Los Angeles Unified School District (PERB 0336E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
HOWARD 	O. 	WATTS,
Complainant,
v.
LOS 	ANGELES 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
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____________________ )
Case 	No. 	LA-PN-38
PERB 	Decision 	No. 	336
August 	18, 	1983
Appearances: 	Howard 	o. 	Watts, 	representing 	himself.
Before 	Gluck, 	Chairperson; 	Jaeger 	and 	Morgenstern, 	Members.
DECISION
MORGENSTERN, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is 	before 	the 	Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(PERB 	or 	Board) 	on 	exceptions 	filed
by 	the 	complainant, 	Howard 	o. 	Watts, 	to 	the 	hearing 	officer's
proposed 	decision 	which 	dismissed 	the 	alleged 	violations 	of 	a
public 	notice 	provision 	of 	the 	Educational 	Employment 	Relations
Act 	(EERA or 	Act). 	The 	hearing 	officer 	concluded 	that 	the
District 	complied 	with 	subsection 	3547(d) 	by 	placing 	an
informational 	document 	in 	a 	file 	in 	the 	public 	information
office 	within 	24 	hours 	after 	a 	new 	proposal 	was 	presented.!
lEERA 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3540
et 	seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory 	references
are 	to 	the 	Government 	Code.
Subsection 	3547(d) 	states 	in 	pertinent 	part:
New 	subjects 	of 	meeting 	and 	negotiating 	arising

after
	the 	presentation 	of
	initial
	proposals
shall
	be 	made
	public 	within
	24
	hours
•••.
FACTS
On
	September
	15,
	1981, 	Watts
	filed
	the
	instant
	public
notice
	complaint
	against
	the
	Los
	Angeles
	Unified
	School
District
	(District)
	and
	the
	United 	Teachers
	of
	Los
	Angeles
(UTLA).
	He
	alleged,
	inter
	alia,
	that
	the
	District
	and
	UTLA
failed 	to	
make
	public
	their
	new
	bargaining 	proposal
	in
violation
	of
	EERA
	subsection
	3547(d).
	watts'
	complaint
proceeded
	to
	hearing
	on
	May
	27, 	1982.
Thereafter,
	on
	June 	14, 	1982,
	the
	parties2	
were
	asked
	to
submit
	post-hearing
	briefs
	addressing 	Watts'
	argument,
	raised
for
	the
	first
	time
	at
	the
	hearing,
	that
	merely
	placing
	a 	new
proposal 	in
	the
	file
	in 	the
	public 	information
	office
	does
	not
satisfy
EERA's
	public 	notice 	provisions.
On
	July
	14, 	1982, 	Watts
	submitted
	a
	motion
	to
	correct
	the
hearing
	transcript
	to
	include 	reference
	to
	a
	settlement
proposal3	
and
	to
	identify
	the
	PERB
	general 	counsel 	as
	the
"unidentified"
	voice 	noted
	in 	the 	hearing
	transcript.
2At
	the
	commencement
	of 	the 	hearing, 	the
	parties
stipulated 	that
	the 	charge
	against
	UTLA
	be
	dismissed.
3on
	May
	24, 	1982,
	prior 	to
	commencing
	the 	hearing, 	Watts
submitted
	a
	written
	motion
	to
	settle.
	He
	proposed
	that
	all
	new
bargaining 	proposals
	be
	included 	in 	the 	board 	of 	educationagenda 	documents
	distributed 	at 	public 	meetings 	of 	the 	boardand
	that
	the
	full
	package 	be
	posted
	on
	bulletin
	boards 	where
the 	agendas 	are 	customarily 	posted.
2

The 	hearing 	officer 	replied 	to 	this 	motion 	on 	July 	22, 	1982
and 	informed 	Watts 	that 	no 	reference 	to 	the 	settlement 	appeared
on 	the 	record 	since 	the 	"Motion 	for 	Settlement" 	was 	received
and 	discussed 	during 	the 	pre-hearing 	conference. 	The 	hearing
officer 	considered 	the 	proposed 	settlement 	to 	be 	a 	request 	to
reconvene 	informal 	settlement 	discussions 	with 	the 	District 	and
UTLA; 	however, 	both 	parties 	declined. 	He 	advised 	Watts 	that 	he
would 	treat 	the 	settlement 	proposal 	as 	an 	attempt 	to 	specify 	a
remedy.
As 	to 	Watts' 	request 	to 	have 	the 	general 	counsel 	identified
on 	the 	transcript, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	indicated 	that 	while 	no
positive 	identification 	was 	possible, 	the 	general 	counsel's
appearance 	was 	noted. 	He 	advised 	Watts, 	however, 	that 	none 	of
those 	comments 	would 	be 	considered.
On 	July 	26, 	1982, 	Watts 	submitted 	a 	motion 	to 	reopen 	the
hearing, 	seeking 	to 	introduce 	evidence 	concerning 	the 	exact
time 	the 	new 	proposal 	was 	placed 	in 	the 	public 	information 	file
and 	to 	introduce 	a 	settlement 	proposal 	which 	was 	allegedly
offered 	during 	the 	hearing 	but 	not 	recorded.
On 	July 	30, 	1982, 	the 	District 	responded 	to Watts' 	point
about 	the 	time 	of 	filing 	and 	asserted 	that 	while 	inconsistent
statements 	did 	appear 	in 	the 	record, 	the 	public 	filing 	was
timely 	in 	either 	situation.
In 	the 	proposed 	decision 	issued 	on August 	17, 	1982, 	the
hearing 	officer 	dismissed 	Watts' 	allegation 	that 	the 	District
3

failed
	to 	place
	the
	new
	bargaining 	proposal 	in
	the
	public
information
	file
	within
	the
	24-hour 	time
	limit.
	He
	also
rejected
	Watts'
	assertion 	that
	simply
	placing
	a 	document
	in
	a
file
	in
	the
	public
	information
	office
	and
	allowing
	public
access 	to
	that
	file
	does
	not
	constitute
	compliance
	with
	the
statutory
	public 	notice
	requirements.4
He
	concluded
	that
	subsection
	3547(d)
	does
	not
	require
	the
employer
	to
	place 	the
	new
	proposal
	on
	the 	school
	board's
	agenda
or
	to
	post 	informational 	notices
	at
	various
	locations.
	The
hearing
	officer
	outlined
	the 	process
	through
	which
	the
	public
is
	permitted
	to
	participate
	in 	the
	collective
	bargaining
process
	and 	found
	that
	the 	chronological 	public 	notice
	scheme
requires
	sunshining
	of
	initial
	proposals 	only.
	As
	to 	the
requirement
	that
	new
	proposals
	be made
	public,
	he 	found 	no
evidentiary
	support 	for 	Watts'
	assertion 	that
	few
	people
	knew
of 	or
	could
	have 	found
	the
	public 	information
	file
	and
	noted
that
	a
	District 	bulletin
	specifying
	where
	information 	regarding
new
	proposals
	could
	be
	obtained
	was 	on
	file
	in
	all
	schools 	in
the
	District.
4with
	regard 	to 	this 	issue,
	the 	hearing
	officer
	dismissed
the
	District's
	argument
	that,
	since
	Watts
	failed 	to
	raise 	this
issue 	prior 	to 	hearing, 	his 	effort
	to
	amend
	the 	complaint
should
	have 	been
	denied.
	The
	hearing
	officer
	found
	that 	the
District
	was
	not 	prejudiced
	by
	this
	amendment 	because
	it
	raised
a
	legal 	rather
	than
	factual 	issue
	and 	because 	the
	District
	was
permitted 	the 	opportunity 	to 	address 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	argument
in
	a
	post-hearing 	brief.
4

DISCUSSION
With 	one 	exception, 	Watts' 	disputes 	with 	the 	hearing
officer's 	proposed 	decision 	fail 	to 	raise 	meritorious
arguments. 	Several 	of 	his 	exceptions 	refer 	to 	the 	proposed
settlement 	and 	contest 	the 	manner 	in 	which 	it 	was 	handled. 	In
fact, 	however, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	appropriately 	considered 	the
settlement 	Watts 	proposed. 	After 	the 	settlement 	was 	received,
the 	hearing 	officer 	offered 	to 	reconvene 	the 	informal
settlement 	conference. 	The 	District 	and 	UTLA 	rejected 	the
offer 	and 	the 	proposed 	settlement. 	After 	the 	hearing 	was
completed, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	again 	considered 	the 	settlement
in 	conjunction 	with 	Watts' 	motion 	for 	correction 	of
transcript. 	In 	response 	thereto, 	Watts 	was 	advised 	that 	the
proposed 	settlement 	was 	not 	discussed 	during 	the 	hearing 	so 	it
was 	not 	referenced 	on 	the 	record, 	that 	the 	settlement 	was
treated 	as 	a 	request 	to 	reconvene 	informal 	discussions, 	and
that 	the 	settlement 	was 	a 	part 	of 	the 	case 	record 	and 	would 	not
be 	denied 	but 	would 	be 	treated 	as 	an 	attempt 	to 	specify 	a
remedy.
Thereafter, 	in 	his 	proposed 	decision, 	the 	hearing 	officer
specifically 	considered 	the 	settlement, 	this 	time 	in 	the
context 	of 	Watts' 	motion 	to 	reopen 	the 	record. 	Concluding 	that
the 	District 	complied 	with 	all 	public 	notice 	requirements 	by
placing 	the 	new 	proposal 	in 	the 	public 	information 	file, 	the
5

hearing 	officer 	found 	the 	settlement proposal 	to 	be 	"of 	no
practical 	value 	as 	a 	requested 	remedy" 	and 	denied 	Watts' 	motion.
In 	the 	instant 	case, 	five 	of 	Watts' 	exceptions 	essentially
reiterate 	his 	earlier 	complaints 	regarding 	the 	alleged
settlement 	he 	proposed. 	They 	are 	all 	without 	merit 	and 	are
disregarded.
Similarly, 	as 	to 	Watts' 	exception 	concerning 	identification
of 	the 	unidentified 	voice 	in 	the 	transcript, 	the 	hearing
officer 	aptly 	considered 	and 	rejected 	the 	argument.
First, 	with 	regard 	to 	Watts' 	motion 	to 	correct 	the
transcript, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	advised 	that 	positive
identification 	was 	not 	possible, 	but 	that 	the 	unidentified
speaker's 	comments 	would 	not 	be 	considered. 	A reading 	of 	the
transcript 	reveals 	that 	the 	comments 	of 	the 	unidentified
speaker 	were 	efforts 	to 	assist 	Watts 	or 	the 	hearing 	officer 	or
otherwise 	offered 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	moving 	the 	proceeding
along. 	Watts 	was 	in 	no 	way 	prejudiced 	by 	these 	comments 	nor
was 	the 	decision 	based 	on 	the 	remarks. 	This 	exception 	is
without 	merit.
Watts 	also 	charges 	that 	the 	hearing 	officer 	erred 	in
refusing 	to 	allow 	Watts 	to 	introduce 	certain 	evidence. 	During
the 	hearing, 	Watts 	tried 	to 	introduce 	the 	recommendation 	of 	the
District office 	of 	staff 	relations 	to 	the 	board 	of 	education
that 	the 	board 	should 	find 	Watts' 	complaint 	unmeritorious. 	The
hearing 	officer 	found 	that 	the 	action 	taken 	by 	the 	school 	board
6

under 	its 	internal 	complaint 	procedure 	was 	not 	relevant 	to 	the
issue 	raised 	in 	the 	instant 	case. 	The 	hearing 	officer's 	ruling
was 	correct.
Watts 	also 	submits 	an 	exception 	concerning 	the 	discrepancy
in 	the 	testimony 	of 	William 	J. 	Sharp, 	District 	assistant
superintendent/staff 	relations, 	and 	Reginald Murphy, 	his
subordinate. 	In 	the 	District's 	response 	to 	the 	instant
complaint, 	Sharp 	advised 	Watts 	that 	the 	document 	detailing 	the
new 	proposal 	was 	placed 	in 	the 	public 	information 	file 	on
August 	18, 	1981, 	the 	same 	afternoon 	it 	was 	presented 	to 	UTLA.
When 	Murphy 	testified 	at 	the 	hearing, 	however, 	he 	said 	he
placed 	the 	document 	in 	the 	file 	on 	the 	following 	morning,
August 	19, 	1981. 	In 	conjunction 	with 	Watts' 	post-hearing
motion 	to 	reopen 	the 	record, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	considered
this 	matter. 	He 	concluded 	that 	Watts 	was 	aware 	of 	Sharp's
response 	before 	the 	hearing; 	yet, 	at 	the 	hearing, 	he 	failed 	to
question Murphy 	about 	the 	discrepancy. 	He 	therefore 	found 	no
showing 	that 	the 	testimony 	sought 	to 	be 	introduced 	was 	not
known 	or 	unavailable 	to 	Watts 	during 	the 	hearing. 	In 	addition,
the 	hearing 	officer 	noted 	that, 	while 	the 	record 	may 	never
reveal 	the 	reason 	for 	the 	discrepancy, 	the 	document 	was 	placed
in 	the 	public 	information 	file 	within 	the 	24-hour 	time 	limit,
as 	required 	by 	subsection 	3547{d). 	Watts' 	exception 	reiterates
the 	argument 	appropriately 	resolved 	hearing 	officer 	and
is 	accordingly 	rejected.
7

Watts
	also
	argues
	that
	the 	hearing
	officer
	should
	have
recognized
	and
	described
	on
	the 	record
	each
	of
	the
	exhibits
submitted
	by
	Watts
	in
	support
	of
	his
	appeal
	of
	the
	dismissal
	of
portions
	of
	this
	public 	notice
	complaint
	by
	the 	regional
director
..
5 	The
	hearing
	officer
	took
	"official
	notice"
	of
that
	case
	and
	its
	supporting
	exhibits.
	The
	hearing
	officer
appropriately
	incorporated 	these
	documents 	by
	reference.
	It
was
	not
	necessary
	to
	read
	each
	into
	the 	record.
Two
	of
	Watts' 	exceptions
	concern
	the
	allegation 	that
	he
	was
disadvantaged
	by
	virtue
	of
	the
	fact 	that
	he
	is
	not
	a
	lawyer
	and
acted 	in 	pro
	per.
	There
	is
	little
	basis 	to
	conclude
	that 	legal
training
	would 	have
	altered
	the
	result
	in 	the
	instant 	case.
Admittedly,
	a
	reading
	of
	the
	transcript
	displays
	lengthy
arguments
	between
	watts
	and
	the 	hearing
	officer,
	extensive
repetition
	of 	explanation
	by
	the 	hearing
	officer
	and
	little
testimony
	from
	witnesses.
	It
	does
	not
	reveal,
	however,
	that
the 	hearing
	officer 	relied
	extensively
	on
	technical
	arguments
or 	"legalese."
In
	Los 	Angeles 	Community
	College
	District
	(12/15/81)
	PERB
Decision
	No.
	186,
	the
	Board
	concluded
	that
	PERB
	Rule 	37030
requires
	PERB
	representatives 	to 	provide 	technical 	assistance
Son 	November 	10, 	1981,
	the
	Los 	Angeles
	regional 	director
dismissed 	portions 	of Watts'
	initial
	complaint 	without 	leave 	to
amend. 	Watts 	subsequently 	appealed.
	The
	Board's 	review
	of
that 	dismissai 	is
	found
	in
	Los 	Angeles 	Unified 	School
	District
( 	8/18/83)
	PERB
	Decision 	No. 	335.
8

rather 	than 	legal 	representation 	to 	the 	complainant. 	And 	see
Los 	Angeles 	Community College 	District 	(12/15/81) 	PERB 	Order
No. 	Ad-119. 	There 	is 	nothing 	in 	the 	record 	to 	support 	a
finding 	that 	such 	assistance 	was 	requested 	or 	denied. 	These
exceptions 	are 	therefore 	rejected.
Watts' 	final 	exception 	refers 	to 	the 	hearing 	officer's
refusal 	to 	permit 	Watts 	to 	call 	two 	additional 	witnesses.
However, 	the 	exception 	raises 	the 	larger 	issue 	of 	the 	scope 	of
Watts' 	alleged 	public 	notice 	violation. 	While 	not 	free 	of
ambiguity, 	the 	charge 	can 	reasonably 	be 	read 	to 	ask 	whether 	new
proposals 	must 	be 	sunshined 	in 	the 	same 	manner 	as 	parties'
initial 	proposals 	or, 	if 	not, 	whether 	placement 	in 	the 	public
information 	file 	satisfies 	the 	"make 	public" 	requirement 	of
subsection 	3547(d).
Initially, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	did 	not 	address 	either 	of
these 	issues 	but 	limited 	the 	scope 	of 	the 	hearing 	to 	the
question 	of 	whether 	the 	District 	placed 	the 	new proposal 	in 	the
public 	information 	file 	within 	the 	24-hour 	time 	period.
Following 	the 	hearing, 	however, 	he 	expanded 	the 	parameters 	of
the 	instant 	case 	to 	include 	the 	issues 	of 	whether 	the 	new
proposals 	must 	be 	sunshined 	and 	whether 	placement 	of 	a 	document
in 	the 	public 	information 	file 	constitutes 	compliance 	with 	the
statutory 	public 	notice 	requirements.6
6ouring 	the 	hearing, 	the 	District 	voiced 	opposition 	to
Watts' 	effort 	to 	amend 	his 	complaint ·to 	include 	his 	challenge
to 	the 	adequacy 	of 	the 	public 	information 	file. 	The 	hearing
9

As 	to 	the 	first 	issue, 	we 	agree 	with 	the 	hearing 	officer's
conclusion 	that 	the 	language 	of 	subsection 3547{d) 	does 	not
mandate 	the 	public 	school 	employer 	to 	place 	new 	negotiating
proposals 	on 	the 	school 	board's 	agenda. 	As 	discussed 	by 	the
hearing 	officer, 	section 	3547 	provides 	a 	process 	by 	which 	the
public 	is 	made 	aware 	of 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	exchange.
Unlike 	subsection 	(d), 	subsections 	3547(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c) 	relate
to 	initial 	proposals 	and 	clearly 	comtemplate 	a 	chronological
process 	encouraging 	comment 	at 	public 	meetings 	of 	the 	school
board 	on 	initial 	proposals.? 	As 	compared 	to 	the 	first 	three
subsections, 	subsection 	3547(d) 	does 	not 	refer 	to 	meetings 	of
officer 	took 	the 	District's 	objection 	under 	advisement 	and,
after 	conclusion 	of 	the 	evidentiary 	hearing, 	invited 	the
parties 	to 	address 	the 	issue 	in 	their 	post-hearing 	briefs. 	In
his 	proposed 	decision, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	permitted Watts'
amendment 	since 	the 	facts 	were 	not 	in 	dispute 	and 	due 	process
was 	therefore 	served 	through 	submission 	of 	briefs. 	The
District 	did 	not 	except 	to 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	decision 	to
permit Watts' 	amendment. 	As 	discussed 	infra, 	however, 	we 	are
in 	disagreement 	with 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	conclusion 	that 	the
adequacy 	of 	the 	public 	information 	file 	can 	be 	assessed 	without
reliance 	on 	factual 	considerations.
?section 	3547 	outlines 	the 	public 	presentation of
proposals. 	It 	states:
(a) 	All 	initial 	proposals 	of 	exclusive
representatives 	and 	of 	public 	school
employers, 	which 	relate 	to matters 	within
the 	scope 	of 	representation, 	shall 	be
presented 	at 	a 	public 	meeting 	of 	the 	public
school 	employer 	and 	thereafter 	shall 	be
public 	records.
(b) 	Meeting 	and 	negotiating 	shall 	not 	take
place 	on 	any 	proposal 	until 	a 	reasonable
time 	has 	elapsed 	after 	the 	submission 	of 	the
proposal 	to 	enable 	the 	public 	to 	become
10

informed 	and 	the 	public 	has 	the 	opportunity
to 	express 	itself 	regarding 	the 	proposal 	at
a 	meeting 	of 	the 	public 	school 	employer.
(c) 	After 	the 	public 	has 	had 	the
opportunity 	to 	express 	itself, 	the 	public
school 	employer 	shall, 	at 	a 	meeting 	which 	is
open 	to 	the 	public, 	adopt 	its 	initial
proposal.
(d) 	New 	subjects 	of 	meeting 	and 	negotiating
arising 	after 	the 	presentation of 	initial
proposals 	shall 	be 	made 	public 	within 	24
hours. 	If 	a 	vote 	is 	taken 	on 	such 	subject
by 	the 	public 	school 	employer, 	the 	vote
thereon 	by 	each 	member 	voting 	shall 	also 	be
made 	public 	within 	24 	hours.
(e) 	The 	board 	may 	adopt 	regulations 	for 	the
purpose 	of 	implementing 	this 	section, 	which
are 	consistent 	with 	the 	intent 	of 	the
section; 	namely 	that 	the 	public 	be 	informed
of 	the 	issues 	that 	are 	being 	negotiated 	upon
and 	have 	full 	opportunity 	to 	express 	their
views 	on 	the 	issues 	to 	the 	public 	school
employer, 	and 	to 	know 	of 	the 	positions 	of
their 	elected 	representatives.
the 	employer 	and 	we 	do 	not 	read 	it 	to 	require 	placement 	of 	new
proposals 	on 	the 	school 	board's 	agenda 	or 	bulletin 	boards.
Notwithstanding 	this 	conclusion, 	we 	cannot 	divest 	of 	all
substance 	the 	statutory 	directive 	to 	"make 	public" 	and 	must
determine 	what 	is 	required 	to 	satisfy 	that 	provision.
Unfortunately, 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	decision 	to 	expand 	the
complaint 	to 	include 	this 	issue 	after 	completion of 	the 	hearing
poses 	some 	difficulty.
At 	the 	conclusion 	of 	the 	hearing, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	asked
Watts 	if 	he 	had 	any 	witnesses 	who 	would 	speak 	to 	the 	issue 	of
11

whether
	the
	24-hour
	filing
	deadline
	had
	been
	met.
	In
	response,
Watts
	said
	"I've
	got
	a
	witness
	that
	can
	testify
	whether
	the
document
	should
	be
	put 	in
	the
	public
	information
	file."
	While
we
	readily
	admit
	to
	difficulty
	in
	determining
	exactly
	what
evidence
	Watts
	hoped
	to
	elicit,
	our
	interpretation
	of 	the
record
	compels
	the 	conclusion
	that
	at 	least
	one
	of
	watts'
witnesses
	may
	have 	been
	called
	to
	address 	the 	issue 	of 	the
adequacy
	of 	the 	public
	information
	file.
Given
	the 	hearing
	officer's
	decision 	to
	expand
	the
	scope
	of
the
	charge, 	the 	ruling 	to
	exclude 	the
	first
	witness
	seems
inappropriate.
	Whether
	new
	proposals
	"should
	be"
	placed
	in
	the
public
	information
	file
	may
	reasonably
	be
	read 	as
	an
	offer
	of
proof
	that
	the 	witness
	would
	testify
	as 	to 	the 	general
awareness
	of 	the 	public
	information
	file.
Factual
	evidence
	on
	this
	point
	is
	necessary 	in order
	to
assess
	the
	sufficiency 	of
	the
	District's
	procedure. 	Indeed,
when
	the 	hearing
	officer
	expanded
	the 	parameters 	of 	the
	instant
case 	to 	include 	the 	issue 	of
	whether
	the
	District's
	public
information
	file
	procedure
	constitutes
	compliance 	with
subsection 	3547(d),
	he
	stated:
The
	Complainant
	alleges 	that
	the
	District's
policy
	is 	insufficient
	for 	the 	public 	to
become 	aware
	of 	the
	new
	subjects 	of
negotiation 	in 	that
	few
	people 	could 	find
the
	file
	or
	know
	of
	its
	existence.
	However,
as 	mentioned
	earlier,
	no
	evidence
	was
offered 	to 	support
	this 	allegation.
(Emphasis
	supplied.)
12

The
	fact 	that
	he 	found
	the
	evidence
	lacking
	to
	support 	the
alleged
	inadequacy
	of
	the
	public
	information
	file
	is
	not
surprising
	since
	Watts
	was
	prohibited
	from
	addressing 	the
	issue
during 	the 	hearing.
	Indeed,
	the 	hearing
	officer's
	conclusion
that
	the
	District's
	public
	information
	file
	satisfied
	the
statutory
	requirements
	was
	offered
	without
	permitting
	either
party
	the
	opportunity 	to
	fully
	present
	all
	relevant
	evidence.8
In
	short,
	the 	record
	was
	not
	fully
	developed
	to
	be
conclusive
	as
	to
	whether
	the
	public
	information
	file 	is,
	in
fact,
	sufficiently
	"public."
	The
	hearing
	officer
	decided
	to
redefine
	the
	scope
	of
	the 	charge
	after
	completion
	of 	the
hearing 	but
	failed 	to
	permit
	Watts
	or
	the
	District
	to
	introduce
all
	relevant
	evidence
	on
	that 	point.
	We
	find
	this
	conduct
	to
have 	denied
	the
	parties
	fundamental
	due
	process 	guarantees
	and
conclude
	that
	the 	hearing
	must 	be
	reconvened
	to 	permit
	the
introduction 	of
	all
	evidence
	relevant 	to 	the
	accessibility
	of
the 	public 	information
	office
	and
	to
Watts'
	contention
	that
	the
BThe
	hearing
	officer
	included 	reference 	to
	some
	evidence
relevant 	to 	the
	adequacy
	of 	the 	public 	information
	file.
	He
stated,
	for
	example,
	that
	a
	District 	bulletin,
	on
	file 	at 	all
schools, 	specifies
	where
	the 	information 	can 	be
	obtained,
	thatthe 	public 	information
	office
	would 	be 	a
	logical 	place
	to
	look
for 	the
	documents 	and
	that
	the
	documents
	are 	in 	fact 	also
available
	from
	the
	staff 	relations 	office.
	The
	hearing
	officer
failed 	to 	note,
	however,
	that
	the
	above-mentioned
	bulletin
	was
circulated 	to 	the
	District's
	schools 	in
	1979 	and
	that,
according 	to
	Sharp
	who
	maintains 	the
	file
	in 	the
	staffrelations 	office.
	no one 	has 	ever 	requested 	to 	see
	a 	new
	orsubsequent 	proposal 	contained 	in 	that 	file.
13

hearing 	officer 	erred 	in 	concluding 	that 	subsection 	3547(d) 	is
satisfied 	by 	placing 	the 	new 	proposals 	in 	that 	file.
Thus, 	our 	determination 	as 	to 	whether 	the 	Los 	Angeles
Unified 	School 	District's 	public 	information 	file 	satisfies
subsection 	3547(d) 	requires 	a 	remand 	since 	(a) 	neither 	party
was 	permitted 	to 	fully 	address 	the 	issue 	at 	hearing 	and 	(b)
Watts 	was 	specifically 	denied 	the 	opportunity 	to present
witnesses 	who 	allegedly 	would 	have 	addressed 	the 	issue. 	We
stress 	that 	the 	Board 	is 	authorized 	to 	interpret 	what 	is
required 	by 	the 	"make 	public" 	requirement 	and 	admonish 	both
parties 	that 	general 	opinion 	testimony 	will 	not 	be 	permitted.
Our 	concern 	is 	that 	all 	factual 	evidence 	relevant 	to 	this 	issue
come 	before 	us. 	Thus, 	we 	direct 	that 	the 	instant 	case 	be
remanded 	to 	permit 	both 	parties 	to 	elicit 	factual 	evidence
relevant 	to 	whether 	the 	public 	information 	file 	satisfies 	the
public 	notice 	requirement 	of 	subsection 	3547(d).
Chairperson 	Gluck 	and 	Member 	Jaeger 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
14