Apple Valley Unified School District (PERB A209E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
APPLE 	VALLEY 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Employer,
and
CALIFORNIA 	SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION 	CHAPTER 	#653,
Exclusive Representative,
and
APPLE 	VALLEY 	CLASSIFIED 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, 	CTA/NEA,
Employee Organization.
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) 	Case No. LA-D-245
Administrative 	Appeal
PERB Order No. Ad-209
June 	14, 1990
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Appearance: 	California 	Teachers 	Association 	by 	Charles 	R.
Gustafson, 	Attorney, for Apple 	Valley 	Classified 	Employees
Association, 	CTA/NEA.
Before 	Craib, 	Shank and Cunningham, 	Members.
DECISION
CRAIB, Member: 	This case is before 	the Public Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB or 	Board) on appeal 	by 	the Apple 	Valley
Classified 	Employees 	Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(AVCEA) of 	a Board
agent' s administrative 	determination 	in which 	it was 	found 	that
the decertification 	petition 	filed by AVCEA 	on July 	7, 19891 was
untimely. 	Specifically, 	it was 	found 	that the petition was
barred 	by 	a 3-month 	contract 	extension 	entered 	into by 	the Apple
Valley 	Unified 	School District 	(District) 	and 	the 	incumbent
1All dates refer to 	1989, unless 	otherwise 	specified.

exclusive
	representative,
	the
	California
	School
	Employees
Association
	Chapter
	#653
	(CSEA).
FACTUAL
	SUMMARY
The
	District
	and
	CSEA
	were
	parties
	to
	a
	contract
	which
expired
	on
	June
	30.
2
Prior 	to
	the
	expiration
	of
	the
	contract,
the
	parties
	engaged
	in
	reopener
	negotiations.
	Reopener
	proposals
were
	sunshined
	in
	March
	and
	May,
	and
	negotiations
	were
	conducted
on
	May
	11,
	May
	15, 	and
	June
	21.
	By
	that
	time,
	the
	reopener
negotiations
	had
	run
	into
	the 	period
	in
	which
	the
	parties
expected
	to
	conduct
	negotiations 	for
	a
	successor
	agreement.
	On
June
	28,
	the
	negotiators
	initialled
	a
	contract
	extension
provision,
	which
	read
	as
	follows:
CSEA/APPLE
	VALLEY
	UNIFIED
	SCHOOL
	DISTRICT
NEGOTIATIONS 	- 	JUNE
	28,
	1989
Management
	and
	CSEA
	agree
	to
	extend
	the
present
	terms
	of 	the
	existing 	contract 	for
	a
period 	not
	to
	exceed 	September 	28,
	1989
	while
present 	negotiations 	are 	continuing
	for
	a 	new
contract.
Negotiations 	continued
	on
	August
	14
	and 	16,
	and,
	on
	August 	18,
the
	parties
	reached 	agreement 	on
	a
	successor
	contract.
	The
	new
contract
	was
	ratified
	by
	CSEA
	on
	September 	19, 	and
	approved 	by
2
The
	contract 	contained 	an 	automatic 	renewal
	provision,
which
	stated 	that 	the 	contract
	would
	continue
	in 	effect 	year 	to
year 	unless
	one
	of 	the
	parties 	notified 	the 	other, 	in writing,
	no
later
	than April
	1
	of 	the 	year 	the 	contract
	was
	to 	expire, 	of
	its
desire 	to
	modify,
	amend,
	or 	terminate 	the 	agreement. 	While
	there
is
	no
	indication 	in 	the 	record 	that 	either 	party 	provided 	such
written 	notice,
	it
	is 	clear
	from
	the 	facts 	presented 	that 	the
District
	and
	CSEA,	
by 	negotiating
	a
	successor 	agreement,
	treated
the 	contract 	as
	if 	it
	had 	expired
	on 	June 	30.
2

the 	District 	Board 	of 	Education 	on 	September 	20. 	As 	noted 	above,
AVCEA's 	decertification 	petition was 	filed 	on 	July 	7.
THE 	ADMINISTRATIVE 	DETERMINATION
Before 	the 	Board 	agent, 	AVCEA 	asserted 	many 	different
reasons 	why 	the 	contract 	extension 	should 	not 	bar 	its 	petition.
First, 	AVCEA 	argued 	that 	the 	extension was 	not 	a 	bar 	because 	it
was 	not 	ratified 	by 	CSEA, 	whose 	bylaws 	require 	ratification. 	The
Board 	agent 	rejected 	this 	argument, 	noting 	the 	Board 	has 	held
that, 	for 	the 	purposes 	of 	contract 	bar 	rules, 	ratification 	is
necessary 	only 	if 	the 	parties 	agree, 	either 	in 	ground 	rules 	or 	in
the 	agreement 	itself, 	that 	the 	agreement 	is 	not 	effective 	until
ratified. 	(State 	of 	California 	(SETC) 	(1983) 	PERB 	Decision 	No.
348-S.) 	Here, 	there 	were 	no 	ground 	rules 	or 	contract 	provisions
requiring 	ratification. 3
In 	related 	arguments, 	AVCEA 	questioned 	the 	authority 	of 	the
District's 	negotiator 	to 	enter 	into 	such 	a 	contract 	extension,
and 	argued 	that 	the 	contract 	extension was 	just 	a 	tentative
agreement 	because 	it 	was 	initialled 	rather 	than 	signed. 	The
Board 	agent 	dismissed 	these 	arguments 	because, 	in 	his 	view, 	PERB
had 	rejected 	similar 	arguments 	in San 	Francisco 	Unified 	School
3AVCEA 	also 	asserted 	that 	the 	expired 	contract 	required 	a
successor 	agreement 	to 	be 	ratified. 	Though 	Article 	XVII 	of 	the
contract 	sets 	out 	the 	term 	of 	the 	agreement, 	the 	signature 	page
also 	has 	"term" 	language 	which 	states, 	in 	pertinent 	part: 	"This
agreement 	shall 	remain 	in 	force 	and 	effect 	from 	July 	1, 	1988
through 	June 	30, 	1989, 	or 	ratification 	of 	the 	next 	successor
contract." 	The 	Board 	agent 	concluded 	that, 	even 	if 	this 	language
can 	be 	interpreted 	as 	requiring 	ratification 	of 	a 	successor
agreement, 	the 	3-month 	contract 	extension was 	not 	a 	true
successor 	agreement.
3

District
	(1984)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	476.
	In
	San
	Francisco,
	the
Board 	found
	that
	a
	contract
	extension
	signed
	by
	the
	chief
negotiators
	acted
	as
	a
	bar
	to
	a
	decertification 	petition,
	even
though
	the 	extension
	had
	not
	been
	formally 	"accepted"
	by
	the
district.
	The
	Board
	stated 	that
	good
	faith
	bargaining
	requires
negotiators 	to
	be
	invested
	with
	sufficient
	authority 	to
	fully
engage
	in
	negotiations
	on
	their
	principals'
	behalf
	and
	found
	no
indication 	that
	the
	district's
	negotiator
	did 	not
	have
	such
authority.
	(
Id
.
	at
	pp
. 	5 - 6 . )
Next,
	AVCEA
	argued
	that
	CSEA
	and
	the
	District
	were
	not
legally
	engaged
	in 	negotiations
	because,
	at
	the
	time
	of
	the
extension,
	they
	had
	not
	yet
	sunshined
	proposals 	for
	a
	successor
agreement.
	The
	Board
	agent
	found
	that
	it
	was
	unnecessary
	to
determine
	if
	sunshining
	was
	required
	because
	a
	failure 	to
sunshine
	does
	not 	render
	an 	agreement
	invalid.
	(Los
	Angeles
	CCD
(Kimmett) 	(1981)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	158.)
Lastly, 	the
	Board
	agent
	rejected
	AVCEA's
	assertion
	that
	an
evidentiary
	hearing
	was
	necessary 	pursuant
	to
	the
	rule 	set
	out 	in
Alum 	Rock 	Union
	Elementary 	School
	District
	(1986)
	PERB
	Order
No.
	Ad-158
	(Alum
	Rock), 	because
	he 	found
	that 	there
	were 	no
material 	facts 	in 	dispute. 	In
	Alum
	Rock,
	the
	Board
	held
	that
	a
short-term 	contract 	extension
	which
	is
	too 	short 	to 	create
	a
window
	period 	will
	be
	a
	valid 	bar 	to
	a
	decertification 	petition,
so 	long 	as 	the 	parties 	are 	actively
	engaged
	in 	good-faith
negotiations,
	and
	absent 	other 	evidence 	of
	a
	bad-faith 	attempt 	to
manipulate 	the
	window
	period. 
4

The 	Board 	agent 	found 	that AVCEA 	failed 	to 	allege 	sufficient
facts 	to 	reflect 	that 	the 	contract 	extension was 	entered 	into 	in
bad 	faith, 	i.e., 	in 	an 	effort 	to 	circumvent 	the 	decertification
petition 	that 	was 	filed 	shortly 	thereafter. 	The 	Board 	agent 	was
not 	convinced 	that 	the 	bad 	faith 	exception 	described 	in Alum 	Rock
applied 	here. 	AVCEA 	pointed 	to 	several 	factors 	that 	purportedly
showed 	bad 	faith: 	(1) 	the 	lack 	of 	formality 	surrounding 	the
extension, 	as 	evidenced 	by 	the 	lack 	of 	ratification 	and 	written
signatures, 	the 	failure 	to 	sunshine, 	and 	the 	overall 	style 	and
format 	of 	the 	extension; 	(2) 	CSEA 	leaders 	and 	District
administrators, 	when 	talking 	with AVCEA 	members 	shortly 	after 	the
petition was 	filed, 	spoke 	of 	going 	ahead 	with 	an 	election, 	and
only 	later 	did 	they 	assert 	that 	there 	was 	a 	contract 	extension
that 	barred 	the 	petition; 	and 	(3) 	a 	CSEA 	interoffice 	memorandum
sent 	to 	all 	locals 	warned 	of 	possible 	raids 	by 	another
organization 	and 	suggested 	that 	chapters 	with 	contracts 	about 	to
expire 	enter 	into 	"Alum 	Rock" 	agreements.
In 	finding 	AVCEA's 	allegations 	of 	bad 	faith 	to 	be
insufficient, 	the 	Board 	agent 	focussed 	on what 	he 	saw as 	the
similarities 	between 	the 	present 	case 	and Alum 	Rock. 	Of 	primary
importance 	was 	the 	Board 	agent's 	observation 	that, 	as 	in Alum
Rock, 	the 	parties 	extended 	the 	existing 	contract 	because 	they
felt 	they 	would 	not 	complete 	negotiations 	before 	it 	expired, 	and
a 	retroactive 	successor 	agreement was 	reached within 	the 	period
of 	the 	extension. 	Thus, 	he 	concluded 	that 	the 	extension 	in 	this
case 	contributed 	to 	stability 	in 	labor 	relations, 	and 	thereby
5

served 	the
	interest
	the
	Board
	sought
	to
	protect 	in
	its
	Alum
	Rock
decision.
	The
	Board
	agent
	found
	no
	indication
	of
	bad
	faith
	in
CSEA's
	internal
	memorandum
	because,
	in 	his
	view,
	an
	"Alum
	Rock"
agreement
	is,
	by
	definition,
	entered
	into 	in
	good
	faith.
	He
	also
noted
	that
	the 	contract
	extension 	did
	not
	result
	in
	the
manipulation 	of
	any
	existing
	window
	period.
4
DISCUSSION
In
	its
	appeal,
	AVCEA
	insists 	that
	an
	evidentiary 	hearing
	is
required
	because
	there 	are 	material 	facts 	in
	dispute
	concerning
the 	existence 	of 	the
	contract,
	ratification
	requirements,
	and
	the
bad
	faith
	of
	the
	District
	and
	CSEA.
In
	view
	of 	the
	Board's 	holdings
	in 	State
	of
	California
(SETC),
	supra,
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	348-S 	and
	San
	Francisco 	Unified
School
	District,
	supra,
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	476,
	the
	Board
	agent
correctly 	rejected
	the
	arguments
	that 	ratification
	was
	required
or
	that
	the
	District's
	negotiator
	lacked
	authority 	to 	enter 	into
the 	contract
	extension.
	AVCEA
	has
	failed 	to 	allege
	sufficient
facts
	to 	support 	these
	arguments.
	More
	interesting 	is
	AVCEA's
assertion 	that
	the 	extension
was
	not
	effective
	as
	a
	bar 	because
it
	was
	initialled
	instead 	of 	"signed.''
	This
	raises 	the 	question
of 	what
	is
	meant 	by
	the 	Board's 	requirement
	that 	to 	constitute
	a
4
The
	contract 	extension, 	in 	the
	literal
	sense,
	was
	of
	an
indefinite 	duration 	because
	it
	was
	"for
	a
	period 	not 	to
	exceed
September 	28,
	1989 	. 	"
	However,
	unlike 	the 	open-ended
extensions 	the
	Board 	has
	previously
	found 	not 	to 	bar
	petitions,
this
	one
	is 	indefinite
	only 	within 	fixed 	limits.
	(See
	State 	of
California.
	Department 	of 	Personnel 	Administration
	(1989)
	PERB
Order
	No.
	Ad-191-S.) 	Noting
	this 	distinction, 	the
	Board
	agent
concluded 	that 	the 	indefinite 	duration 	rule 	did 	not 	apply.
	We
need 	not 	address 	this 	issue 	here.
6

bar, 	a 	contract 	must 	be 	in writing, 	signed, 	and 	contain
substantial 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	employment. 	(State 	of
California, 	Department 	of 	Personnel 	Administration, 	supra, 	PERB
Order 	No. 	Ad-191-S, 	at 	p. 	7.)
While 	no 	Board 	decision 	has 	addressed 	this 	precise 	issue,
the 	National 	Labor 	Relations 	Board 	(NLRB) 	has 	done 	so 	on 	at 	least
one 	occasion. 	In 	Gaylord 	Broadcasting 	Co. 	(1980) 	250 	NLRB 	198,
199 	[104 	LRRM 	1360), 	the 	NLRB 	held 	that 	initials 	constitute 	a
sufficient 	signature 	for 	contract 	bar 	purposes. 	The 	NLRB
concluded 	that 	signing 	an 	agreement 	with 	initials 	was 	no 	less
certain 	an 	event 	than 	signing with 	a 	full 	signature. 	Further,
there 	was 	no 	indication 	that 	the 	contract was 	not 	intended 	to 	be
final 	and 	binding, 	even 	though 	formal 	execution 	was 	scheduled 	for
some 	time 	later. 	While 	the 	Board 	has 	not 	adopted 	all 	of 	the
NLRB's 	contract 	bar 	rules, 	it 	has 	followed 	most 	of 	them. 	(See
State 	of 	California, 	Department 	of 	Personnel 	Administration,
supra, 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	Ad-191-S, 	at 	p. 	7, 	fn. 	4.) 	Here, 	we
find 	the 	NLRB 1 s 	supporting 	rationale 	to 	be 	persuasive 	and 	hold
that 	initials 	are 	sufficient 	to 	fulfill 	the 	requirement 	that 	a
contract 	be 	"signed" 	in 	order 	to 	act 	as 	a 	bar.
As 	noted 	above, 	in Alum 	Rock, 	the 	Board 	held 	that 	contracts
too 	short 	to 	create 	their 	own window periods 	can 	nonetheless 	bar
a 	decertification 	petition, 	if 	the 	contract 	is 	not 	entered 	into
in 	an 	effort 	to 	circumvent 	the 	petition. 	For 	the 	reasons 	that
follow, 	we 	overrule 	Alum 	Rock 	and 	hold 	that 	the 	short-term
7

contract
	extension
	involved 	here
	did
	not
	act
	as
	a
	bar
	to
	the
filing
	of
	AVCEA's
	decertification 	petition.
The
	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(EERA) 5
contains
	a
statutory
	contract
	bar
	rule, 	at
	section
	3544.7,
	subdivision
(b)(l):
(b)
	No
	election 	shall
	be
	held
	and
	the
petition 	shall
	be
	dismissed
	whenever:
(1)
	There
	is
	currently 	in 	effect
	a
	lawful
written
	agreement
	negotiated
	by
	the 	public
school
	employer
	and
	another
	employee
organization
	covering
	any 	employees
	included
in
	the
	unit
	described
	in
	the 	request 	for
recognition, 	or 	unless 	the 	request 	for
recognition
	is 	filed
	less
	than
	120
	days,
	but
more
	than
	90
	days,
	prior
	to 	the
	expirationdate
	of 	the
	agreement;
In
	Alum
	Rock,
	the 	majority 	held
	that
	the
	above
	provision
	does
	not
mandate
	that
	to
	bar
	a
	petition,
	a
	contract
	must 	be
	of
	sufficient
length 	to 	create
	a
	window
	period.
	The
	Board
	instead
	held
	that
the 	provision
	could
	be
	read
	in
	the
	disjunctive
	sense,
	so
	only
contracts
	of
	120
	days
	or
	more
	are 	subject 	to 	the 	provision 	of
	a
window
	period.
	The
	Board 	went 	on
	to
	adopt 	the
	ad 	hoc
	rule
	noted
earlier,
	that
	contracts 	of
	less
	than
	120
	days 	can
	bar
	a
	petition
if
	the 	parties
	are 	actively
	engaged
	in 	good-faith 	negotiations,
and
	absent 	evidence 	of
	a
	bad-faith
	attempt 	to
	manipulate
	the
window
	period.
	(Alum 	Rock 	Union
	Elementary 	School
	District,
supra,
	PERB
	Order
	No.
	Ad-158,
	at
	p. 	8.)
	This 	approach
	differs
from
	that
	adopted
	by
	the
	NLRB,
	whose
	rule
	has
	no
	statutory
5EERA
	is 	codified 	at
	Government 	Code
	section
	3540
	et 	seq.
Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory 	references 	herein 	are
to 	the
	Government 	Code.
8

underpinning. 	(See 	Crompton 	Company. 	Inc. 	(1982) 	260 	NLRB 	417
[109 	LRRM 	1161] .) 	The 	Board 	declined 	to 	follow 	the 	NLRB 	rule,
asserting 	that 	its 	experience 	in 	the 	public 	sector 	led 	it 	to
believe 	short 	contract 	extensions 	add 	significantly 	to 	labor
relations 	stability, 	while 	detracting 	little 	from 	employee 	free
C h Ol.Ce.
. 	6 (Alum 	Rock 	Union 	Elementary 	School 	District, 	supra,
PERB 	Order 	No. 	Ad-158, 	at 	p. 	9, 	fn. 	6.)
The 	National 	Labor 	Relations 	Act 	contains 	no 	express
legislative 	prescriptions 	concerning 	contract 	bar 	rules.
Therefore, 	the 	NLRB 	may 	properly 	develop 	contract 	bar 	rules 	as 	a
matter 	of 	administrative 	discretion. 	In 	contrast, 	EERA 	section
3544.7, 	subdivision 	(b)(l) 	contains 	an 	express 	contract 	bar 	rule.
Therefore, 	this 	Board 	does 	not 	have 	the 	same 	discretion 	afforded
the 	NLRB, 	but 	instead 	must 	follow 	the 	prescription 	of 	section
3544.7. 	After 	carefully 	examining 	the 	language 	of 	section
3544.7, 	we 	conclude 	it 	requires 	that, 	in 	order 	to 	act 	as 	a 	bar 	to
representation petition, 	a 	contract 	must 	be 	of 	sufficient
duration 	to 	create 	a 	window 	period.
The 	phrase 	"of 	the 	agreement," 	appearing 	in 	the 	provision's
dependent 	clause, 	"or 	unless 	the 	request 	for 	recognition 	is 	filed
less 	than 	120 	days, 	but 	more 	than 	90 	days, 	prior 	to 	the
expiration 	date 	of 	the 	agreement," 	is 	an 	explicit 	reference 	to
6Given 	our 	construction 	of 	section 	3544.7 	(see 	discussion
infra), 	it 	is 	unnecessary 	to 	attempt, 	as 	the 	Board 	did 	in 	Alum
Rock, 	to 	balance 	the 	competing 	interests 	of 	labor 	relations
stability 	and 	employee 	free 	choice. 	We 	find 	that 	the
Legislature, 	by 	enacting 	the 	language 	of 	section 	3544.7, 	has
already 	struck 	that 	balance.
9

the
	''agreement"
	in
	the 	preceding
	main
	clause.
7
Thus,
	the
qualifying
	phrase,
	when
	properly
	read
	as
	a
	limitation
	upon
	the
main
	clause,
	assumes
	the
	contract
	that
	acts
	as
	a
	bar
	is
	of
	at
least
	120-days
	duration.
As
	we
	find
	no
	ambiguity
	that
	would
	allow
	a
	different
interpretation
	of
	section
	3544.7,
	we
	conclude
	that
	the
Legislature
	has
	provided
	that
	a
	contract
	must
	be
	long
	enough
	to
create
	a
	window
	period
	if
	it
	is
	to 	act
	as
	a
	bar.
	It
	is,
	of
course,
	not
	within 	the 	Board's
	authority 	to
	adopt
	contract 	bar
rules
	which
	are
	inconsistent
	with
	the
	express
	language
	of
	the
statute.
	(Cadiz 	v.
	Agricultural
	Labor
	Relations
	Board 	(1979)
	92
Cal.App.3d
	365, 	371-372;
	Service
	Employees
	International
	Union 	v.
City 	of
	Santa 	Barbara
	(1981)
	125
	Cal.App.3d
	459,
	467-468.)
The
	"bright 	line"
	rule,
	which
	we
	have 	found
	to
	be 	mandated
by
	the
	statute,
	not 	only
	embodies
	the
	Legislature's
	balancing 	of
the
	competing
	interests
	of 	labor
	relations
	stability
	and 	employee
free
	choice
	in 	the
	selection
	of
	an
	exclusive
	representative,
	but
also
	has 	important
	practical 	benefits.
	In
	contrast 	to 	the
	ad
	hoc
rule
	adopted
	in
	Alum
	Rock,
	which
	requires
	an
	examination
	of 	the
subjective 	intent
	of 	the
	employer 	and
	the
	incumbent
	exclusive
representative,
	a
	clear
	and
	simple
	rule 	that
	a
	contract 	extension
must 	be 	of
	at 	least
	120
	days
	in 	length 	in 	order 	to 	act
	as
	a
	bar
will
	minimize
	the 	potential 	for 	disputes.
7
It 	is
	a
	well-established 	rule 	of 	statutory 	construction
that 	qualifying 	phrases 	must 	be
	applied 	to 	the
	words 	immediately
preceding
	them. 	(Addison 	v. 	Department 	of
	Motor
	Vehicles 	(1977)
69
	Cal.App.3d 	486, 	496;
	Olivia
	v. 	Swoap 	(1976) 	59
	Cal.App.3d 	130,
138; 	People 	v. 	Baker 	(1968) 	69
	Cal.2d 	44, 	46.)
10

While 	''bright 	line" 	rules 	are 	always 	helpful 	in providing
guidance 	to 	the 	parties 	and 	minimizing 	disputes, 	they 	are
particularly 	useful 	in 	representation 	matters. 	Representation
matters 	involving 	competing 	unions 	are 	usually 	hotly 	contested.
Any 	ambiguity 	or 	uncertainty 	in 	the 	applicable 	rules 	will
inevitably 	become 	the 	subject 	of 	dispute 	and, 	consequently, 	cause
the 	delay 	inherent 	in 	the 	conduct 	of 	evidentiary 	hearings 	and
subsequent 	appeals 	to 	the 	Board. 	Such 	delay 	can 	seriously
interfere 	with 	employees' 	fundamental 	statutory 	right 	to 	freely
choose 	an 	exclusive 	representative 	and 	severely 	disrupt 	labor
relations 	in 	general.
CONCLUSION
Having 	found 	that 	contracts 	of 	a 	duration 	of 	less 	than 	120
days 	do 	not 	act 	as 	a 	bar 	to 	representation 	petitions, 	the
contract 	extension 	at 	issue 	herein, 	which, 	by 	its 	terms, 	was
effective 	from 	June 	28 	to 	no 	later 	than 	September 	28, 	did 	not 	bar
AVCEA's 	decertification 	petition 	filed 	on 	July 	7. 	Consequently,
the 	petition was 	timely 	filed.
ORDER
The 	decertification 	petition 	filed 	on 	July 	7, 	1989 	by 	AVCEA
was 	timely 	filed. 	Case 	No. 	LA-D-245 	is 	hereby 	REMANDED 	to 	the
Los 	Angeles 	Regional 	Director 	for 	further 	proceedings 	consistent
with 	this 	decision.
Members 	Shank and 	Cunningham 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
1 1