Chula Vista City School District (PERB A029E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
CHULA
	VISTA
	CITY
	SCHOOL
	DISTRICT,
Employer,
~d
CHULA
	VISTA
	ELEMENTARY
	EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION,
	CTA/NEA,
Employee
	Organization,
APPELLANT.
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Case
	No. 	LA-CE-73
PERE
	Order
	No.
	Ad-29
Administrative
	Appeal
April
	4,
	1978
Appearances:	
Charles
	R.
	Gustafson, 	Attorney,
	for
	Chula
	Vista
Elementary Education
	Association,
	and
	Arlene
	Prater,
	Deputy
County
	Counsel,
	for
	Chula
	Vista 	City
	School
	District.
Before
	Gluck, 	Chairman; 	Cossack
	Twohey 	and
	Gonzales,
	Members.
OPINION
This
	is
	an
	appeal
	by 	Chula
	Vista
	Elementary 	Education
Association,
CTA/NEA
	(Association)
	from
	the
	rejection
	by 	the
Executive
	Assistant
	to 	the
	Board
	of
	its
	exceptions 	to 	the
	hear-
ing
	officer's
	recommended
	decision.
	The
	Executive
	Assistant 	to
the
	Board
	rejected
	the 	Association's 	exceptions 	as 	untimely
	filed
pursuant 	to
	Rule 	35030. 1
FACTS
Pursuant 	to
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	filed
	by
	the Associa
tion,
	a
	hearing
	was
	held 	before
	a
	PERE
	hearing
	officer.
	A
recommended
	decision
	was
	issued 	dismissing 	the 	charge 	in
	its
1 Repealed 	and 	superseded, 	effective 	March 	20, 	1978.

entirety
	and
	stating 	that
	pursuant 	to
	Rule
	35029 2
the
	recommended
decision
	would
	become
	final
	on
	October
	17,
	1977
	unless
	timely
exceptions
	were
	filed
Rule
	35029 3
stated:
35029.
	Decision.
	The 	recommended
decision
	shall
	become
	final 	fifteen
	calendar
days
	after
	it
	is
	served
	on
	all
	parties
	or
	on
the 	date
	specified 	in
	the 	decision,
	whichever
is
	earlier,
	provided
	no
	party
	files
	a
	state-
ment
	of
	exceptions 	to 	the
	recommended
	decision
as 	provided
	in
	Section
	35030.
Rule
	35030 4
stated, 	in 	pertinent 	part,
35030.
	Statement
	of
	Exceptions
	to
Recommended
	Decision.
(a) 	Within 	seven
	calendar
	days
	after
service 	of
	the
	recommended
	decision
	a
party
	may
	file
	a
	statement 	of 	exceptions
to 	the
	recommended
	decision 	or
	any
	part
of
	the 	record 	or 	proceedings.
The 	recommended
	decision
was
	served
	on
	October 	3, 	1977.
Exceptions
	were
	therefore
	due 	on
	October 	10, 	1977,
	a
	state
holiday
	on
	which
	PERB
	offices
	were
	closed.
	The
	exceptions 	were
deposited 	in
	the 	mail
	on
	October 	10,.
1977;
	they
	were
	received
	in
the
	Sacramento
	headquarters
	offices
	on
	October 	14.
	On
	October
	18
the 	Executive
	Assistant 	to 	the
	Board
	rejected
	the 	exceptions 	as
untimely
	filed
	and
	returned
	them
	to 	the 	Association.
..
-2-

The
	Association
	timely
	appealed
	the
	Executive
	Assistant's
rejection.
	The
	appeal
	is
	based,
	among
	other
	things,
	on
	"mistake,
inadvertence
	and
	excusable
	neglect 	of 	counsel."
In
	an
	unrefuted
	affidavit
	submitted
	in
	support
	of
	the
	appeal,
the
	Association's 	attorney
	states
	that
	it
	is
	his
	standard
	practice
to 	both mail 	exceptions
	to
	the 	Board's
	Sacramento
	office
	and
deliver
	them
	to 	the
	Los
	Angeles
	regional
	office
	on
	or 	before
the 	seventh
	day
	following
	service 	of
	the
	recommended
	decision.
The
	affidavit
	further 	states 	that
	on
	October
	10 	a
	temporary
secretary
	was
	employed
who
	apparently,
	although
	she
	gave
	no
	such
indication,
	did not 	understand 	the
	instructions
	to
	deliver
	the
exceptions
	to
	the 	regional
	office.
	The
	temporary
	secretary
	is
	no
longer
	employed by
-the
	attorney.
	In
	reviewing 	the
	file
	following
the 	Executive
	Assistant's 	rejection
	of 	the 	exceptions, 	the
	attorney
learned
	that
	they
	had
	not
	been
	delivered
	to 	the
	regional
	office.
DISCUSSION
In
	Gibson 	v.
	Unemployment
	Insurance
	Appeals 	Board
5
the
California
	Supreme
	Court
	held
	that
	it
	was
	reversible 	error 	for
an 	agency
	to 	automatically
	and
	mechanically
	reject 	late-filed
appeals 	without
	r.egard
	to,
	among
	other 	things, 	the
	excusability
of 	the 	error.
	In 	the
	instant
	case,
	had 	the 	temporary
	secretary
employed by
	the 	Association's 	attorney
	followed
	instructions,
	the
59 	Cal. 3d 	494, 	108 	Cal. Rptr. 1, 	509 	(1973).
. 	.
-3-

Association's
	exceptions
	would 	have 	been
	timely
	filed.
6
The
secretary
was
	instructed
	to
	deliver
	the 	exceptions 	to 	the
	regional
office
	but
	failed
	to
	do
	so.
	Excusable
	neglect
	by
	the
	Association's
attorney
7
is
	grounds
	to
	waive
	the
	time
	requirements
	and
	failure
	to
do
	so
	is
	an
	abuse
	of
	the 	Board's
	discretion
	and
	reversable
	error.
8
AccoYdingly,
	we
	reverse
	the 	Executive
	Assistant
	and
	entertain
	the
Association's
	exceptions.
ORDER
The
	decision
	of
	the 	Executive
	Assistant
	is
	reversed.
Appellant 	Association
	may
	resubmit
	its
	rejected
	exceptions
to
	the
	recommended
	decision 	within
	seven
	(7)
	calendar
	days
	of
receipt
	of
	this 	decision.
	Within 	seven
	(7)
	calendar
	days
	after
service
	of
	the 	statement
	of
	exceptions 	the
	Respondent
	District
may
	file
	a
	response
	and
	supporting
	brief.
Jerilou
	Cossack
	Twohey,
Raynond
J.
	G:mzales,
	Member,
	dissenting:
I
	dissent
	from
	the 	majority 	opinion
	on
	several 	grounds.
First,
	it
	is
	arguable
	that
	the
	Board
	in
	its
	appellate 	capacity
6While
	the
	letter
	accompanying
	the
	recommended
	decision 	states
that
	exceptions 	should 	be
	filed 	in
	Sacramento,
	it
	has 	been 	an 	adminis-
trative 	practice 	of 	the
	Board 	to 	accept 	exceptions 	timely
	filed
	in
	a
regional 	office
	because 	of 	the 	limited
	time
	within
	which 	exceptionsmust 	be
	filed 	pursuant 	to 	the 	Board's 	then 	existing 	rules 	and
regulations.
7
cf.
	Anaheim 	Union 	High 	School
	District,
	PERB
	Order 	No. 	Ad-27,
March 	16, 	1978.
8
see 	also 	Gonzales 	v. 	State 	Personnel 	Board, 	76 	Cal.App.3d364,
	_Cal.Rptr_
	(1977).
-4-

lacks
	jurisdiction
	to 	consider 	the
	appellant's
	case
	on
	its
	merits
due
	to
	an
	untimely
	filing
	of
	appeal.
	Second, 	assuming
	that
	the
Board
	possesses
	jurisdiction,
	the
	majority's
	acceptance
	of
counsel's
	argument
	that
	inadvertence
	by
	a
	temporary
	secretary
should
	be 	viewed 	as
	excusable
	grounds
	for
	overcoming
	the
	late
filing
	of
	its
	exceptions
	is 	totally
	unsustainable 	for
	several
reasons. 	Lastly,
	the
	Board
	fails
	to 	recognize
	that
	in
	this
	area
of 	the
	law,
	a
	higher 	standard 	of
	compliance
	with
	time
	requirements
is
	not
	only
	justifiable,
	but 	preferable, 	in
	contrast
	to
	other
	areas
of
	the
	law.
A
preliminary
	issue
	which
	the 	majority 	opinion 	completely
overlooks
	is
	whether
	or 	not 	the
	failure
	of 	the
	Chula
	Vista
Elementary 	Education
	Association 	(Association) 	to
	file
	a
	timely
appeal 	of 	the 	hearing
	officer's
	recommended
	decision 	deprives
	the
Board
	itself
	of
	jurisdiction
	to 	decide 	the 	case
	on
	its
	merits.
In
	a
	most
	recent
	case, 	City 	of 	Santa 	Barbara 	v.
	California
	Coastal
Zone 	Commission,
1
the
	Court
	noted
	that 	failure
	to
	file
	a
	timely
appeal
	in
	an
	administrative
	proceeding, 	as
	with 	the 	court,
precludes 	the 	appellate
	body 	from
	considering 	the 	case
	on
	the
grounds
	of 	lack 	of
	jurisdiction.
	In
	that
	case, 	the
	California
Coastal
	Zone
	Conservation 	Commission's
	older 	regulations
	failed
to 	clearly
	define
	where 	and when
	an 	appeal
	was
	to 	be
	filed
	and
whether
	filing
	was 	deemed
	complete
	on
	mailing 	or 	actual
	receipt.
1
(1977) 	7 5 	Cal.App. 3d 	572.
5

The
	Court
	acknowledged
	the 	adoption
	by
	the
	Commission
	of
subsequent
	regulations
	which
	clarified
	the 	ambiguities
	just
mentioned.
	In
	reference
	to 	the
	new
	regulations,
	the
	Court
	stated:
The
	presently
	effective
	regulations
	clearly
specify
	both 	the
	time
	and
	place
	and
	the
	manner
in
	which
	appeals
	from
	decisions 	of
	Regional
Conn:nissions
	must 	be
	filed
...
	By
	[these
regulations],
	appellants 	are
	clearly
	advised
not
	only
	when
	but
	where
	their
	appeal
	must
	be
filed.
	So
	long
	as
	these
	regulation[s]
	remain
in
	effect,
	appeals 	not
	filed
	in
	accordance
therewith
	will
	be
	beyond
	the
	jurisdiction
	ofthe
	Commission.2
Former
	section
	35030(a)
	of
	the 	Board's
	rules,3	
in
	effect 	at
the
	time
	in 	question,
	provided 	the
	time
	period within
	which 	an
exception
	to
	a
	hearing
	officer's
	recommended
	decision
	was
	to
	be
filed.
	Additionally,
	former
	section
	35002(b),
	falling
	under 	the
label 	of
	"Filing," 	clearly 	referred
	to 	the
	act 	of
	filing 	in
	the
context 	of 	actual 	receipt
	by
	the
	appropriate 	regional
	office.
There 	can be
	no
	doubt
	that
	the
	rules
	adopted
	by
	this
	Board
	were
clear
	on
	their
	face. 	Further,
	former
	section
	35030(b)
	stated,
"The
	filing
	of 	the 	statement 	of
	exceptions
	submits
	the 	case
	to
the
	Board
	itself."
	Such
	language
	reflected
	a
	consistency
with
the
	quasi-judicial
	model
	which
	the
	Board
	itself
	had 	assumed
	and
still
	assumes
	in 	the 	area 	of 	appeals.
	Specifically,
	the 	Board
since
	its 	initial
	stages
	has 	viewed
	itself
	as 	an
	appellate
	body
that
	would 	review 	cases
	on
	their
	merits 	provided
	a
	statement 	of
exceptions 	had been
	filed.
	Thus,
	the
	filing
	of
	an
	appeal, 	as
2
Id., 	at
	p. 	576. 	See
	also
	Van
	De
	Veer 	v.
	De
	t. 	of AlcoholicBeverage Control 	(1957) 	155 	Cal.App. 2d 	817, 	820-2 1.
3Toe 	Board's 	rules 	are 	published 	in 	California AdministrativeCode,
	title
	8, 	section 	31100
	et 	seq.
6

distinguished
	from
	other
	types
	of
	filings,
	is
	not
	merely
	a
procedural
	step.
	Rather
	it
	is
	the 	necessary 	step
	the
	parties
must
	take 	to 	enable 	the
	Board
	itself
	to
	exercise
	its
	appellate
functions.
	Thus,
	if
	the
	parties
	fail
	to 	take
	such
	a
	step,
	the
	Board
lacks
	jurisdiction
	to 	hear 	the 	appeal.
	See
	Hollister
	Convalescent
Hosp.
	Inc.
	v.
	Rico
	(1975)
	15
	Cal.3d
	660, 	666.
But 	assuming
	for
	the
	sake
	of
	argument
	that
	the
	failure
	to
file
	a
	timely 	appeal
	is
	not 	the
	jurisdictional
	flaw 	argued
	above,
other
	reasons
	exist
	for
	rejecting
	the
	Association's 	appeal.
The
	majority 	accepts
	counsel's 	contention
	that
	inadvertence
by
	a
	temporary
	secretary 	in
	filing
	the
	appellant's
	statement 	of
exceptions
	constitutes
	excusable
	neglect.
4 	I
	find
	the
	majority's
position
weak
	for
	two
	reasons.
	First,
	my
	colleagues
	fail
	to
	assess
critically
	whether
	counsel's 	declaration 	factually 	constitutes
excusable
	neglect
	justifying
	a
	reversal 	of 	the 	Executive
	Assistant's
decision.
	Second,
	my
	colleagues' 	decision 	in 	this
	case
	results
	in.
a
	confusing
	and
	irrational
	application 	of
	two
	different
	standards
where
	exceptions
	have 	been 	untimely
	filed.
Regarding
	counsel's 	declaration,
	the
	majority's
	most
	signifi-
cant
	error 	is
	finding 	that 	but 	for 	the
	temporary
	secretary's
failure
	to 	follow
	instructions,
	the 	Association's 	exceptions
	would
4
counsel 	also 	claims 	confusion 	as 	to 	the 	service
	and
	filing
requirements 	of 	this
	agency,
	citing
	a
	form
	letter
	of 	the 	agency'sGeneral 	Counsel 	as 	the 	source 	of
	such 	confusion.
	The 	form
	letter
advises 	the 	parties
	as 	to 	the
	filing
	of 	exceptions.
	It
	defines
"service" 	but 	not
	"filing."
	To
	this 	extent, 	perhaps, 	the
	letteris 	deficient. 	Nonetheless, 	the 	rules 	delineated 	filing 	require-
ments 	as 	noted 	above
	in 	the 	text.
	Moreover, 	in 	his 	very 	appeal,counsel,
	who
	is
	known
	to 	have 	practiced before 	this 	agency 	since
its 	early 	stages, 	acknowledges 	the 	fact 	that 	it
	has 	been 	the 	office
practice 	to 	file 	exceptions 	on 	or 	before 	the 	seventh 	day 	as 	requiredby 	our 	former 	rules. 	Given 	the 	foregoing, 	I 	find 	it 	incredible 	that
counsel would 	now 	claim 	confusion.
'
7

have
	been
	timely
	filed.
	Counsel
	states
	in
	his 	declaration:
The
	normal
	practice
	of
	this 	office
	is
	to
	file
the 	exceptions
	in
	the
	regional
	office
	of
	EERB
on
	or 	before 	the
	seventh
	day 	and
	to
	also
	mail
same
	to 	the
	Sacramento
	Office 	of
	EERB
	at
	the
	same
time.
	In 	reviewing 	the
	file
	I
	find
	no
	evidence
that
	the 	exceptions
	in
	this
	case
	were
	filed
	in
the
	Los
	Angeles
	office
	of
	EERB
	as
	I
	had
instructed
	my
	secretary.
	On
	October 	10,
	1977,
we
	were 	employing
	a
	temporary
	secretary,
	who
is
	no
	longer 	with
	this 	office,
	and
	apparently
she
	did not
	understand
	my
	instructions
	though
she
	gave
	no
	such
	indication.
	(Emphasis
	added.)
I
	would
	note
	from
	the
	above-quoted
	portion 	of 	counsel's
	declaration
counsel's
	statement
	that
	he
	had
	instructed
	a
	temporary
	secretary
	to
"file"
	the
	Association's
	exceptions 	with 	the
	regional
	office.
	The
majority
	equates
	"file"
	with
	"deliver,"
	which
	I
	think
	is
	a
	fair
reading 	of
	what
	counsel
	meant,
	particularly
	since
	he 	used
	the
	term
nmail
11
in
	the
	same
	breath 	in 	his 	declaration.
	As
	such,
	it
	would
have 	been 	impossible
	for 	the
	temporary
	secretary
	to
	comply
	with
the
	counsel's 	instructions
	since 	the
	regional
	office
	was
	closed
	on
October
	10, 	1977,
	a
	state
	holiday,
	and
	personal 	delivery 	could
	not
have
	occurred
	on
	that
	date.
Of
	course,
	it
	may
	be
	that
	the
	instructions
	given 	to
	the
	temporary
secretary
were
	to
	deliver
	the 	exceptions 	to 	the 	regional
	office
	prior
to
	October
	10, 	1977.
	Counsel's
	declaration,
	however, 	does
	not 	state
this
	and
	I 	do
	not 	think 	this
	assumption 	can
	or 	should be
	made 	by
the
	Board. 	Moreover,
	the 	impression
	one
	receives 	in 	reviewing
counsel's 	declaration
	is 	that 	instructions
	were 	given 	to
	the
	temporary
secretary 	to 	deliver 	the 	exceptions
	on 	October 	10, 	1977.
	Alterna-
tively,
	it
	may 	be
	that 	counsel's 	instructions 	to 	the 	temporary
secretary
	were 	to 	place 	the 	exceptions 	in 	the 	mail 	on 	October 	10, 	1977,
hoping 	that 	delivery would 	occur 	in 	the 	regional 	office
	on
October 	11, 	19 77. 	But, 	again, 	since 	c,,ouns
el'
s 	declaration 	is
.
8

relatively
	cryptic
	on
	the
	nature 	of
	given
	instructions,
	the
	most
we
	can
	do
	is
	glean
	from
	the
	tone
	of
	his 	declaration
	and
	certain
phrases
	a
	strong 	suggestion
	that
	counsel
	used
	the
	term
	"file"
	to
mean
	"personal 	delivery"
	as
	distinguished
	from
	"mail
	delivery."
But 	even 	assuming
	counsel
	did
	intend
	"file"
	to
	mean
	"mail
delivery,"
	it
	appears
	to
	me
	rather
	imprudent
	on
	his 	part 	to
	have
placed
	the 	exceptions
	in
	the 	mail 	the
	day
	before
	they
	were
actually
	due,
	October 	11, 	1977.
	He
	could
	have
	easily
	waited
	until
that
	day
	to
	assure
	proper
	filing
	of
	the
	exceptionsS·
by
	personal
delivery
	rather
	than 	improvidently
	assuming
	that
	the
	exceptions
would 	be
	received
	by
	mail
	in
	the
	regional
	office 	that
	day.
6
Counsel
	does
	not
	explain,howevertwhy he
	failed
	to 	consider
	filing
on
	October
	11, 	1977.
Finally,
	it
	seems
	to
	me
	that
	counsel
	was
	imprudent
	in 	failing
to
	check
	on
	the
	secretary's 	filing
	of
	the
	Association's 	exceptions
5
code
	of 	Civil
	Procedure
	section
	12,
	subdivision 	(a),
	provides
in 	pertinent 	part:
If
	the
	last
	day
	for 	the
	performance
	of
	any
	act
provided 	or 	required
	by 	law
	to 	be 	performed
within
	a
	specified 	period 	of
	time
	shall
	be
	a
holiday, 	then 	such
	period
	is
	hereby 	extended 	to
and
	including 	the 	next
	day which
	is
	not
	a
	holiday.
6
This
	is
	not 	unlike 	the
	situation 	in 	the 	Board's
	recentlyissued
	Anaheim Union 	High 	School
	District,
	(March 	16, 	1978) 	PERE
Order
	No. 	Ad-27,,,_where
	the 	appellant
	argued 	excuse 	on
	the 	grounds
of 	postal 	delay 	even 	though
	its
	appeal
	was
	postmarked
	a
	day 	before
the
	filing
	due
	date.
9

to
	ensure
	its
	timely
	filing
	given 	the
	fact 	that
	she
	was 	a
temporary
	secretary
	and
	it
was
	reasonably
	foreseeable
	that
	she
could
	have
	misunderstood
	his 	instructions.
On
	the
	basis
	of 	the 	foregoing,
	I
	cannot
	find 	counsel's
declaration
	to
	merit
	reversal
	of
	the
	Executive
	Assistant's
	decision
on 	a
	theory
	of
	excusable
	neglect.
	I
	think
	it
	is 	clear
	that
	counsel
has 	even
	failed
	to
	act
	as
	"a 	reasonably 	prudent 	person
	would 	under
the
	same
	circumstances," 	the
	applicable
	test
	in
	excusable
	neglect
cases.
7
My
	second
	criticism
	of
	the
	majority
	opinion
	concerns
	the
implicit
	application 	of
	a 	low
	standard 	of 	proof
	in 	this
	case
8
despite (1) 	the
	fact 	that
	the 	Board's
	rules
	and
	regulations
	in
	effect
at
	the
	time
	this
	appeal
	was
	filed
	offered
no
	standard whatsoever
	for
excusing
	an
	untimely
	filing
	of 	exceptions 	to 	hearing
	officers'
proposed
	or
	recommended.decisions,
	and
	(2)
	the
	fact 	that 	the
	Board
has
	recently
	adopted
	new
	regulations, 	effective
	March 	20,
	1978,
wherein
	a
	late 	filing
	of
	exceptions 	to 	hearing
	officers'
	decisions
may
	be 	excused 	only 	under
	"extraordinary 	circumstances,"
	a 	much
higher 	standard.
9
~Dingwall 	v. 	Vangus,
	Inc.
	(1963) 	218
	Cal.App.2d 	108;
Fidelity
	Federal
	Sav. 	& Loan Assn. 	v.
	Loo§ 	(1959) 	175 	Cal 	App 	2d
149; 	Elms
	v.
	Elms 	(1946)
	72
	Cal.App.2d
	5
8
My
	colleagues
	cite
	to
	Anaheim Union 	High 	School
	District
supra,
	PERB
	Order 	No. 	Ad-27, 	where 	the
	Board 	adopted
	a
	"sufficient
cause" 	standard 	to 	be
	applied 	to 	appeals 	of 	administrative 	decisions
zer 	se 	and 	to 	Gibson'!· 	Unemplo~ent 	Ins.
	Appeals 	Bd. 	(1973) 	9
	Cal.3d
:94, 	where 	the 	Court
	interprete 	the 	"good 	cause" 	standard
	set
	forth
i~
	Unemployment
	Insurance
	Code
	section
	1328
	in
	view
	of
	an
	administra-
tive 	rule 	applied 	by 	the 	California
	Unemployment 	Insurance 	Appeals
Board.
9
California Administrative 	Code,
	title 	8, 	section 	32133.
.
. 	. 	.
10

The
	majority
	fails
	to
	realize
	the 	confusion
	it
	creates
	by
accepting
	indiscriminately 	counsel's
	less
	than
	lucid
	declaration
as 	grounds
	for
	proving 	excusable
	neglect,
	thus 	applying
	an
	extremely
low
	standard 	of 	proof,
	when
	in
	cases
	coming
	before
	the
	Board
	under
its
	new
	regulations
	a
	higher
	burden
	will
	have
	to
	be
	met.
	How 	do
my
	colleagues 	intend 	to 	reconcile
	the
	application
	of 	these
	two
different
	standards
	to
	late-filed
	exceptions?
Finally,
	I
	believe
	the
	majority
	fails
	to
	appreciate
	the
importance
	of 	requiring
	an
	especially
	high
	standard
	of
	compliance
with 	the 	Board's
	time
	requirements
	in 	contrast
	to
	time
	requirements
in
	other
	areas 	of 	the
	law.
	Where 	a
	delayed
	filing
	merely
	postpones
the
	payment
	of
	money
	(like 	social
	welfare
	benefits)
	to 	the
	party,
himself 	responsible 	for
	the 	delay, 	the
	law
	justly
	views
	with
liberality
	excuses
	for
	the 	delay
	and
	sets
	a 	low
	standard
	for
	timely
filings.
10
Since 	the 	only
	injury
	from
	the 	delay 	accrues
	to 	the
late,
	party, 	there
	is
	no
	reason 	for
	strictness.
	This
	logic
	is
	not
applicable 	to 	the
	administration 	of 	the 	Educational
	Employment
Relations
	Act.
	The
	EERA
was
	enacted 	to
	promote
	stability 	in
	the
public
	school 	systems
	of
	our
	state
	by
	improving
	personnel
	management
and 	employer-employee
	relations.
	School
	districts,
	employee
organizations,
	and
	the 	general 	public
	all
	have 	a
	vital 	interest
	in
such
	a
	goal. 	In 	the
	interest
	of
	promoting
	that 	goal, 	the
	Legislature
and
	the
	Board have 	adopted
	specific
	deadlines 	to 	ensure
	that
	the
parties 	get 	to 	the 	negotiating 	table
	and
	enter 	into
	a
	suitable
lOS ee,
	e.g.,
	Gi 	son 	v. 	Unemployment
	Ins. 	Appeals 	Bd., 	supra,9
	Cal. 3d 	494.
'b
,:
11

contract
	as 	soon
	as
	possible. 	Both.representation
	and
	unfair
labor
	practice
	cases
	are 	subject
	to
	such
	timelines.
	As
	to
	the
latter,
	there
	can
	be
	no
	doubt
	that
	an
	unresolved
	unfair 	labor
practice
	charge 	clouds
	the 	process
	and
	that
	its
	presence
	threatens
stability.
	All 	the
	parties
	are
	entitled
	to
	a
	prompt
	resolution
	of
such
	charges.
	Thus,
	in
	my
	view,
	it
	is
	extremely
	important
	that
such
	cases
	be
	finalized
	as
	quickly
	as
	possible--either
	on
	the
merits 	absent
	any
	procedural
	flaws
	or
	because
	a
	party
	has
	failed
to
	act
	on
	its
	rights
	in
	a
	timely 	fashion.
On
	the
	basis 	of
	the 	foregoing
	and
	in
	view
	of
	past 	decisions
issued
	by
	this
	Board
11
where
	timeliness 	of
	filing
	was
	the
	sole
issue,
	I
	find 	the 	majority
	position 	in 	this
	case 	to
	be
	not
	only
confusing 	but 	lacking
	responsibility.
11
cf.
	Anaheim Union 	High 	School
	District,
	supra,
	PERB
	Order
No.
	Ad-27, 	comparing
	its
	facts
	to 	the 	present 	case.
	See
	also
Hanford
	Joint
	Union 	High 	School
	District
	Board
	of 	Trustees(February
	1, 	1978)
	PERB
	Dec. 	No. 	48;
	Glendale 	Unified 	School
District
	and 	Glendale
	Conn:nuni
ty	
College
	District
	(February 	1,
	19
7 8)
PERB
	Order 	No. 	Ad-25; 	Los 	Angeles 	Unified
	School
	District·
(November
	8,
	1977)
	EERB
	Order 	No. 	Ad-19; 	and
	Santa
	Ana
	Unified
School
	District
	(October 	28, 	1977)
	EERB
	Decision
	No.
	36.
12

STAT:: OF
CAU'ORNIA 	ELiMUND G 	BRO','t.N
JR,
Go-..ernor
EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS	
BO.ARD
Headquarters
Office
923 	12th Street, Suite
201
Sacramento,
California
	95814
(916) 322-3088
October 18,
	1977
Mr.
	Charles
R.
	Gustafson
1125
West
Sixth
Street
Los .Angeles,
	CA
	90017
\ \
SJ
.,
\:
'
~
i
;ii I 	, •
Re: 	Chula
Vista
Elerrentary Education Association,
	CTA/NEA,
	vs. 	Chula
Vista
City School
District,
	Case
No.
	LA.-CE-73
Dear
1':tr
. 	Gustafson:
This
mll
acknowledge
receipt of
	the exceptions
	filed
by
Chula
VistaElementary Education Association
in
	the above-captioned case. 	Unfortunacely,
your documents were
not
t:i.rrely
filed
pursuant to
California
AdrPinistrative
Code
Section 35030.
With regard to
	filing
exceptions
	to
recomnended decisions
	in rnfairpractice
cases, 	Section
35030
states.that
exceptions
nust
be
fil~d within
seven calendar days
	after
service.
	The
recorrrnended decision
in this
	case
was
served on October 3, 	1977, making.exceptions
due on October 10, 	1977.
Exceptions were
filed in this office
on October 14, 1977.
As a
result of this failure
	to tim:ly
file,
	the enclosed exceptions cannot
be submitted to the Board
itself
for consideration. 	Please be advised
	that
while there are
no
rules
	to
	this effect,
	you
are
welcorre
	to
appeal
	thisrejection of
your
filing
	to the Board
itself.
	Should you choose to
	do
	so,
your appeal should be
	filed in this office
on
or
before seven calendar
days 	from
receipt of this
	corrmmication.
Sincerely,
~~~
Stephen Barber
Executive Assistant
to the Board
Enclosure