Alum Rock Union Elementary School District (PERB 0322E)

STATE
	OF
	CALIF
ORN
IA
DEC
IS
ION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
CALIFORNIA
	SCHOOL
	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
	CHAPTER
	305,
Charging
	Party,
v.
ALUM 	ROCK
	UNION 	ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
DIST RI CT,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)	
Case
	No.
	SF-CE-170
PERB
	Decision
	No. 	322
June
	27,
	1983
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances: 	Siona
	D.
	Windsor,
	Attorney 	for
	California
	School
Employees
	Association,
	Chapter
	305; 	John
	L.
	Bukey,
	Attorney
(Biddle,
	Walters
	& Bukey)
	for
	Alum 	Rock
	Union
	Elementary 	School
District.
Before
	Gluck,
	Chairperson; 	Tovar, 	Morgenstern
	and
	Burt,
	Members.
DECISION
MORGENSTERN,
	Member:
	This 	case
	is
	before 	the 	Public
Employment
	Relations
	Board
	(PE.RB
	or
	Board) 	on
	exceptions
	filed
by
	the
	Alum 	Rock
	Union
	Elementary 	School
	District 	(District)
	to
a
	hearing
	officer's
	proposed
	decision 	finding
	that
	the
	District
violated 	subsections
	3543.5
(a),
	(b) 	and 	(c)
	of
	the 	Educational
Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(EERA
	or
	Act)l	
by
	unilaterally
lEERA
	is 	codified 	at
	Government 	Code
	section
	3540
et 	seq. 	All 	statutory 	references 	are 	to 	the
	Government Code,
unless 	specified 	otherwise.
Subsections 	3543.S(a),
	(b) 	and 	(c)
	provide 	as 	follows:
It 	shall
	be
	unlawful 	for
	a
	public 	schoolemployer 	to:

adopting
	anci
	implementing
	a
	classification
	plan
	for
	classified
employees
	without
	negotiating
	with 	the
	exclusive
representative,
	California
	School
	Employees
	Association,
Chapter
	305
	(CSEA
	or
	Charging
	Party).
The
	District
	excepts 	to
	the
	hearing
	officer's
	finaing
	that
the
	classification
	plan
	affects
	matters 	within
	the
	scope
	of
representation
	and
	to 	his
	reliance
	on
	the 	Board's
	decision 	in
Healdsburg
	Union 	High
	School
	District
	and
	Healdsburg
	Union
School
	District
	(6/19/80)
	PERE
	Decision
	No. 	132
	as
	authority
for
	this
	finding.
The
	District
	further
	excepts 	to
	the 	hearing
	officer's
denial
	of
	its
	motion
	to 	dismiss
	that 	portion
	of 	the 	charge
pertaining
	to 	the
	unit
	of 	blue
	collar
	employees
	no
	longer
represented	
by	
CSEA
	or,
	in 	the
	alternative,
	to 	join
	the
	current
exclusive 	representative
	of
	that 	unit,
	the
	Teamsters
	Union
(Teamsters),
	as
	an
	indispensable 	party
	to 	the 	hearing
	on
	this
matter. 
(a) 	Impose
	or
	threaten
	to
	impose
	reprisals
on
	employees,
	to 	discriminate
	or
	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against
	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to
	interfere
	with,
	restrain,
	or 	coerceemployees 	because 	of
	their 	exercise
	of
rights
	guaranteed
	by
	this 	chapter.
(b) 	Deny
	to
	employee
	organizations 	rightsguaranteed 	to
	them 	by
	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse 	or
	fail
	to
	meet 	ana
	negotiate 	ingood
	faith
	with 	an
	exclusive 	representative.
2

Finally, 	the 	District 	excepts 	to 	the 	hearing 	officer's
proposed 	order, 	claiming 	it 	is 	ambiguous 	and 	inappropriate 	in
light 	of 	the 	length 	of 	time 	that 	has 	transpired 	since 	the
initiation 	of 	the 	charge 	and 	because 	the 	parties 	have 	entered
into 	a 	tentative 	agreement 	regarding 	certain 	features 	that 	are
affected 	by 	the 	oraer.
The 	Board 	has 	reviewed 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	light 	of 	the
District's 	exceptions. 	We 	find 	that 	the 	hearing 	officer's
findings 	of 	fact 	are 	free 	of 	prejudicial 	error 	ana 	adopt 	them
as 	the 	findings 	of 	the 	Board 	itself. 	For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth
below, 	we 	affirm 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	finding 	of 	violation 	and
his 	ruling 	on 	the 	District's 	motion 	to 	aismiss, 	but 	we 	modify
his 	proposed 	oraer.
FACTS
On 	October 	13, 	1977, 	the 	District 	adopted 	a 	classification
plan2 	which 	consists 	of 	the 	following 	elements:
(1) 	explanatory 	materials 	- 	definitions, 	objectives,
procedures; 	(2) 	lists 	of 	classes 	retitled, 	new 	classes, 	and
abolished 	classes; 	(3) 	Position 	Allocation 	List 	which 	allocates
positions 	to 	classitications; 	(4) 	Book 	of 	Specifications 	which
2charging 	Party's 	Exhibit 	No. 	6 	is 	the 	Alum 	Rock 	Union
Elementary 	School 	District 	Classification 	Study 	1977 	prepared
by 	Cooperative 	Personnel 	Services, 	California 	State 	Personnel
Board. 	The 	classification 	plan 	was 	adopted 	with 	minor
modifications 	set 	forth 	in 	memoranda 	dated 	October 	10 	and
October 	12, 	1977 	from 	Superintendent 	William 	F. 	Jefferds 	to 	the
Board 	of 	Trustees 	(C.P. 	Exh. 	12, 	13).
3

provides
	specifications
	for
	each
	classification,
	including
title,
	definition,
	distinguishing
	characteristics,
	examples
	of
duties,
	special
	requirements
	(if
	any),
	and 	minimum
qualifications;
	(5)
	Class
	Relationship
	Charts
	which
	group
classifications
	into
	occupational
	groups,
	identify
	a
	"bench
mark"
	class
	to
	be
	surveyed 	as
	to
	prevailing
	salaries
	in
surrounding
	districts,
	and
	specify
	internal
	salary
relationships
	(percent
	differentials)
	between
	classes
	in 	the
same
	occupational
	group
	in
	relation
	to
	the
	bench
	mark
	class.
The
	District
	does
	not 	except
	to
	the 	hearing
	officer's
findings
	that
	adoption 	of 	the
	classification
	plan
	resulted
	in
the 	following 	changes:
1.
	New
	classifications
	were
	createa; 	existing
classifications
	were
	abolished.
	In
	some
	cases,
	cla~sifications
were
	created
	and
	abolished	
by	
splitting
	existing
classifications
	or
	by
	consolidating 	existing
	classifications.
2.
	Classifications
	were
	retitled.
3. 	Salary 	ranges 	of
	existing
	classifications
	were
	adjusted
upward 	ana 	downward 	and
	percent
	differentials
	between
classifications
	in
	the
	same
	occupational
	group 	were
	changed.
4. 	Incumbent 	employees 	were
	reassigned
	from
	their 	existing
classifications
	into 	other 	existing 	classifications
	and
	to
newly
	created
	classifications.
5. 	Specifications
	for 	nearly
	all 	classifications
	were
rev.ised.
4

DISCUSSION
Job
	classifications
	are
	an
	integral 	part
	of
	civil
	service
systems
	established
	in 	public
	sector
	jurisdictions
	pursuant 	to
state
	and
	local
	legislation.
	Typical
	of
	such
	legislation,
Education
	Code
	section
	45103
	requires 	public
	school
	districts
to
	classify
	all
	employees
	and
	positions
	with
	certain
	designated
exceptions.
3
The
	plan
	at 	issue
	in
	the
	instant
	case
	defines
"classification
	plan"
	as
	a 	way
	of
	systematically 	describing 	the
positions
	and
	classes 	in
	a
	public
	agency .4	
A
"position"
	is
	a
group
	of
	duties
	and
	responsibilities
	which
	are 	intended
	to
	be
performed
	by
	one
	employee.
	A
"classification'.'
	or
	"class"
	is
any
	number
	of
	positions
	which
	are
	sufficiently
	similar 	in
duties
	and
	responsibilities
	that
	the
	same
	job
	title,
	minimum
3For 	a
	discussion
	of 	the 	accommodation
	of
	pre-existing
classified 	civil
	service
	systems 	with
	the 	requirements 	of
collective
	bargaining, 	see
	Grodin
	and
	Wallett,
	Labor
	Relations
and
	Social
	Problems:
	Collective
	Bargaining
	in
	Public
Employment 	(2d
	ed.
	1975)
	p.
	145
	et
	seq.
4rn 	accord, 	the 	National
	Labor
	Relations
	Board
	(NLRB)
	has
defined
	a
	classification
	system 	as 	"a
	series
	of
	job
	levels
	orgrades 	determined
	arbitrarily
	with
	each
	job
	classified 	into
	its
proper
	relative
	grade"
	Latin
	Watch 	Case Co. 	(1965) 	159
	NLRB
203, 	206 	[61
	LRRM
	1021].
	A
recent
	Court 	of 	Appeal
	decision
found
	that
	"the 	process 	of
	classification 	is 	necessarily
	based
upon
	identifiable
	job 	groupings
	reflecting
	a
	sufficient
similarity
	of
	required
	skills,
	duties,
	knowledge 	and
abilities."
	Sonoma County 	Board 	of 	Education 	v.
	PERB
	(1980)
102 Cal.App.3d 	689, 	697 	[163
	Cal.Rptr. 	464].
	(Emphasis
	in
original.)
5

qualifications,
	qualifying
	tests,
	and
	salary
	range
	are
appropriate
	for
	all
	positions 	in
	the
	class.
Subsection
	4510l(a)
	of
	the
	Education
	Code
	similarly 	defines
11
cl
assi
f i
cation
II
	as
	fallows:
"Classification"
	means
	that
	each
	position 	in
the
	classified
	service
	shall
	have 	a
designated
	title,
	a
	regular
	minimum
	of
assigned
	hours 	per
	day,
	days 	per
	week, 	and
months
	per
	year,
	a
	specific
	statement
	of
	the
duties
	required 	to
	be
	performed
	by
	the
employees
	in
	each 	such
	position,
	and
	the
regular
	monthly
	salary
	ranges
	for
	each 	such
position.
The
	hearing
	officer
	determined
	that
	the
	District,
	by
	its
unilateral
	adoption
	and
	implementation 	of
	a 	new
	classification
plan,
	breached
	its
	obligation
	to
	negotiate 	in
	good
	faith
	about
matters
	within 	the
	scope 	of
	representation.
	In 	reaching
	this
conclusion,
	the 	hearing
	officer 	relied, 	in 	part,
	on
	the
	Board's
decision 	in
	Healdsburg
	Union High
	School
	District
	and
Healdsburg
	Union
	School
	District,
	supra,
	as
	authority
	for
finding
	that
	the
	classification
	plan
	affects
	matters 	within 	the
scope 	of
	representation.5
Srn
	Healdsburg,
	we
	considered
	the
	negotiability
	of 	seven
specific
	proposals,
	advanced
	during
	negotiations, 	regarding 	the
classification
	of
	positions.
	A
majority 	of 	the 	Board
	concluded
that 	three
	of 	these 	proposals
	were 	beyond
	the 	scope 	of
representation:
	The
	Association 	could 	not
	require
	the
	District
to
	negotiate
	its
	decision 	to
	create, 	abolish
	or
	reclassify
	a
position,
	nor 	could
	it
	seek	
to	
ensure
	that
	all
	new
	positions
	or
classifications
	are 	assigned 	to 	the 	negotiating 	unit.
However,
	we
	held 	that
	the 	Association
	had
	the
	right 	to
negotiate 	the 	following 	proposals:
	(1)
	that
	every 	bargaining
6

The
	District
	initially
	excepts 	to 	the 	hearing
	officer's
reliance
	on
	the 	Board's
	decision 	in
	Healdsburg,
	claiming
	that
case
	did 	not
	provide
	legally
	sufficient
	precedent 	for 	the
hearing
	officer's
	decision
	because
	it
	was
	then
	on
	appeal.6
The
	hearing
	officer
	did 	not
	rely
	exclusively
	on
	Healdsburg
for
	his
	finding
	that
	the
	classification
	plan
	affects
	matters
within
	the
	scope
	of
	representation.
	He
	cited
	both
	NLRB
	and
other
	state
	public
	employment
	relations
	cases
	which
	provide
independent
	authority
	for
	his
	holding.7
unit
	position
	shall
	be
	placed
	in
	a
	classification;
	(2)
	that
when
	the
	classification
	of
	a
	position
	or
	class
	of
	positions 	is
changed, 	the
	position
	or
	positions
	shall
	be
	placea
	on
	the
salary
	schedule
	at 	least
	one
	range
	above
	the
	previous
	salary;
(3)
	that
	when
	the
	classification
	of
	an
	entire 	class 	ot
positions 	is
	changed, 	incumbents
	shall
	be
	entitled
	to 	serve 	inthe
	new
	positions
	and 	when
	less
	than
	an
	entire 	class 	is
changed,
	incumbents
	who
	have 	been
	in
	the
	positions
	for
	one
	yearor
	more
	shall
	be
	reallocated
	to 	the
	higher
	class,
	ana
	if
	no
incumbent 	has
	served 	in
	that 	position
	for
	one
	year 	or
	more,
	the
new
	position 	shall
	be
	considereo
	a
	vacant
	position 	subject 	to
established 	transfer
	and
	promotion
	procedures;
	ana 	(4)
	that
	any
downward
	adjustment 	of
	a
	position
	or
	class
	shall
	be
	consiaered
a
	demotion
	subject
	to
	established 	layoff
	or
	disciplinaryprocedures.
6The
	dee
is
ion 	of 	the 	Court
	of
	Appeal
	in
	1 	Civ
..
	50191
(Division
	4)
	issued
	on 	December
	1981.
	On
	February
	24, 	1982
	the
California
	Supreme
	Court 	granted
	petition
	for 	hearing 	inHealdsburg
	Union 	High
	School
	District
	v.
	PERB,
	CSEA
	(Case
No. 	SF 	24401, 	1
	Civ. 	50199).
'I'hose
	aspects 	of 	the 	Court 	of
	Appeal
	aecision
	which 	were
adverse 	to
	our
	holdings 	in 	Healdsburg 	were
	vacated
	by
	the
Supreme
	Court's 	grant 	of
	a
	hearing.
	Coae
	of 	Civil
	Procedure
subsection· 916(a);
	Ponce
	v.
	Marr 	(1956) 	47 	C.2d 	159, 	161 	[301D
	'),-'j
	Q'-171.	
Re!+-::l+-.o	
r.f'	
Kon+-	
11~
/;.	
(' 	')ri	
1C:./i	
15c.	
IC:.7
	D
* •"""~
	'),';	
an,,
7Latin
	Watch
	case 	Co., 	sup1a; 	Limpco 	Mfg., 	Inc.
	(1976)
225
	NLRB
	987 	[93	
LRRM
	1464]
;,
	Central 	Cartage, 	Inc.
	(1978) 	236
•
	•"""""'	
V.JI
J /	
.L.I'-''-""""'-'-'	
.....,.,_
	.&.
'-••'-	
\..&..J,...JVJ	
V	
'-"•'-'""-	
..,,1,..J-Z:f	
,.J,,. 	V	
L.JI	
,.,JV•J
•
7

Moreover,
	the
	Supreme
	court
	has
	now
	affirmea
	the
	boara's
.test
	for
	negotiability
	as
	stated
	in
	Anaheim 	Union 	High
	School
District
	(10/28/81)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	177.8	
Consistent
	with
the
	Supreme
	Court's 	decision
	in 	Healdsburg,
	we
	apply 	the
Anaheim
	test
	to
	determine 	the
	negotiability
	of
	those
	f,Ortion,s
of 	the
	classification
	plan
	which
	are
	not
	expressly
	enumerate6
as
	terms
	and
	conditions
	of
	employment
	in
	section
	3543.2.9
NLRB
	1232
	(98
	LRRM
	1554];
	Handen 	Community
	Child
	Care 	(1979)
l
	NPER
	U7-10038
	Comm.
	SBLR;
	Milwaukee
	Police 	Association 	v.
Breier
	(1979)
	WERC
	Dec~sion
	No.
	16602-A.
8rn
	adaition
	to 	affirming
	the
	Board's
	test,
	the
	Supreme
Court
	remanded
	the 	Healdsburg 	c~se
	to
	the
	Board
	for
	further
proceeoings
	consistent
	with 	the
	court's
	opinion.
	San 	Mateo
City
	School
	District
	v.
	PERB,
	California
	Scbool
	Employees
Association
	v.
	PERB,
	Healdsburg
	Union 	High
	School
	District
et 	al.
	v.
	PERB
	(1983)
	Cal.3d
	(SF
	24401).
9section
	3543.2
	~roviaes,
	in
	pertinent 	part,
	as
	tallows:
(a) 	The
	scope
	of
	repr~sentation
	shall
	be
limited 	to 	matters
	relating
	to
	wages, 	hoursof
	emplo:i, men
t,
	and
	other
	terms 	ana
conaitions
	of
	employment.
	"Terms
	ana
conditions
	of
	employment" 	mean
	heal
th
	ana
welfare
	benefits
	...
	leave, 	transfer
	anu
reassignment
	policies, 	safety 	conditions
	of
employment,
	class 	size,
	procedures 	to
	be
used
	for 	the
	evaluation 	of
	employees,
organizational 	security
	...
,
	proceduresfor 	processing 	grievances
	...
, 	and
	the
layoff 	of 	probationary
	certificatea
	school
district
	employees
	....
	All 	matters 	not
specifically
	enumeratea 	are 	reserved 	to 	the
public 	school
	employer 	and 	may
	not
	be 	a
subject 	ot	
meeting
	and
	negotiating,
	proviaeci
that
	nothing 	herein
	may 	be
	construed 	to
limit
	the
	right
	of 	the 	public 	school
8

The Anaheim 	test 	provides 	that 	a 	subject 	will 	be 	found 	to
be 	negotiable 	even 	though 	not 	specifically 	enumerated 	in
section 	3543.2 	if 	(1) 	it 	is 	logically 	and 	reasonably 	related 	to
hours, 	wages 	or 	an 	enumerated 	term 	and 	condition 	of 	employment,
(2) 	the 	subject 	is 	of 	such 	concern 	to 	both management 	and
employees 	that 	conflict 	is 	likely 	to 	occur 	and 	the 	mediatory
influence 	of 	collective 	negotiations 	is 	the 	appropriate means
of 	resolving 	the 	conflict, 	and 	(3) 	the 	employer's 	obligation 	to
negotiate 	would 	not 	significantly 	abridge 	the 	employer's
freedom 	to 	exercise 	those 	managerial 	prerogatives 	(including
matters 	of 	fundamental 	policy) 	essential 	to 	the 	achievement 	of
the 	District's 	mission.
Applying 	the 	Anaheim 	test 	here, 	we 	find 	that 	certain
changes 	made 	by 	the 	District 	affect 	negotiable 	subjects. 	In
addition, 	we 	find 	that 	the 	classification 	plan 	made 	changes 	in
matters 	expressly 	enumerated 	within 	the 	scope 	of
representation. 	Because 	the 	District 	unilaterally 	adopted 	and
implemented 	this 	classification 	plan, 	which 	contained many
changes 	within 	statutory 	scope, 	in 	the 	face 	of 	CSEA's 	timely
demand 	to 	negotiate 	on 	"all 	aspects 	of" 	the 	plan, 	we 	affirm 	the
hearing 	officer's 	conclusion 	that 	the 	District 	breached 	its
obligation 	to 	negotiate 	in 	good 	faith.
employer 	to 	consult 	with 	any 	employees 	or
employee 	organization 	on 	any matter 	outside
the 	scope 	of 	representation.
9

Creation
	ana
	Abolition
	of
	Classifications
Neither .the
	creation
	nor
	abolition
	of
	classifications 	is
specifically
	enumerated
	as
	a
	term
	ana
	condition 	of
	employment
within
	the
	scope
	of
	representation.
	Thus,
	we
	apply 	the
	Anaheim
test
	to
	determine
	if
	these
	subjects
	are 	properly 	within 	the
scope 	of
	representation.
The
	creation
	of
	a 	new
	classification
	is 	necessarily
	related
to 	the
	wages,
	hours
	and
,terms
	and
	conditions 	of
	that
	new
classification
	and
	to
	transfer
	and
	promotional
	opportunities
for
	incumbent 	employees
	in
	existing
	classifications.
Similarly,
	the
	abolition
	of
	an
	existing
	classification
	is
related
	to 	the
	transfer
	and
	reassignment 	of
	incumbents
	out 	of
the 	abolishea
	class,
	the
	tranbfer
	of
	work
	previously
	aone
	by
them,
	and
	the
	transfer 	rights
	of
	employees
	in 	other
	classes.
The
	creation
	ana
	abolition
	of
	classifications
	are 	of
concern 	to
	employees
	whose
	job
	auties, 	transfer,
	reassignment
ano
	promotional
	opportunities
	are
	affectea
	thereby.
However, 	management
	has 	an
	overriding
	interest
	in
aetermining
	which
	functions 	are 	necessary 	to 	the 	accomplishment
of
	its
	mission
	and 	which
	functions
	no
	longer 	serve
	its.purposes
and
	should
	be
	eliminatea.
	To
	aetermine
	that
	the
	District
requires
	the
	services 	of 	custodians,
	clericals, 	cafeteria
workers,
	etc.,
	is
	a
	patent 	managerial 	task
	which 	cannot
	be
abrogatea
	by 	a
	duty 	to 	negotiate
	over 	such
	aecisions.
Conversely, 	the 	aecision 	that
	the
	District's
	mission
	no
	longer
10

requires
	the
	work
	performed
	by
	custodians,
	clericals
	or
cafeteria
	employees
	is
	equally
	a
	manageLial
	prerogative
	which
would 	be
	significantly
	abridged
	by
	an
	obligation
	to
	negotiate.
Thus,
	we
	conclude
	that
	where 	management
	seeks
	to
	create
	a
new
	classification
	to
	perform
	a
	function
	not
	previously
performed
	or
	to 	abolish
	a
	classification
	and
	cease
	engaging
	in
the
	activity
	previously
	performed
	by
	employees
	in
	that
classification,
	it
	need
	not
	negotiate
	its
	decision.10
However,
	we
	find
	that
	those.
aspects
	of 	the
	creation
	or
abolition
	of
	a
	classification
	which
	merely
	transfer 	existing
functions
	and
	duties
	from
	one
	classification
	to 	another 	involve
no
	overriding
	manager.ial
	prerogative.
	Such
	changes
	amount
	to
transfers
	of
	work
	between 	employees
	or 	groupings 	of 	employees,
similar
	to 	decisions
	to 	subcontract
	work
	or 	to
	transfer
	work
out 	of 	the 	bargaining
	unit.11	
They 	do
	not
	represent
	a
decision
	to 	undertake
	a 	new
	function
	or 	to 	eliminate
	an
l0of 	course,
	management
	remains
	obligated 	to
	negotiate
the
	effects
	of
	its
	decis.ion
	which
	fall
	within 	the 	scope
	of
representation.
	Solano 	County 	Communitx
	College
	District
(6/30/82)
	PERB
	Decision
	No. 	219; 	South
	Bay 	Union
	School
District
	Board
	of 	Trustees 	(4/30/82)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	207.
llsee
	Charmer
	Industries
	(1980) 	250
	NLRB
	293 	[104
	LRRl-1
1368]; 	Central 	Cartage, 	supra;
	Pilot 	Freight
	carriers
	(1975)
221
	NLRB
	1026 	l91
	LRRM
	1005];
	Oil,
	Chemical 	ana 	Atomic 	Worker_s
(1976) 	547
	F.2d
	575 	[92
	LRRM
	3059], 	modified
	on
	other 	grounas
(1977) 	94
	LRRM
	3074; 	Bay
	State
	Gas 	Co. 	(1980)	
:;,_53	
NLRB
	538
	ll05
LRRM
	1673];
	R.
	J.
	Liberto, 	Inc.
	(1978) 	235
	NLRB
	1450 	l98
	LRR.M
1299].
	And
	see 	Rialto 	Unified 	School
	District
	t4/30;82)
	PERE
Decis.ion 	No. 	209; 	Solano 	County 	Community
	College
	District,
supra.
11

existing
	function.
	Thus,
	no
	decision
	on
	what
	functions
	are
essential
	to
	management's
	mission
	is
	involved.
	The
	same
functions
	are
	still
	being
	performed;
	an
	existing
	classification
is
	merely
	replaced
	by 	a 	new
	classification
	to
	do
	the
	same
	work
under
	similar 	conditions
	of
	employment.
	See
	Fibre
board
	Paper
Products
	Corp.
	v.
	NLRB
	(1964)
	379
	U.S. 	203,
	213
	[85
	S.Ct.
	398].
To
	require
	the
	District
	to
	negotiate
	the
	decision
	to
transfer. existing 	duties
	from 	one
	class
	to
	another
	does
	not
significantly
	abridge
	its
	freedom
	to
	exercise
	any
	essential
managerial
	prerogative.
	Thus, 	under
	Anaheim,
	the
	decision 	to
transfer 	duties
	from 	one
	classification
	to 	another
	is
negotiable.
The
	classification
	plan 	here
	lists
	11
	abolished
classifications
	and 	22
	newly
	created
	classifications.
	It
appears,
	however,
	that
	of 	the
	11
	classifications
	purportedly
abolished,
	the 	functions
	of 	only
	2
	classifications 	effectively
ceased 	to
	be
	performed.12	
The
	duties 	previously 	assigned
	to
the 	other	
9	
"abolished"
	classifications
	were
	simply
	transferred
to 	other
	classifications.
	Similarly,
	of 	the	
23	
allegedly
	newly
created
	classifications,
	only
	2
	appear 	to 	represent
	new
functions
	not
	previously
	performed
	by
	employees
	in
	a
pre-existing 	classification.13	
All 	other
	"newly
	cr~ated"
12These 	are 	Locksmith 	and 	Food
	Service
	Manager
	III.
13These 	are 	Administrative 	Assistant
	and
	Data Entry Clerk.
12

classifications
	represent
	the
	transfer
	of
	existing
	functions
and
	duties
	to
	a
	retitled
	classification.
Thus,
	for
	example,
	four
	separate
	classifications
(Audio-Visual
	Clerk, 	Duplication Clerk,
	Library Clerk,
	and 	Food
Service
	Clerk)
	were
	nominally
	"abolished"
	and
	consolidated
	into
the
	"new"
	classification,
	Clerk
	II.
	Conversely, 	the
	existing
classification,
	Teacher 	Aide,
	was
	abolished
	and
	split
	into
	four
"new
	class~fications," 	Instructional
	Aide, 	Health Aide,
	Library
Aide,
	and
	Special
	Education
Aide.
	In
	both
	instances,
	the
	same
functions
	are
	being 	performed; 	the
	same 	work
	is
	being
	done
under
	similar 	conditions
	of
	employment,
	frequently
	by
	the
	same
employees
	under 	a 	new
	rubric.
	In
	these
	and
	similar
circumstances, 	the
	District
	was
	obligated
	to
	negotiate
	its
decision 	to
	transfer
	work 	from 	one
	classification
	to 	another.
Retitling
	of
	Classifications
Job
	titles
	are
	not
	an
	enumerated 	term
	and
	condition 	of
employment.
	Thus,
	we
	again 	apply 	the
	Anaheim
	test
	to 	determine
the
	negotiability
	of 	job
	titles.
The
	title
	of
	a
	classification
	describes 	the 	nature
	and
level
	of
	duties
	performed
	and
	the
	relationship
	of
	one
classification
	to 	other
	classifications
	in 	the
	same
occupational
	group. 	Thus, 	the
	title
	of
	a
	classification 	is
	a
factor 	in 	determining
	salary, 	transfer 	rights,
	and
reassignments, 	including 	promotional
	opportunities,
	and
	is
related
	to
	all
	of 	these 	enumerated
	subjects.
13

Employees 	are 	naturally 	concerned 	about 	the 	JOb 	title 	which
def.ines 	their 	working 	existence 	and 	contributes 	significantly
to 	their 	concept 	of 	self-worth 	anci 	identity. 	While 	this 	is 	an
intangible 	and 	subjective 	conoition 	of 	employment, .lit 	is
nevertheless 	quite 	real 	anci 	often 	of 	paramount 	importance 	to
employees. 	Changes 	in 	job 	title 	have 	not 	infrequently 	been
important 	components 	of 	labor-management 	agreements 	and 	of
serious 	labor 	disputes. 	While 	such 	intangible 	concerns 	might,
un6er 	some 	circumstances, 	be 	outweighed 	by 	a 	substantial
management 	interest, 	in 	this 	case 	we 	fail 	to _see 	any 	e$sential
management 	interest 	which 	would 	be 	compromisea 	or 	abridged 	by
requiring 	the 	District 	to 	negotiate 	about 	job 	titles.
The 	plan 	lists 	17 	retitlea 	classes. 	Some 	ot 	these 	changes
are 	pure 	retitling, 	applied 	to 	every 	position 	in 	the 	class, 	ana
involving 	no 	other 	classification 	changes. 	For 	example,
Maintenance 	I, 	II 	ana 	III 	are 	retitled 	Maintenance 	Worker 	I, 	II
and 	III. 	Similarly, 	several 	former 	Supervisors 	are 	retitlea 	as
Chiefs, 	and 	the 	gender-specific 	titles 	Foreman, 	Serviceman 	ana
Warehouseman 	are 	replacea 	by 	Supervisor, 	Servicer 	anci 	Warehouse
worker, 	respectively. 	Failing·to 	see 	an:/ 	significant
management 	interest 	which 	is 	served 	by 	such 	changes 	of 	title,
we 	conclude 	that 	these 	job 	titles 	are 	within 	the 	scope 	ot
representation.
Moreover, 	some 	changes 	in 	title 	are 	airectly 	related 	to 	the
transfer 	of 	duties 	from 	one 	classification 	to 	another.
14

According
	to
	the
	plan,
	the
	custodian
	class 	is
	retitlea
Custodian
	I,
	while
	custodian
	II
	.is
	adde6
	as
	a 	new
	class.
	Some
Custodian
	positions
	are
	allocated
	to
	the
	custodian
	I
	class,
others
	to
	Custodian
	II.
	We
	discern
	no
	compelling
	rationale
	or
management 	need 	which
	mandates
	the
	labeling 	of
	one
	action
	a
retitling
	of
	a
	class
	and
	the
	other
	the
	creation
	of
	a 	new
class.
	Similarly,
	the
	plan
	indicates
	that
	the
	classification
Teacher
	Aide
	,is
	retitled
	Instructional
	Aide.
	However,
	not
	all
Teacher
	Aide
	positions
	are
	retitled
	Instructional
	Aide.
	As
indicated
	above, 	Teacher
	Aide
	positions
	are
	also
	variousl1
retitled
	as 	Health 	Aide,
	Library
	Aide 	ana
	Special
	Bducation
Aide, 	in 	conjunction
	with 	the
	creation
	of
	those
	new
classifications.
Having
	fauna
	that
	the
	decision
	to
	transter 	duties
	from 	one
classification
	to 	another .is 	negotiable
	and
	.is
	difficult
	to
distinguish
	from
	the
	retitling
	of
	classifications
	in
	some
instances,
	we
	find
	the
	retitling
	of 	these
	classifications
	to
	be
negotiable
	for
	this
	reason 	as
	well.
Adjustment
	of
	Wages
Wages
	are 	unquestionably 	within 	the 	scope
	of
representation.
	The
	California
	Supreme
	Court 	has 	held
	that
	the
authority 	to 	prescribe 	classifications
	6oes 	not
	encompass
	the
power
	to
	set
	the
	particular 	salary 	for 	such
	classifications.
Pacific
	Legal 	Foundation 	v.
	Brown 	(1981) 	29
	Cal.3d 	168, 	187
15

[172 	Cal.Rptr. 	487] .14 	Further, 	salary 	adjustments 	for
individual 	job 	classifications 	within 	the 	same 	occupational
group 	are 	negotiable. 	Sonoma County 	Board 	of 	Education 	v.
PERB, 	supra, 	102 	Cal.App.3d 	689, 	702.15
Therefore, 	the 	District 	was 	obligated 	to 	negotiate 	those
portions 	of 	the 	classification 	plan 	which 	assigned 	new
classifications 	to 	salary 	ranges, 	changed 	the 	salary 	ranges 	of
existing 	classifications~ 	or 	in 	any 	way 	changed 	the 	salary 	of
any 	employee .16
Here, 	the 	District 	unilaterally 	set 	pew 	salaries 	and 	salary
ranges. 	The 	fact 	that 	these 	changes 	were 	based, 	in 	part, 	on 	an
elaborate 	system 	of 	taking 	prevailing 	wage 	surveys 	of 	bench
mark 	classes 	and 	establishing 	percent 	differentials 	between
14Pacific Legal 	Foundation 	v. 	Brown, 	supra, 	concerned 	an
alleged 	conflict 	between 	the 	State 	Personnnel Board's
constitutional 	authority 	to 	prescribe 	classifications 	and 	the
State's 	obligation 	to 	negotiate 	salaries 	under 	the 	State
Employer-Employee 	Relations 	Act 	(SEERA), 	Government 	Code
section 	3512 	et 	seq.
15where 	a 	district 	operates 	a 	merit 	system 	pursuant 	to
section 	45240 	et 	seq. 	of 	the 	Education Code, 	the 	scope 	of
negotiability 	is 	limited 	by 	the 	requirement 	that 	the 	salary
relationship 	between 	individual 	positions 	established 	by 	the
personnel 	commission 	must 	remain 	intact. 	Sonoma County 	Board
of 	Education 	v. 	PERB, 	supra. 	And 	see San Lorenzo 	Unified
School 	District 	(12/29/82) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	274. 	Here, 	there
is 	no 	evidence 	that 	the 	district 	operates 	a 	merit 	system.
Therefore, 	this 	limitation 	on 	negotiability 	does 	not 	apply.
16

classifications
	in
	relation
	to 	the
	bench
	mark
	classes
	does
	not
obviate
	the
	District's
	obligation 	to 	negotiate.
	The
	District
can
	develop
	a
	system 	of
	bench marks
	and
	percent
	differentials,
take
	surveys
	and
	prepare 	other
	types
	of
	financial 	data.
	Such
systems
	and
	data
	may 	be
	used
	to
	arrive
	at
	and
	support
	a
negotiating 	position 	that 	salary
	setting
	should
	be
	based 	on
those
	bench
	marks,
	differentials
	and
	surveys.
	However,
	the
District
	cannot
	unilaterally
	implement 	such
	a
	plan 	or
	in
	any
way
	change
	salaries
	or
	salary
	ranges 	without
	first
	negotiating
with
	the
	employee
	organization.
Reassignment
	of
	Employees
The
	District 	unilaterally
	reassigned
	employees
	to
	different
or 	newly
	created
	classifications.
	Reassignments 	are
specifically
	enumerated
	in 	section
	3543.2
	as
	expressly 	within
the 	scope 	of
	representation.
	While
	"reassignment"
	is
	not
defined 	in
	the 	Act, 	the
	plain
	meaning
	of 	the
	term
	clearly
encompasses
	the
	movement
	of
	an
	employee 	from 	an
	existing
classification
	to
	a
	different
	or 	newly
	created
classification,17
17This
	definition
	of 	"reassignment"
	is 	consistent
	with
the 	use 	of 	the 	term
	in 	the 	Education
	Code.
	Education
Code
subsection 	4510l(e) 	defines 	"disciplinary
	action"
	as 	"any
action
	whereby 	an 	employee
	is 	deprived 	of
	any
	classification
	orany
	incident
	of 	any
	classification 	in
	which 	he 	has 	permanence,
including 	dismissal, 	suspension, 	demotion, 	or 	any
	reassignment,
without 	his 	voluntary 	consent, 	except 	for
	a
	layoff 	for 	lack 	ofwork
	or 	lack 	of 	funds."
	(Emphasis
	added.) 	Dismissal
	clearly
17

We,
	therefore,
	find
	that
	"reassignment"
	includes
	assignment
to
	a
	different
	classification,
	and
	conclude
	that
	the
	District
had
	a
	duty
	to 	negotiate
	the
	reassignment
	of
	incumbent
	employees
from
	existing
	classifications
	to
	different
	or
	newly
	created
classifications.
Allocation
	of
	Positions
	to
	Classifications
The
	allocation
	of
	positions
	to
	classifications,
	while
perhaps 	conceptually
	distinct,
	is,
	in
	this
	case,
	virtually
indistinguishable
	from
	the 	reassignment
	of
	employees
	to
different
	or
	newly
	created
	classifications.
	Thus,
	for
	example,
some
	Custodian
	positions
	were
	allocated
	to 	the
	retitled
Custodian
	I
	classification
	while
	others
	were
	allocated 	to
	the
new
	Custodian
	II 	classification.
	The
	positions
	so
	allocated
were
	identified
	by
	the
	name
	of 	the
	incumbent
	custodial
employee.
	Concurrently,
	that
	employee
	was
	reassigned 	to
	the
new
	classification.
The
	allocation
	of
	positions
	to
	classifications
	was
inseparable
	from
	the 	reassignment
	of 	employees,
	and
	we
	find
	it
to	
be	
similarly
	negotiable 	in
	this
	case.
denotes
	the 	permanent
	deprivation
	of
	a
	classification;
suspen~ion,
	a
	temporary
	deprivation;
	demotion
	is 	specifically
defined 	in 	subsection 	4510l(d) 	as 	"assignment 	to
	an
	inferiorposition
	or
	status,
	without 	the 	employee's
	written 	voluntary
consent."
	The
	only 	remaining 	contingency
	is 	deprivation 	of
	a
classifi~ati?n
	by_assignmen~
	~o
	a_different,
	though 	not
necessarily 	1nfer1or, 	class1f1cat1on.
18

Grouping 	of 	Classifications 	into 	Occupational 	Groups
The 	classification plan 	states 	that 	positions 	are, 	"divided
first 	into 	groups 	which 	involve 	the 	same 	kine 	of 	work 	and 	then
subdivided 	into 	classes 	based 	on 	levels 	of 	responsibility
with in 	each 	grouping." 	'l·hus, 	for 	example, 	the 	plan 	identifies
the 	occupational 	group 	Clerk, 	Clerk-Typist 	and 	Related 	Classes,
consi$ting 	of 	the 	classifications 	Clerk 	I 	and 	II,
Typist-Clerk 	I, 	II 	and 	III, 	PBX 	Operat~r/Receptionist 	ana
Attenaance 	Clerk. 	Similarly, 	Fooa 	Services 	anu 	Related 	Classes
consist 	of 	the 	classifications 	Food 	Service 	Assistant 	I 	and 	II,
Fooa 	Service 	Manager 	I 	and 	II, 	Fooa 	Service 	Operations
Supervisor, 	and 	Director 	of 	Nutrition 	Education 	and 	Food
Services.
As 	noted 	above, 	a 	classification 	plan 	is, 	"a 	way 	of
systematically 	describing 	positions 	an6 	classes 	in 	a 	public
agency." 	Like 	other 	elements 	of 	a 	classification 	plan,
occupational 	groupings, 	which 	logically 	order 	or 	uisplay 	the
occupations 	ana 	jobs 	extant 	within 	the 	organization, 	may 	be
prepared 	and 	utilized 	for 	proper 	managerial 	purposes 	but 	may
not 	be 	emplo}ea 	to 	unilaterally 	change 	terms 	ana 	conaitions 	ot
employment.
Here, 	job 	specifications 	included 	in 	the 	plan 	indicate
that, 	at 	least 	in 	some 	cases, 	occupational 	groupings 	affect
reassignment 	rights 	and 	promotional 	opportunities. 	Thus, 	for
example, 	job 	specifications 	provide 	as 	follows:
19

Typist-Clerks 	I 	are 	normally 	considered 	to
be 	a 	training 	status, 	and 	as 	assigned
reponsibilities 	and 	breadth 	of 	knowledge
increase 	with 	increased 	experience, 	may
reasonably 	expect 	their 	positions 	to 	be
reassigned 	to 	the 	next 	higher 	grade 	of
Typist-Clerk 	II .
• 	• 	• 	Typist 	Clerk 	II: 	Positions 	in 	this
grade 	are 	normally 	filled 	by 	advancement 	from
the 	lower 	grade 	of 	Typist-Clerk 	I 	•...
Similar 	language 	appears 	in 	the 	job 	specifications 	for
Administrative 	Assistant, 	Clerk 	I, 	Food Services 	Assistant 	I
and 	Programmer 	Trainee. 	Thus, 	occupational 	groupings 	are 	being
used 	in 	a 	manner 	that 	relates 	to 	employee 	reassignment 	and
promotional 	rights.
In addition, 	provisions 	on 	transfBr, 	layoff 	and 	bumping
rights 	contained 	in 	the 	successive 	negotiated 	agreements
between 	the 	parties 	refer 	to 	"higher" 	and 	"lower" 	grades. 	The
job 	specifications 	qu6ted 	above 	use 	the 	terms 	"higher" 	and
"lower" 	to 	refer 	to 	relative 	placement 	in 	an 	occupational
group. 	If, 	as 	appears 	likely, 	the 	same 	meaning 	is 	intended 	by
the 	use 	of 	the 	terms 	"higher" 	and 	"lower" 	in 	the 	contract, 	then
transfer, 	layoff 	and 	bumping 	rights 	would 	also 	be 	related 	to
occupational 	groups.
Occupational 	groups 	may 	also 	be 	related 	to 	wages.18
Here, 	the 	classifications 	within 	each 	occupational 	group 	are
arranged 	in 	vertical 	series 	with 	arrows 	pointing 	from 	the 	lower
18see 	Sonoma County 	Board 	of 	Education 	v. 	PERB, 	supra.
20

to 	the 	higher 	class 	and 	with 	percent 	differentials 	indicated
between 	classes 	in 	the 	same 	series. 	Thus, 	a 	10 	percent
differential 	is 	indicated 	between Clerk 	I 	and 	II, 	Clerk-Typist
I 	and 	II, 	and 	Food 	Services 	Assistant 	I 	and 	II.
Because 	the District 	has 	utilized 	occupational 	groupings 	in
a 	manner 	related 	to 	reassignments 	and 	promotions, 	transfer,
layoff 	and 	bumping 	rights, 	and 	wages, 	the 	groupings 	have 	become
a 	concern 	of 	both 	management 	and 	employees, 	and 	the 	mediatory
influence 	of 	collective 	negotiations 	is 	the 	appropriate means
of 	resolving 	the 	concerns 	of 	both 	parties. 	At 	the 	same 	time,
the 	decision 	to 	group 	classifications 	in 	a 	particular
occupational 	group 	is 	not 	one 	which 	is 	central 	or 	essential 	to
the 	District's 	operation. 	Therefore, 	negotiations 	over 	this
matter 	would 	not 	abridge 	the 	District's 	freedom 	to 	exercise
managerial 	prerogatives 	essential 	to 	its 	mission.
Revision 	of 	Job 	Specifications
In 	the 	instant 	case, 	job 	specifications 	include 	a
definition, 	example 	of 	duties, 	special 	requirements 	(if 	any)
and 	minimum 	qualifications.
Salary 	is 	based, 	in 	large 	part, 	on 	the 	duties,
requirements, 	and 	qualifications 	for 	a 	job. 	In 	addition, 	job
duties, 	requirements 	and 	qualifications 	may 	serve 	as 	the
criteria 	for 	evaluation 	of 	employee 	performance 	and 	thus 	of
continued 	employment. 	See 	Holtville 	Unified 	School 	District
(9/30/82) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	250. 	Changes 	in 	duties 	and
21

responsibilities
	may
	increase
	hours,
	speed
	up
	the
	work
	required
or
	change
	other 	conditions 	of
	employment
	in
	a 	number
	of
	ways.
As
	the
	Board
	has
	previously 	indicated,
	a
	significant
	change
	in
an
	employee's
	actual
	job
	duties
	is
	within
	the
	scope
	of
representation.
	Rio
	Hondo 	Community
	College
	District
(12/31/82)
	PERB
	Decision
	No. 	279 	and 	Mt.
	San
	Antonio
	Community
College
	District
	(3/24/83)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	297.
	Thus, 	an
employee's
	actual
	job
	duties
	and
	qualifications
	are
	related
	to
wages,
	hours,
	evaluation
	and
	other 	matters 	within
	the 	scope 	of
representation
	and 	any
	change
	in
	job
	specifications 	that
results
	in
	a
	change
	of
	such
	duties
	or
	qualifications
	is
	also
related
	to 	matters 	within 	scope.
However,
	here 	the 	record
	fails
	to
	indicate 	that
	the
	change
of
	job
	specifications 	resulted
	in
	any
	actual
	change
	in 	job
duties, 	qualifications
	or
	any
	other
	term
	or
	condition 	of
employment.
	Rather, 	the 	record
	indicates 	that 	specifications
were
	revised 	for
	several
	reasons:
	(1)
	to
	more
	accurately
describe
	the
	duties 	actually
	being 	performed;
	(2)
	to 	provide
	a
consistent
	format;
	and 	(3)
	to
	conform
	to 	the 	requirements 	of
the 	Civil
	Rights
	Act
	of
	1964 	by
	eliminating
	sex-based
references
	and
	qualifications
	which 	had 	a
	discriminatory 	effect
and 	were
	not
	shown
	to
	be
	job
	related.
Thus, 	while 	sections 	of 	the
	written 	job
	specifications
	were
indeed 	rewritten,
	Charging 	Party 	failed 	to
	show
	that 	these
revisions 	in 	fact
	changed 	any
	condition 	of 	employment. 	A
22

unilateral
	act
	which
	does
	not
	change
	a
	condition 	of
	employment
is
	not 	unlawful
	under
	EERA.
In
	summary, 	on
	the
	facts
	here
	presented,
	we
	have
	found
	that
the
	District
	was
	obligated 	to 	negotiate
	regarding:
	(1)
	the
transfer
	of
	work 	from 	one
	classification
	to
	another;
	(2)
	the
retitling
	of
	classifications;
	(3)
	all
	matters
	related 	to
salaries,
	including
	the
	salary
	ranges
	to
	which 	newly
	created
classifications
	are 	assigned
	and 	any
	changes
	in
	salaries
	or
salary
	ranges 	of
	existing
	classifications;
	(4)
	the 	reassignment
of
	employees
	from
	existing
	classifications
	to
	different
	or
newly
	created
	classifications;
	(5)
	the
	allocation
	of
	positions
to
	classifications;
·(6) 	the 	grouping
	of
	classifications
	into
occupational
	groups;
	and
	(7}
	the
	effects,
	if
	any,
	on
	terms
	and
conditions 	of
	employment
	of 	those
	classification
	decisions
within
	the
	District's
	exclusive 	prerogative, 	including 	the
creation
	of
	new
	classifications
	to
	perform
	functions 	not
previously
	performed, 	the
	abolition
	of
	classifications
	to
	cease
engaging
	in 	functions 	previously
	performed,
	and
	the
	revision
	of
job 	specifications.
It
	is
	undisputed
	that
	CSEA
	made 	a
	timely
	demand
	to
negotiate
	on
	"all
	aspects 	of" 	the
	classification
	plan,
	and
	that
the
	District 	unilaterally
	adopted
	and 	implemented
	the
classification
	plan 	in 	the 	face 	of
	its
	demand.
	Therefor€,
	we
find 	that 	the
	District
	breached
	its
	obligation 	to 	negotiate 	in
good
	faith 	in 	violation 	of 	subsection 	3543.S(c) 	(San 	Mateo
23

County 	Community 	College 	District 	(6/8/79) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	94; 	Pajaro Valley 	Unified 	School 	District 	(5/22/78) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	51) 	and 	subsections 	3543.S(a) 	and 	(b) 	derivatively
(San 	Francisco 	Community 	College 	District 	(10/12/79) 	PERB
Decision No. 	105).
Motion 	to 	Dismiss
Because 	the 	Teamsters 	Union 	has 	replaced 	CSEA 	as 	the
current 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	the 	blue 	collar 	unit, 	the
District 	moved, 	at 	the 	opening 	of 	hearing, 	to 	dismiss 	that
portion 	of 	the 	charge 	pertaining 	to 	the 	blue 	collar 	unit 	or, 	in
the 	alternative, 	to 	join 	the 	Teamsters 	as 	an 	indispensable
party. 	The 	hearing 	officer 	denied 	the 	District's 	motion, 	and
the 	District 	argues 	that, 	as 	a 	result, 	employees 	were 	denied 	a
voice 	in 	the 	proceeding, 	and 	the 	District 	was 	denied 	its 	due
process 	right 	to 	confront 	the 	true 	parties 	in 	interest.
We 	find 	the 	District's 	argument 	to 	be 	without 	merit 	and
affirm 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	ruling 	on 	this 	issue. 	As 	the
hearing 	officer 	stated, 	dismissal 	as 	to 	the 	blue 	collar 	unit
would 	leave 	those 	employees 	without 	a 	remedy .
. 	. 	. 	CSEA 	filed 	the 	instant 	unfair 	practice
charge 	in 	a 	timely 	manner 	during 	the 	period
it 	served 	as 	the 	exclusive 	representative
for 	the 	blue 	collar 	unit. 	Thus, 	CSEA 	had
standing 	to 	pursue 	the 	charge 	at 	the 	time 	it
was 	filed. 	The 	Teamsters, 	on 	the 	other
hand, 	never 	had 	standing 	to 	pursue 	the
charge 	because 	it 	was 	not 	the 	exclusive
representative 	of 	the 	blue 	collar 	unit 	at
the 	time 	of 	the 	illegal 	unilateral 	action,
and 	it 	gained 	exclusive 	status 	after 	the 	six
24

month
	statute
	of
	limitations
	had
	run
	on
	thecharge. 	Therefore,
	there
	being
	no
alternative,
	if
	the
	harm 	done 	by
	the
District's
	unilateral
	action
	is
	to
	be
remedied,
	it
	must
	be 	done
	in
	this
proceeding. 	Dismissal 	of
	the 	charge
	as
	it
relates
	to 	the 	blue
	collar
	unit
	would
	leavethe
	employees
	in
	that 	unit
	completely
without
	a
	remedy,
	a
	result
	the 	hearing
officer
	believes 	to
	be
	inconsistent
	with 	thepurposes
	of
	the
	EERA.
Neither
	can
	the 	Teamsters
	be
	considered
	an
	indispensable
party.
	A
party
	is
	indispensable 	to
	an
	action
	if 	its
	absence
will
	prevent
	the
	Board 	from
	rendering
	any
	effective
	judgment
between
	the
	parties
	or
	seriously 	prejudice
	any
	party
	or
	if
their 	interest
	would 	be
	inequitably 	affected
	or
	jeopardized
	by
a
	judgment
	rendered
	between
	the
	parties.
	Cf. 	Hibbard	
v.
Calgrove
	(1972)
	28
	Cal.App.3d
	1017 	[105
	Cal.Rptr.
	172].
	The
indispensable 	party 	doctrine
	is
	designed 	to
	protect
	the
defendant
	from 	a
	multiplicity
	of
	suits.
	Taylor 	v.
	Sanford
(1962) 	203
	Cal.App.2d
	330 	[21
	Cal.Rptr.
	697]
,19
19california
	Code
	of
	Civil
	Procedure
	section
	389
	defines
an
	indispensable 	party
	as
	follows:
(a) 	A
person
	who
	is 	subject 	to 	service
	of
process
	and 	whose
	joinder 	will
	not 	deprivethe 	court 	of
	jurisdiction
	over 	the
	subjectmatter 	of 	the 	action 	shall
	be
	joined
	as
	a
party 	in 	the 	action
	if
	(1)
	in 	his
	absence
complete
	relief
	cannot
	be
	accorded
	among
those 	already 	~arties
	or
	(2) 	he
	claims
	an
interest 	relating 	to 	the 	subject 	of 	the
action
	ana
	is
	so
	situated 	that
	the
disposition 	of 	the 	action 	in 	his
	absence 	may
(i) 	as 	a
	practical 	matter 	impair 	or 	impede
his 	ability
	to 	protect 	that 	interest
	or
25

Here, 	the 	absence 	of 	the 	Teamsters 	does 	not 	prevent 	an
effective 	judgment. 	There 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	the 	interests 	of
blue 	collar 	employees 	were 	not 	adequately 	represented 	at
hearing 	by 	CSEA 	or 	that 	they 	were 	prejudiced 	thereby. 	Nor 	was
the 	District 	inequitably 	affected 	by 	the 	Teamsters' 	absence
since 	it 	had 	the 	right 	to 	confront 	CSEA, 	the 	party 	making 	the
charges 	against 	it. 	Neither 	is 	the 	District 	in 	danger 	of 	a
multiplicity 	of 	suits, 	since 	the 	Teamsters 	lack 	standing 	to
pursue 	a 	charge 	based 	on 	conduct 	which 	occurred 	when 	CSEA 	was
the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	the 	affected 	employees.
Therefore, 	the 	Teamsters 	cannot 	be 	considered 	an 	indispensable
party 	to 	this 	action.
Additionally, 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	CSEA 	is 	seeking 	to
undermine 	the 	current 	exclusive 	representative 	in 	the 	blue
collar 	unit. 	It 	filed 	the 	instant 	charge 	in 	a 	timely 	fashion
to 	protect 	its 	own 	bargaining 	interests 	and 	seeks 	only 	a 	remedy
which 	would 	make 	whole 	employees 	who 	suffered 	losses 	as 	a
result 	of 	the 	unilateral 	action.
Therefore, 	we 	find 	that 	the 	hearing 	officer 	correctly
denied 	the 	District's 	motion 	to 	dismiss.
(ii) 	leave 	any 	of 	the 	persons 	already
Darties 	subject 	to 	a 	substantial 	risk 	of
lncurring 	double, 	mult1ple, 	or 	otherwise
inconsistent 	obligations 	by 	reason 	of 	his
claimed 	interest. 	If 	he 	has 	not 	been 	so
joined, 	the 	court 	shall 	order 	that 	he 	be
made 	a 	party.
26

REMEDY
The 	District 	argues 	that 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	proposed
order 	is 	inherently 	contradictory 	and 	patently 	ambiguous. 	In
addition, 	the 	District 	contends 	that 	the 	remedy 	is
inappropriate 	because 	of 	the 	length 	of 	time 	that 	has 	transpired
since 	the 	initiation 	of 	the 	charge, 	and 	because 	it 	has 	entered
into 	a 	tentative 	agreement 	with 	CSEA 	regarding 	certain 	features
that 	are 	affected 	by 	the 	Order. 	In 	this 	regard, 	the 	District
requests 	that 	testimony 	be 	taken 	as 	to 	these 	subsequent 	events
so 	that 	the 	remedy 	may 	be 	tailored 	to 	present 	circumstances.
Contrary 	to 	the 	District's 	contentions, 	neither 	the 	mere
passage 	of 	time 	nor 	a 	"tentative" 	agreement 	between 	the 	parties
renders 	the 	ordered 	remedy 	inappropriate. 	In Amador 	Valley
Joint 	Union High 	School 	District 	(10/2/78) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	74, 	the 	Board 	stated 	that 	a 	subsequent 	contract 	between 	the
parties 	does 	not 	settle 	or 	moot 	charges 	of 	unlawful 	conduct
during 	the 	negotiations 	process. 	Here, 	CSEA, 	by 	contract,
specifically 	reserved 	the 	right 	to 	reopen 	negotiations 	on 	the
classification 	plan 	if 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge, 	which 	is 	the
subject 	of 	this 	case, 	was 	upheld 	by 	PERB. 	Thus, 	our 	Order 	is
consistent 	with 	the 	~greement 	of 	the 	parties 	themselves 	as
contained 	in 	the 	record 	before 	us. 	Moreover, 	as 	the 	Board 	has
previously 	ruled 	in 	Alum 	Rock 	Union 	School 	District/Mt. 	Diablo
Unified 	School 	District 	(9/22/81) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	Ad-115,
additional 	testimony 	regarding 	subsequent 	events 	is 	not
27

required 	since
	any
	remaining
	uncertainties
	regarding
	our
	Order
can
	be
	resolved 	in
	a
	compliance
	hearing.
	See
	Santa
	Monica
Community
	College
	District
	(9/21/79)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	103;
San
	Francisco
	Community
	College
	District,
	supra;
	and
	Santa
Clara
	Unified
	School
	District
	(5/7/80)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	104a.
Non~theless,
	we
	do
	not
	find
	the 	hearing
	officer's
	proposed
order 	to
	be
	appropriate
	here.·
The
	hearing
	officer
	ordered
	restoration
	of 	the
	status
	quo
to
	the
	extent
	requested
	by 	CSEA.
	That
	is,
	CSEA
	would
	retain
the
	right
	to
	choose
	which
	of 	the
	unilateral
	changes,
	if
	any,
are
	returned 	to 	the
	status
	quo
	ante.
	The
	order
	was
	so
	limited
because
	it
	could 	not
	be
	predicted
	with
	any
	certainty
	whether
CSEA
	or
	any
	of 	the
	affected
	employees
	desires
	a
	return 	to 	the
status
	quo
	as
	to
	any
	or
	all
	of 	the 	changes.
	A
status
	quo
remedy
	as
	to 	areas
	where
	the
	parties
	have 	no
	disagreement
	would
be
	potentially 	disruptive
	to 	the
	negotiating 	process
	and 	would
not 	serve 	the 	purposes 	of 	the 	Act.
We
	find
	that
	partial 	restoration
	of
	the
	status
	quo
	here
would 	be 	unduly 	burdensome
	if
	not 	impossible 	as
	a
	practical
matter
	inasmuch
	as
	some
	classifications
	were
	completely
abolished,
	and
	because 	the
	classification
	plan
	was 	a
	single
integrated
	package
	in
	which
	alterations
	in
	any
	single
classification 	necessarily
	impact 	on 	numerous
	related
classifications.
	In 	addition,
	due
	to 	the 	large 	scale 	of 	the
changes 	implemented,
	affecting 	virtually
	every 	employee, 	a
28

temporary 	return 	to 	the 	status 	quo 	during 	negotiations, 	which
would 	likely 	result 	in 	still 	further 	changes, 	would 	be 	unduly
and 	unnecessarily 	disruptive.
However, 	to 	insure 	that 	meaningful 	bargaining 	will 	occur
under 	conditions 	essentially 	similar 	to 	those 	that 	would 	have
obtained 	had 	the 	District 	bargained 	at 	the 	time 	the 	Act
required 	it 	to 	do 	so, 	unless 	the 	parties 	reach 	a 	contrary
agreement, 	we 	order 	the 	District 	to 	make 	employees 	in 	the 	white
collar 	unit 	whole 	for 	economic 	losses 	suffered 	as 	a 	result 	of
the 	classification 	plan, 	with 	interest 	at 	the 	rate 	of 	7 	percent
per 	annum, 	from 	the 	date 	of 	the 	unilateral 	change 	(October 	13,
1977) 	until 	the 	occurrence 	of 	the 	earliest 	of 	the 	following
conditions:
(1) 	the 	date 	the 	District 	and 	CSEA 	reach 	agreement;
(2) 	completion 	of 	the 	statutory 	impasse 	procedures;
(3) 	the 	failure 	of 	CSEA 	to 	request 	bargaining 	within 	10
days 	of 	service 	of 	this 	Decision; 	or
(4) 	the 	subsequent 	failure 	of 	CSEA 	to 	bargain 	in 	good
faith.
Because 	the 	current 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	the 	blue
collar 	unit 	was 	not 	a 	party 	to 	this 	action, 	the 	record 	is
silent 	as 	to 	the 	course 	of 	bargaining 	between 	the 	District 	and
that 	union. 	Therefore, 	we 	cannot 	determine 	whether 	a 	demand 	to
bargain 	on 	the 	matters 	at 	issue 	here 	was 	made 	by 	that 	union
and, 	if 	so, 	what 	if 	any 	agreement may 	have 	been 	reached 	between
29

the
	parties.
	In
	these 	circumstances,
	we
	do
	not 	order
	the
District
	to 	bargain
	with 	the
	current
	exclusive
	rep~esentative
of
	the
	blue
	collar
	unit
	which
	may
	not
	desire
	to 	bargain
	or
	may
have
	already
	so
	bargained. 	Therefore, 	the
	make-whole 	remedy
ordered 	for
	employees
	in
	this
	unit
	is
	limited
	to 	the
	period
from
	the
	date 	of 	the
	unilateral
	change 	{October
	13,
	1977)
	until
the
	date
	on
	which
	agreement
	on
	salaries
	for 	the
	affected
employees
	was,
	or
	is,
	reached 	with 	the
	successor
	exclusive
representative
•.
It
	is
	also 	appropriate
	that
	the
	District
	post
	a
	notice
incorporating
	the
	terms
	of 	the
	Order.
	Posting 	of
	such
	notice,
signed
	by 	an
	authorized 	agent 	of 	the
	District,
	will
	provide
employees 	with
	notice
	that
	the
	District
	has
	acted 	in
	an
unlawful
	manner,
	is
	being
	required
	to 	cease
	and
	desist
	from
this 	activity,
	and
	will
	comply
	with
	this
	Order.
	It
	effectuates
the
	purposes 	of 	the
	EERA
	that
	employees
	be
	informed
	of 	the
resolution
	of 	the 	controversy
	and
	the
	District's
	readiness 	to
comply
	with 	the 	ordered
	remedy. 	Davis
	Unified 	School
	District
et 	al.
	(2/22/80)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	116; 	see
	also 	Placerville
Union 	School
	District
	{9/18/78)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	69.
ORDER
Upon
	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact
	and
	conclusions 	of
	law,
and 	the
	entire
	record 	in 	the 	case,
	it
	is
	found
	that 	the
	Alum
Rock 	Union 	Elementary 	School
	District 	violated 	subsections
3543.S(a),
	(b) 	and 	(c)
	of 	the 	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
30

Act.
	Pursuant
	to 	subsection
	3541.S(c)
	of
	the
	Government 	Code,
it
	is
	hereby
	ORDERED
	that
	the
	District,
	its
	governing 	board
	and
its
	representatives
	shall:
1.
	CEASE
	AND
	DESIST
	FROM:
(a)
	Failing
	and
	refusing
	to
	meet
	and
	negotiate 	in
good
	faith
	with 	the
	California
	School
	Employees
	Association,
Chapter
	305,
	as 	the
	exclusive
	representative
	of
	its
	employees
in
	the
	paraprofessional, 	aides, 	technical
	and
	business
	services
unit,
	by making
	unilateral
	changes
	in 	matters 	within 	the
	scope
of 	representation,
	with
	respect
	to 	the 	following
	portions
	of
	a
classification
	plan
	adopted
	in
	October 	1977:
	(1)
	the
	transfer
of
	work 	from 	one
	classification
	to 	another;
	(2)
	the
	retitling
of
	classifications;
	(3)
	all
	matters 	related
	to
	salaries,
including 	the
	salary
	ranges
	to
	which 	newly
	created
classifications
	are 	assigned
	and 	any
	changes
	in 	the
	salaries
	or
salary
	ranges 	of
	existing
	classifications;
	(4)
	the 	reassignment
of
	employees
	from
	existing 	classifications
	to
	different
	or
newly
	created
	classifications;
	(5)
	the
	allocation
	of
	positions
to
	classifications;
	(6)
	the 	grouping 	of
	classifications 	into
occupational 	groups;
	and 	(7)
	the
	impact
	on 	employees
	of 	those
classification
	decisions 	within 	the
	District's
	exclusive
prerogative.
(b)
	By
	the
	same
	conduct, 	denying 	to 	the
	California
School
	Employees
	Association, 	Chapter 	305,
	rights 	guaranteed	
by
31

the 	Educational Employment 	Relations 	Act, 	including 	the 	right
to 	represent 	its 	members.
(c) 	By 	the 	same 	conduct, 	interfering 	with 	employees
in 	the 	exercise of 	rights 	guaranteed 	by 	the 	Educational
Employment 	Relations 	Act, 	including 	the 	right 	to 	be 	represented
by 	their 	chosen 	representative.
2. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE 	ACTIONS 	DESIGNED 	TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF 	THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS 	ACT:
(a) 	Upon 	request, 	immediately 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	with
the 	California 	School 	Employees 	Association, 	Chapter 	305,
regarding 	the 	following 	portions 	of 	the 	classification 	plan 	for
the 	District's 	employees 	in 	the 	paraprofessional, 	aides,
technical 	and 	business 	services 	unit 	(white 	collar 	unit):
(1) 	the 	transfer 	of 	work 	from 	one 	classification 	to 	another;
(2) 	the 	retitling 	of 	classifications; 	(3) 	all 	matters 	related
to 	salaries, 	including 	the 	salary 	ranges 	to 	which 	newly 	created
classifications 	are 	assigned 	and 	any 	changes 	in 	the 	salaries 	or
salary 	ranges 	of 	existing 	classifications; 	(4) 	the 	reassignment
of 	employees 	from 	existing 	classifications 	to 	different 	or
newly 	created 	classifications; 	(5) 	the 	allocation 	of 	positions
to 	classifications; 	( 6) 	the 	grouping 	of 	class if ica tions 	into
occupational 	groups; 	and 	(7) 	the 	impact 	on 	conditions 	of
employment 	of 	those 	classification 	decisions 	within 	the
District's 	exclusive 	prerogative.
32

(b) 	Unless 	a 	contrary 	agreement 	is 	reached 	with 	the
California 	School 	Employees 	Association, 	Chapter 	305, 	make
employees 	in 	the 	white 	collar 	unit 	whole 	for 	economic 	losses
suffered 	as 	a 	result 	of 	the 	District's 	unilateral 	action, 	with
interest 	at 	the 	rate 	of 	seven 	(7) 	percent 	per 	annum, 	for 	the
period 	beginning 	on 	the 	date 	of 	the 	unilateral 	change
(October 	13, 	1977) 	until 	the 	occurrence 	of 	the 	earliest 	of 	the
following 	conditions:
(1) 	the 	date 	the 	parties 	reach 	agreement;
(2) 	completion 	of 	the 	statutory 	impasse
procedures;
(3) 	the 	failure 	of 	CSEA 	to 	request 	bargaining
within 	10 	days 	following 	service 	of 	this 	Decision; 	or
(4) 	the 	subsequent 	failure 	of 	CSEA 	to 	bargain 	in
good 	faith.
(c) 	Make 	employees 	in 	the 	blue 	collar 	unit 	whole 	for
economic 	losses 	suffered 	as 	a 	result 	of 	the 	District's
unilateral 	action, 	with 	interest 	at 	the 	rate 	of 	seven 	(7)
percent 	per 	annum, 	for 	the 	period 	beginning 	on 	the 	date 	of 	the
unilateral 	change 	(October 	13, 	1977) 	until 	the 	date 	on 	which
agreement 	on 	salaries 	for 	the 	affected 	employees 	was, 	or 	is,
reached 	with 	the 	successor 	exclusive 	representative.
(d) 	Within 	seven 	(7) 	workdays 	of 	service 	of 	this
Decision, 	post 	at 	all 	school 	sites 	and 	all 	other 	work 	locations
where 	notices 	to 	employees 	are 	customarily 	placed, 	copies 	of
33

the
	Notice
	attached 	hereto
	as
	an
	Appendix.
	The
	Notice
	must
	be
signed
	by 	an
	authorized
	agent 	of 	the
	District,
	indicating
	that
the
	District
	will
	comply
	with
	the
	terms
	of
	this
	Order.
	Such
posting
	shall
	be
	maintained 	for
	a
	period
	of
	thirty
	(30)
consecutive
	workdays. 	Reasonable
	steps
	shall
	be
	taken
	to
insure 	that
	the 	Notice
	is
	not
	reduced
	in
	size, 	altered,
	defaced
or
	cqvered
	by
	any
	other
	material.
(e)
	Within
	thirty
	(30)
	workdays
	from
	service 	of
	this
Decision, 	notify
	the
	San
	Francisco 	regional
	director
	of 	the
Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board,
	in
	writing,
	of 	the
	steps
	the
employer 	has
	taken
	to
	comply
	with
	the
	terms
	of
	this
	Order.
Continue 	to
	report
	in
	writing
	to 	the
	regional
	director
periodically 	thereafter
	as
	directed.
	All
	reports
	to
	the
regional 	director 	shall
	be
	served
	concurrently
	on
	the
	charging
party 	herein.
C.hairperson
	Gluck 	and
	Members
	Tovar 	and
	Burt 	joined 	in
	this
Decision.
34

APPENDIX NOTICE
	TO
	EMPLOYEES
POSTED
	BY
	ORDER
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
An
	Agency
	of 	the
	State
	of
	California
After
	a
	hearing
	in
	Unfair
	Practice
	Case
	No.
	SF-CE-170,
California
	School
	Employees
	Association,
	Chapter
	305
	v.
	Alum
Rock 	Union
	Elementary
	School
	District,
	in
	which
	all
	parties
	had
the
	right
	to
	participate,
	it
	has 	been 	found
	that
	the
	Alum 	Rock
Union
	Elementary 	School
	District
	violated
	subsection
	3543.S(c)
of
	the 	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Act
	by
	failing
	and
refusing
	to
	meet 	and
	negotiate
	with
	the
	California
	School
Employees
	Association,
	Chapter
	305,
	with
	respect 	to
	a
classification
	plan
	for
	employees
	containing 	matters 	within
	the
scope
	of
	representation.
	It
	was
	further
	found
	that
	this
	same
conduct
	violated
	subsection
	3543.5(b)
	since
	it
	denied
	CSEA
	the
right
	to
	represent
	its
	members, 	and
	interfered
	with 	employees'
rights
	to
	be
	represented
	by
	their
	chosen
	representative 	in
violation
	of 	subsection
	3543.S(a)
	of 	the 	Educational
	Employment
Relations
	Act.
As
	a
	result
	of
	this
	conduct,
	we
	have 	been
	ordered 	to 	post
this
	Notice,
	and
	will
	abide
	by
	the 	following.
	We
	will:
1.
	CEASE
	AND
	DESIST
	FROM:
(a)
	Failing
	and
	refusing 	to
	meet
	and
	negotiate 	in
good
	faith
	with 	the
	California
	School
	Employees
	Association,
Chapter
	305, 	as
	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of
	employees
	in
the 	paraprofessional, 	aides, 	technical
	and
	business
	services
unit,
	by making
	unilateral
	changes
	in 	matters 	within 	the
	scope
of 	representation.
(b) 	Denying
	to
	the
	California
	School
	Employees
Association,
	Chapte~ 	305,
	rights
	guaranteed
	by
	the 	Educational
Employment
	Relations 	Act, 	including 	the
	right
	to
	represent
	its
members.
(c)
	Interfering
	with 	employees
	in 	the 	exercise 	of
rights
	guaranteed
	by
	the 	Educational
	Employment
	Relations 	Act,
including 	the 	right
	to
	be
	represented
	by
	their
	chosen
representative.
2.
	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING 	AFFIR1i'..ATIVE 	ACTIONS 	DESIGNED
	TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE
	POLICIES
	OF 	THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS 	ACT:
(a) 	Upon
	request, 	immediately 	meet 	and
	negotiate 	with
the 	California 	School 	Employees
	Association, 	Chapter 	305,
regarding 	the 	classification 	plan 	for 	the
	District's
	employees
in 	the 	paraprofessional, 	aides, 	technical 	and 	business 	services

unit
	(white
	collar 	unit),
	regarding
	particularly
	the
	following
subjects:
	(1)
	the
	transfer
	of
	duties
	from 	one
	classification
to
	another, 	(2) 	the
	retitling
	of
	classifications;	
(3)	
all
matters 	related
	to
	salaries,
	including
	the
	salary
	ranges
	to
which
	newly
	created
	classifications
	are 	assigned
	and
	any
changes
	in
	the
	salaries
	or
	salary
	ranges
	of
	existing
classifications;
	(4)
	the 	reassignment 	of
	employees 	from
existing 	classifications
	to
	different
	or
	newly
	created
classifications;
	(5)
	the
	allocation
	of
	positions
	to
classifications;
	(6)
	the 	grouping
	of
	classifications 	into
occupational
	groups;
	and 	(7)
	the
	impact
	on
	conditions 	of
employment
	of 	those
	classification
	decisions
	within 	the
District's
	exclusive
	prerogative.
(b)
	Unless
	a
	contrary
	agreement
	is
	reached
	with 	the
California
	School
	Employees
	Association,
	Chapter
	305,
	make
employees
	in 	the 	white
	collar
	unit
	whole
	for
	economic
	lossessuffered
	as
	a
	result
	of 	the
	District's
	unilateral 	action,
	with
interest
	at
	the
	rate
	of
	seven 	(7)
	percent
	per
	annum,
	for
	the
period
	beginning
	on
	the
	date
	of
	the
	unilateral
	change
(October
	13,
	1977)
	until
	the 	occurrence 	of 	the
	earliest
	of 	the
following
	conditions:
(1)
	the 	date
	the
	parties
	reach 	agreement;
(2)
	completion 	of 	the
	statutory
	impasse
procedures;
(3)
	the
	failure
	of
	CSEA
	to 	request 	bargaining
within
	10 	days
	following
	service
	of
	this
	decision;
	or
(4)
	the 	subsequent
	failure
	of
	CSEA
	to 	bargain 	in
good
	faith.
(c) 	Make 	employees
	in 	the 	blue
	collar 	unit
	whole
	for
economic
	losses 	suffered
	as
	a
	result
	of 	the
	District'sunilateral 	action,
	with
	interest 	at
	the
	rate
	of 	seven 	(7)
percent
	per
	annum,
	for 	the 	period 	beginning
	on
	the 	date 	of 	the
unilateral
	change 	(October
	13,
	1977)
	until
	the 	date
	on 	which
agreement
	on
	salaries
	for 	affected
	employees 	was, 	or
	is,
reached 	with 	the 	successor 	exclusive 	representative.
Dated:	
ALUM 	ROCK
	UNION 	ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL
	DISTRICT
By
Authorized 	Agent
THIS 	IS
	AN
	OFFICIAL 	NOTICE. 	IT
	MUST 	REMAIN 	POSTED 	FOR 	AT 	LEAST
THIRTY 	(30) 	CONSECUTIVE 	WORKDAYS 	FROM THE 	DATE 	OF
	POSTING
	AND
MUST 	NOT 	BE 	REDUCED 	IN 	SIZE, 	DEFACED, 	ALTERED 	OR 	COVERED 	BY 	ANY
MATERIAL.