In re Samantha D.

Filed 2/9/17 In re Samantha D. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re SAMANTHA D., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B270405
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. DK12630)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Zeke D. Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Claire Abrams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Acting
Assistant County Counsel, and Jeanette Cauble, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Mother M.M. appeals from the orders sustaining the dependency
petition under Welfare and Institutions code section 300, subdivision
(b)(1) as to her daughter, Samantha D., and placing Samantha in her care
under supervision by the Los Angeles County Department of Child and
Welfare Services (DCFS). She contends there was no evidence she
neglected Samantha, and insufficient evidence that her continued
provision of care to Samantha posed a substantial risk of harm. We
conclude that parental neglect is not a prerequisite to assertion of
dependency jurisdiction, and that substantial evidence supports the
court’s finding that Samantha was at substantial risk of serious physical
harm or illness. Therefore, we affirm the orders.
BACKGROUND
In December 2013, when she was 12 years old, Samantha D. (born
January 2000) came to the attention of DCFS after it received a referral
indicating that Samantha had been hospitalized three times in 2013 due
to her uncontrolled diabetes. The reporting party was concerned for the
child’s safety if released again into the care of her mother, appellant
Maritza M. (mother). During her hospitalization in December 2013,
Samantha’s blood sugar (A1c,1 or hemoglobin) level exceeded 14 percent
1 An A1c test reflects the average blood sugar level for over the past
two to three months to indicate how one’s diabetes is being controlled
over a period of months. The higher one’s A1c reading, the greater the
risk of suffering diabetes–related complications. Medical professionals
recommend an A1c reading of less than 7–7.5 percent, depending on age

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(it should have been 7). An adult sister reported that Samantha ate
desserts and junk foods, and refused to take her insulin between meals.
The reporting party believed that mother had failed to provide adequate
supervision or to set appropriate limits for Samantha, who might die if
her diabetes remained uncontrolled.
Samantha and two younger siblings (who are not subjects of this
action), live with mother and two of mother’s adult children. Samantha’s
diabetes was diagnosed when she was 11. While hospitalized in
December 2013, Samantha admitted that she had ignored instructions
regarding her care and lied to mother about her diet and insulin intake.
DCFS determined that voluntary family maintenance (VFM) services
would best serve the family, and that counseling was in order to help the
family address father’s abandonment. Samantha’s father, Jorge D.
(father, who is not a party to this appeal), also has diabetes. Samantha
had forged a special bond with father over their shared illness. She
became depressed after he abandoned the family when she was 13 years
old to return to Guatemala to live with his former wife and children.
DCFS provided VFM services for about a year, beginning in early 2014.
In mid-March 2014, mother was reportedly complying with the
VFM plan, and had been present during all of Samantha’s blood checks
and insulin injections. Samantha’s most recent test indicated that her
and type of diabetes. (http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/a1c-
test/home/ovc-20167930;
http://www.webmd.com/diabetes/glycohemoglobin-ghb#3.)

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A1c level had been reduced to 9.9 percent. By July 2014, DCFS had has
assigned the matter to its Medical Case Management Service (MCMS)
unit, and assigned a public health nurse (PHN) to supervise the case.
The PHN followed up with Samantha’s health care providers, and
monitored mother’s compliance, made recommendations to Samantha
and mother based on Samantha’s medical needs, and discussed with
mother how important it was that Samantha have adequate medical
supplies and medication available at all times, whether at home, school or
elsewhere. The PHN and mother also discussed Samantha’s excessive
weight, and the PHN stressed that mother needed to make healthy food
choices and a weight loss program available, and to encourage Samantha
to engage in physical activities. The PHN reported that Samantha was
being followed for mental health treatment to address ongoing
depression, per the VFM case plan, and that her most recent A1c level
had been 10.4 percent.
A social worker visited the family home in late February 2015 when
DCFS was planning to close the case. However, when mother revealed
that Samantha’s most recent A1c reading in mid–February 2015 was
13.3 percent, DCFS explained it would be necessary to file a non–
detained petition. The family’s VFM case had been open over a year,
and the reasons that led to DCFS involvement remained unresolved.
Mother was frustrated because Samantha refused to cooperate or
participate in managing her own health care, or to eat appropriate
foods. For example, the teenager would sneak junk food (e.g., mother
found a chocolate wrapper by Samantha’s bed), and consumed excessive

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amounts of sugar (18 bottles of juice in four days, and as many as five
packets of sugar in each cup of coffee).
In early April, mother and Samantha met with a DCFS multi-
disciplinary team to assess the family’s progress. The group discussed
Samantha’s health concerns, her elevated glucose levels and her non–
compliance with her medical regimen. Samantha promised to make an
effort to eat better. Mother informed the group that Samantha became
depressed after father left the family, and spent most of her time in her
room. Mother was asked to check with Samantha’s psychiatrist
regarding the medication dose and was reminded to attend therapy and
parenting programs. She agreed to do so. Mother and Samantha were
referred to “Teen Power,” a 10–week support program at Children’s
Hospital Los Angeles (CHLA) with parallel groups for diabetic teens
and their caregivers, to address issues confronting teens with diabetes
who experienced emotional and behavioral issues inhibiting optimal
diabetes care. Samantha and mother actively participated in and
completed the program in June. They registered for a second program,
and mother said they intended to continue participating in the support
group. In late June, the Teen Power program agreed that Samantha’s
mental health treatment could be transferred to its facility for
individual counseling to address her depression after mother told DCFS
the child’s therapist planned to close her daughter’s case
notwithstanding her ongoing depression.

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In July 2015, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300,2 subdivision (b)(1) alleging that, while
mother had been trained to administer Samantha’s medications and to
maintain an appropriate diet in order to control her daughter’s diabetes,
she failed to refill or administer Samantha’s medications regularly or to
ensure that her then 15–year–old daughter consistently checked her own
glucose levels or maintained a proper diet. DCFS also alleged that the
remedial services it provided had not resolved the family’s problems, that
mother remained unable to understand or adequately manage
Samantha’s disease, and that mother’s “failure or inability to supervise or
protect” Samantha adequately, “endanger[ed] the child’s physical, health
and safety and place[d] her at risk of serious harm, damage and danger.”
The allegation that mother “failed to refill and to administer
[Samantha’s] medications” arose from an incident in June 2015, while
mother was in the process of transferring Samantha’s medical care from
providers in Long Beach to CHLA. Mother, a Spanish–speaker,
encountered numerous difficulties making that switch, including
CHLA’s failure to return numerous calls she made to try to schedule
medical appointments for Samantha, and CHLA’s claim not to have
received medical records forwarded by Samantha’s previous doctors. At
one point in June, mother had to take Samantha to a community clinic
after the child ran out of the medicine that was usually delivered
2 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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directly to their home.3 DCFS claimed that Samantha was without her
medication for three weeks. Mother disputed this, and said the lapse in
deliveries had not caused a lapse in Samantha’s taking her medication.
Despite her concerted efforts, mother’s difficulty receiving any response
from CHLA or scheduling an appointment for Samantha continued into
July. The problem was finally rectified when County medical
professionals interceded and were able to obtain an endocrinology
appointment for Samantha at CHLA.
When the PHN and social worker visited the family’s home on
July 9, 2015, mother showed them she had a closet filled with “plenty”
of Samantha’s medicines and supplies. Still, mother remained
frustrated that Samantha was not fully participating in managing her
illness. For example, mother prepared healthy breakfasts for
Samantha, who ate them, and then stopped for donuts on the way to
school. And, despite being regularly reminded by mother, Samantha
failed or refused to monitor her blood sugar levels and ate many high
sugar, high carb snacks. Mother tried to help Samantha count calories
and carbs, but was not always able to do so because she was working.
Mother’s adult children in the home tried to help, but that resulted in
3 When mother went to the pharmacy to investigate why the
medicine was not delivered, she learned the prescription had been
cancelled without informing her because of the change of doctors, and
that the new pharmacy did not have a mail order service. Mother was
able to rectify the problem and obtain Samantha’s medication and a
pharmacy that made home deliveries.

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confrontations with Samantha. Mother checked on Samantha as often
as she could, and sent texts to remind her to test her glucose level.
Nevertheless, Samantha sometimes failed or simply refused to do so.
Also, although the school nurse was given the medical orders regarding
Samantha’s need for insulin, Samantha refused to go to the nurse’s
office and would not give herself insulin injections in the school
bathrooms, which she claimed were unsanitary. Mother believed
Samantha’s glucose levels vacillated so much because the teenager
refused to change her eating habits, and did things like awaken at night
to snack.
During the July 2015 home visit, Samantha showed the PHN her
insulin pens and was able to describe the correct procedure for
administering insulin. She admitted that she forgot to check her
glucose and to give herself insulin injections. She acknowledged that
she had deleted a calorie–counting app on her phone because it took up
too much space. Samantha told the PHN that she did not like to go out,
had told only one friend about her diabetes and sometimes felt
depressed.
In addition to her diabetes–related health problems, Samantha
suffers from hypothyroidism (for which she takes medication), is
overweight and depressed. Mother reported that Samantha had “not
seen a psychiatrist in a long time because she did not like the previous
one,” had stopped taking her psychotropic medication, and was about to
attend her final therapy session, which DCFS had terminated.
Samantha also has a vitamin D deficiency, but had stopped taking

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vitamin D (and would not go outside), and had not seen a nephrologist
since switching to CHLA. Samantha needs glasses, but had lost her
last pair and only wanted a specific brand that mother was unable to
provide.
At the time of the detention hearing on July 28, 2015, father’s
whereabouts were unknown. The court ordered that Samantha remain
in mother’s care, and set a combined adjudication/disposition hearing
for October.
In its report for the hearing on October 21, 2015. DCFS informed
the court that Samantha had started to be more attentive to her own
medical and nutritional needs, but remained unable fully to grasp the
severity of medical complications she could suffer if her diabetes was
not kept in check. When questioned in late September regarding the
allegations of the petition, Samantha specifically “denied that mother
[had] been neglectful of her medical care and denied that mother failed
to refill her medication.” To the contrary, Samantha told DCFS that a
“big box full of [her] supplies” had been sent to her home. Samantha
also “denied that mother has not shown importance [sic] or an interest
in [her] well–being and [said] that mother has ensured that she attends
all medical appointments since transferring her medical care to
[CHLA].”
Samantha explained that her glucose levels were high because she
did not follow her doctors’ instructions to “take care of [her]self.” She
“would lie to [mother] and say [she had] checked [her] blood sugar,”
when she had not. Samantha admitted that, despite mother’s “regular

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reminders” to check her glucose levels, she “fail[ed] to follow through
with her responsibilities in managing her diabetes,” and did not comply
with her prescribed medication regimen.4 She admitted the problem
was that she ate chips, soda and other unhealthy foods “behind
[mother’s] back.”
Mother was also interviewed on September 25. She said she had
done her best to ensure that Samantha ate appropriate foods and
followed medical instructions to control her diabetes. But her ability to
maintain control was limited by her inability to supervise Samantha
while she was at work, coupled with the teenager’s insistence on eating
junk foods, and her depression and refusal to exercise. Mother said the
teen had started taking more responsibility for her own health since
attending a weekly support group. However, just the day before,
mother had gone to Samantha’s school where the nurse informed her
that Samantha was not performing her midday blood sugar tests.
Mother said Samantha insisted on conducting the tests and
administering the insulin herself, but then sometimes refused to do
either even after being reminded.
Regarding the gap in Samantha’s medications, mother explained
that Samantha had always received automatic refills, which were
4 The DCFS report reflects that Samantha’s glucose readings were
most consistently recorded in the mornings and evenings when mother
was home. Samantha did not perform the tests at all during school
days. There are gaps of up to five days with no readings at all.

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mailed to the home, and denied neglecting Samantha’s medical needs.
She explained that when Samantha’s health care was switched to
CHLA, there was a short time during which the child’s medication was
not delivered. Mother had been unaware the automatic refills had
ceased, and the new pharmacy did not deliver. Mother obtained
medication for Samantha at a community clinic during the interim, and
transferred to another pharmacy so that home deliveries resumed.
Mother was participating in a parenting education program, and
both she and Samantha received individual counseling and attended
support groups at CHLA. Mother remained willing to comply with the
case plan. She realized that, even though it was Samantha who should
be responsible to check her glucose levels at school, that was not going
to happen. So, it would be difficult, but it was up to mother constantly
to remind her.
DCFS opined that Samantha “remained stable” in mother’s care.
Mother and Samantha had each expressed a commitment to continue
participating in counseling and group sessions, and to make an effort to
improve Samantha’s understanding of the severity of her diabetes and
the importance of complying with the prescribed regimen. Despite her
frustration, mother was committed to continue doing everything she
could to encourage her daughter to manage her illness with diet and
treatment. Samantha did not believe that mother was either
indifferent to her needs or neglectful. She freely admitted lying to
mother about what she readily acknowledged were her own
responsibilities. The social worker concluded that mother and

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Samantha each suffered from varying levels of depression, associated
with the aftermath of father’s departure from the family. But, both had
continued participating in mental health services, and remained willing
to do so in order to better manage their own well–being and to remain
focused on Samantha’s medical needs. In conclusion, DCFS opined
that, although there was a need for improvement it did “not appear that
[Samantha was] at imminent risk under the mother’s care, therefore,
the detention of the child [did] not appear necessary.” DCFS
recommended that family maintenances services be continued.
At the close of the adjudication phase, County Counsel argued
that Samantha remained at risk because mother had difficulty properly
providing or obtaining care for her medical needs, had not “really
monitor[ed] the child sufficiently, was not refilling [Samantha’s]
medications appropriately, [and] was not making doctors’ appointments
for the child.” As a result, Samantha’s glucose levels had varied
dramatically and exceeded acceptable levels for an insulin–dependent
child. County Counsel urged the court to retain jurisdiction so DCFS
could ensure that mother appropriately monitored her teenage
daughter’s health, followed doctors’ advice and attended medical
appointments. The juvenile court asked what the effect, if any, had
been of the alleged three–week gap in Samantha’s receipt of medication
in terms of the alleged current risk of future harm. County Counsel did
not respond directly to this inquiry, saying only that mother should not
have let the delay occur because such a lengthy gap in the receipt of
medication for someone with diabetes could be very dangerous.

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The juvenile court also observed that DCFS’s latest report
indicated that mother was “checking [Samantha’s glucose] levels in the
morning and the evening,” and that Samantha was supposed to be
checking the levels herself during the school day, but did not. The court
asked what effort, if any, DCFS had made since becoming involved with
the family to give mother confidence that Samantha would check her
glucose levels when mother was not there to remind her, and whether
DCFS had done anything to ensure that there was a mechanism in
place during the school day to accomplish that goal. County Counsel
was unable to respond to either question.
The court observed that DCFS had essentially assigned “100
percent” responsibility to mother to check Samantha’s glucose levels
and manage the diabetic teen’s home care. The agency acknowledged
that mother had taken on a more active role, and was watching
Samantha’s diet and checking her glucose levels in the morning and
evening. Thus, the court wondered if the only remaining risk was “the
medication complaints?” County Counsel responded that DCFS
remained concerned about Samantha’s elevated glucose levels.
At this point in the hearing, the court received a last–minute
information indicating that father had been contacted that day in
Guatemala.5 The adjudication hearing was continued to January 12,
5 The last-minute information said father was suffering diabetes–
related complications, was legally unable to return to Los Angeles and
was financially unable to provide for Samantha. He also claimed it

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2016, to give father an opportunity to participate. In the meantime,
DCFS was ordered to provide a supplemental report addressing
compliance by mother and Samantha with the girl’s diabetes
management program, and to address the merits of dismissing this
action “outright.”
DCFS never provided the supplemental report. On January 4,
2016, in lieu of this report, DCFS submitted a last-minute information
that failed to address whether the action should be dismissed. DCFS
reported that Samantha was still attending therapy, albeit reluctantly
and inconsistently, and incorrectly reported that she had not attended a
medical appointment since October.6 DCFS opined that mother and
Samantha still required DCFS support. Accordingly, DCFS said it was
in Samantha’s best interest for the court to sustain the petition and
assume jurisdiction, so that the agency could “continue monitoring the
family in order to ensure that [Samantha] is improving in her diabetes
management.”
The adjudication hearing was reconvened on January 12, 2016.
County Counsel argued that remedial services provided by DCFS had
would be dangerous for Samantha to be with him in Guatemala, which
lacked the medical resources she needed.
6 At the continued adjudication hearing on January 12, mother
presented evidence that Samantha had undergone examinations for
endocrinology, diabetes and metabolism on December 18, 2015.

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not resolved the problems that led to the agency’s involvement, and
recommended that the court sustain the petition.
Mother urged the court to dismiss the petition, arguing that DCFS
had failed to carry its burden to demonstrate the truth of the
allegations. Her counsel argued that mother had fully complied with all
of DCFS’s recommendations, and had done everything within her power
to assist her 16 year old to manage her illness. There was nothing more
mother could learn by taking more classes, and little more she could do
to help the teen who had to learn to assume responsibility to manage
her diabetes, especially when she was away from mother and in school.
Mother’s counsel argued there was no basis for the assertion of
jurisdiction, nor any reason for concern that Samantha faced a current
or future risk of harm in mother’s care.
Samantha’s counsel observed that the girl’s A1c level remained
uncontrolled and dangerously high, and joined DCFS’s request that the
court sustain the petition. Her attorney noted that the girl’s A1c level
had been 13.4 percent in September 2015, and had risen to 14 percent
in mid-December 2015, double the optimal seven percent goal. Further,
the last-minute information indicated that Samantha’s participation in
and attendance at support group and therapy sessions recently had
become inconsistent. Her counsel noted the situation could be quite
dangerous for Samantha, given the potentially grave consequences of
her illness.
At the conclusion of the adjudication phase, without stating its
reasons, the court found DCFS had proved the allegations by a

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preponderance of the evidence, and sustained the petition. (§ 300, subd.
(b)(1).) Proceeding to disposition, the court removed Samantha from
father’s custody, placed her in mother’s care under DCFS supervision
and ordered that family maintenance services be provided. Mother
appeals.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in asserting jurisdiction
in this action as there is no evidence she neglected Samantha, and
DCFS failed to satisfy its burden to show that her continued provision
of care posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to
Samantha. Mother is partly correct. The record contains insufficient
evidence that mother neglected Samantha’s medical condition.
However, the record does contain substantial evidence that, despite her
efforts, and through no fault of her own, mother remained unable
adequately to exert sufficient control or supervision over her teenage
daughter in order to obtain Samantha’s consistent compliance with her
own health regimen. Mother’s inability to do so resulted in a
substantial risk that Samantha would suffer serious physical harm or
illness.
1. The Relevant Provision of Section 300, Subdivision (b)(1) Does Not
Require a Showing of Parental Culpability
As relevant here, section 300, provides a basis for the assertion of
dependency jurisdiction if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a

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substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or
illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to
adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1), italics
added.) We must determine what the statute requires, before reviewing
the court’s factual findings bearing that interpretation in mind.
It has been stressed repeatedly that “[s]ubdivision (b) means what
it says.” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 823.) Longstanding
rules of statutory construction require us to afford meaning to every
word and phrase in a statute. (In re B. J. B. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
1201, 1206-1207.) Where possible, we must give significance to each
word, phrase and sentence of a statute, and avoid a construction that
renders any parts therein surplusage. (See Walker v. Superior Court
(1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 121-122.) “‘Our task in construing a statute is to
ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. [Citation.] We
begin by examining the words of the statute, giving them their usual
and ordinary meaning and construing them in the context of the statute
as a whole. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Weiss v. City of Los Angeles
(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 194, 209.) “‘“If the plain, commonsense meaning of
a statute’s words is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.”
[Citation.]’” (Ibid., citing City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 707, 719.) The plain language of the first clause of
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) provides that a parent’s inability to
provide adequate protection or supervision provides a basis for juvenile
court jurisdiction if the result of that inability places the child at
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.

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Considered in the context of other provisions of section 300, the
concept that a child may be subject to dependency jurisdiction even in
the absence of parental fault is consistent with the view that the
Legislature expressly determined that parental culpability is a
prerequisite for some grounds for dependency jurisdiction, but not
others. Courts typically infer that the omission of a culpability
requirement from a particular ground was intentional. “When language
is included in one portion of a statute, its omission from a different
portion addressing a similar subject suggests that the omission was
purposeful.” (In re Ethan C. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 610, 638 (Ethan C.).)
This is particularly so where the differential treatment occurs in the
same statute or, as here, the same subdivision.
Certain provisions of section 300 require a showing of intentional
parental conduct. (See § 300, subds. (a) [parent’s “nonaccidental”
infliction on child of serious physical harm; (c) [child has suffered, or
may suffer, serious emotional damage “as a result of” parent’s conduct];
(d) [parent’s sexual abuse of child], (e) [parental infliction of severe
physical abuse on child under five]; and (i) [parent has subjected child
to acts of cruelty].) Other provisions of the statute also require a
showing of culpability, although negligence will suffice. (See § 300,
subd. (b)(1) [second and third clauses; parent’s “willful or negligent
failure” to supervise or protect a child left with another, or to provide
“adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment”]; § 300, subds.
(d), (e) & (i) [addressing parental failure to protect child from sexual
abuse, severe physical abuse of young child or cruelty, when parent

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knew or should have known risk existed]; and (j) [parental “abuse or
neglect” caused another child’s death].)
And, as with the provision of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) at
issue here, under some circumstances the Legislature has deemed the
assertion of dependency jurisdiction appropriate without any showing of
parental culpability. (See § 300, subd. (b)(1) [fourth clause; parent’s
“inability . . . to provide regular care for the child” because of parent’s
mental illness or developmental disability]; § 300, subd. (b)(2) [sexually
exploited child whose parent has failed to protect them]; § 300, subd. (c)
[child at substantial risk of suffering, serious emotional damage, and is
without a parent “capable of providing appropriate care”]; In re Roxanne
B. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 916, 921 [this provision of § 300, subd. (c)
does not require “‘parental fault or neglect’”]; § 300, subd. (g) [child “left
without any provision for support”]; D.M. v. Superior Court (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 1117, 1128–1129 [conduct under § 300, subd. (g) need not
be willful].) Dependency court jurisdiction is not grounded on principles
of culpability. (See In re V. M. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 753, 757
[observing that imposition of dependency jurisdiction turns on the
welfare of the child, not parental fault or lack thereof].) Rather, under
this provision of section 300, subdivision (b), DCFS need only show that
a parent cannot, for whatever reason, exercise adequate control or
supervision of her child, and that this inability places the child at
substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.
We acknowledge that our conclusion that dependency jurisdiction
may attach absent a showing of parental culpability is at odds with the

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decision by our colleagues in Division One in In re Precious D. (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 1251 (Precious D.) In Precious D. a mother was unable
to protect her teenage daughter who continually ran away and refused
to return home. (Id. at p. 1261.) DCFS conceded “that it sought
dependency court jurisdiction because of [the child’s] incorrigible
behavior and her need for court-ordered services, not because of any
neglectful conduct by [the mother].” (Id. at p. 1259.) The court
concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the assertion of
jurisdiction, because the mother had not been negligent, and the court
feared that assertion of jurisdiction based on a parent’s blameless
inability to control a teen could result in the termination of parental
rights without any finding that she was an unfit parent. (Id. at pp.
1259–1261.) The court held that “the provision of [section 300,
subdivision (b)] providing for jurisdiction based on the parent’s ‘inability
. . . to adequately supervise or protect the child’ requires that the parent
be unfit or neglectful in causing serious physical harm to the child or a
risk of such harm.” (Id. at pp. 1253–1254.) We respectfully disagree.7
7 Our colleagues in Division Two disagreed with Precious D., and
the issue is pending before the California Supreme Court. (See In re
R.T. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 795, review granted June 17, 2015,
S226416). Two other decisions likewise disagreed (In re Tyler R. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1250, and In re Maricela H. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
615), but after review was granted in those cases, the review-grants
were later dismissed, and thus review is no longer pending in those
cases.

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The assertion of jurisdiction is merely one of the earliest steps in a
series of steps that may or may not lead to termination of parental
rights. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 247–250
[outlining steps] (Cynthia D.); Ethan C., supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 617.)
Parental rights of a custodial parent may only be terminated upon a
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, at the permanency planning
(§ 366.26) hearing. (In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 931, fn.
3.) By the time a dependency case has reached the final step and
termination of parental rights is possible, the danger of returning a
child to parental custody is well-established, and there is no longer good
reason to believe a positive parent-child relationship exists. (See
Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 253, 256.) Indeed, at this point, the
“‘court is required only to find that clear and convincing evidence
establishes the child is likely to be adopted, reunification services were
properly terminated or not offered, and termination of parental rights
would not be detrimental to the child.’” (In re Jason J., supra, 175
Cal.App.4th at p. 931, fn. 3.)
2. The Jurisdictional Findings are Supported by Substantial
Evidence
A juvenile court’s findings at the jurisdictional hearing that the
allegations of the petition are true must be based on a preponderance of
the evidence. (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1432.) DCFS
bears the burden to produce evidence to support the allegations of the
petition. (In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318.) We

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review the court’s findings using the substantial evidence standard of
review, and will affirm the findings if they are supported by reasonable,
credible evidence. (In re Jonathan B. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 115, 118–
119.) In determining whether substantial evidence supports the
jurisdictional findings, a “reviewing court may not ‘consider whether
there is evidence from which the dependency court could have drawn a
different conclusion,’ but is limited to determining whether ‘there is
substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the court did draw.’
[Citation.]” (In re Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 113.)
As discussed above, the unambiguous language of the first clause
of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) makes it clear the Legislature intended
to extend juvenile court protection to children, like Samantha, whose
parents have acted in their children’s best interest and have done all
they can, but who nonetheless remain unable to provide adequate
supervision and care. In this case, it is abundantly clear that, despite
the fact that mother––a single parent with two younger children, a full-
time job, and a significant language barrier––has devoted loving,
extensive effort to try to help Samantha manage her diabetes, deal with
collateral medical and emotional problems, and ensure her daughter’s
compliance with a stringent medical regimen. It is also clear that,
although mother has achieved some success when she is able personally
to supervise Samantha, she has not been nearly as successful in
obtaining Samantha’s cooperation when the teen is unsupervised or is
at school. We are not free to second–guess the juvenile court’s implicit
determination that, although mother did not fail to devote her best

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efforts to supervising, protecting or providing care for Samantha, she
nevertheless remained unable adequately to accomplish those goals,
and her inability to do so posed a substantial risk to her child’s health.
Samantha is not an incorrigible teen like the child in Precious D.,
supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at page 1253. She is, however, quite willful.
And, although Samantha claims to understand the serious
ramifications to her health of the dangerous conduct in which she
sometimes chooses to engage, she remains reluctant to devote the
consistent, vigilant level of care necessary to manage her illness.
Mother does not deny she is frustrated and unable to control the teen’s
behavior no matter how hard she tries to remain on top of the situation.
Samantha eats her healthy meals, then snacks on foods she knows pose
a grave risk to her health. Mother regularly reminds Samantha to
check her blood sugar and take her insulin. Samantha forgets, or
refuses to do so or lies and claims that she has done so. Samantha is
understandably reluctant or embarrassed to perform her glucose tests
in public or unsanitary restrooms, but refuses to do them in the school
nurse’s office. Moreover, she has weight issues and a vitamin D
deficiency that further complicate her health condition, yet refuses
mother’s entreaties to leave her room and go outdoors for exercise or
sunshine, or to maintain a healthful diet.
Clearly, mother has exerted significant effort to safeguard
Samantha’s health. However, the record demonstrates she has been
and remains unable to ensure that Samantha complies with the strict
dietary and medical regimen required to optimize her ability to control

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her chronic, potentially life-threatening disease. The juvenile court did
not err in asserting jurisdiction over Samantha based on mother’s
inability to ensure her daughter’s health and physical well-being.8
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLHITE, J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P. J.
MANELLA, J.
8 We reject mother’s contention that the assertion of jurisdiction as
to Samantha based on mother’s inability to protect her necessarily
poses an additional risk to her younger children. The assertion of
jurisdiction here is specific to Samantha, and does not constitute a
finding that mother is an unfit parent with respect to Samantha, let
alone mother’s other children. (See In re Cody W. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th
221, 225–226.)

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