United Teachers of Los Angeles (Seliga) (PERB 1289E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
PAULA SELIGA,
Charging 	Party,
v.
UNITED TEACHERS OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondent.
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) 	Case No. 	LA-CO-768
PERB Decision No. 	1289
October 8 	1998
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Appearances: 	Paula Seliga, 	on her own behalf; 	Geffner & Bush by-
Nathan Kowalski, 	Attorney, 	for United Teachers of Los Angeles.
Before Caffrey, 	Chairman; 	Johnson and Dyer, 	Members.
DECISION
DYER, 	Member: 	This 	case comes before the Public Employment
Relations 	Board 	(Board) 	on appeal 	of a Board agent's 	dismissal
(attached) 	of Paula Seliga's 	(Seliga) 	unfair practice charge.
Seliga's 	charge alleged that 	the United Teachers 	of 	Los Angeles
(UTLA) 	breached the 	duty of 	fair representation mandated by
section 3544.9 	of 	the 	Educational 	Employment Relations Act 	(EERA)
and thereby violated EERA section 3543.6(b)1 when 	it 	failed to
1EERA is 	codified at Government 	Code 	section 3540 	et 	seq.
Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references 	herein are
to 	the Government 	Code. 	Section 3544.9 	provides:
The 	employee 	organization 	recognized 	or
certified as 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	for
the purpose 	of meeting and negotiating 	shall
fairly 	represent 	each and 	every 	employee 	in
the appropriate unit.
Section 3543.6 provides, 	in relevant part:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for an employee
organization to:

adequately represent her with regard to: 	(1) 	a retaliatory
transfer; 	(2) 	a retaliatory evaluation; 	(3) 	numerous grievances;
(4) 	a Chapter Chair election; 	and 	(5) 	a general 	lack of
representation 	for the past 	seven years.
(b) 	Impose or threaten to impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees because 	of 	their exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed by 	this 	chapter.
The Board has 	reviewed 	the 	entire 	record 	in this 	case,
including 	the unfair practice 	charge, 	the warning and dismissal
letters, 	Seliga's appeal2 and UTLA's 	response thereto. 	The Board
finds 	the warning and dismissal 	letters 	to be 	free 	from
prejudicial 	error and adopts 	them as 	the 	decision of 	the Board
itself.
20n appeal, 	Seliga requests that, 	if the Board affirms 	the
Board agent's 	dismissal, 	it 	issue a writ 	of 	extraordinary relief
from its 	decision. 	Seliga's 	request appears 	to be a reference 	to
EERA section 3542(b), 	which provides:
(b) 	Any charging party, 	respondent, 	or
intervenor aggrieved by a 	final 	decision 	or
order of 	the board 	in an unfair practice
case, 	except a decision of 	the board not 	to
issue a complaint 	in such a case, 	may
petition 	for a writ 	of 	extraordinary 	relief
from such decision or order.
By 	its 	terms, 	Section 3542(b) 	does not 	apply to a Board decision
not to issue a complaint. 	Further, 	a writ of extraordinary
relief 	is 	a 	type 	of 	equitable 	relief 	issued by a 	court 	in
response 	to a decision by the Board. 	The Board has 	no authority
to 	issue 	such a writ.
22

ORDER
The unfair practice 	charge 	in Case No. 	LA-CO-768 	is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Chairman Caffrey and Member Johnson 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
33

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON. Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 650
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213) 736-3127
August 14, 199 8
Paula J. 	Seliga
Re: 	Paula Seliga v. 	United Teachers of Los Angeles
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CO-768, 	Second Amended Charge
DISMISSAL AND REFUSAL TO 	ISSUE A COMPLAINT
Dear Ms. Seliga:
In the above-referenced charge Paula Seliga alleges 	the United
Teachers of Los Angeles 	(UTLA) 	violated the Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(EERA or Act) 	§ 3543.6(b) 	by violating
its duty of 	fair representation. 	Seliga filed the original
charge on June 23, 	1998. 	On or about June 24, 	1998, 	I asked
Seliga several questions 	regarding her charges. 	On or about July
17, 	1998, 	I spoke with Seliga and answered several procedural
questions. 	On July 29, 	1998, 	I issued a warning letter. 	On
August 3, 199 8, Seliga filed a first amended charge. On August
5, 	1998, 	Seliga filed a second amended charge.1
The 	first and second amended charges allege UTLA failed to
represent Seliga with regard to: 	(1) 	her transfer; 	(2) 	her
performance evaluation; 	(3) 	her grievances during the 1997-1998
school year; 	and 	(4) 	the UTLA Chapter Chair's lack of
representation while Seliga was at the Bertrand School.
The warning letter indicated the original 	charge did not
establish: 	(1) 	the allegations were timely; 	(2) 	the who, what,
when, 	where and how of an unfair practice; 	and 	(3) 	that UTLA had
acted in an arbitrary, 	discriminatory or bad faith manner.
1. 	Transfer
The warning letter indicated the original 	charge 	failed to
provide the pertinent facts regarding this allegation, 	and failed
1The second amended 	charge did not vary significantly 	from
the first amended charge 	in content, 	but 	instead simply reworded
several of the paragraphs in the first amended charge.
'
j

LA-CO-768-S
Dismissal
Page 2
to demonstrate UTLA acted in an arbitrary, 	discriminatory or bad
faith manner.2 The warning letter stated, 	in pertinent part:
The 	Charging Party explained that 	she
[Seliga] 	contacted Dori Miles of UTLA when
she 	received notice of her transfer. 	Miles
indicated that 	grievances 	regarding
involuntary transfers were difficult 	to win
absent monetary loss to the grievant. 	Seliga
indicated she was going to file a grievance
on her own. 	These facts do not indicate UTLA
acted arbitrarily. 	It appears Miles assessed
the 	facts provided by Seliga, 	and told Seliga
what 	she thought was 	the likely outcome of
the grievance. 	In response, 	Seliga indicated
she would file on her own behalf. 	That
statement 	suggests Seliga did not ask for
further help from UTLA. 	Nor does the charge
provide 	facts 	indicating Seliga asked for
further help from UTLA. 	Thus, 	UTLA's conduct
regarding Seliga's 	transfer does not violate
the EERA.
The 	first and second amended charges do not refute the above-
stated facts. 	However, 	the first and second amended charges
allege the transfer was 	supported by UTLA. 	The second amended
charge alleges:
UTLA is 	supposed to support bargaining unit
members, 	(me) 	in conditions of employment, 	of
which a transfer is 	included and procedures 	to be
used for evaluation of employees. 	I was
transferred for being disharmonious, 	which sprang
from the exercise of protected rights guaranteed
by our Constitution. 	Disharmony is not equal 	to
disruption. 	I did not cause disruption. 	I
advocated for students' 	rights under the Chandra
Smith Consent Decree. 	UTLA knowingly allowed
LAUSD to use methods 	such as 	saddling me with an
inordinate amount of students with behavioral,
emotional and academic problems. 	This is also a
condition of employment 	- 	teaching students with
undiagnosed learning problems, 	and allowing them
to be 	illegally denied these services.
2The original 	charge indicates Seliga received notice of her
transfer on June 3, 	1998, 	thus, 	an allegation regarding UTLA's
conduct 	in response to that notice would appear to be timely
filed.

LA-CO-768-S
Dismissal
Page 3
The above-stated 	information does not 	factually demonstrate Miles
or any other UTLA representative acted in an arbitrary,
discriminatory, 	or bad faith manner with regard to Seliga's
transfer. 	Nor does 	the allegation provide any facts 	from which
it 	can be determined that UTLA participated in the transfer. 	As
the 	first and second amended charges did not 	correct 	the
deficiencies noted in the warning letter, 	this allegation must be
dismissed.
2. 	Performance Evaluation
The warning letter 	indicated the original 	charge failed to
demonstrate the allegation was timely, 	to provide pertinent
facts, 	and to establish UTLA acted in arbitrary, 	discriminatory
or bad faith manner.
The 	first and second amended charges 	indicate Seliga received
negative performance evaluations 	in March and June of 	1998. 	The
charges do not 	indicate whether Seliga contacted UTLA, 	or any
particular UTLA representative 	regarding these evaluations. 	The
second amended charge indicates, 	in pertinent part:
Even though the collective bargaining
agreement states Article X, 	Evaluation and
Discipline Section 4.2 	and 4.3 	that 	if 	the
employee and employer are unable to reach
agreement . 	. 	. and if the employee is
dissatisfied with the 	evaluator's
determination, 	the employee may appeal the
matter to the next higher administrative
level 	for resolution." 	and 4.3 	"If the
employee 	is dissatisfied with the evaluator's
determination, 	the employee may appeal the
matter to the next higher administrative
level." 	These rights were denied me by UTLA,
with various 	lack of 	responses 	from D.
Higuchi, T. Skotnes, and D. Miles. 	D. Miles'
only response was 	to verbally state 	"she's
never heard of this 	clause being used
before." 	[sic]
The 	second amended charge also states:
When I went before the grievance committee 	in
May 98, 	I went to pursue Article X, 	Section
4.2 	and 4.3 	which stated that 	the employee
may appeal 	the matter to the next higher
administrative level, 	not merely protest the
evaluation. 	This right was denied to me by
the district with full support of UTLA, 	yet

LA-CO-768-S
Dismissal
Page 4
the right 	is 	clearly stated in the contract
in the aforementioned sections.
The 	first and second amended charges 	do not 	explain how UTLA
denied Seliga these rights, 	nor do the 	facts provided explain how
UTLA supported the District 	in denying these rights. 	UTLA
informed Seliga that 	it would not pursue the grievance to
arbitration because UTLA's Grievance 	Committee determined that
the District had not violated any contract provision. 	Therefore,
the original and the amended charges 	fail 	to demonstrate UTLA
acted in arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or bad faith manner.
3. 	Grievances
The warning 	letter 	indicated the original 	charge 	failed to
demonstrate the allegation was timely, 	to provide pertinent
facts, 	and to establish UTLA acted in an arbitrary,
discriminatory or bad faith manner.
The 	first 	and second amended charges 	indicate Seliga 	filed
grievances, 	during the 	"97-98 school year," without providing
specific dates. 	As previously stated, 	unfair practices occurring
before December 23, 	1997, 	are time-barred by PERB's six month
statute of limitations. 	The first and second amended charges do
not establish that 	this allegation is 	timely filed, 	and therefore
it must be dismissed.
Even if considered timely filed, 	the charge does not demonstrate
UTLA acted in an arbitrary discriminatory or bad faith manner.
With regard to this allegation, 	the second amended charge
indicates:
D. 	Miles 	refused to pursue my grievance on
notification of absence, 	even though
grievance had merit 	that would have affected
many other teachers. 	A grievance victory
would not have damaged the terms and
conditions of employment 	for the bargaining
unit as a whole. 	In fact, 	it would have
clarified some ambiguous 	language that was
susceptible on it face to more than one
interpretation 	(patent ambiguity) 	The
contract provision specifically states 	that
the office must know of the teacher's absence
not later than 	"30 minutes before the
schedule begins on the day of the absence."
It 	is not clear whose schedule is referred to
here, 	the substitutes's or the teacher's. 	In
cases where the teacher leaves 	for part of
the day, 	and has already called the sub. 	desk

LA-C0-768-S
Dismissal
Page 5
to order a substitute for his/her absence,
there is no need for the office to know first
thing in the morning if the teacher is not
leaving till 	say 1:00 pm. 	This 	interferes
with teachers' 	rights, 	and opens the door for
workplace abuse, 	in as much as administration
can then lobby for unavailability of half-day
substitutes. 	I did not have 	"second
thoughts" about the remedy, 	but was told by
D. 	Miles that if I did not accept provisions
of 	the grievance about substitute
notification, 	she would not advocate for me
at Grievance Review. 	(I did not know at the
time that 	I could present my own case to the
committee.) 	I was coerced into accepting the
remedy which was really no remedy at all as 	I
specifically asked 	for declaratory relief 	in
resolution of 	this ambiguously worded
contract provision, 	[sic]
The above-stated information does not demonstrate a prima facie
violation of the duty of 	fair representation. 	The facts 	indicate
UTLA represented Seliga and settled the 	absence-policy grievance.
Seliga, 	however, 	alleges this conduct violates the EERA because
she did not get 	the remedy she 	initially requested. 	Although
Seliga does not agree with the settlement, 	the duty of fair
representation does not require UTLA to obtain the remedy sought
by Seliga. 	The duty of 	fair representation allows UTLA to:
exercise 	its discretion in determining how
far to pursue a grievance as long as it does
not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious
grievance or process a grievance in a
perfunctory fashion. 	(United Teachers of Los
Angeles 	(Collins) 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No.
258.)
Here, 	the facts do not indicate UTLA ignored Seliga's grievance,
nor do they indicate UTLA processed the grievance in a
perfunctory fashion. 	Thus, 	this allegation is dismissed.
4. 	The Chapter Chair
The 	original 	charge alleged that UTLA violated the EERA by
failing to set aside the Chapter Chair election. 	The warning
letter indicated the original 	charge 	failed to demonstrate 	the
allegation was timely, 	to provide pertinent facts, 	and to
establish UTLA acted in an arbitrary, 	discriminatory or bad faith
manner. 	The warning letter also indicated the election was an
internal union affair, 	and that the original charge did not

LA-CO-768-S
Dismissal
Page 6
provide facts 	indicating UTLA's refusal 	to set aside the Chapter
Chair election had an impact 	on Seliga's 	relationship with her
employer. 	The warning letter also noted that Seliga voluntarily
withdrew her candidacy for the 	Chapter Chair position.
With regard to the election, 	the second amended charge alleges:
Furthermore, 	I belong to a protected class, 	I
have a known disability and am a known union
activist. 	I had no fair representation for
grievance handling. 	The decision not to
pursue the chapter chair election in May of
98 was not voluntarily withdrawn. 	Rather my
candidacy was 	forced to be withdrawn because
I 	feared physical 	harm based on the 	torn
speeches placed in my mailbox with derogatory
statements, 	threats, 	and foul language. 	I
have evidence that 	I had previously been
attacked by a 	teacher 	favored by the
principal, 	and then blamed for causing her to
attack me. 	She is a close personal 	friend of
my local school Union representative, 	my
chapter chair, Don Hori.
In Kimmett v. 	SSEU it is stated that a charge
involving internal union affairs 	is not a DFR
claim and is outside PERB jurisdiction unless
the activity has 	substantial 	impact on
employees' 	relationship with employer.) 	When
my chapter chair Don Hori and D. 	Miles did
not support my rights, 	this did impact on my
relationship with my principal. 	Since I had
no support, 	he felt free to intimidate me
further and further deny my rights. 	However,
these transgressions by UTLA are not 	internal
union affairs, 	but result from a lack of
enforcing many CBA provisions, 	[sic]
The above-stated information does not 	correct 	the deficiencies
noted in the warning letter. 	The Chapter Chair election is an
internal union affair over which PERB does not have jurisdiction
absent 	facts 	demonstrating-a substantial-impact 	on Seliga's
relationship with her employer or that UTLA retaliated against
Seliga for protected activities. 	Seliga's allegation that 	the
principal 	felt 	free to intimidate her as a result of UTLA's
decision not 	to set aside the election does not demonstrate a
substantial 	impact 	on Seliga's 	relationship with her employer.
Nor does 	the 	charge 	include 	facts demonstrating UTLA retaliated
against Seliga for protected activities. 	Thus, 	this allegation
should be dismissed.

LA-CO-768-S
Dismissal
Page 7
The warning 	letter also noted that 	Seliga withdrew from the
election. 	The 	first and second amended charges allege Seliga
withdrew because she received written threats, 	and that 	therefore
she did not voluntarily withdraw her candidacy. 	However, 	neither
the original 	nor the amended charges 	include those written
threats. 	The charges 	fail to identify who wrote the alleged
threats, 	and therefore that conduct cannot be attributed to UTLA.
In addition to the allegation regarding the Chapter Election, 	the
original 	charge also alleged the Chapter Chair denied her a duty
of 	fair representation. 	The warning letter indicated the
original 	charge 	failed to demonstrate 	the allegation was 	timely,
to provide pertinent 	facts, 	and to establish UTLA acted in an
arbitrary, 	discriminatory or bad faith manner. 	The first and
second amended charges allege the UTLA Chapter Chair, 	Don Hori,
denied Seliga representation during her seven years at Bertrand.
The 	first and second amended charges allege Hori 	failed to
represent Seliga by failing to help Seliga enforce her seniority
rights. 	This 	information does not state a prima facie violation
within the jurisdiction of PERB for the reasons that 	follow.
As previously stated, 	PERB has a six-month statute of limitations
period. 	In the original charge, 	Seliga provided:
I have not been able to use my seniority
rights for four years, due to unsubstantiated,
defamatory statements made about me, 	by other
bargaining unit members.
In the first and second amended charges 	Seliga alleges Hori has
failed to represent her for the past seven years. 	Thus, 	it
appears 	that 	Seliga knew of 	the alleged unfair practice more than
six months before the filing of this charge. 	Therefore, 	this
general allegation must be dismissed as 	outside the jurisdiction
of 	PERB. 	Seliga specifically alleges the Hori 	failed to support
her seniority rights. 	The original 	charge 	includes a May 7,
1997, 	letter from UTLA to Seliga regarding Hori's failure to
support her seniority rights. 	Thus, 	it appears Seliga had
knowledge of 	this alleged unfair practice more than six months
prior to the filing of this charge on June 23, 	1998. 	Therefore,
this 	allegation should be dismissed.
Even if 	timely filed the charges do not present 	facts 	indicating
Hori or UTLA acted in an arbitrary, 	discriminatory, 	or bad faith
manner. 	UTLA addressed Seliga's concern in a May 7, 	1997, 	letter
which indicated the Chapter Chair was not 	required to vote a
certain way over the selection of classes. 	The charges do not
include any memorandum from UTLA describing Seliga 	in a negative
light. 	Thus, 	this allegation must be dismissed.

LA-CO-768-S
Dismissal
Page 8
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to Public Employment Relations Board regulations, 	you
may obtain a review of this dismissal of 	the charge by filing
an appeal to the Board itself within twenty 	(20) 	calendar days
after service of this dismissal. 	(Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a).) 	Any document 	filed with the Board must 	contain
the case name and number. 	To be timely filed, 	the original and
five 	copies 	of 	such appeal must be actually received by the Board
itself before the close of business 	(5 p.m.) 	or sent by
telegraph, 	certified or Express United States mail postmarked no
later than the last date set for filing. 	(Cal. 	Code Regs.,
tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32135.) 	Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 shall
apply. 	The Board's address is:
Attention: Appeals Assistant
Public Employment Relations Board
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 	95814
If you file a timely appeal of the refusal 	to issue a complaint,
any other party may file with the Board an original 	and five
copies of a statement in opposition within twenty 	(20) 	calendar
days following the date of service of the appeal. 	(Cal. 	Code
Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32635(b).)
Service
All 	documents authorized to be 	filed herein must also be 	"served"
upon all parties to the proceeding, 	and a 	"proof of service"
must accompany each copy of a document 	served upon a party or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for the required contents and a sample form.) 	The
document will be 	considered properly 	"served" 	when personally
delivered or deposited in the first-class mail, 	postage paid and
properly addressed.
Extension of Time
A request 	for an extension of time, 	in which to file a document
with the Board itself, 	must be in writing and filed with the
Board at 	the previously noted address. 	A request 	for an
extension must be filed at least three 	(3) 	calendar days before
the expiration of 	the time required for filing the document.
The request must indicate good cause for and, 	if known, 	the
position of each other party regarding the extension, 	and shall
be accompanied by proof 	of 	service of 	the 	request upon each
party. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32132.)
Final Date
I

LA-CO-768-S
Dismissal
Page 9
If no appeal 	is filed within the specified time limits, 	the
dismissal will become final when the time limits have expired.
Sincerely,
ROBERT THOMPSON
Deputy General 	Counsel
Tammy L. Samsel
Regional Director
Attachment
cc: 	Nathan Kowalski

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	. 	PETE WILSON. Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 650
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213) 736-3127
July 29, 	1998
Paula J. 	Seliga
Re: 	Paula Seliga v. 	United Teachers of Los Angeles
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CO-768
WARNING LETTER
Dear Ms. Seliga:
In the above-referenced charge 	Paula Seliga alleges 	the United
Teachers of Los Angeles 	(UTLA) 	violated the Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(EERA or Act) 	§ 3543.6(b) 	by violating
her duty of 	fair representation. 	Seliga is a teacher within the
Los Angeles Unified School District 	(LAUSD or District). 	The
charge states 	in its entirety:
PERB's test for determining if a subject is
within the scope of representation is the
"Anaheim Test." 	Under EERA 3543.2 Terms and
Conditions of Employment. 	UTLA has failed to
represent me fairly in 1) 	Retaliatory
transfer. 	2.) 	Retaliatory evaluation of
employee, 	(me) 	3.) 	In numerous grievances
there has been no 	"good faith" bargaining.
4.) 	My School 	Chapter Chair is encouraged to
do as he feels is best, 	rather than support
my right to fair representation. 	After
numerous written and oral 	communications
asking for support because 	I had complained
to the Calif. Dept. 	of Education and LAUSD's
Division of Compliance Review. 	I am being
moved to another school, 	schedule, 	and grade
level against my wishes. 	I should have been
offered protection, 	according to the enclosed
memos from D. Higuichi and Dr. 	Jones, but my
pleas 	for justice 	for myself and my students
have gone unheeded in spite of 	legal mandates
to do so.
Clovis USD 	(1984) 	No. 	389 62 CPER 56
(Representation election set aside because
unfair practice 	interfered with right 	to
freely choose representative; 	unfair conduct
included 	"Captive Audience" 	speech to
employees about election, 	etc. 	This same
situation happened to me when UTLA Elections

LA-CO-768
Warning 	Letter
Page 	2
for 	chapter 	chair were 	held 	during 	the 	first
15 minutes 	of 	a staff meeting. 	(immediately
after my 	campaign 	literature 	had been 	torn 	to
shreds 	with 	obscenities 	written 	on 	them and
placed 	in my mailbox.) 	My morale was 	so 	low,
that 	I 	considered 	it 	futile 	to make 	a 	speech
under 	such 	conditions 	and 	I 	felt 	forced 	to
withdraw my 	candidacy.
Under EERA 3543.2 	conditions 	of 	employment
include transfer, 	reassignment, 	and
procedures 	to be used 	for evaluation 	of
employees. 	When I brought 	grievances 	to
arbitration, 	regarding my Stull 	Evaluation
the 	UTLA Grievance 	Review 	Committee 	told me
these 	grievances 	weren't 	eligible 	for
arbitration because 	I 	had not 	yet 	received
and unfavorable 	evaluation. 	Yet 	in the 	CBA
Article X, 	Evaluation and Discipline 	4.2,
4.3, 	under 	the 	state 	statute 	regarding
reprisal, 	and according to 	the 	equity clause
of 	the 	CBA. 	Other 	teachers 	were 	allowed to
make appointments 	at 	their 	convenience 	for
their performance 	review, 	while 	I was 	forced
to 	be 	evaluated 	during 	yearly 	testing 	other
inauspicious, 	not mutually agreed upon times.
In May of 	1998 	I was 	entitled to present my
case 	to the arbitration committee, 	but 	denied
access 	for 	the 	stated 	reason.
I 	have 	not 	been able 	to use my 	seniority
rights 	for 4 years 	due 	to the
unsubstantiated, 	defamatory 	statements made
about me, 	by other bargaining unit members
(See 	latest 	covertly 	circulated memo 	about
me, 	propagating unfounded rumors 	without
bringing 	the matter 	to my attention.) 	My
chapter chair, 	Don Hori has 	not 	supported by
seniority 	rights 	and 	additionally has 	been at
the 	forefront 	in 	signing 	these 	defamatory
remarks 	about me, 	and has not alerted me 	to
the .damage 	to my 	reputation,-so 	I 	have 	had no
"fair representation." 	When 	I 	appealed to
the UTLA Constitution Committee, 	they stated
that 	he 	did not 	have 	to 	support 	my 	seniority
rights 	as 	stated 	in 	the 	CBA. 	(See 	enclosed.)
At 	the 	last 	of my many grievances, 	during 	the
'97-98 	school year, 	I was 	forced to accept a
remedy 	that 	was 	not 	included 	in 	the 	grievance

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when I wrote it up. 	I clearly stated on the
grievance 	form that 	I wanted declaratory-
relief. 	At Step 1 the principal 	came up with
a different plan. 	While in my naivete I
assumed this was just one step on the way to
declaratory relief, 	my UTLA Representative
later told me she 	considered the matter
settled and would not advocate 	for me
continuing this grievance even though it was
so stated on the grievance form that 	I wanted
"Declaratory Relief." 	See enclosed.
The charge also includes the following attachments: 	(1) 	May 7,
1997 letter from Lila Dawson-Weber, 	UTLA Constitution Committee
Chairperson, 	to Seliga, 	indicating the Committee had unanimously
ruled against Seliga's request that 	it overturn the election of
the Chapter Chair; 	(2) 	a December 23, 	1997 letter from Seliga to
Mr. 	Butler and Mr. 	Skotnes listing complaints against the
principal at the Bertarnd School; 	(3) 	a June 5, 	1998 letter from
Margaret Jones to Seliga closing Seliga's 	complaint to the
administration that she was being retaliated against; 	(4) 	an
unsigned and undated petition which would require UTLA to mandate
their Chapter Chairs to support votes on seniority rights; 	(5) 	a
June 9, 	1997 letter from Day Higuchi, 	UTLA President, 	to Sheila
Hopper which indicates UTLA adopted a policy on whistleblower
protection; 	and 	(6) 	a June 30, 	1997 letter from Henry Jones,
LAUSD Chief 	Financial Officer to Douglas Hopper indicating that
the State Auditor's office would investigate allegations made by
Mr. 	Hopper against LAUSD.
Seliga also hand-delivered approximately 50 pages 	of documents 	to
the Los Angeles Regional Office. 	These documents were not served
on the Respondent.
On June 23, 	1998, 	Seliga filed a unfair practice charge alleging
the District 	retaliated against her by transferring her to the
Hazeltine Elementary School. 	On or about June 24, 	1998, 	I asked
Seliga several questions 	regarding her charges. 	During this
conversation, 	Seliga indicated that she had contacted Dori Miles
of UTLA when she had received notice of her transfer. 	Seliga
alleges Miles 	told her that grievances based on transfers usually
lose unless the employees can-prove loss of money. 	Seliga told
Miles 	that she would be filing a grievance herself. 	Miles did
not 	respond to Seliga's 	statement.
On or about July 17, 	1998, 	I spoke with Seliga and answered
several procedural questions 	for Seliga.
I

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The 	above-stated 	information 	fails 	to 	state 	a prima 	facie
violation of 	the 	EERA within 	the 	jurisdiction 	of 	PERB 	for 	the
reasons 	that 	follow.
Seliga alleges UTLA failed to 	represent her with regard to: 	(1) 	a
retaliatory transfer; 	(2) 	a retaliatory evaluation; 	(3) 	in
numerous grievances; 	(4) 	a Chapter Chair election; 	and 	(5) 	in
failing 	to provide 	declaratory 	relief 	in her last 	grievance.
EERA § 	3541.5(a)(1) 	provides 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations
Board 	shall 	not, 	"issue a 	complaint 	in respect 	of 	any charge
based upon 	an alleged unfair practice 	occurring more 	than 	six
months prior to the 	filing of 	the 	charge." 	It 	is your burden, 	as
the 	charging party 	to demonstrate 	the 	charge 	has 	been 	timely
filed. 	(See Tehachapi Unified School District 	(1993) 	PERB
Decision No. 	1024.)
Seliga filed this 	charge on June 23, 	1998. 	The charge does not
include 	facts 	indicating 	when 	the District 	issued 	Seliga 	a
negative 	evaluation, 	when Seliga 	filed any grievances, 	when the
Chapter 	Chair 	election 	took place 	or when UTLA 	forced 	Seliga 	to
accept 	less 	than declaratory relief. 	Thus, 	these 	four
allegations 	are 	considered untimely 	filed 	and must 	be 	dismissed.
Even 	if 	considered timely filed, 	these allegations 	do not 	state a
prima 	facie violation 	for 	reasons 	that 	will 	be 	discussed 	further
below.
The 	charge 	indicates 	Seliga 	received notice 	of 	her 	transfer 	on
June 3, 	1998, 	thus, 	an allegation regarding UTLA's 	conduct 	in
response 	to 	that 	notice would appear to be 	timely 	filed.
However, 	that 	allegation does 	not 	state a prima 	facie violation
for 	reasons 	that 	will 	be 	discussed 	further below.
Even 	if 	considered 	timely 	filed, 	all 	five 	of 	the 	charge's
allegations 	suffer 	from 	further 	inadequacies. 	A charging party
should allege the 	"who, 	what, 	when, 	where, 	and how" 	of an unfair
practice. 	(United Teachers-Los Angeles 	(Ragsdale) 	(1992) 	PERB
Decision 	944.) 	Mere 	legal 	conclusions are 	insufficient. 	(See
State 	of 	California 	(Department 	of 	Food and Agriculture 	(1994)
PERB Decision No. 	1071-S.)
The written statement of 	charge does not-present 	the 	"who, 	what,
when, 	where, 	and how of an unfair practice." 	Nor do the
documents 	attached to the 	charge, 	and summarized above, 	provide
this 	information. 	Seliga alleges 	UTLA failed 	to 	represent 	her
with regard to: 	(1) 	a retaliatory transfer; 	(2) 	a retaliatory
evaluation; 	(3) 	in numerous grievances; 	(4) 	in a Chapter Chair
election; 	and 	(5) 	in failing to provide declaratory relief 	in her
last grievance. 	However, 	the 	charge does not provide 	facts
supporting these allegations. 	Thus, 	the 	charge 	should be
I

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dismissed for failure to provide the who, 	what, 	when, 	where and
how of 	an unfair practice.
Even 	if 	not 	dismissed for 	the 	above-stated reasons, 	the 	charge
fails 	to 	state 	a prima 	facie violation of 	the 	EERA for the
following 	additional 	reasons. 	Charging 	Party has 	alleged 	that
the 	exclusive 	representative 	denied 	Charging 	Party 	the 	right 	to
fair 	representation 	guaranteed 	by 	EERA 	section 	3544.9 	and 	thereby
violated 	section 3543.6(b). 	The duty of 	fair representation
imposed 	on 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	extends 	to 	grievance
handling. 	(Fremont Teachers Association 	(King) 	(1980) 	PERB
Decision No. 	125; 	United Teachers of Los Angeles 	(Collins) 	(1982)
PERB Decision No. 	258.) 	In order to state a prima 	facie
violation of 	this 	section of 	EERA, 	Charging 	Party must 	show that
the Association's 	conduct was 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory or 	in bad
faith. 	In United Teachers 	of 	Los Angeles 	(Collins). 	the Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board 	stated:
Absent bad faith, 	discrimination, 	or
arbitrary 	conduct, 	mere negligence 	or poor
judgment 	in handling 	a grievance 	does 	not
constitute 	a breach 	of 	the union's 	duty.
[Citations.]
A union may exercise 	its 	discretion 	to
determine 	how 	far 	to pursue 	a grievance 	in
the 	employee's 	behalf 	as 	long as 	it 	does 	not
arbitrarily 	ignore 	a meritorious 	grievance 	or
process 	a grievance 	in a perfunctory 	fashion.
A union 	is 	also not 	required to process 	an
employee's 	grievance 	if 	the 	chances 	for
success are minimal.
In 	order 	to 	state 	a prima 	facie 	case 	of 	arbitrary 	conduct
violating 	the 	duty of 	fair representation, 	a Charging 	Party:
" . . . 	must 	at 	a minimum 	include 	an 	assertion
of 	sufficient 	facts 	from which 	it 	becomes
apparent 	how or 	in what manner 	the 	exclusive
representative's 	action 	or 	inaction was
without 	a 	rational 	basis 	or devoid of 	honest
judgment. . . . . . (Emphasis 	added.) " 	[Reed District
Teachers Association. 	CTA/NEA 	(Reyes) 	(1983)
PERB Decision No. 	332, 	p. 	9, 	citing Rocklin
Teachers 	Professional 	Association 	(Romero)
(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	124.]
The 	charge 	does 	not 	provide 	facts 	indicating UTLA acted 	in an
arbitrary, 	discriminatory or bad 	faith manner. 	The 	Charging
Party 	explained 	that 	she 	contacted Dori Miles 	of 	UTLA when 	she

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received notice 	of 	her 	transfer. 	Miles 	indicated 	that 	grievances
regarding 	involuntary 	transfers 	were 	difficult 	to 	win absent
monetary 	loss 	to 	the 	grievant. 	Seliga 	indicated 	she was 	going 	to
file a grievance 	on her own. 	These 	facts 	do not 	indicate UTLA
acted arbitrarily. 	It appears Miles assessed the 	facts provided
by Seliga, 	and told Seliga what 	she 	thought was 	the 	likely
outcome 	of 	the grievance. 	In response, 	Seliga 	indicated she
would 	file 	on her 	own behalf. 	That 	statement 	suggests 	Seliga did
not 	ask 	for 	further help 	from UTLA. 	Nor does 	the 	charge provide
facts 	indicating Seliga asked 	for 	further help 	from UTLA. 	Thus,
UTLA's 	conduct 	regarding 	Seliga's 	transfer does 	not 	violate 	the
EERA. 	Nor 	does 	the 	charge provide 	facts 	indicating UTLA violated
the 	EERA with 	regard 	to 	Seliga's 	performance 	evaluation 	or 	other
grievances. 	Thus, 	these allegations 	should be dismissed.
The 	charge 	also 	suggests 	UTLA denied Seliga's 	duty 	of 	fair
representation by 	failing 	to 	set 	aside 	a 	Chapter 	Chair election.
PERB 	decided matters 	concerning 	internal 	union affairs 	are
generally 	immune 	from review, 	unless 	they have 	a 	substantial
impact 	on 	the 	relationships 	of 	unit members 	to 	their employers 	so
as 	to give 	rise 	to a duty of 	fair representation, 	or 	involve
retaliations 	for protected activity. 	(San 	Francisco 	Community
College District 	Federation of 	Teachers 	(1995) 	PERB Decision No.
1084.) 	The 	charge 	does 	not provide any 	facts 	indicating 	the
election had an 	impact 	on Seliga's 	relationship with her employer
as 	to 	give 	rise 	to 	the duty 	of 	fair 	representation and should
therefore be dismissed. 	Moreover, 	the 	charge 	itself, 	indicates
Seliga 	voluntarily 	withdrew 	her 	candidacy.
For these 	reasons 	the charge, 	as presently written, 	does not
state a prima 	facie 	case. 	If 	there are any 	factual 	inaccuracies
in 	this 	letter 	or additional 	facts 	which would 	correct 	the
deficiencies 	explained above, 	please amend the 	charge. 	The
amended 	charge 	should be 	prepared 	on a 	standard 	PERB unfair
practice 	charge 	form, 	clearly 	labeled First Amended Charge,
contain all 	the 	facts and allegations you wish to make, 	and
be 	signed under penalty 	of perjury by 	the 	charging party. 	The
amended 	charge must 	have 	the 	case 	number written 	on 	the 	top 	right
hand 	corner 	of 	the 	charge 	form. 	The 	amended 	charge must 	be
served 	on 	the 	respondent's 	representative 	and 	the 	original 	proof
of 	service must be 	filed with PERB. 	If 	I 	do not 	receive an
amended charge or withdrawal 	from you before August 	5, 	1998, 	I
shall dismiss your charge. 	If you have any questions, 	please
call me at 	(213) 	736-3008.
Sincerely,
Tammy L. 	Samsel
Regional 	Director