P. v. Jackson

Filed 5/26/20 P. v. Jackson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
STEVIE B. JACKSON,
Defendant and
Appellant.
B296324
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA244075)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert Perry, Judge. Affirmed.
Maggie Shrout, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Stephanie C.
Santoro, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________

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Stevie Jackson petitioned the trial court for resentencing
under Senate Bill No. 1437, which “amend[ed] the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder . . . .” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The
trial court appointed counsel for Jackson and ordered briefing.
Before it received any briefs, the trial court ruled on Jackson’s
petition, concluding that Jackson was the actual killer of the
victims and was, therefore, not eligible for resentencing under
Senate Bill No. 1437. Jackson contends that the trial court erred
and violated his due process rights when it denied his petition
without allowing him the assistance of counsel and before briefs
were submitted. We affirm the trial court’s order denying
Jackson’s petition.
BACKGROUND
Albert and Edna Patton were murdered in their home on
May 27, 2000. (People v. Jackson (June 28, 2005, B169059) at pp.
3-4 [nonpub. opn.] (Jackson).) “Albert was 90 years old and in the
early stages of Alzheimer’s disease. Edna was 84 years old. She
weighed 92 pounds and was confined to a wheelchair.” (Id. at p.
3.) “Albert died of multiple blunt force injuries and stab wounds.
He received 22 stab wounds to his upper-left chest, many of
which pierced his heart and lung. He also received two stab
wounds to his right eye. Edna died of multiple, massive blunt
force head injuries and 13 stab wounds to her upper-left chest,
many of which pierced her lung and heart.” (Id. at p. 4.)
Jackson was charged with the Pattons’ murders. After two
mistrials, “[t]he jury found [Jackson] guilty on two counts of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189), first degree
robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (§§
211, 212.5, subd. (b)). The jury found true the allegations that

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defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a
knife, during the murders and first degree robbery (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)), as well as the felony murder and multiple murder
special circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3), (a)(17)).
In addition, defendant admitted two prior ‘strike’ convictions (§§
667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court sentenced defendant
to state prison for two consecutive terms of life without the
possibility of parole, after first serving 12 years plus 25 years to
life.”1 (Jackson, supra, B169059 at p. 2, fn. omitted.)
We affirmed Jackson’s conviction. (Jackson, supra, at p.
23.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective on January 1, 2019.
On January 7, 2019, Jackson filed a petition for resentencing
under the new legislation. After reviewing Jackson’s petition, the
trial court appointed counsel for Jackson and ordered the People
to respond to Jackson’s petition on or before March 11, 2019.
On February 5, 2019, the trial court issued a written order
denying Jackson’s petition. The order stated that “[a]s the actual
killer of Albert Patton and Edna Patton, Defendant Stevie
Jackson is not eligible for resentencing under [section] 1170.95.
His petition for resentencing is denied.”
Jackson filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
“Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted ‘to amend the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1135, review
granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598 (Lewis).) “Senate Bill No. 1437
achieves these goals by amending section 188 to require that a
principal act with express or implied malice and by amending
section 189 to state that a person can only be liable for felony
murder if (1) the ‘person was the actual killer’; (2) the person was
an aider or abettor in the commission of murder in the first
degree; or (3) the ‘person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’ [Citation.]
“Senate Bill No. 1437 added section 1170.95, which allows
a ‘person convicted of a felony murder or murder under a natural
and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the
court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s
murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts.’ (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) To file the petition, all
three of the following conditions must be met: ‘(1) A complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first or second
degree murder following a trial . . . . [¶] (3) The petitioner could
not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of
changes to [s]ection 188 or 189.’ (Ibid.) The petition shall include
a declaration stating that ‘he or she is eligible for relief under
this section’ based on the three requirements of subdivision (a).
(§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1).)
“Section 1170.95, subdivision (c), sets forth the process for
the trial court’s review of the petition. The trial court ‘shall

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review the petition and determine if the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing that the petitioner falls within the provisions
of this section. If the petitioner has requested counsel, the court
shall appoint counsel to represent petitioner . . . . If the
petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled
to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.’ (§ 1170.95,
subd. (c).)” (People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 57-58,
review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260410.)
“Under section 1170.95, subdivision (c), the court was
required to review [Jackson’s] petition and determine whether he
made a prima facie showing that he ‘falls within the provisions of’
the statute; that is, that he could not be convicted of first or
second degree murder under the law as amended by Senate Bill
No. 1437. (§ 1170.95, subds. (a)(3) & (c).) . . . . [¶] ‘A prima facie
showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the
party in question.’ [Citation.]”2 (Lewis, 43 Cal.App.5th at p.
1137.)
2 Section 1170.95, subdivision (c) refers to two prima facie
showings. The first is a prima facie showing that the petitioner
“falls within the provisions of this section.” If the petitioner
satisfies that prima facie showing, the trial court “shall appoint
counsel” and the prosecutor and petitioner may brief whether the
petitioner is entitled to resentencing relief—the second prima
facie showing referenced in section 1170.95, subdivision (c). The
trial court here concluded that the petitioner does not fall within
the provisions of section 1170.95. It is irrelevant, then, that the
trial court appointed counsel. Our analysis is limited to whether
the trial court erred when it concluded—based on a review of the
record of conviction—that Jackson did not fall within the
provisions of section 1170.95 because he was the Pattons’ actual
killer.

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Jackson’s petition, like other petitions this court has
considered in a similar context, was on a form with boxes checked
beside standard language alleging the statutory elements of a
petition under section 1170.95. (See People v. Verdugo (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 320, 324, fn. 2, review granted Mar. 18, 2020,
S260493.) Jackson checked the boxes beside the words, “I was
not the actual killer,” “I did not, with the intent to kill, aid, abet,
counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or assist the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree,” and “I was
not a major participant in the felony or I did not act with reckless
indifference to human life during the course of the crime or
felony.”
Jackson contends that because his petition alleged that he
was not the actual killer, the trial court’s review of our opinion
affirming his conviction and any other part of the record of
conviction and ruling on the petition before briefing was error
and deprived him of due process. We rejected identical
contentions in Lewis.
In Lewis, we concluded that the trial court may review the
record of conviction, which includes a reviewing court’s opinion,
to determine whether a petitioner has made the required prima
facie showing under section 1170.95, subdivision (c). (Lewis,
supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1136, fn. 7, 1138.) “As a respected
commentator has explained: ‘It would be a gross misuse of
judicial resources to require the issuance of an order to show
cause or even appointment of counsel based solely on the
allegations of the petition, which frequently are erroneous, when
even a cursory review of the court file would show as a matter of
law that the petitioner is not eligible for relief. . . .’ ” (Id. at p.
1138.)

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We have no occasion to revisit that conclusion here.
As part of our opinion affirming his conviction, we noted
that Jackson had confessed to killing the Pattons. (Jackson,
supra, B169059 at p. 6 [“defendant told Jordan he had killed the
Pattons”].) Indeed, the jury concluded that Jackson had
participated in the murders of both Albert and Edna Patton, and
that he had personally used a knife during the murders. The
trial court properly concluded that Jackson was ineligible for
resentencing under section 1170.95 because he was the Pattons’
actual killer.3
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J. WEINGART, J.*
3 Jackson’s assertions of constitutional error rely on his
assertion that the trial court impermissibly reviewed the record
of conviction to determine whether he had made the necessary
prima facie showing under section 1170.95. Because we have
rejected that argument, we need not consider Jackson’s other
claims that rely on that argument.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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