Centralia School District (Burchell) (PERB 1059E)

STATE 	OP 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
LAUREL BURCHELL,
Charging 	Party,
v.
CENTRALIA SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CE-3293
PERB Decision No. 	1059
September 23, 	1994
Appearances: 	Laurel Burchell, 	on her own behalf; 	Atkinson,
Andelson, 	Loya, 	Ruud and Romo by Robert L. 	Sammis, 	Attorney, 	for
Centralia 	School 	District.
Before Carlyle, 	Garcia and Johnson, 	Members.
DECISION
JOHNSON, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is before 	the Public Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB 	or Board) 	on appeal 	by Laurel 	Burchell
(Burchell) 	of 	the administrative law judge's 	(ALJ) 	proposed
decision 	(attached). 	In that decision the ALJ dismissed
Burchell's 	unfair practice 	charge 	which alleged 	that 	the
Centralia School 	District 	(District) 	violated 	section 	3543.5(a)
of 	the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations Act 	(EERA)1 by 	taking
1EERA is 	codified at Government 	Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.
Section 3543.5 	states, 	in pertinent part:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for a public 	school
employer 	to do any of 	the 	following:
(a) 	Impose 	or threaten to 	impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees because 	of 	their exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed by 	this 	chapter.
)
)
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______________ )

adverse 	action against 	Burchell. 	Although 	the ALJ 	found 	"some
evidence 	of minimal 	protected activity," 	Burchell 	could not 	prove
that 	the District's motivation, 	even in part, 	was based on her
protected 	activity.
The 	Board has 	reviewed the 	entire 	record 	in this 	case,
including the ALJ's proposed decision, 	the 	transcript, 	exhibits,
Burchell's 	statement 	of 	exceptions2 and the District's 	opposition
to the 	exceptions. 	The Board finds 	the ALJ's 	findings 	of 	fact
and 	conclusions 	of 	law to be 	free 	of prejudicial 	error and,
therefore, 	adopts 	them as 	the decision of 	the Board 	itself
consistent 	with 	the 	following 	discussion.
BURCHELL'S 	EXCEPTIONS
On appeal, 	Burchell 	excepts 	to 11 	statements made by the ALJ
in the proposed decision. 	Burchell 	excepts 	to 	the ALJ's
discussion which 	implies 	that 	there was 	little 	or no
circumstantial 	evidence 	that 	the District was motivated, 	even in
part, 	by Burchell's protected activity. 	Burchell 	next 	takes
exception to 	the ALJ's 	finding 	that 	there was 	no violation that
whenever 	the District 	wanted 	to 	engage 	in discussions 	regarding
disciplinary issues, 	they would ensure 	that 	Burchell 	was
represented by her union.
Furthermore, 	Burchell 	argues 	that 	the District's motivations
and decision to 	terminate her was 	not 	due 	to her poor work
performance but based on retaliation, 	disparate 	treatment,
2Burchell's 	request 	for oral 	argument 	in this 	case was
previously 	denied by 	the 	Board.
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shifting 	justifications 	and 	inadequate 	information. 	Finally,
Burchell 	objects 	to the ALJ's 	dismissal 	of her charge, 	especially
when 	the 	District 	was 	under no 	obligation 	to put 	forth any 	facts
or evidence 	in its 	defense.
DISTRICT'S 	OPPOSITION TO 	EXCEPTIONS
The District 	refers 	to 	the ALJ's proposed decision 	in
responding 	to Burchell's 	exceptions. 	The District 	states 	that
Burchell's 	exceptions 	relate 	to matters 	of 	fact 	found by the ALJ
and 	raise 	no 	challenge 	to 	the 	legal 	standards 	applied by 	the ALJ.
Further, 	the District 	confirms 	that 	the ALJ correctly applied the
legal 	standards 	to 	the 	facts 	presented by Burchell 	and 	correctly
concluded 	that 	the District 	never denied Burchell 	the 	right 	to
union 	representation.
DISCUSSION
The ALJ appropriately 	relied on 	the 	Board's 	decision 	in
Novato Unified School District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	210
(Novato), 	where the Board set out 	the elements of a prima facie
case 	of 	discrimination or retaliation.
In order to state a prima facie 	case under Novato, 	Burchell
must prove: 	(1) 	that she engaged in protected activity, 	(2) 	that
the District had knowledge of her protected activity, 	(3) 	that
the District 	took adverse action against her, 	and 	(4) 	the
District 	took adverse 	action against 	her because 	she 	engaged 	in
that protected activity. 	(See also, 	Carlsbad Unified School
District 	(1979) 	PERB Decision No. 	89.) 	Generally, 	if direct
proof 	of 	a 	connection or nexus 	between protected activity and 	the
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adverse action is unavailable, 	the 	charging party must 	rely on
circumstantial 	evidence 	and/or 	inferences 	drawn 	from the 	record
as a whole.
Novato also 	instructs 	that 	once a prima 	facie 	case 	has been
established, 	the burden then shifts 	to 	the District 	to prove 	that
it 	would have 	taken 	the action 	regardless 	of 	any protected
activity. 	In the present 	case, 	Burchell 	did not 	establish a
prima 	facie 	case. 	The burden does not 	shift 	to 	the District.
Therefore, 	the District was under no obligation to put 	forth any
evidence. 	Burchell 	failed to prove 	either by direct 	evidence 	or
circumstantial 	evidence 	that 	the District was motivated, 	even in
part, 	by her protected activity.
Assuming 	for argument 	sake 	that 	Burchell 	did 	in 	fact 	state 	a
prima 	facie 	case, 	we 	further agree with the ALJ's 	finding that
there was 	enough evidence presented 	in this 	record, 	without 	the
District 	offering anything 	else, 	to 	rebut 	a prima 	facie 	case and
prove 	that 	the District 	would have 	terminated Burchell, 	in spite
of 	any protected activity. 	The 	record demonstrated 	that
Burchell's 	behavior 	created 	an 	intolerable 	working 	relationship
between herself 	and 	other 	teachers 	she was 	assigned 	to work with,
as well as 	the principal.
In 	reaching 	his 	decision 	the ALJ 	found 	that 	there was 	no
evidence of disparate treatment; 	there was no evidence of
shifting justifications 	from the District; 	and 	in fact, 	there was
no 	evidence 	of 	protected activity presented by Burchell 	that
played a 	role 	in the District's 	decision making process. 	The
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District's 	evidence 	showed 	that 	on numerous 	occasions various
methods were used to 	effectuate 	change 	in Burchell's 	behavior,
but 	to no avail.
Accordingly, 	the ALJ found that 	the. District's decision to
terminate 	Burchell 	was 	based on poor performance 	and her 	rude 	and
abusive behavioral 	tendencies, 	not 	on protected activity. 	We
agree 	with 	the ALJ's 	conclusion 	that 	Burchell 	failed 	to 	establish
a prima 	facie 	case.
ORDER
The unfair practice 	charge 	in Case No. 	LA-CE-3293 	is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Members 	Carlyle and Garcia 	joined 	in this 	Decision
55

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
LAUREL BURCHELL,
Charging 	Party,
v.
THE 	CENTRALIA SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
)
)
) 	Unfair 	Practice
Case No. 	LA-CE-3293
PROPOSED DECISION
(2/11/94)
)
)
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Appearances; 	Laurel Burchell, 	on her own behalf; 	Atkinson,
Andelson, 	Loya, 	Ruud and Romo, 	by Robert L. 	Sammis, 	Attorney,
for the Centralia School 	District.
Before JAMES W. 	TAMM, 	Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL 	HISTORY
On March 12, 	1993, 	Laurel Burchell 	(Burchell or Charging
Party) 	filed 	this unfair practice 	charge against 	the 	Centralia
School District 	(District or Respondent). 	The 	charge was amended
on March 25, 	1993. 	On April 2, 	1993, 	the case was placed in
abeyance by the parties until June 2, 	1993. 	On August 	12, 	1993,
a 	complaint 	was 	issued by 	the 	general 	counsel's 	office 	of 	the
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(PERB 	or Board) 	alleging
violations 	of 	section 3543.5(a) 	of 	the Educational 	Employment
Relations 	Act 	(EERA).1
EERA	1EERA is 	codified at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3540
et 	seq. 	The pertinent portion of 	section 3543.5 	reads:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for a public 	school 	employer
to:
(a) 	Impose or threaten to impose reprisals 	on
employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise 	to
interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce employees
because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of 	rights 	guaranteed by
this 	chapter.
This proposed decision has been appealed to the
Board itself and may not be cited as precedent
unless the decision and its rationale have been
adopted by the Board.
__________________ )

The 	complaint 	specifically alleged 	that 	the 	District 	took
adverse 	action against 	Burchell 	by denying her use 	of 	leave 	time,
denying pay 	for a 	staff 	development 	day, 	issuing written
reprimands, 	giving negative 	evaluations 	and terminating her
employment because 	of her exercise 	of protected activity. 	The
complaint 	further alleged 	that 	on 	several 	occasions 	the District
denied Burchell 	the 	right 	to be 	represented by her union during
interviews 	which would result 	in disciplinary action 	or 	in 	the
alternative 	posed 	"highly unusual 	circumstances."
At 	the 	start 	of 	the 	formal 	hearing, 	the Charging Party
amended the 	complaint, 	changing the dates 	of 	some allegations and
adding additional 	allegations 	of denial 	of pay.
At 	the 	conclusion of 	the 	third day of 	hearing, 	the 	Charging
Party 	rested her 	case 	and 	the District made a motion 	to dismiss
the 	complaint. 	The parties waived transcripts but 	chose 	to 	file
briefs. 	The matter was 	submitted January 21, 	1994. 	After
careful 	consideration of 	the entire 	record, 	the District's motion
to dismiss 	is granted.
Negative 	Evaluations. 	Written Reprimands 	and Termination
Charging 	Party was 	a 	resource 	specialist 	assistant 	for 	the
District 	since 	1989. 	While her 	initial 	performance 	evaluations
were 	satisfactory, 	she began having problems 	in her working
relationships with her resource 	specialist 	teacher, 	Judee
Comings, 	early in her employment.
During 	the 	1991-92 	school 	year Charging 	Party began having
tardiness 	problems 	and her 	relationship with her principal,
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Richard Hoss, 	deteriorated. 	That 	school year Charging Party-
received reprimands 	for 	insubordination due 	to 	rudeness, 	and
carelessness 	in leaving 	children unattended, 	among 	other 	reasons.
During 	the 	1992-93 	school 	year Charging 	Party's 	behavioral
problems 	continued. 	Comings 	testified 	in a very credible manner,
listing numerous 	examples, 	that 	the 	Charging Party undermined her
efforts 	to teach, 	was generally 	incompetent 	to handle 	the 	tasks
she was 	assigned and acted 	in an unprofessional 	manner. 	Comings
testified 	that 	Burchell 	had an 	explosive 	temper and was 	verbally
abusive 	and rude. 	Comings 	was 	clearly 	frightened 	to work with
her. 	Comings 	asked the District 	to move Burchell 	to a different
work assignment 	and even offered 	to 	teach without 	the 	support 	of
a 	resource aide 	if 	the District would transfer Burchell. 	Comings
generally 	described 	Charging 	Party's 	relationship 	with 	students
as 	bizarre 	and 	inappropriate.
Comings 	testimony was 	supported by 	the 	credible 	testimony of
Hoss, 	who 	characterized Charging Party's behavior as
inappropriate and unprofessional. 	Hoss 	testified that 	he 	tried
to 	change 	Charging 	Party's 	inappropriate behavior 	through
informal 	and formal 	discussions with her, 	notes and directives,
and then finally, 	written reprimands, 	however, 	nothing worked.
According 	to Hoss, 	whenever he 	raised performance 	issues with
Charging 	Party, 	she would get very upset 	and storm out 	of 	his
office.
The 	Charging 	Party has 	put 	forth 	some 	evidence 	of minimal
protected activity. 	For example, 	she 	raised concerns about her
3
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work hours, 	safety issues, 	changes 	in assigned duties and pay.
She 	also used 	the 	grievance procedure 	regarding 	the 	use 	of
personal 	necessity leave, 	and 	filed a 	formal 	grievance 	regarding
the use of sick leave. 	The formal grievance, 	however, 	was 	filed
after 	the 	District 	had already decided to 	terminate 	her.2
In order to prove a prima 	facie violation, 	the Charging
Party must prove 	(1) 	that 	she engaged in protected activity; 	(2)
that 	the District 	had knowledge 	of 	her protected activity; 	(3)
that 	the District 	took adverse action against her; 	and 	(4) 	the
District 	took 	the 	adverse 	action against 	her because 	she 	engaged
in 	that 	protected activity. 	(Novato Unified School 	District
(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	210; 	Carlsbad Unified School District
(1979) 	PERB Decision No. 	89.)
Once 	the 	Charging Party has 	established a prima 	facie 	case,
the burden then shifts 	to 	the Respondent 	to prove 	that 	it would
have 	taken the 	action regardless 	of any protected activity. 	If,
however, 	the Charging Party has 	not proven a prima facie 	case,
the burden does 	not 	shift 	to 	the Respondent 	and 	it 	is under no
obligation to put 	forth any evidence.
Here, 	Burchell 	had engaged 	in some minor protected activity.
The 	District 	was 	aware 	that 	Burchell 	had engaged 	in protected
activity. 	The District 	also admits 	that 	it 	took adverse action
2The 	Charging 	Party has 	also 	claimed 	that 	a 	February 	1992
meeting between 	Charging 	Party and 	the 	superintendent 	was 	also
protected. 	I find, 	however, 	that the subject matter of that
meeting was 	Charging 	Party's 	allegations 	of 	child abuse and 	thus,
not 	a matter protected by EERA. 	(Regents 	of 	the University of
California 	(Yearv) 	(1987) 	PERB Decision No. 	615-H.)
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against her. 	The 	final 	element 	that 	Charging Party must prove 	is
that 	the District was motivated, 	at 	least 	in part, 	by her
protected activity. 	Since 	an employer's 	motivation 	can 	seldom be
proven by direct 	evidence, 	unlawful motivation can often be
inferred from circumstantial 	evidence. 	Here, 	however, 	Charging
Party 	has 	failed 	to prove by 	either direct 	or 	circumstantial
evidence 	that 	the District was motivated, 	even in part, 	by her
protected 	activity.
Charging 	Party's 	working 	relationship with 	the 	resource
teacher and 	the principal 	was 	deeply 	troubled due 	to her
rudeness, 	anger and her undermining of 	Coming's 	teaching. 	While
the adverse action may have 	occurred at 	the 	same 	time as 	some 	of
her protected activity, 	that 	is 	insufficient 	to prove unlawful
intent. 	(Charter Oak Unified School District) 	(1984) 	PERB
Decision No. 	404.)
There was 	no 	evidence 	of 	disparate 	treatment 	or an
inappropriate 	departure 	from established practices. 	There was 	no
evidence 	of 	shifting 	justifications 	from the 	employer. 	There 	is
certainly no 	evidence 	that 	the District 	based 	it's 	decision upon
inadequate 	information. 	The District 	tried numerous methods 	to
effectuate 	change 	in Charging 	Party's behavior, 	over a 	long
period of time, 	to no avail.
In summary, 	it appears 	that 	the District based their
decisions 	upon 	Charging 	Party's 	poor work performance 	and her
rude and abusive behavioral 	tendencies. 	There 	is 	no 	evidence
that 	Charging 	Party's 	protected activity played any 	role 	in 	the
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District's 	decision making process. 	Charging 	Party has 	therefore
not been able 	to prove a prima 	facie 	case, 	and the District 	is
under no 	obligation 	to put 	forth any evidence 	in 	its 	defense.
If, 	however, 	assuming for argument's sake only, 	the Charging
Party had proven a prima 	facie 	case, 	there 	is already enough
evidence 	in 	this 	record, 	without 	the District 	offering anything
else, 	to prove 	that 	the District would have 	taken the adverse
action, 	including the termination, 	in spite of any protected
activity. 	The 	evidence 	is 	clear that 	Charging 	Party's behavior
had 	created 	an 	intolerable 	working 	relationship 	between 	herself
and the 	teacher she was 	assigned to work with, 	as well 	as 	her
principal.
Loss 	of 	Pay and Denial 	of 	Leave
The 	Charging 	Party has 	the 	same burden of proof 	on this
issue as 	in the last 	issue. 	Here, 	however, 	Charging Party has
not 	only 	failed 	to prove 	a nexus 	between her protected 	activity
and adverse action, 	she has 	also 	failed to prove 	that any adverse
action has 	occurred. 	In her brief, 	Charging Party claims 	that
she was 	denied pay 	for 	6 	or 	7 	staff 	development 	and teacher
preparation days. 	The 	record simply does 	not 	support 	such a
claim.
It 	is 	not 	clear 	from the 	record 	that 	Charging 	Party was 	ever
denied pay. 	For example, 	there was 	credible 	testimony 	from both
District 	and Union officials 	that 	classified employees 	have 	the
option of 	either working, 	taking vacation, 	or taking 	time 	off
without 	pay 	for 	certain days 	Charging 	Party 	is 	alleging 	she
6

should have been paid. 	Charging 	Party was 	never 	told 	she 	could
not 	work and receive pay. 	On one 	such occasion, 	Charging 	Party,
in 	fact, 	came 	to work and then left 	on her own accord.
On another occasion, 	there was a dispute about 	the denial 	of
personal 	necessity leave 	for regular doctor appointments. 	Even
Charging 	Party's 	union representative 	testified 	that, 	contrary 	to
Charging Party's wishes, 	it was 	improper to use personal
necessity 	leave 	for 	such absences.
On another occasion, 	there was 	a dispute 	regarding Charging
Party's 	failure 	to provide 	a 	requested medical 	verification of
her illness. 	The contract, 	however, 	clearly and unequivocally
allows 	the District 	to require verification of 	illness 	and 	there
was 	no 	evidence 	that 	the policy was 	being applied 	in a
retaliatory manner.
It 	appears 	that 	the 	issue 	from the District's point 	of view
was 	the 	Charging 	Party's 	failure 	to 	comply with personal
necessity 	and 	sick 	leave 	rules 	and policies 	rather 	than any
retaliation 	for protected activity. 	Thus, 	the 	Charging Party has
failed 	to prove 	a prima 	facie 	case 	regarding allegations 	that 	the
District 	denied her use 	of 	leave 	and/or pay.
Denial 	of 	Representation Rights
The 	Board's 	policy 	regarding 	the 	right 	of 	an employee 	to be
represented in meetings with an employer is based, 	in part, 	on
the National 	Labor Relations Board's 	(NLRB) 	long standing
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Weingarten rule.3 Under that policy, 	private 	sector employees
have 	a 	right 	to union 	representation at 	"investigatory
interviews" 	when the 	employee 	reasonably believes 	the
investigation will 	result 	in disciplinary action. 	Employers may,
however, 	continue 	to 	carry out 	their investigation without
interviewing the employee. 	Thus, 	the employee may be 	left with a
choice 	of 	being 	interviewed without 	union 	representation 	or
having no 	interview and 	foregoing 	the 	possible 	benefits 	that
might 	occur 	from an 	interview.
In Redwoods 	Community College District v. 	PERB 	(1984) 	159
Cal.App.3d 617 	[205 Cal.Rptr 523], 	the circumstances providing
for 	employee 	representation at 	investigatory 	interviews 	were
broadened 	to 	those 	involving 	"highly unusual 	circumstances 	even
though there may be no expectation of 	discipline." 	In that 	case,
the 	employee 	was 	required 	to 	attend an 	interview regarding 	a
negative 	evaluation. 	The meeting was 	conducted 	in a 	formal
manner by a high level 	administrator, 	in spite 	of 	the 	fact 	that
the 	employee 	and her 	supervisor had worked 	out 	their differences
and had both 	requested that 	the meeting be 	cancelled. 	The 	court
held 	the meeting 	to be both 	investigatory and 	intimidating.
Although 	there was 	no 	reasonable 	expectation of 	discipline 	in
that 	case, 	the 	court provided the 	right 	of 	representation at 	the
meeting due 	to 	the 	highly unusual 	circumstances 	of 	the 	interview.
3NLRB v. 	Weingarten. 	Inc. 	(1975) 	420 U.S. 	251 	[88
LRRM 2689].
8

Nothing in that 	case, 	however, 	suggests 	that 	the employee's
right 	to be 	represented 	is violated when an 	employer decides 	not
to 	conduct an 	investigatory interview. 	In this 	case, 	the
employer did not 	require 	the 	Charging 	Party 	to attend any
interviews. 	Quite the contrary is 	true. 	The District
scrupulously 	avoided 	requiring 	Charging 	Party's 	attendance 	at
investigatory meetings without 	her union representative. 	"The
evidence 	is 	clear 	that 	the 	only 	time 	the 	Charging 	Party attended
meetings 	without 	a union 	representative was 	when 	she 	demanded 	to
meet 	(in 	spite 	of 	the District's 	desire 	to put 	off 	the meeting
until 	the union representative 	could attend) 	or when 	the District
simply presented 	Charging 	Party with 	disciplinary 	action 	(written
reprimand or 	termination papers) 	and did not 	seek to discuss 	the
matters. 	Even in the latter situation, 	the District would
typically 	contact 	the 	union 	representative 	first 	and 	inform her
that 	the District 	was 	going 	to present 	Charging 	Party with
disciplinary action, 	and offer an opportunity for 	the union
representative 	to attend.
Whenever 	the District 	wanted 	to 	engage 	in discussions
regarding disciplinary issues, 	they would ensure 	that 	the
Charging 	Party was 	represented by her union 	representative, 	even
if 	that meant 	rescheduling the meeting. 	It appears 	that 	the
District 	felt 	it was 	in the District's best 	interests, 	just as
much as 	in Burchell's 	interest, 	to have 	the union representative
present 	when 	any performance/disciplinary 	discussions 	occurred.
9

Therefore 	the 	Charging 	Party has 	failed 	to prove 	that 	she
was 	ever 	denied union 	representation 	in 	investigatory meetings
which 	could 	lead 	to 	discipline 	or 	in any meetings 	involving
"highly unusual 	circumstances" 	as 	outlined 	in Redwoods 	Community
College District, 	supra.
CONCLUSION AND 	ORDER
For the above 	listed reasons, 	the District's motion to
dismiss 	is 	granted and this 	complaint 	is 	hereby dismissed 	in 	its
entirety.4
Pursuant 	to California Code of Regulations, 	title 	8,
section 32305, 	this 	Proposed Decision and Order shall 	become
final 	unless 	a party 	files 	a Notice 	of 	Intent 	to 	File 	Exceptions
and a 	completed Transcript 	Order 	form 	(attached hereto) 	with 	the
Board 	itself 	at 	the 	headquarters 	office 	in Sacramento within 20
days 	of 	service 	of 	this Decision. 	Any party anticipating 	filing
a responsive 	statement, 	pursuant 	to section 32310, 	should forward
a 	completed Transcript 	Order 	form within 	5 	days 	of 	receipt 	of 	a
Notice of 	Intent 	to 	File Exceptions. 	Within 20 	days 	of 	service
of 	the 	transcript, 	the party shall 	file a statement 	of 	exceptions
with the Board 	itself 	at 	the headquarters 	office 	in Sacramento.
4At 	the 	hearing 	the 	District 	raised an objection 	to 	Charging
Party's 	introduction of 	transcripts 	of 	her 	secretly 	recorded
telephone 	calls 	and 	conversations. 	The District based 	its
objection on Penal 	Code 	section 631 	(wiretapping). 	Those motions
to exclude are denied, 	however, 	nothing in the transcripts or
Charging 	Party's 	offer of 	proof 	regarding 	conversations 	not yet
transcribed, 	would alter 	in any way, 	my decision on the
District's motion to dismiss 	this 	complaint. 	It 	is 	therefore
unnecessary 	to deal 	with the 	issue 	of 	the accuracy of 	the 	tapes
or transcripts.
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In accordance with PERB Regulations, 	the 	statement 	of 	exceptions
should 	identify by page 	citation 	or 	exhibit 	number 	the portions
of 	the record, 	if any, 	relied upon for such exceptions. 	(See
Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32300.) 	A document is
considered 	"filed" 	when actually 	received before 	the 	close 	of
business 	(5:00 p.m.) 	on the last day set 	for filing 	". 	. 	. o r
when 	sent 	by 	telegraph or 	certified 	or Express 	United 	States
mail, 	postmarked not 	later 	than the 	last day set 	for
filing . 	. 	. 	." 	(See Cal. Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 32135;
Code Civ. 	P r o c , 	sec. 	1013 	shall apply.) 	Any statement of
exceptions 	and 	supporting brief 	must 	be 	served 	concurrently with
its 	filing upon each party 	to 	this 	proceeding. 	Proof 	of 	service
shall 	accompany 	each 	copy 	served 	on a party 	or 	filed with 	the
Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	secs. 	32300,
32305 	and 	32140.)
James W. 	Tamm
Administrative 	Law 	Judge
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