asserted three causes of action: (1)
retaliation for exercising his employment rights (§ 98.6); (2) whistleblower
retaliation (§ 1102.5); and (3) wage discussion retaliation (§ 232).
The matter proceeded to a jury trial in 2023. Contreras testified,
explaining the events leading up to his firing. Contreras also denied the
violations of company policies and procedures stated in his termination letter.
Contreras told the jury that based on his discussion with the deputy labor
commissioner and the FAQ Contreras reviewed, he believed Green Thumb
violated the EPA by paying him unequal wages.
Pursuant to his reading of the FAQ, Contreras explained that he
understood the EPA was originally enacted to protect women, but he believed
it also applied to men based on the law’s constant updates. Contreras
identified question 9 as his basis for believing the law applied to his
circumstances. Question 9 states: “Can I file a claim if the person who earns
more than I do has a different job title? Yes, you may file a claim. Because
the Equal Pay Act compares jobs that are ‘substantially similar,’ the job titles
that are being compared do not have to be the same. What is important is
whether the work itself is ‘substantially similar.’ ”

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Contreras acknowledged that because he was not a lawyer, he was
uncertain that Green Thumb violated the EPA. However, given his “10th
grade education” he believed there might be an EPA violation, the resolution
of which would help him get a raise. Contreras also testified, however, that
he did not believe his unequal wages were based on his sex, race, or ethnicity.
Vikita Poindexter, Green Thumb’s vice president of human resources,
testified for Green Thumb. Poindexter stated that while Contreras worked at
Green Thumb, he had “an enormous amount of attendance issues,” he faced
several disciplinary actions, he violated the code of conduct, and other
employees complained about him. She opined that Green Thumb was overly
lenient with Contreras and should have terminated Contreras much earlier.
The trial court used CACI No. 4603 to instruct the jury on Contreras’s
section 1102.5(b) cause of action. Pursuant to that instruction, the trial court
informed the jury that to prevail, Contreras had to prove that he had “had
reasonable cause to believe that [Green Thumb] was in violation of state law
regarding equal pay.” The instruction was modified to state, “CONTRERAS
only had to have a reasonable belief that [Green Thumb] was violating state
law. That belief did not have to be, in fact, legally correct under the law.”4
The jury found in Contreras’s favor on all three causes of action. The
jury awarded Contreras $53,000 in past economic damages, $72,428 in future
economic damages, and $47,000 in past non-economic damages.
On August 18, 2023, Green Thumb filed its JNOV motion. Challenging
only the second cause of action, Green Thumb argued there was insufficient
evidence because Contreras admitted his pay disparity was not based on sex,
4 This modification is consistent with our conclusion below. Further,
there is no indication that Green Thumb challenged this modification during
trial, nor does Green Thumb challenge it on appeal.

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race or ethnicity, and Contreras’s mistaken belief that Green Thumb violated
the EPA could not create liability under section 1102.5.
On August 25, 2023, the trial court entered judgment against Green
Thumb in the amount of $172,428, reflecting the jury’s damage award. On
September 8, 2023, the trial court filed an amended judgment, adding
$20,000 in statutory penalties for Green Thumb’s violations of sections 98.6
and 1102.5.
On November 3, 2023, the trial court granted the partial JNOV motion,
finding that “based on [Contreras’s] own testimony, he had not made any
complaints of any violation of law and that [Contreras] cannot make up a
non-existent law to gain § 1102.5 protections.” The trial court entered a
second amended judgment on November 20, 2023, reflecting its ruling on the
motion. The second amended judgment awarded Contreras a total of
$182,428 based on the jury’s determination of damages and $10,000 in
statutory penalties for Green Thumb’s violation of section 98.6. Contreras
appealed from the second amended judgment, challenging the trial court’s
ruling on the partial JNOV motion.
III. DISCUSSION
Contreras argues there was substantial evidence that he reasonably
believed Green Thumb violated the EPA. Green Thumb argues Contreras’s
beliefs were unreasonable because the FAQ informed Contreras that the EPA
only applied if the disparity in wages was based on sex, race or ethnicity, and
Contreras admitted that was not the case. Green Thumb further contends
that Contreras improperly based his section 1102.5 claim on nonexistent or
inapplicable statutes. We agree with Contreras.
A. Standards of Review

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“ ‘ “Questions of statutory interpretation . . . present questions of law,
which we review de novo.” ’ ” (Davis Boat Manufacturing-Nordic, Inc. v.
Smith (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 660, 672.) We therefore independently review
whether Contreras’s mistaken interpretation of the EPA necessarily defeats
his section 1102.5(b) claim. Finding that it does not, we move on to address
the trial court’s ruling on the JNOV motion under the substantial evidence
standard.
“ ‘A motion for [JNOV] may be granted only if it appears from the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict,
that there is no substantial evidence in support.’ [Citation.] The standard of
review on appeal is the same: ‘whether any substantial evidence—
contradicted or uncontradicted—supports the jury’s conclusion.’ ” (I.C. v.
Compton Unified School Dist. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 688, 698.) Under this
“highly deferential” standard of review, we must “accept all evidence
supporting the trial court’s order[,] . . . draw all reasonable inferences to
affirm the trial court,” and “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence.” (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581.)
B. Section 1102.5
Section 1102.5 is “California’s general whistleblower statute.” (Carter
v. Escondido Union High School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 922, 933.) As is
relevant here, section 1102.5(b), prohibits an employer from retaliating
“against an employee for disclosing information . . . to a person with
authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to
investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance . . . if the
employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a
violation of state or federal statute.” (§ 1102.5(b).) This provision “ ‘reflects
the broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistle-blowers to

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report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.’ ” (People ex rel. Garcia-
Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 719, 723 (Kolla’s).) “In developing
the statute, the relevant committees spoke clearly and repeatedly about the
purposes and reasoning behind the enactment and expansion of section
1102.5(b): to protect workers, to encourage disclosure, and to promote
compliance with employment-related laws and regulations.” (Id. at p. 730.)
“[T]he protections of section 1102.5(b) apply only where the disclosing
employee ‘has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a
[legal] violation.’ ” (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 734.) Accordingly, “the
relevant inquiry is not whether the conduct ‘actually violated’ any specific
statute or regulation, but whether the plaintiff ‘reasonably believed that
there was a violation.’ ” (Killgore v. SpecPro Professional Services, LLC
(9th Cir. 2022) 51 F.4th 973, 988 (Killgore); see also, Nejadian v. County of
Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 703, 719 [“Unlike retaliation under . . .
section 1102.5[(b)], in which the employee must show only that he or she
reasonably believed that there was a violation of a statute, rule, or regulation,
section 1102.5[, subdivision ](c) requires a showing that the activity in
question actually would result in a violation or noncompliance with a statute,
rule, or regulation”].) Section 1102.5(b) requires “objective reasonableness”
(Kolla’s, at p. 734) and it “does not protect employees who do not believe or
who unreasonably believe that the information they are disclosing shows a
violation of the law” (id. at p. 731).
C. Analysis
1. Contreras’s Mistaken Interpretation of the EPA Does Not
Necessarily Defeat His Section 1102.5 Claim
At the outset, we observe that when assessing the reasonableness of an
employee’s mistaken beliefs under section 1102.5, there are three potential

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scenarios. The employee could be mistaken about his or her understanding of
(1) the law, (2) the facts, or (3) the law and the facts. In this case we confront
the first scenario, but we see no reason why the type of mistake should be
controlling. We find the proper focus is on the reasonableness of an
employee’s beliefs, and preserving the legislative intent to encourage workers
to report activity they believe is unlawful.
Green Thumb is correct that a section 1102.5 claimant may not rely on
a perceived violation of a nonexistent law. “To have a reasonably based
suspicion of illegal activity, the employee must be able to point to some legal
foundation for his suspicion—some statute, rule or regulation which may
have been violated by the conduct he disclosed.” (Ross v. County of Riverside
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 580, 592; see also Love v. Motion Industries, Inc.
(N.D.Cal. 2004) 309 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1135 [rejecting § 1102.5(b) claim where
plaintiff did “not cite any statute, rule, or regulation that may have been
violated” and instead “argue[d] simply that he reasonably believed that the
activity violated some unnamed statute, rule, or regulation”].)
But this is not a case where Contreras claimed a violation of “some
unnamed statute, rule, or regulation.” (Love v. Motion Industries, Inc., supra,
309 F.Supp.2d at p. 1135.) Instead, Contreras “point[ed] to some legal
foundation for his suspicion” (Ross v. County of Riverside, supra, Cal.App.5th
at p. 592); namely, the EPA.
Further, Contreras’s misinterpretation of the law does not necessarily
undermine his section 1102.5(b) claim. As stated above, section 1102.5(b)
only requires an employee to have “reasonable cause” to believe that a law
has been violated. (Italics added.) There is no requirement that the
employee prove an actual violation. (Killgore, supra, 51 F.4th at p. 988; see
also, Ferrick v. Santa Clara University (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1345 [“

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‘[A]n employee need not prove an actual violation of law; it suffices if the
employer fired him for reporting his “reasonably based suspicions” of illegal
activity.’ ”].) As such, section 1102.5 may provide relief for an employee who
reasonably believed a legal violation occurred despite incorrectly analyzing
the relevant law.
Nor does common sense dictate a different result as Green Thumb
suggests. According to Green Thumb, our interpretation would allow an
employee to recover under section 1102.5(b) under the mistaken belief that
an employer is legally required to give a 100 percent pay raise every year, or
that women must be paid twice as much as men for the same work. This
argument ignores section 1102.5(b)’s “objective reasonableness” requirement.
(Kolla’s, at p. 734.) The hypothetical mistaken legal interpretations cited by
Green Thumb are unreasonable, precluding any relief under the statute.
Finally, we must consider the purpose of section 1102.5(b), which is to
“ ‘encourage[e] workplace whistle-blowers to report unlawful acts without
fearing retaliation.’ ” (Kolla’s, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 723.) Indeed, accepting
Green Thumb’s interpretation would defeat the Legislature’s purpose in
enacting the law. It would deprive employees of the statute’s protection
simply because the workers have no legal training and lack the expertise to
properly interpret a statute. Such employees would be reluctant to report
suspected violations for fear they misunderstood the law.
Based on the foregoing, while a lay employee’s incorrect legal
interpretation may be unreasonable under some circumstances, we see no
basis to find that it will always be unreasonable. Rather, “[r]easonableness is
generally a question of fact to be resolved by a jury.” (Edgerly v. City of
Oakland (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1206.) Accordingly, Contreras’s
incorrect legal analysis does not necessarily bar his section 1102.5 claim.

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2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Determination that
Contreras Had Reasonable Cause to Believe Green Thumb Violated the EPA
Based on his discussion with a deputy labor commissioner, and his
reading of the FAQ, Contreras believed Green Thumb violated the EPA.
Although the deputy labor commissioner did not make a definitive
determination, stating only that Green Thumb might have violated the law,
it is reasonable for a lay person to give that assessment credit. After all, the
Labor Commissioner enforces California’s labor laws. (Kilby v. CVS
Pharmacy, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 1, 13.)
As for his reading of the FAQ, Contreras explained that he interpreted
the EPA as originally protecting women but it was later expanded to include
men. This is consistent with the first two questions in the FAQ. Question 1
reflects that the EPA originally “prohibited an employer from paying its
employees less than employees of the opposite sex for equal work,” and that
recent legislation “strengthened the Equal Pay Act in a number of ways.”
Question 2 then describes “the most significant changes to the Equal Pay
Act,” and the first bullet point under that questions states, “[r]equiring equal
pay for employees who perform ‘substantially similar work,’ when viewed as
a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility.” Of the six bullet points under
question 2, only one mentions sex, and none mention race or ethnicity.
Accordingly, a lay person might interpret these first two questions as stating
that the EPA requires equal pay for substantially similar work regardless of
whether a protected class was involved.
Contreras also told the jury that his beliefs were based on question 9,
which states that an employee may “file a claim if the person who earns
more . . . has a different job title . . . [b]ecause the Equal Pay Act compares
jobs that are ‘substantially similar.’ ” Again, this question does not refer to

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protected classes and is therefore potentially misleading regarding the
required elements of an EPA claim. Similarly, more than half of the
questions in the FAQ omit sex, race, or ethnicity. The EPA’s name also
increases the potential for confusion, merely referencing equal pay with no
mention of protected classes.
We acknowledge that as judges with years of legal education and
experience, our reading of the entire FAQ correctly reflects that the EPA only
prohibits discriminatory wage variations based on sex, race, or ethnicity. But
a lay person with no formal legal training could easily misinterpret the FAQ
similarly to Contreras, especially when told by a deputy labor commissioner
that there was a potential violation.
And that is why the decision in this case properly belonged to a jury of
Contreras’s peers. The jurors had the FAQ to read for themselves, and they
determined that Contreras’s mistaken legal analysis was reasonable from the
perspective of a layperson. Although one could reach a different conclusion,
that is not our standard of review. (Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411,
429, fn. 5 [“ ‘So long as there is “substantial evidence,” the appellate court
must affirm . . . even if the reviewing justices personally would have ruled
differently had they presided over the proceedings below, and even if other
substantial evidence would have supported a different result.’ ”].) Drawing
all inferences in support of the judgment as we must, based on the deputy
labor commissioner’s statement of a possible violation, the potentially unclear
language in the FAQ, and Contreras’s testimony, the jury’s reasonable cause
determination is sufficiently supported.
In sum, notwithstanding Contreras’s mistaken interpretation of the
EPA, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Contreras

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had reasonable cause to believe Green Thumb violated that law. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in granting the partial JNOV motion.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand the trial court shall issue an
amended judgment consistent with the first-amended judgment entered on
September 8, 2023. Contreras is awarded costs on appeal.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.

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