Regents of the University of California (PERB 0353H)

2 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES '
ASSOCIATION,

Charging Party, Case No. SF-CE-80-H

Vv. PERB Decision No. 353-H

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF October 27, 1983

CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Appearances: Eugene S. Darling for California State Employees
Association.

Before Tovar, Jaeger and Morgenstern, Members.
DECISION

TOVAR, Member: This case is before the Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by the
California State Employees' Association (CSEA) to the attached
proposed decision of a PERB administrative law judge (ALJ).
CSEA's exceptions are to that part of the proposed decision
which dismisses its allegations that the Regents of the
University of California (University) violated subsections
3571(a) and (b) of the Higher Education Employer-Employee

Relations Act (HEERA or Act)1 by reclassifying all employees

Ilthe HEERA is codified at Government Code section 3560
et seq. All statutory references herein are to the Government

in the "gardener A" classification to the "gardener B"
classification, thereby eliminating the existing differential
in wages between gardeners "A" and "B. " For the reasons which
follow, we affirm the ALJ's decision to dismiss those
allegations.
No exceptions have been filed to the remainder of the
proposed decision, in which the ALJ determined that the
University violated subsections 3543.5 (a) and (b) of the HEERA
by reclassifying certain cafeteria workers. On that basis the
ALJ's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order with
respect thereto are adopted as those of the Board.
FACTS
In 1972, the University established a two-level pay
classification system for gardeners. According to that plan,
those classified as "A" gardeners would use no power tools in
their work, and would receive a lower rate of pay than "B"
gardeners, whose duties would emphasize the use of power
Code unless otherwise indicated. Section 3571 provides in
relevant part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for the higher
education employer to:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(b) Deny to employee organizations rights
guaranteed to them by this chapter.
2

tools. 	The A gardeners were known as "beat" gardeners because
each was assigned full time to a particular area of the campus
which he or she was to maintain. B gardeners were not assigned
to a particular geographic territory, but specialized in the
operation of power equipment and received assignments wherever
power tool work was needed on the campus. In practice,
however, the distinction in the job duties between A and B
gardeners became blurred. A gardeners found it inefficient to
wait for a B gardener when they found a need for power tool
work. Most took great pride in their work and thus proceeded
to use power tools themselves to get the job done, even though
the duties set forth in their job description did not include
operation of power tools.
In 1976, CSEA job representative Joe Castagnasso, himself
an A gardener, drafted a letter which was signed by 25
A gardeners and sent to the department of facilities management
requesting that the A gardeners be reclassified as B gardeners
in light of the widespread use of power tools. The University
took no action in response to the letter.
In February 1978, Castagnasso again wrote to the department
complaining of the fact that the beat gardeners were classified
and paid as A gardeners but were regularly operating power
tools. The letter noted that in 1972 "there were six to eight
men" doing the work of B gardeners, but that at present there
were only three B gardeners employed at the campus. The letter
ended by stating as follows:
3

We feel this is a serious blow to the class
concept of "A" and "B" gardeners and is in
direct violation of the rules and
regulations written by the University.
What we have to sell is our labor and
services and we expect to be paid
accordingly. We ask that these current
practices be corrected immediately.
In testimony at the PERB hearing, Castagnasso acknowledged
that the letters of 1976 and 1978 were attempts to have the
A gardeners reclassified to B. These attempts were made by
Castagnasso in response to complaints and pressure brought to
bear on him by his fellow A gardeners.
Later in 1978, an A gardener filed a grievance over the
fact that he was using power tools to get the job done but was
not being paid at the higher B rate. The outcome of this was
that A gardeners were instructed not to use power tools. 	In
conjunction with this instruction, the B gardeners were
reorganized in an effort to make them more available for the A
gardener's needs. 	This effort was unsuccessful, however.
Rather than wait idly for a B gardener to be dispatched
whenever the need to use a power tool arose, many A gardeners
reverted to the practice of using those tools themselves.
In 1979, Rick Sanchez took over as personnel manager for
the department. Upon learning of the gardener issue, he met
with the gardener supervisors and other department officials.
Eventually, he proposed that all A gardeners be reclassified to
the B level. Sanchez met with the A gardeners and explained

the reclassification process. Employees were told that certain
of them would be contacted and their jobs audited in order to
develop representative job cards.
CSEA representative Castagnasso had by this time been
promoted to B gardener. Upon learning informally of the
proposal to reclassify the A gardeners, he phoned Sanchez to
confirm the information that the department was developing a
plan to upgrade the A gardeners. 	Sanchez told him that he was,
in fact, considering that action. Castagnasso then asked to
meet with Sanchez, and Sanchez agreed.
On meeting with Sanchez, Castagnasso objected that the
upgrade of the A gardeners would eliminate the pay differential
enjoyed by the B gardeners. Castagnasso related to Sanchez the
concerns of his fellow B gardeners about this and suggested
that a new position of C level gardener should be created, to
which the existing B gardeners could be assigned. Sanchez
listened to this proposal and told Castagnasso he would keep
the concerns of the B gardeners in mind.
About a month later, following the conclusion of the
reclassification survey in March 1980, the reclassification of
the A gardeners to the B level was implemented. In response to
this, Castagnasso requested a meeting with Phil Encinio, the
Berkeley campus director of labor relations. Encinio first
said he could not meet with Castagnasso, but with the prompting
of a letter from the CSEA president, a meeting was set up.
UT

Castagnasso and Encinio discussed the question of the pay
differential extensively. 	Encinio agreed to turn over to his
subordinates a proposal to study the feasibility of
reclassifying the original B gardeners to an as yet nonexistent
C level so as to restore a pay differential for the power tool
specialists. Castagnasso then met with one of Encinio's
subordinates and it was arranged that the personnel office
would conduct a reclassification study of the original
B positions. As part of this procedure, Sanchez supervised an
audit of the original B jobs. He also met with Castagnasso and
discussed the latter's desire to restore a differential by
creating a class of C gardeners.
The information generated by the job audit was reviewed by
University personnel officials. As a result of this process,
the position of the B gardener doing the tree trimming was
adjusted to receive a higher wage in recognition of the special
skills required by that position. Otherwise, the determination
of the University personnel staff following the conclusion of
the job audit in August 1981 was that there were no grounds for
making any other changes in the gardening classifications. On
August 31, 1981, CSEA filed the instant charge against the
University.
DISCUSSION
CSEA's charge alleges that the reclassification of A
gardeners to the B classification and the resulting elimination
6

of the pay differential previously enjoyed by the B gardeners
violated the HEERA in two ways. First, CSEA asserts that the
reclassification unlawfully interfered with its ongoing
organizing drive. The historical origin of the pay
differential, alleges CSEA, is in past union-University
agreements; thus, the University's unilateral elimination of
the differential creates an appearance that unions are
ineffectual in exacting lasting employee benefits from the
University, and thereby damages CSEA's ability to recruit
support among the employees. 	Second, CSEA alleges that the
University acted to reclassify the A gardeners without first
meeting its obligation to afford CSEA, as a nonexclusive
representative, notice and an opportunity to meet and discuss
the proposed action, as mandated by Regents of the University
of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (4/30/82)
PERB Decision No. 212.
The ALJ found that these allegations were barred by the
HEERA's six-month statute of limitations. That limitations
period is set forth at subsection 3563.2 (a) and provides as
follows :
(a) Any employee, employee organization, or
employer shall have the right to file an
unfair practice charge, except that the
board shall not issue a complaint in respect
of any charge based upon an alleged unfair
practice occurring more than six months
prior to the filing of the charge.
7

The ALJ noted that the promotion of the A gardeners was
implemented in March 1980, while the instant charge was filed
in August 1981, more than 17 months after the complained-of
conduct. Finding no reason why the statute should be tolled,
he concluded that the charge was untimely.
CSEA presents two theories as alternate bases for its
exceptions to the ALJ's determination that its charge was
untimely. First, it maintains that following the blanket
promotion of the A gardeners it was not certain that the pay
differential was in fact a thing of the past. CSEA
representative Castagnasso was continuing to pursue an upward
reclassification of the power equipment specialists, and until
the University ultimately denied the reclassification request
in August 1981, asserts CSEA, the elimination of the
differential was not final.
We find this argument to be without merit. The University
reclassified the former A gardeners, which had the effect of
eliminating the wage differential, in March 1980. If the
elimination of the differential was violative of the Act, then
it was so as of that date. Thus, the charge could have been
filed 17 months earlier. In arguing that the elimination of
the differential was not final, and thus not violative, so long
as the University remained open to CSEA's efforts to restore
it, CSEA is in essence contending that a unilateral change is
not a per se violation. This argument is more commonly

asserted by employers who are defending charges that they have
refused to bargain in good faith. Regardless of the source of
the argument, it is well-settled that a unilateral change
violates the Act notwithstanding the employer's subjective good
faith. 	See San Mateo County Community College District
(6/8/79) PERB Decision No. 94; Moreno Valley Unified School
District (4/30/82) PERB Decision No. 206, affirmed sub nom.
Moreno Valley Unified School District v. PERB (1983) 142
Cal . App. 3d 191; NLRB v. Katz (1962) 369 U.S. 739 [50 LRRM
2177]. Neither can the elimination of the differential be
characterized as a continuing violation. This Board has
previously determined that a unilateral change was not a
continuing violation where no subsequent reimplementation or
refusal to negotiate the affected policy was shown. San
Dieguito_Union_High School District (2/25/82) PERB Decision
No. 194.
CSEA's alternative argument is that its pursuit of the
reclassification procedure equitably tolled the HEERA's statute
of limitations. CSEA relies on the Board's decision in State
of_California, Department of Water Resources (12/29/81) PERB
Order No. Ad-122-S, in which we adopted the doctrine of
equitable tolling as developed and applied by the California
courts, and on two subsequent decisions of this Board in which
issues of equitable tolling arose: San Diegueto_Union High
School District, supra, and Los Angeles Unified School District
(9/20/82) PERB Decision No. 237.

In Department of Water Resources, supra, we reviewed the
California Supreme Court's treatment of the equitable tolling
doctrine in Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 410. There the
Court observed that the purpose of a statute of limitations is
"to insure timely notice to an adverse party so that he can
assemble a defense when the facts are still fresh." 	(Elkins,
supra, 12 Cal. 3d at 412.) The Court thus held that a statute
of limitations may be equitably tolled where a plaintiff has
several legal remedies and reasonably and in good faith pursues
one. Such tolling is appropriate, explained the Court, so long
as the plaintiff's pursuit of his claim via the first avenue
has put the defendant on notice of that claim and thereby
obviated the danger of surprise and prejudice which might
otherwise result from the extended passage of time. The notice
must be of a quality which is effective to protect
" [djefendants' interest in being promptly apprised of claims
against them in order that they may gather and preserve
evidence." 	(Elkins, supra, 12 Cal. 3d at 417.) Based on this
review, we held that the statute of limitations found in the
State Employer-Employee Relations Act2 would be tolled while
an employee pursued a remedy reasonably and in good faith via a
proceeding before the State Personnel Board and thereafter
filed a charge raising the same issues with PERB.
2The State Employer-Employee Relations Act is codified at
Government Code section 3512 et seq. The statute of
limitations is set forth at subsection 3514.5 (a) and is in
substance the same as the parallel provision of the HEERA.
10

In San Diegueto, supra, the complainant filed a grievance
in the fall of 1977 alleging that the employer had made a
unilateral change in negotiable terms and conditions of
employment . That attempt at a remedy ended unsuccessfully in
June 1978 when the employer rejected the advisory arbitrator's
decision. In September 1978, the complainant refiled the
identical grievance. 	This was rejected by the employer the
following month. In January 1979, the complainant filed suit
in superior court seeking enforcement of the contract provision
allegedly violated by the employer. This suit was dismissed
two months later on the grounds that administrative remedies
had not yet been exhausted. In May 1979, the complainant filed
its charge with PERB.
We held that the statute of limitations should not be
tolled. While the initial grievance proceeding would justify
tolling of the statute until its resolution in June 1978, the
complainant's actions over the succeeding ll months did not
constitute reasonable and good faith pursuit of an alternate
remedy . 	"Before this Board is willing to relieve a charging
party from the effects of the statute of limitations, " we held,
"there should be some indication in the record that the
alternate chosen represented a practical effort to resolve this
dispute expeditiously."
In Los Angeles Unified School District, supra, we again
rejected a complainant's claim that the statute of limitations
11

should be equitably tolled. We affirmed an administrative law
judge's ruling that letters to public officials did not
constitute the kind of administrative remedies contemplated by
Elkins, and that the proceedings instituted by the complainant
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not
constitute a reasonable alternative remedy for the matters
raised by the charge before PERB.
Our review of the three decisions of this Board on which
CSEA relies fails to persuade us that the ALJ erred in ruling
that the statute of limitations should not be tolled. That
ruling was based on the ALJ's judgment that CSEA's efforts to
secure reclassification of the original B gardeners was not the
sort of alternative action which would put the University on
notice that it should be prepared for litigation in connection
with its decision to promote the A gardeners.
We agree. 	As we have explained, an essential requirement
of the doctrine of equitable tolling is that the complainant's
initial action in pursuit of a remedy must have alerted the
respondent of the claim against it so that the delay in the
filing of the subsequent action does not prejudice it in the
ability to assemble a defense. Here, charging party's only
actions in the six months preceding the filing of the instant
charge were to express to the University its wish that the
original B gardeners be reclassified to a new classification
and to secure the University's agreement to conduct a
12

reclassification investigation. We cannot find that these
actions assured protection of "defendants' interest in being
promptly apprised of claims against them in order that they may
gather and preserve evidence. " (Elkins, supra.)
In addition, we find CSEA's previous actions deficient as
notice for another reason. The charge brought before PERB by
CSEA raises substantially different issues than those which
arose in connection with the reclassification investigation
undertaken by the University. In Department of Water Resources
we said that equitable tolling would be applied "where unfair
practice charges have been filed more than six months after the
alleged violation of SEERA and the issues raised by the charge
have been pursued [by alternative remedy] . " [Emphasis added. ]
In the instant case, the issues raised by CSEA's charge
before PERB are significantly different from the issues
involved in the reclassification investigation pursued by the
University at Castagnasso's behest. The communications between
CSEA and the University during the 17 months prior to the
filing of the instant charge addressed only the question of the
proper job classification for power equipment specialists. The
charge before PERB, however, would at this late date have the
Board undertake two different inquiries entirely: whether the
University failed to meet and discuss the reclassification of
the A gardeners; and whether that reclassification unlawfully
infringed on CSEA's right to organize employees. Clearly,
these issues would turn on evidence and witnesses entirely
13

unrelated to the reclassification investigation. Thus, even
positing that CSEA's pursuit of reclassification on behalf of
the original B gardeners alerted the University that CSEA
harbored a claim against it, that information was insufficient
to enable it to assemble and preserve the evidence necessary
for its defense to the instant charge.
We conclude on the facts before us that there are no
grounds for tolling the HEERA's statute of limitations with
respect to CSEA's charge that the University unlawfully
reclassified its gardeners. Consequently, that portion of the
charge is DISMISSED. 	The Board's Order with respect to the
remainder of the charge follows.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing Decision and the entire record in this
case, it is hereby ORDERED that the Regents of University of
California, its governing board and its representatives shall:
1. CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(a) Arriving at a determination of policy or course
of action concerning matters within the scope of representation
without first giving notice to employee organizations and, upon
request, discussing these matters pending the selection of an
exclusive representative.
(b) Denying to the California State Employees'
Association rights guaranteed by the Higher Education
Employer-Employee Relations Act including the right to
represent its members.
14

(c) Interfering with employees because of the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the Higher Education
Employer-Employee Relations Act.
2. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
(a) Upon request, immediately meet and discuss with
the California State Employees Association regarding the impact
of the reclassification of food service workers on the senior
food service worker classification.
(b) Within five (5) workdays after service of this
Decision, prepare and post copies of the Notice attached as an
appendix hereto, for at least thirty (30) consecutive workdays
at its headquarters offices and in conspicuous places at the
location where notices to employees are customarily posted. It
must not be reduced in size and reasonable steps should be
taken to see that it is not defaced, altered or covered by any
material.
(c) Within twenty (20) workdays from service of the
final Decision herein, give written notification to the
San Francisco regional director of the Public Employment
Relations Board of the actions taken to comply with this
Order . 	Continue to report in writing to the regional director
thereafter as directed. All reports to the regional director
shall be concurrently served on the charging party herein.
Members Jaeger and Morgenstern joined in this Decision.
15

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the State of California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. SF-CE-80-H,
California State Employees' Association v. Regents of the
University of California, in which all the parties had the
right to participate, it has been found that the University
violated Government Code subsections 3571 (a) and (b) by
implementing a reclassification of food service workers without
giving prior notice to CSEA and by refusing to meet and discuss
the effects of that decision. In all other respects the
Complaint issued against the University, regarding a
reclassification of gardeners, has been DISMISSED.
As a result of this conduct, we have been ordered to post
this Notice, and will abide by the following. We will:
1 . 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(a) Arriving at a determination of policy or course
of action concerning matters within the scope of representation
without first giving notice to employee organizations and, upon
request, discussing these matters pending the selection of an
exclusive representative.
(b) Denying to the California State Employees'
Association rights guaranteed by the Higher Education
Employer-Employee Relations Act, including the right to
represent its members.
(c) Interfering with employees because of the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the Higher Education
Employer-Employee Relations Act.
2. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
Upon request, immediately meet and discuss with the
California State Employees' Association regarding the impact of
the reclassification of food service workers to the senior food
service worker classification.
Dated : 	REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
By
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. 	IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST
THIRTY (30) CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE REDUCED IN SIZE, DEFACED, ALTERED OR COVERED BY ANY
MATERIAL .

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
v .
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA,
Respondent.
Unfair Practice
Case No. SF-CE-80-H
PROPOSED DECISION
(9/30/82)
Appearances: Eugene S. Darling, job steward, for California
State Employees' Association; Marcia J. Canning, assistant
counsel, for Regents of the University of California.
Before: James W. Tamm, Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 31, 1981 the California State Employees'
Association (hereafter CSEA or charging party) filed this
charge against the Regents of the University of California
(hereafter University or respondent) . The charge originally
alleged the University violated Government Code section 3571 (a)
and (b) of the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act
(HEERA) 1 by taking unilateral action reclassifying certain
THEERA is codified at Government Code section 3560 et
seq. 	All references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise specified.
Sections 3571 states, in pertinent part:

gardeners, which had the effect of eliminating a differential
paid to other gardeners.
An informal settlement conference held October 21, 1981
failed to resolve the issues, and a complaint was issued
November 3, 1981. A formal hearing was originally scheduled
for December 1981, however, at the request of the University,
with the concurrence of the charging party, the hearing was
postponed .
On February 22, 1982 CSEA amended its charge to include
alleged unilateral action taken by the University in
reclassifying food service workers. This, according to CSEA,
had the effect of eliminating a differential paid to senior
food service workers.
A pre-hearing conference was held May 14, 1982, and the
formal hearing held May 24, 25 and 26, 1982. The transcript
It shall be unlawful for the higher
education employer to:
) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(b) Deny to employee organizations rights
guaranteed to them by this chapter.
N

was prepared, briefs filed, and the case was submitted for
decision September 20, 1982.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Prior to 1972, certain University employees were hired at
the Berkeley campus in what was then known as "union-related"
classifications. Included among these were the building and
construction trades and the culinary classifications. 	The
wages and job classifications accorded by the University to
these employees in union-related classifications were the same
as those appearing in area contracts that the laborers,
gardeners or culinary unions had with private sector
employers. Since 1972 the University has been converting
employees in union-related classifications to the University
wage and classification system.
Gardeners.
Prior to 1972, there were three rates of pay for employees
doing gardener work. These were rates 1, 2 and 3, with rate 3
being the highest paid. Those gardeners paid at rate 1 used no
power tools. Gardeners paid at rate 2 used power tools such as
rotary mowers, edgers and hedge shears. The gardeners paid at
rate 3 used power tools such as power mowers, and they also did
tree-trimming which required the use of ladders and climbing.
As of July 1, 1972, the union-related classifications for
the gardeners were converted to the University classification
system which combined the old classifications into gardener A
W

and B classifications. The former rate 1 work, using no power
tools, was converted to gardener A. The former rate 2 and 3
work, which involved the use of power tools, was combined into
the level B work for gardeners.
The A gardeners, those who were at the lower rate of pay
and did not use power tools, were usually referred to as "beat
gardeners" because they worked within a certain territory.
Beat gardeners generally had total responsibility for work done
on the beat except for jobs requiring the use of power tools.
The B gardeners operated power tools a substantial portion
of the time. They moved around the campus and were not
confined to or responsible for a beat. In theory, they were
responsible for any work which required the use of power tools.
Under the strict A and B system, many beat gardeners (A's)
who were not supposed to be using power tools, found it
impossible to do their jobs adequately. Most took great pride
in their work and proceeded to use power tools in order to get
the job done.
During the same period, a number of A gardeners complained
to CSEA job representative Joe Castagnasso that they were doing
B level work to get the job done, but they were not getting
paid at the B rate. Castagnasso, who was then an A gardener,
stalled them and encouraged them to do what was necessary to
get the job done. 	The complaints continued, however, and in
July 1976 Castagnasso sent a letter and a petition to the

Department of Facilities Management (hereafter DOFM) . The
letter and petition was, according to Castagnasso, an attempt
to have the A gardeners reclassified to the B level.
No action was taken in 1976, however, and in February 1978
Castagnasso wrote to DOFM in another attempt to have the A
gardners reclassified to the B level. The substance of that
letter is as follows:
Prior to 1972 there were six to eight men who
were qualified and doing the work required of
the present . 	. Gardeners ("B") now we
have three "B" Gardeners. Class "A"
Gardeners are being asked to do the work of
"B" Gardeners, without the higher rate of
pay.
According to Staff Personnel Manual, dated
July, 1973, "A" Gardeners are not required
to climb trees, work on . 	ladders,
operate chain saws, tractor mowers,
roto-tillers, and other power equipment.
We have observed "A" Gardeners and Ceta
workers doing all of the above mentioned
work.
There are several things wrong with this
practice:
1 . 	Safety - an unskilled man could be
seriously injured.
2. 	Damage to equipment.
3 . 	Morale (the men feel degraded) .
4. 	Working out of class.
We feel this is a serious blow to the class
concept of "A" and "B" Gardeners and is in
direct violation of the rules and regulations
written by the University.
un

What we have to sell is our labor and
services and we expect to be paid
accordingly. We ask that these current
practices be corrected immediately.
Castagnasso testified he never intended to equalize
everybody's wages. There is, however, no evidence that his
intentions other than in the letters, were ever communicated to
management until he proposed a new C level classification two
years later, during a reclassification in 1980.
Later in 1978, one of the A gardeners filed a grievance
over the fact that he was using power tools to get the job
done, but was not being paid at the higher B rate. As a result
of the grievance, the A gardeners were instructed not to use
power tools. Additionally, the B gardeners were reorganized
into squads. Whenever the A gardeners needed the use of power
tools on their beats, the squad of B gardeners would come in to
do those jobs. However, according to testimony by Fred Warnke,
manager of grounds and services, DOFM, this system of squads of
B gardeners performing tasks within the beats was not
workable. 	The A gardeners could not really perform their jobs
adequately and were hampered by the necessity of waiting for
the availability of B gardeners. The B gardeners were
overburdened with the job of using power tools on the whole
campus. As it turned out, some of the A gardeners simply
continued to use power tools without authorization in order to
get the job done.
6

In 1979, Rick Sanchez took over as personnel manager for
DOFM, and learned of the gardener issue while conducting a
general job review of the department. Sanchez met with Warnke
and the supervisors of the gardeners unit concerning their lack
of flexibility in assignment of work. Sanchez eventually
recommended that the A gardeners be reclassified to the B
level. According to Sanchez, he also talked to individual
employees in the A gardener classification during his study and
had a meeting with employees to explain the reclassification
process. Employees were told at a meeting that certain
individuals would be contacted and their jobs audited in order
to develop representative job cards.
During this survey, approximately four to five weeks prior
to the implementation of the reclassification, Castagnasso, who
by this time had been promoted to the B level, phoned Sanchez.
Castagnasso said he had heard that the A gardeners might be
blanketed into the B classification and he was calling to
confirm that. Sanchez told Castagnasso that the possibility
did exist. Castagnasso then asked to meet Sanchez and Sanchez
agreed.
Sanchez met with Castagnasso and several other gardeners
and discussed the possibility of the upgrade. Castagnasso
indicated that a reclassification would effectively eliminate
the pay differential the B gardeners were paid. Castagnasso
indicated a third position (a C level gardener ) could be

created. 	Sanchez listened to Castagnasso's proposal and told
him he would keep the incumbent B gardeners in mind.
The reclassification of the A gardeners to the B level was
implemented in March 1980. 	There is no evidence on record,
however, that at the time of the reclassification survey any
representative from CSEA other than Castagnasso or any other
employee organization requested further meetings to discuss the
reclassification of the A gardeners to the B level.
After the actual reclassification took place, Castagnasso
requested a meeting with Phil Encinio, Berkeley campus director
of labor relations. Encinio first indicated he could not meet
with Castagnasso. However, once the CSEA president wrote to
Encinio requesting a meeting, one was set up. Castagnasso
indicated this meeting eventually took place several months
after the reclassification.
Castagnasso testified they discussed the pros and cons of
the differential, and that,
I gave him all my information. 	We
discussed it almost two hours. I don't
2Castagnasso's explanation of Encinio's reasons were
rather vague:
Well, the first letter, he said he could not
meet with us due to some fact about HEERA,
and etc. and so forth 	and he couldn't
play favorites or didn't quite make a lot of
sense to me, but . 	. I'm not that up on
HEERA.

recall all of his [Encinio's] conversation
but I gave him everything I had on it.
When Castagnasso was asked if Encinio expressed any
willingness to consider Castagnasso's proposal, he testified:
A. He advised me that he would turn it over
to . 	One or two of his subordinates,
and they would handle it.
Q. Did they?
A. Yes. .
The proposal that Encinio agreed to turn over to his
subordinates involved a job audit regarding the feasibility of
creating a new differential for the original B gardeners.
Castagnasso met with Dennis Marino, who is a senior
personnel analyst in the Berkeley personnel office. 	They
discussed the issue and the potential of creating a new
differential. Marino agreed to have the original B jobs
audited to see if a new job classification should be created.
Marino followed up that meeting by having Sanchez collect job
cards from the original B gardeners. While collecting job
cards, Sanchez met once again with Castagnasso. He went over
Castagnasso's job duties and once again discussed the proposal
to create a C level job for the original B gardeners.
The information was then turned over to, and reviewed by, a
team of personnel services advisors and the University
classification committee. During this reclassification review,
the position of the B gardener doing the tree trimming was
adjusted. DOFM and the personnel office determined that the

position of tree trimmer, which was already in existence in the
University's classification scheme, should be accorded a higher
wage in recognition of the special skills required by that
position. It was as a result of the reclassification review
that this position was given a range adjustment and was offered
to one of the original B gardeners.
In August 1981 it was the determination of both the
department and the personnel office that the remaining
B gardeners originally in that classification were
appropriately classified as B gardeners, and that there were no
grounds for recommending to systemwide administration the
creation of a third classification in that series. Thus, other
than the adjustment of the wage rate for the tree trimmer
position, the job audit done by the personnel office did not
result in the creation of another classification level.
Several gardeners testified on behalf of the charging party
regarding their own attitude towards unions as well as giving
hearsay testimony regarding the attitudes of other employees.
In general, the testimony was that some employees were now
cynical about unions and may not want to pay dues to unions
because unions were ineffective in maintaining pay
differentials.
Some of the same gardeners also testified that the
reclassification of A gardeners to the B level was "a good
idea, " and that it was done,
10

Because [the University] couldn't get the
other guys to run mowers and stuff.
Furthermore, they testified that after the reclassification
they could use power tools and get the job done right.
Food Service Workers.
The housing, child care and food services department
provides staffing to seven food service operations located at
different points at the Berkeley campus. These food service
operations provide service to six resident halls which house as
many as 900 students per hall, as well as to the rest of the
campus . 	The department staffs these operations seven days a
week, two shifts per day.
Prior to 1977, there were employees in the food services
department whose job title was kitchen helper, and those whose
job title was porter. Although individuals holding these job
titles were University employees, the job titles themselves
were union-related classifications. The campus paid the
prevailing rate set by the area contracts which Local 28 of the
Cooks and Culinary Workers Union had with other employers. At
that time the kitchen helpers were paid more than porters.
In the fall of 1977, the University decided to convert the
employees in these union-related classifications to the
University's title and pay plan. The kitchen helper
classification was converted to the University's uniform
classification of senior food service worker, and the employees
in the porter classification were converted to food service
11

worker. The senior food service worker classification started
at a higher wage rate than the food service worker
classification.
Food service workers work under close supervision and
perform a variety of unskilled duties related to food
preparation, serving and general maintenance in a kitchen or
dining area. Senior food service workers work under less
supervision than the food service workers, and usually require
previous experience and training in food preparation, serving,
and general maintenance in a kitchen or dining area.
A third level currently exists titled principal food
service worker. 	Incumbents in this position serve as work
leaders for groups of food service workers. The assistant cook
classification is another promotional opportunity which is
senior to the principal food service worker.
By 1981 the department was having a difficult time keeping
qualified career employees in the food service worker
classification. 4 Ed Hendricks, the director of housing and
child care and food services, also testified that the
department had a classification of senior custodian which was
very similar in responsibility to the food service worker. The
4Career employees, who work longer hours and tend to
develop more expertise in the job, were distinguished from
student employees and casual employees working a limited number
of hours.
12

senior custodian was, however, receiving higher pay than the
food service worker doing similar maintenance work, which
caused employee dissatisfaction.
Given those problems, along with the desire to offer more
cross training, the department on its own initiative requested
the Berkeley personnel office to conduct a reclassification
review of food service workers. Job cards gathered from
individual employees were submitted on a representational
basis, and a review conducted. The reclassification was
approved, and on September 15, 1981 food service workers were
notified by letter that they had been reclassified to senior
food service workers retroactively as of September 1, 1981.
On October 23, 1981 the department received a petition from
CSEA requesting a meeting to discuss reclassification and
wages. Hendricks testified he forwarded the request to the
Berkeley personnel office. CSEA, however, received no response
from the Berkeley personnel office.
On December 3, 1981 CSEA wrote directly to Encinio,
requesting a meeting to discuss the issue of classifications
and wages. 	That request triggered a series of letters between
CSEA and the Berkeley personnel office regarding a meeting.
The personnel office kept seeking a more specific written
agenda from CSEA so that it could
. prepare for the meeting and have the
correct management persons in attendance.
13

They further notified CSEA that,
Unless extraordinary circumstances exist and
prior approval is obtained, only two
representatives or employees will be allowed
in the session. 5
By the conclusion of the formal hearing in this matter on
May 26, a meeting had still not been held between the Berkeley
personnel office and the charging party regarding the issues of
classifications and wages of food service employees.
ISSUES
1. Did the University violate sections 3571 (a) and (b) by
unilaterally reclassifying A gardeners thereby eliminating pay
differentials paid to B gardeners?
2. Did the University violate sections 3571 (a) and (b) by
unilaterally reclassifying food service workers thereby
eliminating pay differentials paid to senior food service
workers?
DISCUSSION
Arguments of the Parties.
CSEA claims that the actions taken by the University in
these two situations violate HEERA in two ways:
1. They were unilateral changes. There was no prior
notice to CSEA nor was there prior consultation with CSEA.
5The issue of whether the University's limitations of the
number of CSEA representatives is an unfair practice was
specifically removed from consideration in this case by the
charging party, and is therefore not addressed in this decision.
14

2. Even had they not been unilateral, the changes
nevertheless violate HEERA in that they have had a discouraging
effect on employees' exercise of their right to organize and
have interfered with CSEA's right to organize because they
caused many employees to view the union cynically as impotent
and unreliable.
The University argues with respect to the reclassification
of gardeners the following:
1. 	There is no evidence that the reclassification of the
A gardeners or the failure to create a new classification for
the original B gardeners was unlawfully motivated.
2. The charging party did not establish there is a duty to
meet and discuss over a review of employees' duties to
determine if they are properly classified.
3. If in fact there was a duty to meet and discuss
regarding the effects of the action (elimination of the
differential), the University met that duty.
4. The elimination of the differential was an effect of
the original reclassification in March 1980 and is therefore
outside the statute of limitations.
With regard to the food service workers, the University
argues:
1. The charging party failed to produce any evidence of
unlawful motive or retaliation.
15

2. The charging party did not establish there is a duty to
meet and discuss over a review of employees' duties to
determine if they are properly classified.
3. 	There has been no refusal to meet regarding senior food
service worker classification and wages, and that the parties
are in fact setting up a meeting so that discussions can take
place.
Gardeners-Unilateral Changes.
As to the unilateral changes affecting gardeners, the issue
arises of whether the unfair practice complaint should be
dismissed because of the six-month statute of limitations
provided in HEERA.
Section 3563.2 (a) provides that:
Any employee, employee organization, or
employer shall have the right to file an
unfair practice charge, except that the board
shall not issue a complaint in respect of any
charge based upon an alleged unfair practice
occurring more than six months prior to the
filing of the charge.
Charging party takes the position that once the University
refused to create a new pay differential it immediately filed
this unfair practice charge. Here, CSEA misses the point. If
any violation occurred, it happened not because the University
refused to create a new classification or create a new pay
differential, but rather because it made unilateral changes
when it eliminated the original pay differential. Thus, the
statute of limitations should start running at the time the
16

charging party first learned of the actual elimination of the
pay differential. CSEA clearly had notice of the change in
March 1980, almost 17 months prior to the filing of this charge.
CSEA argues that after learning of the reclassification, it
filed for a new job audit. This, according to CSEA, is in
effect an internal appeal process which should toll the statute
of limitations.
In San Diegueto Union High School District (2/25/82) PERB
Decision No. 194, the Board held a statute of limitations could
be tolled under either of two circumstances. 	The first is the
statutory provisions which provide for tolling during efforts
of the parties to resolve their differences through binding
arbitration. This is not the case at hand.
The second possibility is the doctrine of equitable tolling
established by the California courts and adopted by PERB in
State of California, Department of Water Resources; State of
California, Department of Developmental Services (12/29/81)
PERB Order No. Ad-122-S. Essential to this doctrine is the
premise that the respondent is somehow given notice of
potential claims to prevent surprise. In Henriette Allums v.
Los Angeles Unified School District (9/20/82) PERB Decision
No. 237, the Board found the doctrine of equitable tolling
6Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 410 [115 Cal. Rptr. 641];
Myers v. County of Orange (1970) 6 Cal. App. 3d 626
[86 Cal. Rptr. 198].
17

inapplicable where the actions taken by the charging party were
not sufficient to provide timely notice to the employer of its
need to preserve relevant evidence. In this case, although the
University was in fact aware CSEA sought a reclassification of
the former B gardeners to a new C level, it had never received
notice of any potential litigation on this issue. CSEA should
therefore not be allowed to revive a 17-month old claim of
unilateral change.
It is therefore found that the statute of limitations
started running in March 1980 and was not tolled by any action
by the parties. The complaint regarding gardeners is therefore
untimely by almost one full year.
Even assuming, arguendo, the statute the limitations was
either tolled or started running when the University refused to
create a new classification, the University has met any duty it
had to meet and discuss the issue with CSEA.
In Laborers' Local 1276, LIUNA, AFL-CIO and Alameda County
Building and Construction Trades Council (4/30/82) PERB
Decision No. 212, the Board held that HEERA requires the
University to provide prior notice and an opportunity to
discuss contemplated changes in wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment to non-exclusive representatives.
In Professional Engineers in California Government (3/19/80)
PERB Decision No. 118-S, the Board held the duty to meet and
discuss with a non-exclusive representative was not the same as
18

that imposed with regard to an exclusive representative. A
employer and an exclusive representative have a mutual duty to
meet and confer in good faith promptly upon request by either
party and continue for a reasonable period of time in order to
exchange information, opinions and proposals, and to endeavor
to reach agreement on matters within scope of representation.
In contrast, the obligation upon the employer with respect to a
non-exclusive representative is to provide "reasonable
opportunity to meet and discuss" subjects basic to the
employment relationship prior to reaching or taking action upon
policy decisions.
It is clear that the affected employees (both A gardeners
and B gardeners) had actual notice of the potential
reclassification. Furthermore, one of the affected employees
was Joe Castagnasso, the CSEA representative, who had on two
prior occasions suggested reclassification of A gardeners
because they were working out of classification. When
Castagnasso learned of the possibility of the upgrade he asked
to meet with Rick Sanchez, the personnel officer for the
department . 	Sanchez agreed and did, in fact, meet with
Castagnasso and other gardeners. They discussed the potential
upgrade, and Sanchez listened to Castagnasso's proposal that a
C level classification be created.
There was no evidence of any other request for meetings
until after the reclassification was implemented. At that
19

time, Castagnasso met with Phil Encinio and, according to
Castagnasso,
I gave him all my information. . 	We
discussed it almost two hours. I don't
recall all of his [Encinio's] conversation
but I gave him everything I had on it.
From that meeting, the University agreed to do a job audit
on the former B gardeners. The job audit was completed and the
University offered to increase the level of the B gardener who
did tree trimming.
Gardeners-Interference.
CSEA also argues that even if the University's actions did
not constitute unilateral changes, they nevertheless interfered
with rights to organize. Although the unilateral action has
been found to be outside the statute of limitations, the
refusal to create a new pay differential or new classification
is within the statute of limitations and could be a violation
if it is found to interfere with rights to organize.
In Carlsbad Unified School District (1/30/79) PERB Decision
No. 89, and Novato Unified School District (4/30/82) PERB
Decision No. 210, the Board noted that subsection 3543.5 (a)
the section of the EERA corresponding with section 3571 (a) 17
essentially combined provisions of subsections 8 (a) (1) and
8 (a) (3) of the NLRA. 8 The Board pointed out that:
The Educational Employment Relations Act is codified at
Government Code section 3540 et seq.
8The National Labor Relations Act is codified at
29 U.S.C. 151-68. Section 8 (a) states:
20

Generally with respect to "intent" the NLRB
and federal courts have drawn a distinction
between sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) . While
unlawful intent appears not to be a necessary
element of an interference charge under
8 (a) (1) (cites omitted) , it has generally
been held to be a necessary ingredient in
finding a violation of section 8 (a) (3)
(cites omitted) . Novato, supra, at
footnote 6.
If the charging party has meant to show the refusal to
create a new pay differential or create a new gardener
classification was done with unlawful motivation, it has failed
completely. In Carlsbad, supra, the Board said:
Unlawful motivation, purpose or intent is
essentially a state of mind, a subjective
condition known only to the charged party.
Direct and affirmative proof is not always
available or possible. However, following
generally accepted legal principles the
presence of such unlawful motivation,
purpose or intent may be established by
inference from the entire record. (Cites
Omitted.)
The evidence from which unlawful motive could be inferred
is limited to the following: 	(1) the pay differential was
looked upon by some employees as a benefit acquired for them by
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer - (1) to interfere with, restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7. . 	. (3) by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of
employment, to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
21

unions, and (2) the action took place during a time in which
unions were seeking to become exclusive representatives. It
cannot reasonably be concluded from these two facts that the
University took this action with the unlawful intent to
interfere with rights to organize. This is particularly true
since this was a move which had received at least partial
support from CSEA in prior years.
If, on the other hand, charging party sought to treat the
charge strictly as an interference case showing no unlawful
motive, then CSEA,
. need only make a prima facie showing
that respondent's conduct tends to or does
result in harm to employee rights guaranteed
under . 	. [the Act] . The respondent then
has the burden of producing an operational
necessity justification. The Board will
then balance the competing interests of the
parties and resolve the charge accordingly.
Novato, supra, at footnote 7.
Although some employees may view unions cynically as
impotent and unreliable because CSEA was unable to secure a new
pay differential or a new classification for all of the
original B gardeners, that by itself does not establish harm to
employee rights. Employee rights are not harmed simply because
the University chose not to adopt CSEA's proposal.
Furthermore, even if this were to establish a prima facie case
of harm to employee rights, the University has clearly
demonstrated an operational justification. These valid
operational needs were established by both University and
22

charging party witnesses, and outweigh any alleged harm to
employee rights.
For the reasons set forth above, that portion of the
complaint dealing with the gardener reclassification should be
dismissed.
Food Service Workers.
The process of the elimination of the senior food worker
pay differential is significantly different than the
gardeners. Here, there was no prior notice given to CSEA or
any of the affected employees. Although individual job cards
were gathered from employees, there was no evidence the
employees were aware of the purpose or the implications of such
action. 	CSEA was not given any opportunity to state its
position regarding the elimination of the pay differential, or
to suggest possible alternatives. The first any employees or
CSEA learned of the change was two weeks after the change had
already taken place.
Furthermore, once the change did occur and CSEA made a
request to meet, the request was apparently ignored. The
director of food services testified he forwarded the request to
the Berkeley personnel office. However, CSEA received no
response whatsoever. After waiting almost six weeks for a
response, CSEA wrote directly to the Berkeley personnel office
seeking a meeting. This request still did not result in a
meeting due to the University's insistence upon a more specific
23

written agenda and a limit on the number of CSEA
representatives allowed into any meeting.9 The University
has simply failed to demonstrate any sincere willingness to
meet on this issue.
The University states in its brief that the parties are, in
fact, still trying to set up a meeting over this issue. This,
however, strains credibility beyond reasonable limits. If the
University had a good faith willingness to meet, it certainly
would not take 10 months to schedule a simple meet and discuss
session. Furthermore, even if it were true, the duty to meet
arises prior to taking action, not a year later.
The University also argues that there is no duty to meet
and discuss because there was no unilateral change. According
to the University, all it did was scrutinize the work performed
and, based upon that, adjusted titles and wages within the
existing classification structure. This argument is not
persuasive . 	There was no evidence that food service workers
performed senior food service worker duties on a routine
basis. The reclassification did not merely change their title
to reflect their actual duties. The purpose of the
reclassification was to cut down on turnover, ease recruiting
9Although the limitation on the number of CSEA
representatives the University would allow into any meet and
discuss session was removed from consideration as a separate
violation, it is evidence of a lack of a sincere interest to
meet on this issue.
24

problems, and provide opportunity for cross-training. 	Thus ,
when all career employees in the food service worker class were
reclassified to senior food service workers, a change most
definitely occurred. This change affected wages, an item
fundamentally within the scope of representation.
Based upon the information set forth above, it is clear the
University failed to give CSEA any prior notice of the
reclassification, nor did it give CSEA an opportunity to
discuss the elimination of the pay differential which was an
effect of the reclassification.
CONCLUSION
By implementing a reclassification of food service workers
without giving the required notice to CSEA, and by refusing to
meet and discuss the effects of that decision, the University
has denied to CSEA its right to represent its members in their
employment relationships with the University in violation of
section 3571 (b) . Because the failure to meet and discuss this
issue necessarily interferes with the employees in their
exercise of protected rights to representation, the University
has also violated section 3571 (a) .
Because the University did provide notice to CSEA and did
meet and discuss the issue of the reclassification and pay
differential for gardeners, and because the unfair practice
charge was filed beyond the statute of limitations provided in
the Act, that portion of the complaint dealing with the
25

elimination of the pay differential to gardeners is hereby
DISMISSED.
Because CSEA failed to prove that the refusal to establish
a gardener C classification was done with unlawful motive or
that any rights were interfered with, that portion of the
complaint dealing with the refusal to create a new
classification is hereby DISMISSED.
REMEDY
Section 3563.3 of the Act provides that:
The board shall have the power to issue a
decision and order directing an offending
party to cease and desist from the unfair
practice and to take such affirmative
action, including, but not limited to, the
reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this chapter.
The remedy for violations such as those found in this case
should be designed to restore, so far as possible, the status
quo ante. Santa Clara Unified School District (9/26/79) PERB
Decision No. 104. Restoration of the status quo ante in the
present case would require demotion of former food service
workers and would not, therefore, be appropriate. It would
only serve to further undermine the charging party. 	The
charging party, instead, seeks the restoration of the pay
differential to original senior food service workers through a
salary increase or the establishment of a new classification
for original senior food service workers. In light of the fact
that the senior food service worker classification is one of a
26

series of several promotional levels, ordering a pay increase
to the original senior food service workers would merely
compound the problem and would create exactly the same issue
for employees in the next higher job classification.
Furthermore, the original senior food service workers are
performing the same duties as they did in the past, and there
is no evidence on the record justifying a salary increase or
establishment of a new classification as an ordered remedy.
The University will therefore be ordered to meet with CSEA
and discuss the impact of the implementation of the
reclassification of food service workers.
The University shall also be ordered to cease and desist
from arriving at a determination of policy or course of action
concerning matters within scope of representation without first
giving notice to employee organizations and, upon request,
discussing the matters pending the selection of an exclusive
representative.
It also is appropriate that the University be required to
post a notice incorporating the terms of the order. The notice
should be subscribed by an authorized agent of the University
indicating that it will comply with the terms thereof. The
notice shall not be reduced in size. Posting such a notice
effectuates the purpose of the Act by providing employees with
notice that the controversy has been resolved, that the
University has acted in an unlawful manner and that the
27

University is being required to cease and desist from this
activity. See, e.g., Placerville Union School District
(9/18/78) PERB Decision No. 69; Pandol and Sons v. ALRB and UFW
(1979) 98 Cal . App. 3d 580; NLRB v. Express Publishing Co. (1941)
312 U.S. 426 [8 LRRM 415] .
PROPOSED ORDER
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to section
3563.3, it is hereby ordered that the University of California,
its governing board and its representatives shall:
1 . 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(a) Arriving at a determination of policy or course
of action concerning matters within the scope of representation
without first giving notice to employee organizations and, upon
request, discussing these matters pending the selection of an
exclusive representative.
(b) Denying to the California State Employees
Association rights guaranteed by the Higher Education
Employeer-Employee Relations Act including the right to
represent its members.
(c) 	Interfering with employees because of the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the Higher Education
Employer-Employee Relations Act.
28

2. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE ACT:
(a) Upon request, immediately meet and discuss with
the California State Employees Association regarding the impact
of the reclassification of food service workers on the senior
food service worker classification.
(b) Within five (5) workdays after this decision
becomes final, prepare and post copies of the NOTICE TO
EMPLOYEES attached as an appendix hereto, for at least thirty
(30) workdays at its headquarters offices and in conspicuous
places at the location where notices to certificated employees
are customarily posted. It must not be reduced in size and
reasonable steps should be taken to see that it is not defaced,
altered or covered by any material.
(c) Within twenty (20) workdays from service of the
final decision herein, give written notification to the
San Francisco Regional Director of the Public Employment
Relations Board, of the actions taken to comply with this
Order. Continue to report in writing to the Regional Director
thereafter as directed. All reports to the Regional Director
shall be concurrently served on the charging party herein.
3. 	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other charges filed
against the University regarding reclassification of gardeners
be DISMISSED, and that the Notice attached as an appendix shall
reflect this dismissal.
29

Pursuant to California Administrative Code, title 8,
part III, section 32305, this Proposed Decision and Order shall
become final on October 20, 1982, unless a party files a timely
statement of exceptions. In accordance with the rules, the
statement of exceptions should identify by page citation or
exhibit number the portions of the record relied upon for such
exceptions. See California Administrative Code title 8,
part III, section 32300. Such statement of exceptions and
supporting brief must be actually received by the Board itself
at the headquarters office of the Public Employment Relations
Board in Sacramento before the close of business (5:00 p.m. ) on
October 20, 1982, in order to be timely filed. When exceptions
are sent by telegraph or certified United States mail
postmarked not later than the last day set for filing, said
document shall also be considered filed. See California
Administrative Code, title 8, part III, section 32135. Any
statement of exceptions and supporting brief must be served
concurrently with its filing upon each party to this
proceeding. Proof of service shall be filed with the Board
itself. See California Administrative Code, title 8, part III,
sections 32300 and 32305 as amended.
Dated: September 30, 1982 James W. Tamm
Administrative Law Judge
30