Los Angeles Unified School District/Lynwood Unified School District (PERB A132E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
Classified
	Union
	of 	Supervisory
Employees,
	Local
	347,
	SEIU,
	AFL-CIO,
Employee
	Organization,
and
Los
	Angeles
	Unified
	School
	District,
Employer.
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_____________________
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Case
	No. 	LA-R-835
PERB
	Order 	No.
	Ad-132
Administrative
	Appeal
August 	27,
	1982
Classified
	Union
	of
	Supervisory
Employees, 	Local
	347,
	SEIU,
	AFL-CIO,
Employee
	Organization,
and
Lynwood
	Unified
	School
	District,
Employer.
)
.)
)
)
)
. )
)
)
)
)
______________________ )
Case
	No. 	LA-R-858
Appearances:	
Joel	
N.	
Grossman,
	Attorney
	(O'Melveny	
&	
Myers)
for
	Los
	Angeles
	Unified
	School
	District;
	William
	E. 	Brown,
Attorney
	(Brown 	&
Conradi)
	for
	Lynwood
	Unified 	School
	District;
Bert
	Glennon,
	Jr.,
	Attorney
	(Ochoa,
	Barbosa
	&
Glennon)
	for
Classified
	Union
	of 	Supervisory
	Employees, 	Local 	347, 	SEIU,AFL-CIO.
Before
	Jensen,
	Tovar 	and
	Jaeger,
	Members.
DECISION
These
	consolidated 	cases 	are 	before 	the
	Public
	Employment
Relations
	Board
	(hereafter
	PERE
	or
	Board) 	on
	interlocutory
appeal 	of
	a
	board
	agent's 	denial 	of
	a
	motion 	to 	dismiss
	a
representation 	petition.
	That 	denial
	was
	jointly 	certified
	to
PERB 	by
	the
	Los 	Angeles 	Unified 	School
	District,
	the
	Lynwood

Unified
	School
	District
	(hereafter 	referred
	to
	respectively
	as
LAUSD
	and
	Lynwood
	USD
	and
	jointly
	as
	Districts),
	and
	the 	board
agent,
	pursuant 	to
	PERB
	rule
	32200.1
On
	November
	11,
	1978,
	Classified
	Union
	of 	Supervisory
Employees, 	Local
	347,
	SEIU,
	AFL-CIO
	(hereafter
	the
	Local)
requested 	recognition
	as
	the
	exclusive
	representative
	of
	the
supervisory
	classified
	employees
	of 	the
	LAUSD.2	
During
	that
lpERB
	rules
	are 	codified
	at 	California
	Administrative
Code,
	title
	8,
	section
	31000
	et
	seq.
	PERB
	rule
	32200
	provides:
A
party
	may
	object
	to 	the
	ruling
	on
	a
	motion
by
	the
	Board
	agent
	and
	request
	a
	ruling
	by
the
	Board
	itself.
	The
	request
	shall
	be
	made
in
	writing 	to 	the
	Board
	agent
	and
	a
	copy
shall
	be
	sent
	to 	the
	Board
	itself.
	The
Board
	agent
	may
	refuse
	the
	request 	or
	join
in 	the
	request
	and
	thereby
	certify
	the
matter 	to
	the
	Board
	itself.
	The
	Board
	agent
may
	join
	in 	the 	request
	only
	where
	all
	of
the 	following 	apply:
(a)
	The
	issue
	involved
	is
	one
	of
	law;
(b) 	The
	issue
	involved
	is 	controlling
	in
the 	case;
	and
(c)
	An
	immediate
	appeal
	will 	materially
advance 	the
	resolution
	of 	the
	case.
2The
	Local
	was
	known
	as
	Classified
	Union
	of 	Supervisory
Employees, 	Local 	699,
	Service
	Employees
	International
	Union,
AFL-CIO,
	(hereafter
	Local
	699)
	at
	the 	time
	of 	the
	initial
request 	for 	recognition.
	Although, 	as 	discussed
	more
	fully
infra,
	the 	Local 	does 	contend
	that
	changed
	circumstances
	have
altered
	the
	relationship
	between
	it
	~nd
	certain
	of
	its
affiliates, 	it
	does 	not 	contend
	at 	this 	stage 	of 	the
proceedings 	that
	it
	became
	a
	substantially 	different 	entity
pursuant 	to 	the
	name
	change.
2

same 	general 	period 	of 	time, 	it 	requested 	recognition 	from
Lynwood 	USD 	in 	a 	similar 	unit. 	On 	February 	14, 	1979, 	LAUSD
indicated 	to 	PERB 	that 	it 	doubted 	the 	appropriateness 	of 	the
request 	on 	the 	basis 	that 	representation 	of 	supervisory
employees 	by 	the 	Local 	would 	be 	prohibited 	under 	subsection
3545 (b) (2) 	of 	the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations 	Act
(hereafter 	EERA or 	Act) 	because 	the 	Local 	was 	the 	same 	employee
organization 	as 	SEIU, 	Local 	99 	(hereafter 	Local 	99), 	the
representative 	of 	certain 	units 	of 	rank 	and 	file 	classified
employees 	of 	the 	Districts, 	and 	was 	thus 	seeking 	to 	represent
both 	their 	supervisory 	and 	non-supervisory 	employees.3 	On
March 	6, 	1979, 	Regional 	Director 	Frances 	A. 	Kreiling 	ordered
that 	investigation 	and 	processing 	of 	the 	petitions 	in 	the
instant 	cases 	be 	held 	in 	abeyance 	pending 	resolution 	of 	the
identical 	issue 	in 	case 	number 	LA-R-809, 	which 	was 	resolved 	in
Los 	Angeles 	Community 	College 	District 	(3/25/80) 	PERB 	Decision
3EERA 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	sections 	3540 	et
seq. 	All 	statutory 	references 	are 	to 	the 	Government 	Code,
unless 	otherwise 	specified. 	Subsection 	3545(b) (2) 	states:
(b) 	In 	all 	cases:
(2) 	A negotiating 	unit 	of 	supervisory
employees 	shall 	not 	be 	appropriate
unless 	it 	includes 	all 	supervisory
employees 	employed 	by 	the 	district 	and
shall 	not 	be 	represented 	by 	the 	same
employee 	organization 	as 	employees 	whom
the 	supervisory 	employees 	supervise.
3

No. 	123 	and 	(12/16/81) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	123a 	(hereafter
LACCD). 	On 	March 	25, 	1980, 	PERB 	issued 	its 	decisions 	in
Fairfield-Suisun 	Unified 	School 	District 	(3/25/80) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	121, 	Sacramento 	City 	Unified 	School 	District
(3/25/80) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	122, 	and 	LACCD, 	supra. 	In
Fairfield-Suisun, 	PERB 	held 	that 	two 	locals 	of 	California 	School
Employees 	Association 	(hereafter 	CSEA) 	did 	constitute 	the 	same
employee 	organization 	within 	the 	meaning 	of 	subsection
3545(b) (2) 	because 	statewide 	CSEA 	was 	signatory 	as 	a 	party 	to
both 	the 	recognition 	agreements. and 	contract 	signed 	by 	the
District 	with 	the 	non-supervisory 	group 	and 	the 	request 	for
recognition 	filed 	by 	the 	supervisory 	group. 	Further, 	PERB
relied 	upon 	the 	close 	relationship 	and 	many 	connections 	between
the 	two 	chapters 	and 	statewide 	CSEA. 	In 	Sacramento 	City,
supra, 	the 	Board-articulated 	the 	rule 	in 	more 	detail, 	stating
that 	the 	Board 	would 	consider 	labor 	organizations 	separate 	if
they 	are 	shown 	factually 	to 	be 	autonomous 	entities 	that 	act
independently 	from 	one 	another 	and 	from 	their 	common 	parent.
Contrarily, 	the 	Board 	would 	hold 	them 	to 	be 	the 	same
organization 	if 	either 	dictates 	the 	other's 	course 	of 	action,
or 	if 	the 	parent 	with 	which 	they 	share 	a 	common 	affiliation
dictates 	the 	actions 	of 	both. 	The 	lead 	and 	concurring 	opinions
stressed 	that 	mere 	direct 	or 	indirect 	affiliation 	would 	not 	be
sufficient 	to 	render 	different 	locals 	the 	same 	employee
organiztion. 	In 	LACCD, 	supra, 	the 	Board 	applied 	this 	rule 	to
the 	entities 	involved 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	and 	held 	them 	not 	to
4

be 	the 	same 	employee 	organization. 	The 	District 	in 	that 	case
requested 	judicial 	review. 	On 	June 	16, 	1981, 	the 	Court 	of
Appeal, 	Second 	District, 	Division 	2, 	issued 	its 	opinion 	in 	Los
Angeles 	Community 	College 	District 	v. 	PERB 	(1981)
_Cal.App._ 	(no 	official 	cite) 	[175 	Cal.Rptr. 	223]
(hereafter 	LACCD 	v. 	PERB) 	finding 	that 	because 	the 	Local 	and
Local 	99 	were 	affiliates 	of 	Service 	Employees 	International
Union 	(the 	International), 	they 	were 	the 	same 	organization 	for
purposes 	of 	subsection 	3545(b) (2) 	and 	thus 	were 	precluded 	from
representing 	supervisory 	and 	non-supervisory 	employees. 	The
Court 	relied 	upon 	its 	construction 	of 	the 	subsection, 	to 	wit,
that 	the 	Legislature 	intended 	to 	prevent 	representation 	of
supervisory 	employees 	by 	an 	employee 	organization 	which 	was
affiliated 	directly 	or 	indirectly 	with 	an 	employee 	organization
that 	represents 	non-supervisory 	employees. 	The 	Court 	further
noted, 	in 	dicta, 	that 	PERB's 	decision 	was 	not 	fairly 	supported
by 	the 	evidence, 	and 	that 	there 	was 	substantial 	identity 	of
interest 	and 	function 	between 	the 	locals 	and 	substantial
control 	of 	them 	by 	the 	International, 	but 	that 	it 	did 	not 	rely
on 	that 	factual 	determination 	for 	its 	result. 	PERB 	requested 	a
hearing 	on 	that 	decision 	from 	the 	Supreme 	Court, 	which 	denied
hearing 	on 	September 	20, 	1981, 	but 	ordered 	that 	the 	Court 	of
Appeals 	decision 	be 	unpublished.
On 	October 	8, 	1981, 	the 	Local 	requested 	PERB 	to 	resume
processing 	the 	instant 	petition, 	and 	on 	October 	30, 	1981 	filed
5

a 	brief 	in 	support 	of 	that 	request. 	On 	November 	12, 	1981,
LAUSD 	responded, 	urging 	PERB 	not 	to 	proceed. 	Pursuant 	to 	the
Court 	of 	Appeals 	remand, 	PERB 	issued 	LACCD, 	Decision 	No. 	123a,
on 	December 	16, 	1981. 	That 	decision 	provided 	that, 	on 	the
facts 	of 	that 	case, 	and 	as 	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	original 	decision
(3/25/80), 	the 	Local 	and 	Local 	99 	were 	the 	same 	employee
organization.
On March 	17, 	1982, 	LAUSD 	filed 	a 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	the
representation 	petition 	filed 	by 	the 	Local, 	arguing 	that 	under
the 	doctrines 	of 	res 	judicata 	and 	collateral 	estoppel 	the 	LACCD
v. 	PERB 	decision 	was 	conclusive 	as 	to 	the 	"sameness" 	of 	the
Local 	and 	Local 	99. 	The 	Local 	subsequently 	filed 	a 	responsive
brief, 	followed 	by 	the 	District's 	response 	and 	the 	Local's
further 	response. 	On 	April 	22, 	1982, 	Regional 	Representative
Robert 	Bergeson 	issued 	his 	ruling 	denying 	the 	District's
motion, 	and 	ordering 	that 	the 	hearing 	proceed. 	The 	Districts
appealed, 	and 	the 	regional 	representative 	certified 	their
appeal 	of 	his 	ruling 	to 	the 	Board 	on 	April 	29, 	1982. 	On
May 	13, 	1982, 	the 	Local 	filed 	a 	response 	to 	the 	Districts'
appeal. 	The 	Districts 	place 	reliance 	upon 	their 	earlier
pleadings.
DISCUSSION
The 	issue 	in 	this 	case 	is 	whether 	the 	decision 	of 	the 	Court
of 	Appeals 	in 	LACCD 	v. 	PERB 	should 	be 	given 	collateral 	estoppel
effect 	and 	thus 	bar 	relitigation 	of 	the 	issue 	as 	to 	whether 	the
6

Local 	(formerly 	Local
	699)
	is
	the
	same
	employee
	organization
	as
Local
	99.
	The
	threshold
	requirements 	for
	collateral
	estoppel
are
	present.
	Thus,
	the
	party 	against
	whom
	collateral
	estoppel
is
	asserted
	as
	a
	bar
	is
	the
	same
	(Local
	347)
.4	
The
	issue
(whether, 	for 	purposes 	of
	subsection
	3545(b)
(2)
	of
	EERA,
	the
Local
	and
	Local
	99
	are
	the
	same
	employee
	organization)
	was
presented,
	litigated
	and
	decided 	in
	the
	LACCD
	v.
	PERB
	case.
Tadhunter
	v.
	Smith
	(1934)
	219
	Cal.
	690,
	at
	695.
The
	Districts
	argue
	that
	because
	the 	elements
	for
application
	of
	collateral
	estoppel 	are 	present,
	the
	doctrine
should
	apply
	here.5
The
	Local 	argues
	that
	collateral
	estoppel
	should 	not 	apply
for
	several 	reasons, 	discussed
	infra,
	and
	thus
	that
	it
	should
4rt 	is
	not 	necessary 	for 	the
	party 	asserting
	collateral
estoppel
	to
	have 	been
	a
	party 	to 	the
	prior 	case,
	so 	long 	as 	the
entity
	against
	whom
	the
	doctrine
	is
	asserted
	was
	a
	party.
Bernhard 	v.
	Bank
	of
	America
	(1942) 	19
	Cal.2d
	807.
5The
	strongest 	effect
	the 	Court
	of
	Appeals
	decision 	could
be
	given
	is 	that
	of 	res
	judicata/collateral
	estoppel.
	This
	is
because 	the
	Supreme
	Court, 	while 	denying
	PERB's
	request 	for
	a
hearing, 	ordered
	that
	the
	decision
	be
	rei'egated 	to 	unpublished
status.
	California
	Rules
	of 	Court,
	Rule
	977
	provides:
An
	opinion 	of
	a
	Court 	of
	Appeal
	or 	ofan
	appellate
	department 	of
	a
	superior
court 	that 	is
	not 	published 	in 	the
Official
	Reports
	shall
	not
	be
	cited
	bya
	court 	or
	by
	a
	party 	in
	any
	other
action
	or 	proceeding 	except
	when
	the
opinion
	is 	relevant
	under 	the
	doctrinesof 	the
	law
	of 	the 	case, 	res 	judicata
	or
collateral
	estoppel	
....
7

be
	allowed
	to
	relitigate
	the
	"same
	organization" 	issue 	before
PERB
	based
	upon
	the
	current
	state
	of
	facts.
A
former 	judgment
	on
	an
	identical
	issue
	is
	not
	res
	judicata
if
	the
	factual 	relationship
	of 	the
	parties
	changes
	in
	a
relevant
	way
	between
	the
	date
	of 	the
	first
	judgment
	and
	the
relevant
	period 	of 	the
	second
	action.
	As
	the
	California
Supreme
	Court 	noted
	in
	Hurd
	v.
	Albert
	(1931) 	214
	Cal.
	15,
The
	doctrine
	of 	res
	judicata
	w~s
	never
intended
	to 	operate
	so 	as
	to 	prevent
	a
re-examination 	of 	the
	same
	question
between
	the
	parties
	where,
	in
	the
interval
	between
	the
	first
	and
	second
actions,
	the
	facts
	have
	materially
changed
	or
	new
	facts
	have
	occurred
which
	may
	have
	altered
	the
	legal 	rights
or
	relations
	of 	the
	litigants.
In 	accord
	is
	California
	Employment
	Stabilization
	Commission
	v.
Matcovich
	(1946) 	74
	Cal.App.2d 	398.
The
	Districts
	concede
	that
	a
	change
	in
	essential 	facts
which
	alters
	the
	legal 	rights
	and
	relations
	of
	the
	parties
would
	render
	collateral
	estoppel 	inapplicable
	in
	a
	subsequent
action 	raising
	the
	same
	issues.
	However,
	they 	contend
	that
	the
only
	essential 	factual 	determination 	here, 	in
	light
	of 	the
Court 	of
	Appeals
	decision, 	is
	whether
	the 	Local
	is
	still
indirectly 	affiliated
	with 	Local 	99.
	The
	Districts
	note
	that
there
	has 	been 	no 	change
	in
	affiliation.
	They 	do
	not 	contend
that
	no
	other 	facts
	bearing
	on
	the
	relationship
	between
	the
Local
	and
	Local
	699 	have 	changed;
	rather,
	they 	argue
	that
	any
other 	changes 	are 	irrelevant
	because 	the 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	held
8

as
	a
	matter
---
of
	law
	that
	direct
	or
	indirect
	affiliation
	rendered
the
	Local
	and
	Local
	99
	the
	same
	organization.
	They
	point 	out
that
	the
	rest
	of
	the
	Court's 	decision,
	regarding
	identity
	of
interest
	and
	function
	between
	the
	locals,
	and
	control
	by
	the
International,
	was
	gratuitous
	dicta,
	and
	that
	the 	only
	fact
	of
any
	consequence
	to 	the
	Court
	of
	Appeals
	was
	the
	fact
	of
affiliation.
The
	Districts'
	argument 	can
	succeed
	only
	if
	collateral
estoppel
	effect 	is
	given
	to 	the
	rule
	of
	law
	set
	forth
	by
	the
Court
	of
	Appeals
	to
	the
	effect 	that
	affiliation
	is
	all
	that 	is
necessary 	to
	render
	organizations
	the
	same
	within 	the
	meaning
of 	subsection
	3545(b)
(2).
	The
	Court 	of
	Appeals 	wrote
	its
decision
	in
	such
	a 	manner
	as
	to
	render
	its
	factual 	findings
regarding
	interrelationship
	between
	the 	Locals 	(other 	than
affiliation)
	entirely
	unnecessary 	to
	its
	judgment,
	and
	it
	is
well 	established 	that
	"if
	a
	finding 	or 	determination 	of
	an
issue
	in
	the
	first
	action
	was
	entirely
	unnecessary 	to 	the
judgment,
	it
	will
	not
	have
	the
	effect
	of
	a
	collateral
estoppel."
	4
Witkin,
	California
	Procedure, 	Section
	210
	at
pp. 	3348-9,
	and
	cases
	cited 	therein.
The
	Local 	does 	not 	argue
	that
	it
	is
	no
	longer
	affiliated
with 	the
	International
	and
	thus
	indirectly 	affiliated
	with
Local 	99.
	It
	does,
	however, 	argue
	that 	collateral
	estoppel
effect
	cannot
	be
	given 	to 	the 	rule 	of
	law
	established
	by
	the
Court 	of 	Appeal 	in 	these 	circumstances.
	We
	agree. 	In 	Louis
9

Stores,
	Inc.
	v.
	Department
	of
	Alcoholic
	Beverage
	Control
	(1962)
57
	Cal.2d
	749,
	at
	757 	[22
	Cal. 	Rptr.
	14],
	the
	California
Supreme
	Court
	expressed
	this 	limitation
	on
	the
	operation
	of
	the
doctrine
	of
	collateral
	estoppel 	in 	the
	following
	manner:
An
	important
	qualification
	of 	the
doctrine
	of
	collateral
	estoppel
	is 	set
forth
	in 	Section
	70
	of 	the 	Restatement
of
	Judgments,
	which
	reads
	as
	follows:
Where
	a
	question 	of
	law
	essential
to
	the
	judgment
	is 	actually
ligitated
	and
	determined
	by
	a
valid
	and
	final
	personal
	judgment,
the 	Determination
	is
	not
conclusive
	between
	the
	parties
	in
a
	subsequent
	action
	on
	a
	different
cause
	of
	action
	except
	where
	both
causes 	of
	action
	arose 	out 	of 	the
same
	subject
	matter
	or
transaction;
	and
	in
	any
	event
	it
is
	not
	conclusive
	if
	injustice
would
	result.
	[Emphasis 	added 	by
the 	Court.]
Comment 	f
	to
	this 	section 	explains:
The
	determination 	of
	a
	question 	of
law
	by
	a
	judgment
	in
	an
	action
	is
not 	conclusive
	between
	the
	parties
in
	a
	subsequent
	action
	on
	a
different
	cause
	of
	action,
	even
though 	both 	causes 	of
	action 	arose
out 	of 	the
	same
	subject
	matter 	or
transaction,
	if
	it
	would
	be
	unjust
to
	one
	of 	the
	parties
	or 	to
	third
~ersons 	to
	apply 	one
	rule
	of
	law1n
	subsequent
	actions
	between
	the
same
	parties
	and
	to 	apply
	a
different 	rule 	of
	law 	between
other 	persons.
	(Emphasis 	added 	by
the 	Court.)
	The
	conclusion
	and
reasoning 	of 	the 	Restatement 	find
support 	in 	United
	States
	v. 	Stone
& Downer
	Co.,
	274
	U.S. 	225,
235-237 	[47
	S.Ct.
	616,
	71
	L.Ed.
1013].
10

This
	exception 	to
	the
	application
	of
	collateral
	estoppel
	is
routinely
	applied
	in
	California 	cases,
	as 	noted
	at
	4
	Witkins,
California
	Procedure,
	Section
	216,
	at
	pp.
	3352-3353,
	and
	the
1981
	Supplement,
	Section
	216,
	pp. 	264-269,
	and
	cases
	cited
therein.
In
	accord
	is
	Pacific
	Maritime
	Association
	v.
	California
Unemployment
	Insurance
	Appeals
	Board
	(1965)
	236
	Cal.App.2d
	325
[45
	Cal.Rptr.
	892].
	The
	principle
	has
	been
	further
	explained
in
	Chern
	v.
	Bank
	of
	America
	(1976) 	15
	Cal.3d
	866
	[127
	Cal.Rptr.
110].
	The
	Court
	stated, 	at
	872,
	"In 	general
	it
	may
	be
	said
that
	rulings
	of
	law,
	divorced
	from
	the
	specific 	facts
	to
	which
they 	are
	applied, 	are
	not 	binding
	under
	principles
	of
	res
judicata
	[citations]."
	The
	Court
	continued,
	"We
	acknowledge,
further,
	a
	sound
	judicial
	policy 	against
	applying
	collateral
estoppel
	in 	cases
	which
	concern
	matters 	of 	important
	public
interest."
	The
	Court
	reaffirmed
	this
	notion
	recently
	in
Consumers
	Lobby
	Against
	Monopolies 	v.
	Public
	Utilities
Commission 	(1979)
	25
	Cal.3d
	891,
	stating, 	at
	902, 	"[But]
	when
the
	issue
	is
	a
	question 	of
	law
	rather
	than 	of
	fact,
	the
	prior
determination
	is
	not 	conclusive
	either
	if 	injustice
	would
result
	or
	if
	the 	public
	interest
	requires 	that
	relitigation
	not
be
	foreclosed."
We
	find 	that 	the 	determination 	of 	whether· employee
organizations 	are 	the
	"same"
	within 	the
	meaning 	of
	subsection
3545 (b) (2)
	presents
	a
	question 	of 	law, 	the 	resolution 	of
	which
11

is
	a
	matter
	of
	public
	interest.
	Further,
	we
	find
	that
injustice
	would
	result
	should 	the
	Local
	be
	barred
	from
litigating
	the
	question
	on
	the
	basis
	of 	the
	current
	state
	of
facts.
	Should
	the 	Local
	be
	so
	barred
	by
	the
	LACCD
	decision,
	it
would
	be
	subject
	to
	a
	different
	rule
	of
	law
	than
	other
	employee
orgnizations
	throughout 	the
	state
	which
	seek
	to
	represent
supervisory
	employees
	pursuant
	to
	EERA.
	The
	Board's
	current
position,
	as 	expressed 	in
	Sacramento
	City
	USD,
	supra,
	is 	that
indirect
	or
	direct
	affiliation
	does
	not,
	of
	itself,
	render
entities
	so
	affiliated
	the
	"same
	organization"
	under
	subsection
3545(b)
(2).
	Under
	that
	holding, 	other
	entities
	seeking
	to
organize 	supervisors
	would
	not
	be
	prevented
	from
	doing 	so 	by
virtue
	of
	their 	indirect
	affiliation
	with 	the
	exclusive
representative
	of 	the
	rank
	and
	file
	employees, 	whereas
	the
Local
	herein
	would
	be. 	This
	is 	precisely
	the
	sort
	of
"competitive 	disadvantage"
	and
	"injustice"
	which
	the
	Supreme
Court
	has
	condemned.
	We
	decline 	to
	mandate 	such
	an
	anomolous
and
	unjust
	result.
ORDER
Upon
	the 	foregoing 	decision
	and
	the 	record 	as
	a
	whole, 	the
Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
	ORDERS
	that
	the 	board
	agent's
dismissal 	of 	the
	Districts'
	Motion
	to 	Dismiss
	is
	SUSTAINED.
The
	regional 	director 	is
	hereby
	ORDERED
	to 	take 	appropriate
12

action 	consistent
	with
	this
	Decision,
	and
	thus
	to
	resume
	the
processing
	of 	the
	Local's
	petitions
	in
	these 	cases
	with
	all
	due
dispatch.
By:	
Vi~g_(,1-w.
	$en
sen,
	Member	
John
Jaeger,
	Member
/\
Irene
	Tovar,
	Member
13