P. v. Williams

1
Filed 4/7/20 P. v. Williams CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
OMAR LAMONT WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A157031
(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 5-142200-5)
Omar Lamont Williams was convicted of forcible rape in concert (Pen.
Code, § 264.1)1, kidnapping for extortion (§ 209, subd. (a)), and multiple other
counts based on offenses committed when he was 23 years old. After a
successful appeal resulting in a remand for resentencing, Williams now
challenges his new sentence as unauthorized. Williams also contends that
his categorical exclusion, as a sex offender sentenced under the One Strike
Law (Stats. 1994, 1st Ex. Sess. 1993-1994, ch. 14X, § 1, p. 8570; § 667.61),
from eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3501
violates equal protection. We agree with both contentions and therefore
remand for resentencing and an opportunity to develop the facts relevant to a
youth offender parole hearing.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

-- 1 of 18 --

2
BACKGROUND
A.
The underlying facts and procedural history are primarily taken from
this Court’s unpublished opinion in Williams’s prior appeal. (People v.
Williams, 2018 Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 2882 (April 27, 2018, A147160) [non
pub. opn.] (Williams).)2
In May 2014, Williams’s cousin Audrey Sims had an altercation with
Jane Doe, accusing Doe of owing her money. Williams, who was 23 at the
time, got involved and took Doe’s phone. He choked her, called her a “bitch,”
and told her she owed his cousin money. Although Doe denied the debt,
Williams and Sims told Doe she needed to figure out a way to make the
money back that night. They told her she was going to “get on Redbook,” a
prostitution website, and they would get clients for her. Doe refused but
Williams and Sims told her they didn’t care what she wanted. Williams
pulled a gun out from the back of his pants and said, “I’m not stupid. You
have a pussy, right?” Williams pointed the gun in Doe’s face and said “he
was about that life and that he wasn’t afraid to use it.”
Williams and another individual who was present, Michael Keith
Madison, told Doe they needed pictures of her to put on her Redbook page.
Williams and Madison had Doe get in the back seat of her car with Williams
driving. Williams said Doe would have to prostitute herself one to three
times each day to pay back the money she owed.
2 We deny as unnecessary Williams’s request for judicial notice of the
appellate record. (See In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 484 [“Petitioners
need not separately or specifically request judicial notice of all documents
connected with their past appeals”].)

-- 2 of 18 --

3
Williams drove to a gas station and sent Madison inside the store to
buy condoms. Williams later drove back to the complex where Sims lived and
stopped at a grassy area by the community pool. He and Madison were
smoking and drinking. Williams took Doe into the bushes and photographed
her with her pants pulled down, saying he would post the pictures on
Redbook.
Williams, who had a gun, forced Doe to give both him and Madison oral
sex. While Doe performed oral sex on Williams, Madison tried to have anal
sex with her before raping her vaginally. Doe was crying and the men were
laughing. Williams also raped her vaginally. The incident ended when Doe
said she needed to go pick up her son. Doe drove to a friend’s house,
hysterical, and said she had been raped. The friend called the police.
B.
Section 667.61, known as the “One Strike” law (Stats. 1994, 1st Ex.
Sess. 1993-1994, ch. 14X, § 1, p. 8570), is an alternative, harsher sentencing
scheme that applies to specified felony sex offenses. (People v. Anderson
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 102.) For covered offenses, the One Strike law
mandates a sentence of either 15 years to life or 25 years to life depending on
whether certain factual circumstances are found true. (Ibid.; see also §
667.61, subds. (a)-(b).) For some of the covered sex offenses, if the crimes
involve separate victims or the same victim on separate occasions, the trial
court must impose consecutive sentences. (§ 667.61, subd. (i).) As relevant in
Williams’s case, “[t]he sentence will be 25 years to life if the jury finds (or the
defendant admits) . . . one of the more aggravated ‘circumstances’ listed in
section 667.61, subdivision (d).” (People v. Perez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1218,
1223, italics omitted.) The circumstances enumerated in section 667.61,
subdivision (d) include: “The defendant kidnapped the victim of the present

-- 3 of 18 --

4
offense and the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of
harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily inherent in
the underlying offense.” (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2).) Forcible rape in concert (§
264.1) and forcible oral copulation in concert (§ 287, subds. (c)-(d)) are among
the offenses that qualify for treatment under the One Strike law. (§ 667,
subds. (c)(3), (c)(7).)
C.
A third amended information was filed charging Williams as follows:
count one: conspiracy to commit kidnapping for extortion, human trafficking
and pandering (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 209, subd. (a); 236.1, subd. (b); 266i);
count two: kidnapping for extortion (§ 209, subd. (a)); count three: human
trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (b)); count four: forcible rape in concert (§ 264.1);
count five: forcible oral copulation in concert (§ 288a, subd. (d)). The third
amended information also alleged that Williams had personally used a
firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b), in the
commission of the kidnapping charged in count two; had personally used a
firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), in the
commission of the human trafficking charged in count three; and had been
armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1),
during the commission of the rape in concert and oral copulation in concert
charged in counts four and five. Finally, as to the oral copulation charged in
count five, it was alleged under the One Strike law that Williams (along with
Madison) had kidnapped the victim within the meaning of section 667.61,
subdivision (d)(2), and that the movement substantially increased the risk of
harm to her above that level of risk inherent in the underlying offense.
Williams was jointly tried along with his codefendants, Sims and
Madison. The three defendants were convicted as charged. Williams

-- 4 of 18 --

5
received the following sentence: (1) a One Strike term of 25 years to life for
the rape in concert conviction under count four, plus one year for the firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (a)(1); (2) 25 years to life
for the oral copulation in concert conviction under count five, plus one year
for the firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (a)(1),
concurrent to the sentence in count four; (3) life with the possibility of parole
for the kidnapping conviction under count two, plus a 10-year firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (b), concurrent to the
sentence in count four; (4) life with the possibility of parole for the conspiracy
conviction under count one, that sentence to be stayed pursuant to section
654; and (5) the lower term of eight years for the human trafficking
conviction under count three, plus the lower term of three years for the
firearm enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), with “the 11
years that is imposed” being “concurrently stayed under Penal Code section
654.” The trial court also ordered that Williams pay a restitution fine under
section 1202.4 in the amount of $300 per count, or a total of $1,500, and
stayed a parole revocation fine in the same amount under section 1202.45.
D.
In Williams’s prior appeal, this Court affirmed his conviction but
remanded the case for resentencing. (Williams, supra, 2018
Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 2882.) This Court held that the One Strike sentence
for Williams’s rape in concert conviction under count four was unauthorized
because the accusatory pleading did not include a specific One Strike
allegation as to that count. (Ibid.) In addition, this Court held that because
the case was being remanded for resentencing on count four, the trial court
could consider whether to strike or impose the firearm enhancements on
counts two and three pursuant to newly enacted discretionary authority in

-- 5 of 18 --

6
sections 12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h). (Williams,
supra, 2018 Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 2882.) This Court also identified errors
relating to Williams’s restitution and parole revocation fines. (Ibid.) The
disposition read as follows: “The true finding on the One Strike allegation
attached to [Williams’s] rape in concert conviction[] under count 4 is vacated
and the case is remanded for resentencing on that count. At the time of
resentencing, the court may exercise its discretion under sections 12022.5,
subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h), as to any counts to which that
discretion applies. The court shall reduce [] Williams’s restitution fine and
parole revocation fine under sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 from $1,500 to $900,
and shall modify the abstract of judgment in Williams’s case to reflect this
modification and to indicate that the sentence for human trafficking under
count 3 was stayed under section 654. As so modified, the judgment is
affirmed.” (Ibid.)
DISCUSSION
A.
Both parties contend that, following remand, the trial court’s
resentencing authority was limited to carrying out the instructions in this
court’s disposition. Although we disagree as to the scope of the trial court’s
authority, we agree that a remand for resentencing is nonetheless required
here.
1.
The parties cite the principle that after the appellate court issues “a
remittitur, ‘the trial court is revested with jurisdiction of the case, but only to
carry out the judgment as ordered by the appellate court.’ ” (People v.
Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337, quoting People v. Dutra (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 1359, 1366.) While the trial court must no doubt act in

-- 6 of 18 --

7
accordance with the appellate court’s instructions, in the resentencing
context a special rule applies: “when part of a sentence is stricken on review,
on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances. ’ ” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893;
see also, e.g., People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 (“the full
resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when
resentencing a defendant”].) However, on resentencing, the court may not
increase the defendant’s aggregate prison term after a partially successful
appeal. (People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1253, 1256.)
2.
With respect to counts one (conspiracy to commit kidnapping, human
trafficking, and pandering) and two (kidnapping for extortion), the parties
agree that the trial court issued unauthorized sentences.
At the original sentencing, on count one, the court sentenced Williams
to life with the possibility of parole, staying the sentence pursuant to section
654. On count two, the court sentenced Williams to life with the possibility of
parole with a 10 year firearm enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) (to run concurrently with the original sentence for count four).
This court’s prior opinion affirmed the judgment as to these sentences
but authorized the trial court to consider whether to strike the firearm
enhancement as to count two. (Williams, supra, 2018 Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS
2882; § 12022.5, subd. (c).)
On remand, the trial court declined to strike the enhancement as to
count two but modified both sentences. On count one, the court imposed an
“indeterminate life term [with] seven year[s] mandatory minimum parole”
and stayed it pursuant to section 654. On count two, the court imposed “an

-- 7 of 18 --

8
indeterminate life sentence which in effect means a[n] initial seven-year
minimum parole term” plus a 10 year firearm enhancement.”
It is undisputed, however, that the correct sentence is life with the
possibility of parole for both counts, with the firearm enhancement applicable
to count two. (See §§ 182, subd. (a) [penalty for conspiracy to commit
multiple felonies is the penalty for the felony with the greater maximum
term]; 209, subd. (a) [penalty for kidnapping unaccompanied by death or
bodily harm is life with the possibility of parole].)3 Accordingly, on remand,
the trial court should impose sentences of life with the possibility of parole for
counts one and two, with the firearm enhancement applicable to count two.
3.
With respect to count three (human trafficking), the parties assert that
the trial court erred in increasing Williams’s sentence on remand and
declining to stay it pursuant to section 654. (See §654 [where an act is
“punishable in different ways by different provisions of law, . . . in no case
shall the act . . . be punished under more than one provision”].) The court
originally sentenced him to eight years in prison for the human trafficking
conviction plus three years for the firearm enhancement, staying the
sentence pursuant to section 654. This court’s prior opinion affirmed the
judgment as to this count but authorized the trial court to exercise its
discretion to determine whether to strike the firearm enhancement pursuant
to section 12022.5, subdivision (c). (Williams, supra, 2018
Cal.App.Unpub.LEXIS 2882).) On remand, the trial court declined to strike
3 The penalty for kidnapping is greater than the penalties for the other
crimes Williams was convicted of conspiring to commit. (See 236.1, subd. (b)
[penalty for human trafficking is eight, 14, or 20 years and a fine not to
exceed $500,000]; 266i, subd. (a) [penalty for pandering not involving a minor
is three, four, or six years].)

-- 8 of 18 --

9
the enhancement. However, under the mistaken belief that it had originally
selected a four-year enhancement, the court imposed an enhancement of four
years on remand, resulting in a 12 year total sentence on count three. The
court also failed to stay the sentence pursuant to section 654, as it had done
originally. Under the full resentencing rule, the court had authority to select
a four year enhancement rather than the original three year enhancement.
However, because Williams is entitled to a remand for resentencing on counts
one and two, as discussed above, on remand the trial court may consider
whether it wishes to impose the original three year enhancement or increase
the enhancement term, so long as the aggregate term is not increased. On
remand, the court shall stay the sentence pursuant to section 654.
4.
Finally, the abstract of judgment does not accurately reflect the trial
court’s imposition of $900 in restitution fines under section 1202.4. On
remand, the abstract of judgment and clerk’s minutes must accurately reflect
the sentence orally pronounced by the trial court. (See People v. Zackery
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)
B.
Relying on People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183 (Edwards),
Williams asserts that his categorical ineligibility, as a One Strike offender,
for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 violates equal
protection. Edwards considered an identical equal protection claim and held
that section 3051 irrationally discriminates against One Strike offenders.
Edwards reasoned that One Strike offenders are similarly situated to first
degree murderers, who remain eligible for youth offender parole hearings
even though their crimes are universally regarded as more culpable than the
violent sex crimes that fall under the One Strike law. (Edwards, supra, 34

-- 9 of 18 --

10
Cal.App.5th at pp. 195-199.) We agree with Edwards and conclude that on
remand Williams is entitled to an opportunity to develop the factual record
relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing.
1.
Section 3051 “sets mandatory parole eligibility dates for most persons
convicted of crimes before they turned 25.” (People v. Garcia (2018) 30
Cal.App.5th 316, 325.) Parole eligibility is set at 15 years, 20 years, or 25
years depending on the sentence for the “controlling offense” – the offense or
enhancement for which the sentencing court imposed the longest
imprisonment term. (§ 3051, subds. (a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4); see also § 3046, subd.
(c).) Thus, for example, a young person sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of 25 years to life or greater becomes eligible for release on parole at a youth
offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of incarceration. (§
3051, subd. (b)(3); see, e.g., People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 277
(Franklin) [“notwithstanding [Franklin’s] original term of 50 years to life” for
first degree murder with a firearm enhancement, “he is eligible for a ‘youth
offender parole hearing’ during the 25th year of his sentence.”].)
Youth offender parole hearings differ from traditional parole hearings
because, in determining parole suitability, the Board of Parole Hearings
“shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to
adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” (§
4801, subd. (c); see also Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 269 [“The criteria
for parole suitability set forth in . . . sections 3051 and 4801 contemplate that
the Board’s decisionmaking at [a youth offender’s] parole hearing will be
informed by youth-related factors, such as [the offender’s] cognitive ability,
character, and social and family background at the time of the offense.”].)

-- 10 of 18 --

11
Because Williams was 23 at the time of his offenses, he would be
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing but for the fact that youth
offenders sentenced under the One Strike Law (§ 667.61) are categorically
excluded. (§ 3051, subd. (h).) Section 3051 is also inapplicable to those
sentenced under the Three Strikes Law (§§ 1170.12 and 667, subds. (b)-(i));
those sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a
controlling offense committed after age 18; and those who would otherwise be
eligible but who commit an additional crime before age 26 for which malice
aforethought is an element or for which a sentence of life in prison is
received. (§ 3051, subd. (h).) As a result of these exceptions, Williams –
whose controlling sentence is a 26 years to life term of imprisonment – is
ineligible even though a first degree murderer sentenced to 50 years to life is
entitled to a youth offender parole hearing in his 25th year of incarceration.
(See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.)
2.
To succeed on his equal protection claim, Williams must show “that the
state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated
groups in an unequal manner.” (Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.)
The two groups need not be the same in all respects but must be similarly
situated for the purposes of the challenged law. (Id. at p. 198; see also, e.g.,
Somers v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413 [“ ‘[T]he
classification must be based upon some difference between the classes which
is pertinent to the purpose for which the legislation is designed. ’ ”]
Williams contends that with respect to the purposes of section 3051,
One Strike offenders are similarly situated to first degree murderers. As
Edwards explained, “the purpose of section 3051 is to give youthful offenders
a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release’ after they have served at least

-- 11 of 18 --

12
15, 20, or 25 years in prison (§3051, subd. (e)) and made ‘a showing of
rehabilitation and maturity.’ ” (Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 198,
citing People v. Contreras, (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 381 (Contreras).) In light of
decisions of our Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
recognizing the diminished culpability of juvenile offenders, the legislature’s
“expressly stated rationale was to account for neuroscience research that the
human brain—especially those portions responsible for judgment and
decisionmaking—continues to develop into a person’s mid-20s.” (Edwards,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 198; see also, e.g., Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
p. 367 [holding that sentences of 50 years to life and 58 years to life for
juvenile One Strike offenders violate the Eighth Amendment, because “[a]
lawful sentence must recognize ‘a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for
change and limited moral culpability’ ”], quoting Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48, 74 (Graham); Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at 68 [compared to
adults, “juveniles have a ‘ lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility ’; they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures,’ . . . and their characters are ‘not as well
formed.’ ”].) Edwards concluded that in view of this legislative purpose,
youthful One Strike offenders are similarly situated to youthful first degree
murderers. (Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 198; see also Miller v.
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 473 [explaining that “none” of the rationales
concerning children’s “distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and
environmental vulnerabilities” are “crime-specific”].)
Contrary to Edwards, the People argue that One Strike offenders are
not similarly situated to first degree murderers because One Strike offenses
involve multiple criminal acts. However, by conditioning parole eligibility on
the length of the youthful offender’s “controlling sentence” (§ 3051, subds.

-- 12 of 18 --

13
(a)(2)(B), (b)), section 3051 necessarily assumes that eligible offenders may
have committed more than one offense. As the youthful offender parole
scheme reflects, the fact that a young person may commit more than one
offense at once is irrelevant to the legislative purpose of providing youthful
offenders with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
rehabilitation and maturity. Thus, even assuming the People are correct that
One Strike offenses require the commission of multiple criminal acts, that
would not make One Strike offenders dissimilar from persons who are
eligible for youth offender parole hearings.
Once a similarly situated group has been identified, the next question
is whether there is any rational basis for treating them differently. (See
Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 195-196 [no equal protection violation
“[i]f a plausible basis exists for the disparity”].) On that question, Edwards
found “no rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and a
legitimate governmental purpose.” (Id., at p. 197.) Edwards emphasized
that “United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court precedent
has already determined that [nonhomicide offenders] ‘are categorically less
deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.’ ”
(Ibid.; see also, e.g., Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 382 [“ ‘ there is a
distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and
nonhomicide crimes against individual persons, even including child rape, on
the other. The latter crimes may be devastating in their harm, . . . but “in
terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,”
they cannot be compared to murder in their “severity and irrevocability” ’ ”],
quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) 554 U.S. 407, 438.) As a result,
Edwards concluded that there is no rational basis for offering youth offender
parole hearings to first degree murderers while excluding sex offenders

-- 13 of 18 --

14
sentenced under the One Strike Law. (Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th, at
pp. 196-197; cf. Doe v. Saenz (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 960, 989, 991-992
(Saenz) [statutory classification was irrational where it allowed “persons
guilty of serious crimes such as murder and felonies punishable by death . . .
to apply for an exemption” from disqualification from employment in
community care facilities, “yet a person . . . who suffered a second degree
robbery conviction . . . is ineligible”]; Newland v. Bd. of Governors (1977) 19
Cal.3d 705, 712 [statutory denial of college credential to individuals convicted
of misdemeanors but not felons “can claim no rational relationship” to the
statutory purpose because “[t]he Legislature could not possibly or sensibly
have concluded that misdemeanants, as opposed to felons, constitute a class
of particularly incorrigible offenders who are beyond hope of rehabilitation”];
Stapf v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1966) 367 F.2d 326, 329 [“Denial of [custody]
credit in the context of a jurisprudence where others guilty of crimes of the
same or greater magnitude automatically receive credit, would entail an
arbitrary discrimination”].)
The People argue that the One Strike Law and other enactments reflect
the Legislature’s special concern about recidivism by sex offenders. But the
question is not whether the Legislature had a rational basis for the One
Strike Law – a point that no one disputes. “[I]nstead, the relevant inquiry is
whether a legitimate reason exists that permits the Legislature to” afford
youth offender parole hearings to first degree murderers while excluding One
Strike offenders. (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871,
884 (Johnson).) Edwards thus rejected the hypothesis that the Legislature
excluded One Strike offenders based on a recidivism rationale, explaining
that “of course murderers, too, recidivate, and the state has an interest in
severely punishing the crime of murder.” (Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at

-- 14 of 18 --

15
pp. 198-199.) Moreover, a general concern about recidivism provides no
reason to think that young One Strike offenders are less capable of maturity
and growth than are young murderers. (Cf. Saenz, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at
p. 991 [“the Legislature could not possibly have concluded that persons
convicted of second degree robbery constitute a class of incorrigible offenders
who are less susceptible to rehabilitation and more of a threat . . . than
persons convicted of murder”].)4
The People contend that Edwards misapplied the rational basis test
because it noted that the Attorney General in that case cited no evidence that
violent sex offenders are more likely than other felons to recidivate. (See
Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 199.) However, Edwards correctly
applied the principle that in determining whether a hypothesized basis is
rational, “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored.”
(Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 199, citing Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th
at p. 881; see also, e.g., Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 883-884 [reviewing
empirical studies to determine whether a particular rationale was plausible];
Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 322 [considering whether state’s rationale
“has a sufficient basis in fact”].)
Finally, the conclusion in Edwards draws support from our Supreme
Court’s decision in Contreras. In that case, our Supreme Court considered an
Eighth Amendment challenge brought by two juvenile sex offenders who
received sentences of 50 years to life or greater under the One Strike Law.
(See Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 359-360.) In analyzing the claims of
4 The parole process itself accounts for recidivism concerns: an inmate
found to pose a threat to public safety may not be released on parole. (See,
e.g., §§ 3041, subd. (b)(1); 3043, subd. (d); see also In re Lawrence (2008) 44
Cal.4th 1181, 1205 [“the fundamental consideration in parole decisions is
public safety”].)

-- 15 of 18 --

16
these One Strike offenders, Contreras addressed the risk of recidivism,
emphasizing that although “ ‘ [r]ecidivism is a serious risk to public safety,’ . .
. . ‘ “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.” ’ ” (Id., at p. 366.) Holding
that the challenged One Strike sentences violated the Eighth Amendment,
Contreras relied in part on the notion that a lawful sentence must provide a
young offender with “a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.” (Id. at
p. 367.) Although Contreras declined to resolve an equal protection challenge
to section 3051, its reasoning supports Edwards’s conclusion that the purpose
of section 3051 – to provide young offenders a “ ‘meaningful opportunity to
obtain release’ ” upon “ ‘a showing of rehabilitation and maturity’ ” (Edwards,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 198, citing Contreras, 4 Cal.5th at p. 381) – is no
less applicable to One Strike offenders than to first degree murderers.
We agree with Edwards and hold that section 3051’s categorical
exclusion of youthful One Strike offenders from its youth offender parole
scheme violates equal protection.
DISPOSITION
The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing on counts one,
two, and three. With respect to count one, the court shall impose a sentence
of life with the possibility of parole, staying the sentence pursuant to section
654. With respect to count two, the court shall impose a sentence of life with
the possibility of parole, with a firearm enhancement of 10 years. With
respect to count three, the court may select the firearm enhancement term it
deems appropriate, staying the sentence pursuant to section 654. On
remand, the court shall also modify the abstract of judgment to reflect the
corrected sentences, and to reflect the court’s imposition of $900 in
restitutions fines under section 1202.4. Finally, on remand, the court shall
determine whether Williams was afforded an adequate opportunity to make a

-- 16 of 18 --

17
record of information relevant to a youthful offender parole hearing to be held
during his 25th year of incarceration. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp.
286-287.) To the extent he was not, the court shall permit Williams to make
such a record. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

-- 17 of 18 --

18
____________________________
BURNS, J.
We concur:
____________________________
JONES, P.J.
____________________________
SIMONS, J.
A157031

-- 18 of 18 --