Los Angeles Unified School District (Siamis) (PERB 0311E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

GUST SIAMIS,
Case Nos. LA-CE-1163
LA-CE-1234

Charging Party,
Vv.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Respondent. May 20, 1983

GUST SIAMIS,

Case Nos. LA-CO-134
LA-CO-143

Charging Party,
Vv.
UNITED TEACHERS OF LOS ANGELES,

Respondent.

ee ee ee ee ee ae ee ee ee es ee ee ee ae ee ee ee ee ee

Appearances: Gust Siamis, in his own behalf; Joel M. Grossman,
Attorney (O'Melveny & Myers) for Los Angeles Unified School
District; and Richard J. Schwab, Attorney (Law Office of
Lawrence B. Trygstad) for United Teachers of Los Angeles.

Before Tovar, Jaeger and Morgenstern, Members.
DECISION

TOVAR, Member: This case is before the Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by

Gust Siamis to the attached proposed decision of a hearing

officer which dismisses all four of the consolidated charges
which comprise this case. The charges against the Los Angeles

Unified School District allege that it discriminated against

PERB Decision No,

311

Mr. 	Siamis 	in 	violation 	of 	subsection 	3543.5(a) 	of 	the
Educational 	Employment 	Relations 	Act 	(EERA or 	Act)l 	when 	it
issued 	him 	a 	Notice 	of 	Unsatisfactory 	Service 	(Notice). 	The
charges 	against 	the 	United 	Teachers 	of 	Los 	Angeles 	(UTLA)
allege 	that 	it 	failed 	to 	fairly 	represent Mr. 	Siamis 	in
grieving 	the 	Notic~ 	in 	violation 	of 	subsection 	3543.6(b).2
The 	exceptions 	filed 	by Mr. 	Siamis 	claim 	no 	error 	of
substantive 	law 	or 	fact 	on 	the 	part 	of 	the 	hearing 	officer, 	but
instead 	are 	limited 	to 	procedural 	issues. 	With 	one 	exception,
we 	find 	that 	the 	arguments 	presented 	by 	Mr. 	Siamis 	fail 	to
identify 	any 	error 	by 	the 	hearing 	officer 	in 	his 	procedural
lThe 	EERA 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3540
et 	seq. 	All 	statutory 	references 	are 	to 	the 	Government 	Code
unless 	otherwise 	noted.
Section 	3543.5 	provides 	in 	pertinent 	part:
It 	shall 	be 	unlawful 	for 	a 	public 	school 	employer 	to:
(a) 	Impose 	or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	reprisals
on 	employees, 	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against 	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere 	with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed 	by 	this 	chapter.
2section 	3543.6 	provides 	in 	pertinent 	part:
It 	shall 	be 	unlawful 	for 	an 	employee 	organization 	to:
(b) 	Impose 	or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	reprisals
on 	employees, 	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against 	employees, 	or 	otherwise
to 	interfere 	with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed 	by 	this 	chapter.
2

rulings. 	We 	therefore 	affirm 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	rulings
made 	in 	connection 	with 	his 	disposition 	of 	the 	charges 	in 	Case
Nos. 	LA-CE-1234, 	LA-C0-134 	and 	LA-C0-143, 	and 	on 	that 	basis
summarily 	affirm 	the 	dismissal 	of 	those 	charges, 	adopting 	the
hearing 	officer's 	findings 	of 	fact 	and 	conclusions 	of 	law 	as
those 	of 	the 	Board 	itself. 	For 	the 	reasons 	which 	follow,
however, 	we 	find 	that 	the 	hearing 	officer 	erred 	in 	dismissing
Case 	No. 	LA-CE-1163. 	We 	therefore 	reverse 	that 	dismissal 	and
remand 	the 	case 	to 	the 	General 	Counsel 	for 	further 	proceedings.
DISCUSSION
The 	hearing 	officer 	based 	his 	dismissal 	of 	Case
No. 	LA-CE-1163 	upon 	his 	determination 	that 	the 	charge 	had 	been
filed 	with 	PERB 	after 	the 	running 	of 	the 	six-month 	statute 	of
limitations 	set 	forth 	at 	subsection 	3541.S(a} 	of 	the 	EERA,3
and 	was 	therefore 	time-barred.
3subsection 	3541.S(a} 	provides 	in 	pertinent 	part:
(a} 	Any 	employee, 	employee 	organization, 	or
employer 	shall 	have 	the 	right 	to 	file 	an
unfair 	practice 	charge, 	except 	that 	the
board 	shall 	not 	do 	either 	of 	the 	following:
(1) 	issue 	a 	complaint 	in 	respect 	of 	any
charge 	based 	upon 	an 	alleged 	unfair 	practice
occurring 	more 	than 	six 	months 	prior 	to 	the
filing 	of 	the 	charge; 	(2) 	issue 	a 	complaint
against 	conduct 	also 	prohibited 	by 	the
provisions 	of 	the 	agreement 	between 	the
parties 	until 	the 	grievance 	machinery 	of 	the
agreement, 	if 	it 	exists 	and 	covers 	the
matter 	at 	issue, 	has 	been 	exhausted, 	either
by 	settlement 	or 	binding 	arbitration ••••
3

According 	to 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	calculations, 	Siamis
received 	the 	Notice 	on June 	27, 	1979, 	and 	the 	six-month 	statute
of 	limitations 	began 	to 	run 	from 	that 	date. 	The 	statute 	was
tolled 	by 	the 	filing 	of 	Siamis' 	grievance 	on July 	31, 	one 	month
and 	three 	days 	later. 	It 	resumed 	running 	upon 	his 	receipt 	of
notice 	of 	the 	final 	conclusion 	of 	the 	grievance 	proceedings 	on
January 	3, 	1980, 	and 	thus 	expired 	four 	months 	and 	27 	days
later, 	on June 	1, 	1980. 	The 	filing 	of 	charge 	number 	LA-CE-1163
on 	June 	18, 	therefore, 	was 	found 	to 	be 	untimely.
Mr. 	Siamis 	argues, 	and 	we 	agree, 	that 	the 	hearing 	officer
erred 	in 	holding 	that 	the 	statute 	began 	to 	run 	on 	the 	date 	he
4	received 	the 	Notice.
The 	hearing 	officer 	correctly 	noted 	that 	under 	subsection
3541.S(a) 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	is 	tolled 	"during 	the 	time
it 	took 	the 	charging 	party 	to 	exhaust 	the 	grievance
machinery." 	He 	failed 	to 	consider, 	however, 	that 	efforts
preparatory 	to 	the 	actual 	filing 	of 	a 	grievance, 	including 	such
tasks 	as 	investigation, 	discovery, 	planning 	and 	preparation 	of
documents, 	are 	an 	inherent 	and 	necessary 	part 	of 	a
complainant's 	pursuit 	of 	his 	or 	her 	grievance. 	The 	hearing
4Mr. 	Siamis 	also 	excepts 	to 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	finding
that 	the 	Notice 	was 	served 	on 	him on 	June 	27, 	1979. 	The 	record
supports 	his 	contention 	that 	he 	in 	fact 	received 	the 	Notice 	on
July 	11, 	1979. 	However, 	this 	error, 	by 	itself, 	would 	not 	be
prejudicial, 	since, 	if 	we 	were 	to 	adopt 	the 	formula 	used 	by 	the
hearing 	officer 	in 	determining 	the 	running 	of 	the 	statute, 	the
correction 	of 	this 	fourteen-day 	error 	would 	still 	put 	the
filing 	of 	the 	charge 	beyond 	the 	expiration 	of 	the 	statute.
4

officer's 	ruling 	that 	such 	preparatory 	efforts 	do 	not 	toll 	the
statute 	of 	limitations 	fails 	to 	allow 	for 	this 	reality 	and 	is,
therefore, 	in 	our 	view 	erroneous.
The 	record 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	reveals 	that 	Mr. 	Siamis
promptly 	contacted 	his 	exclusive 	representative 	upon 	receiving
the 	Notice. 	He 	met 	twice 	with 	UTLA's 	agent 	in 	charge 	of
grievances, 	Roger 	Segura, 	and 	they 	reviewed 	in 	depth
Mr. 	Siamis' 	view 	of 	the 	relevant 	facts. 	In 	an 	effort 	to
develop 	a 	defense 	on 	Siamis' 	behalf, 	Segura 	then 	met 	with
UTLA's 	representative 	at 	Siamis' 	school. 	Because 	Segura
foresaw 	that 	witnesses 	would 	be 	necessary 	to 	substantiate
Siamis' 	defense, 	he 	then 	made 	efforts 	to 	secure 	such
witnesses. 	Segura 	also 	reviewed 	with 	Siamis 	UTLA's 	own
policies 	with 	regard 	to 	the 	representation 	of 	unit 	members 	in
grievance 	matters. 	Finally, 	Segura 	prepared 	the 	documentation
which 	would 	constitute 	Siamis' 	written 	grievance. 	This 	was
submitted 	to 	the 	District 	on 	July 	31, 	1979, 	within 	15 	working
days 	from 	his 	receipt 	of 	the 	Notice 	on July 	11, 	as 	was 	required
by 	contractual 	grievance 	provision. 	Thus, 	from 	the 	time 	that
Siamis 	received 	the 	Notice 	until 	he 	filed 	his 	grievance, 	he 	was
engaged 	in 	efforts 	reasonably 	related 	to 	pursuit 	of 	the
grievance 	machinery. 	The 	period 	of 	time 	which 	elapsed 	does 	not
constitute 	unreasonable 	delay 	or 	indicate 	that 	Siamis 	was
sitting 	idly 	on 	his 	rights.
5

6
Upon 	these 	facts 	we 	conclude 	that 	the 	statute 	of
limitations 	began 	running 	for 	the 	first 	time 	only 	upon 	the
conclusion 	of 	the 	contractual 	grievance 	machinery 	on
January 	3, 	1980.s
In 	dicta, 	the 	Board 	has 	previously 	endorsed 	this
interpretation 	of 	subsection 	3541.S(a). 	Thus, 	in San Dieguito
Union High 	School 	District 	(2/25/82) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	194, 	an
employee 	organization 	filed 	grievances 	in 	October 	and
November, 	1977, 	over 	alleged 	unilateral 	changes 	implemented 	by
the 	district 	at 	the 	start 	of 	the 	school 	year. 	The 	Board
ultimately 	found 	that 	the 	statute 	had 	indeed 	run. 	In
discussing 	its 	calculations, 	however, 	the 	Board 	noted 	the
charging 	party's 	pursuit 	of 	the 	grievance 	machinery, 	and
explained 	that:
The 	limitations 	period, 	as 	a 	consequence,
would 	not 	run 	until 	after 	it 	became 	clear
that 	the 	possibility 	of 	a 	remedy 	via 	[the
grievance 	procedure] 	was 	foreclosed. 	Here,
the 	route 	proved 	unsuccessful 	on
June 	22, 	1978 	when 	the 	District's 	school
board 	refused 	to 	accept 	the 	[advisory]
arbitrator's 	award. 	The 	Association,
however, 	failed 	to 	file 	its 	unfair 	practice
with 	the 	PERB 	within 	six 	months 	from 	that
date. 	[Emphasis 	added.]
Swe 	note 	that 	subsection 	3541.S(a) 	provides 	that 	the
statute 	of 	limitations 	is 	tolled 	only during 	"the 	time 	it 	took
the 	charging 	party 	to 	exhaust 	the 	grievance 	machinery." 	Thus,
if, 	during 	the 	time 	following 	the 	complained-of 	conduct, 	the
charging 	party 	is 	not 	engaged 	in 	efforts 	reasonably 	aimed 	at
pursuit 	of 	the 	grievance 	machinery 	but 	is 	instead 	sitting 	idly
on 	his 	rights, 	the 	statute 	will 	not 	be 	tolled.
6

7
Consistently 	with 	the 	above 	rationale, 	we 	find 	that 	the
charge 	filed 	in 	Case 	No. 	LA-CE-1163 	was 	filed 	within 	the 	time
period 	prescribed 	by 	subsection 	3541.S(a).
ORDER
Upon 	review 	of 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	case, 	the 	Board
ORDERS 	that:
1. 	Case 	Nos. 	LA-CE-1234, 	LA-C0-134 and 	LA-C0-143 	are
hereby 	DISMISSED;
2. 	Case 	No. 	LA-CE-1163 	is 	hereby 	remanded 	to 	the 	General
Counsel 	for 	further 	proceedings 	consistent 	with 	this 	Decision.
Members 	Jaeger 	and Morgenstern 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
7

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GUST SIAMIS,
Charging Party,
v.
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Respondent,
GUST SIAMIS,
Charging Party,
v.
UNITED TEACHERS OF LOS
ANGELES,
Respondent.
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Unfair Practice
Case Nos. LA-CE-1163
LA-CE-1234
Case Nos. LA-CO-134
LA-CO-143
PROPOSED DECISION
(3/3/82 )
Appearances: Gust Siamis for Charging Party; O'Melveny &
Myers, attorneys, by Joel Grossman and Richard N. Fisher for
Los Angeles Unified School District; and Lawrence B. Trygstad,
attorney, by Richard J. Schwab for United Teachers of Los
Angeles.
Before: Stuart C. Wilson, Administrative Law Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gust Siamis (hereafter Siamis) is a teacher· in the
Los Angeles Unified School District (hereafter District). In
two cases he has charged the District with having discriminated
against him because of his exercise of rights protected under
the Educational Employment Relations Act (hereafter EERA),

Government 	Code 	sections 	3540 	et 	seq. 1 	In 	two 	cases 	he 	has
charged 	United 	Teachers 	of 	Los 	Angeles 	(hereafter 	UTLA) 	with
having 	breached 	its 	duty 	fairly 	to 	represent 	him.
The 	charges 	were 	filed 	between 	June 	18, 	1980 	and
October 	17, 	1980, 	answered 	between 	July 	11, 	1980 	and
February 	20, 	1981, 	and 	heard 	June 	15, 	16 	and 	17, 	1981.
FINDINGS 	OF 	FACT
Within 	the 	meaning 	of 	the 	EERA 	it 	is 	found 	that 	the
District 	is 	an 	employer, 	and 	UTLA 	is 	an 	employee 	organization
which 	is 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	a 	collective
negotiating 	unit 	of 	District 	teachers, 	including 	Siamis.
The 	first 	matter 	addressed 	at 	the 	hearing 	was 	the
District's Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	charge 	LA-CE-1163 	on 	the 	basis
that 	it 	was 	time 	barred 	under 	section 	3541.5(a) 's 	six-month
limitation 	period.
Siamis 	filed 	this 	charge 	on 	June 	18, 	1980 	because 	of 	his
receipt 	from 	the 	District 	of 	a 	Notice 	of 	Unsatisfactory 	Service
on 	June 	27,·1979, 	11 	months 	and 	21 	days 	before.
The 	contract 	between 	the 	UTLA and 	the 	District 	contains
grievance 	machinery 	which 	covers 	the 	situation 	and 	ends 	in
binding 	arbitration. 	Thus 	the 	time 	Siamis 	took 	to 	exhaust 	the
grievance 	machinery 	is 	tolled 	in 	computing 	the 	six-month
limitation 	period.
lAll 	references 	are 	to 	California 	Government 	Code
unless 	otherwise 	noted.
2

Siamis 	initiated 	the 	grievance 	process 	July 	31, 	1979. 	It
ended 	five 	months 	and 	three 	days 	later 	on 	January 	3, 	1980, 	when
Siamis 	received 	final 	notice 	of 	denial.
Thus 	deducting 	the 	grievance 	time 	of 	five 	months 	and 	three
days 	from 	the 	total 	time 	of 	11 	months 	and 	21 	days, 	leaves 	a
difference 	of 	six 	months 	and 	18 	days.
Siamis 	argued 	that 	the 	one 	month 	and 	three 	day 	interval
between 	his 	receipt 	of 	the 	Notice 	of 	Unsatisfactory 	Service 	and
the 	filing 	of 	the 	grievance 	was 	merely 	an 	incubation 	period
which 	did 	not 	count 	toward 	the 	six-month 	limitation 	period 	and
thus 	that 	his 	charge 	was 	timely. 	Siamis' 	incubation 	period
theory 	is 	not 	supported 	by 	the 	language 	of 	section 	3541.5(a)
which 	tolls 	the 	limitation 	period 	only 	"during 	the 	time 	it 	took
the 	charging 	party 	to 	exhaust 	the 	grievance 	machinery."
In 	an 	overwhelming 	majority of 	its 	cases 2 	the 	Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board's 	(hereafter 	PERB) 	construction
2For 	example, 	see 	State 	of 	California 	Franchise 	Tax 	Board
(5/13/81) 	PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-109-S; 	Office 	the 	Santa 	Clara
County 	Superintendent 	of 	Schools 	(9/17/80) 	PERB 	Order
No. 	AD-98; 	Konocti 	Unified 	School 	District 	(7/16/79) 	PERB 	Order
No. 	AD-71; 	Alameda 	Unified 	School 	District 	(7/6/79) 	PERB
Order 	No. 	AD-70; 	San 	Rafael 	City 	Schools 	(7/6/79) 	PERB 	Order
No. 	AD-68; 	Menlo Park 	City 	Elementary 	School 	District 	(5/25/79)
PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-65; 	Bassett 	Unified 	School 	District 	(3/23/79)
PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-63; 	Sacramento 	City 	Unified 	School 	District
(1/29/79) 	PERB 	Order 	No. 	55; 	State 	of 	California 	(1/2/79) 	PERB
Order 	No. 	AD-52; 	Taft 	Union 	Hifh 	School 	District 	(12/8/78) 	PERB
Order 	No. 	AD-50; 	PITisburg 	Uni 	ied 	School 	District 	(10/20/78)
PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-49; 	Anaheim Union 	High 	School 	District
(7/17/78) 	PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-42; 	Los 	Angeles 	Community 	College
District 	(7/14/78) 	PERB 	Order 	AD-41; 	Redding 	Elementary 	School
3

of 	time-bar 	language 	has 	been 	very 	strict. 	This 	has 	been 	true
even 	when 	the 	time-bar 	language 	has 	had 	provision 	for 	the
making 	of 	exceptions 	which 	the 	subject 	language 	does 	not.
Based 	upon 	these 	factors 	it 	was 	concluded 	that 	the 	time
running 	both 	before 	and 	after 	Siamis' 	resort 	to 	the 	grievance
machinery must 	be 	counted, 	that 	the 	charge 	was 	time-barred 	and
it 	was 	dismissed.
The 	next 	charge 	addressed 	was 	LA-CO-134 	charging 	UTLA with
having 	breached 	its 	duty 	fairly 	to 	represent 	Siamis 	in 	its
handling 	of 	his 	problems 	arising 	from 	his 	Notice 	of
Unsatisfactory 	Service.
Siamis 	presented 	evidence 	that 	he 	first 	contacted
Roger 	Segura, 	UTLA's 	person 	in 	charge 	of 	grievances, 	to 	tell
Segura 	he 	thought 	it 	was 	likely 	that 	he 	would 	receive 	a 	Notice
ofUnsatisfactory 	Service. 	Segura 	replied 	that 	if 	Siamis
received 	such 	a 	Notice 	he 	should 	bring 	it 	in 	so 	that 	the 	two 	of
them 	could 	work 	on 	it.
Siamis 	did 	receive 	an 	11 	paragraph 	Notice 	of 	Unsatisfactory
Service 	charging, 	among 	other 	things, 	repeated 	failures 	to
follow 	prescribed 	procedures, 	use 	of 	abusive 	language 	to
District 	(6/21/78) 	PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-39; 	Lincoln 	Unified 	School
District 	(5/30/78) 	PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-35; 	Monterey 	Peninsula
Community 	College 	District 	(5/16/78) 	PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-32;
Anaheim Union 	High 	School 	District 	(3/16/78) 	PERB 	Order 	No. 	27;
Glendale 	Unified 	School 	District 	(2/1/78) 	PERB 	Order 	No. 	AD-25;
Los 	Angeles 	Unified 	School 	District 	(11/8/77) 	EERB 	Order
No. 	AD-19; 	Folsom 	Cordova 	Unified 	School 	District 	(7/7/77)
EERB AD-15.
4

another 	teacher 	who 	was 	conducting 	a 	meeting, 	provocatively
pushing 	another 	teacher, 	and 	attending 	a 	meeting 	during 	time 	he
was 	assigned 	to 	supervise 	students.
Siamis 	took 	this 	Notice 	to 	Segura. 	Their 	first 	meeting
lasted 	over 	an 	hour 	and 	they 	held 	another 	meeting 	later.
Siamis 	told 	Segura 	that 	his 	reason 	for 	repeatedly 	failing 	to
follow 	prescribed 	procedures, 	after 	having 	been 	requested 	to 	do
so 	numerous 	times, 	was 	that 	he 	thought 	his 	way 	was 	better.
Regarding 	attending 	the 	meeting, 	Siamis 	told 	Segura 	that 	he
had 	obtained 	another 	teacher 	to 	cover 	for 	him, 	although 	he 	had
not 	received 	his 	principal's 	permission 	to 	do 	so 	as 	was
required. 	Segura 	testified 	that 	based 	on 	what 	Siamis 	had 	told
him, 	he 	saw 	no 	defense 	which 	could 	be 	raised 	to 	these 	charges.
However, 	in 	an 	effort 	to 	find 	some 	extenuating 	circumstances
Segura 	contacted 	UTLA's 	representative 	at 	Siamis' 	school. 	That
repres~ntative 	told 	Segura 	that 	Siamis 	was 	the 	only 	teacher 	in
trouble 	for 	this 	type 	of 	behavior.
Segura 	had 	been 	involved 	in 	the 	processing 	of 	grievances 	on
behalf 	of 	UTLA 	and 	its 	predecessors 	since 	1960. 	Because 	of
this 	extensive 	experience 	processing 	grievances 	he 	testified
that 	the 	charges 	regarding 	the 	use 	of 	insulting 	names 	and 	the
pushing 	of 	another 	teacher 	would 	result 	in 	conflicting
testimony 	at 	the 	grievance 	hearing. 	Therefore 	he 	foresaw 	the
need 	to 	obtain 	witnesses 	who 	would 	testify 	favorably 	for
Siamis. 	However, 	he 	was 	informed 	by 	the 	representative 	that
5

Siamis 	was 	not 	well-liked 	by 	the 	other 	teachers. 	Segura
concluded 	from 	this 	that 	it 	would 	be 	difficult 	to 	obtain
favorable 	witnesses.
As 	he 	does 	in 	all 	cases, 	Segura 	explained 	to 	Siamis 	that
the 	standard 	conditions 	required 	by 	UTLA 	for 	it 	to 	carry 	the
grievance 	were 	that 	Segura 	would 	be 	the 	person 	in 	charge 	who
would 	run 	the 	case, 	make 	all 	decisions, 	and 	make 	contacts 	with
the 	District. 	Siamis 	agreed 	to 	abide 	by 	these 	conditions 	and
therefore 	Segura 	filed 	the 	grievance, 	even 	though 	he 	thought 	it
had 	no 	chance 	of 	success.
A hearing 	date 	for 	step 	one 	was 	set 	but 	the 	principal
assigned 	her 	designee 	to 	attend 	in 	her 	place 	because 	she 	was
going 	to 	be 	on 	vacation. 	Siamis 	told 	Segura 	that 	he 	did 	not
want 	to 	meet 	with 	the 	designee 	and 	insisted 	on 	meeting 	with 	the
principal. 	Segura 	explained 	that 	it 	would 	then 	be 	necessary 	to
postpone 	the 	hearing 	until 	the 	principal's 	return. 	Siamis 	said
that 	he 	insisted 	on 	holding 	the 	hearing 	on 	the 	scheduled 	date
and 	asked 	Segura 	to 	have 	UTLA 	obtain 	an 	injunction 	prohibiting
the 	principal 	from 	taking 	a 	vacation. 	Segura 	said 	that 	he
would 	not 	do 	so 	and 	with 	this 	Siamis 	went 	to 	other 	UTLA
officials 	attempting 	without 	success 	to 	have 	them order 	Segura
to 	attempt 	to 	get 	the 	injunction.
Siamis, 	without 	Segura's 	knowledge 	or 	consent, 	sent 	a
letter 	to 	the 	District 	requesting 	that 	the 	grievance 	be
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corrected 	in 	certain 	regards 	and 	also 	requesting 	discovery 	of
various 	District 	documents.
Later 	Segura 	received 	a 	call 	from 	Barbara 	La 	Branche,
district 	coordinator 	of 	staff 	relations 	and 	administrator 	of
the 	grievance 	procedure. 	La 	Branche 	complained 	that 	Siamis 	was
coming 	to 	her 	office 	at 	the 	District 	Headquarters 	talking 	about
the 	grievance 	and 	that 	she 	had 	trouble 	getting 	rid 	of 	him. 	In
their 	numerous 	dealings 	with 	grievances, 	she 	and 	Segura 	had
agreed 	that 	they 	would 	be 	the 	contact 	persons 	for 	the
respective 	sides, 	rather 	than 	the 	parties 	or 	witnesses. 	She
asked 	Segura 	to 	keep 	Siamis 	from 	violating 	this 	agreement.
Considering 	all 	of 	the 	matters 	mentioned, 	these 	failures 	of
Siamis 	to 	follow 	UTLA's 	standard 	conditions 	for 	carrying 	a
grievance, 	Segura 	determined 	that 	Siamis 	had 	not 	and 	would 	not
abide 	by 	those 	conditions, 	that 	Siamis 	intended 	to 	represent
himself, 	and 	therefore 	that 	UTLA would 	withdraw 	from 	the
grievance 	leaving 	Siamis 	to 	handle 	it 	himself. 	It 	is 	found
that 	UTLA's 	withdrawal 	was 	based 	solely 	on 	Siamis' 	failure 	to
follow 	UTLA's 	standard 	conditions. 	This 	withdrawal 	took 	place
on 	the 	day 	before 	the 	hearing 	was 	to 	take 	place.
Siamis 	lost 	steps 	one, 	two 	and 	three 	and 	then 	requested
Segura 	to 	have 	UTLA 	take 	the 	grievance 	to 	step 	four, 	binding
arbitration. 	Segura 	testified 	that 	out 	of 	the 	approximately
200 	grievances 	UTLA 	files 	per 	year, 	it 	takes 	only 	approximately
20 	to 	binding 	arbitration. 	Segura 	testified 	that 	considering
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Siamis' 	grievance 	had 	absolutely 	no 	chance 	of 	success 	and 	that
Siamis 	would 	not 	abide 	by 	UTLA 	standard 	conditions, 	he 	declined
to 	have 	UTLA 	take 	the 	matter 	to 	step 	4. 	It 	is 	found 	that
UTLA's 	refusal 	to 	go 	to 	arbitration 	was 	based 	solely 	upon
Siamis' 	refusal 	to 	abide 	by 	the 	standard 	conditions 	and 	the
lack 	of 	chance 	of 	success.
Siamis 	presented 	no 	evidence 	regarding 	Cases 	LA-CE-1234 	or
LA-C0-143.
Respondents 	presented 	no 	evidence.
ISSUES
1. 	Did 	Siamis 	carry 	his 	burden 	of 	proof 	in 	cases
LA-CE-1234 	and 	LA-CO-143?
2. 	Did 	UTLA 	breach 	its 	duty 	fairly 	to 	represent 	Siamis 	as
charged 	in 	Case 	LA-CO-134?
CONCLUSIONS 	OF 	LAW
Case 	LA-CE-1163 	was 	dismissed 	during 	the 	hearing 	because 	it
was 	time-barred. 	Cases 	LA-CE-1234 	and 	LA-CO-143 	are 	now
dismissed 	because 	Siamis 	presented 	no 	evidence 	thereon 	and 	thus
failed 	to 	carry 	the 	burden 	of 	proof 	placed 	on 	the 	charging
party. 	This 	leaves 	case 	LA-CO-134.
In 	Rocklin 	School 	District 	(3/26/80} 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	124,
PERB 	held 	that 	a 	breach 	of 	the 	duty 	of 	fair 	representation
occurs 	when 	an 	employee 	organization's 	conduct 	toward 	a 	member
of 	a 	negotiating 	unit 	is 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory 	or 	in 	bad
faith.
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In 	Castro 	Valley 	Unified 	School 	District 	(12/17/80) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	149, 	PERB 	held 	that 	an 	employee 	does 	not 	have 	an
absolute 	right 	to 	have 	a 	grievance 	taken 	to 	arbitration 	and
that 	an 	exclusive 	representative's 	reasonable 	refusal 	to
proceed 	with 	arbitration 	is 	essential 	to 	the 	operation 	of 	a
grievance 	and 	arbitration 	system.
It 	is 	concluded 	that 	it 	is 	reasonable 	and 	prudent 	for 	an
employee 	organization 	representing 	teachers 	in 	a 	large 	District
such 	as 	this 	one 	to 	have 	standard 	conditions 	for 	its
participation 	in 	the 	grievance 	process 	which 	it 	applies 	to 	all
unit 	members. 	Such 	conditions 	facilitate 	the 1 orderly 	and
efficient 	processing 	of 	the 	large 	number 	of 	grievances 	UTLA
handles 	each 	year.
It 	is 	concluded 	that 	UTLA's 	standard 	conditions 	are
reasonable 	and 	proper 	under 	the 	circumstances. 	There 	is 	no
evidence 	that 	UTLA's 	insistence 	that 	Siamis 	abide 	by 	his
agreement 	to 	observe 	these 	conditions, 	and 	refusal 	to
participate 	if 	he 	refused, 	was 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory or 	in
bad 	faith.
It 	was 	found 	that 	UTLA's 	withdrawal 	from 	the 	grievance
process 	was 	based 	solely 	on 	Siamis' 	refusal 	to 	abide 	by 	these
conditions 	and 	that 	its 	decision 	not 	to 	proceed 	to 	arbitration
was 	based 	on 	the 	same 	factors 	plus 	the 	grievance's 	lack 	of
chance 	of 	success.
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Thus 	Siamis 	has 	totally 	failed 	to 	prove 	that 	UTLA's 	actions
toward 	him 	were 	arbitrary, 	discriminatory or 	in 	bad 	faith. 	To
the 	contrary, 	his 	own 	evidence 	proves 	that 	UTLA's 	actions 	were
entirely 	reasonable 	under 	the 	circumstances.
Therefore, 	it 	is 	concluded 	that 	Siamis 	failed 	to 	meet 	his
burden 	of 	proving 	that 	UTLA 	breached 	its 	duty 	fairly 	to
represent 	him, 	and 	thus 	case 	LA-CO-134 	must 	be 	dismissed.
PROPOSED ORDER
Based 	on 	the 	findings 	of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of 	law, 	and 	the
entire 	record 	in 	this 	case, 	the 	charges 	against 	the 	Los 	Angeles
Unified 	School 	District 	and 	United 	Teachers 	of 	Los 	Angeles 	are
hereby 	DISMISSED.
Pursuant 	to 	California 	Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 	32305, 	this 	Proposed 	Decision 	and 	Order 	shall
become 	final 	on March 	24, 	1982 	unless 	a 	party 	files 	a 	timely
statement 	of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting 	brief 	within 	twenty
(20) 	calendar 	days 	following 	the 	date 	of 	service 	of 	this
decision. 	Said 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting 	brief
must 	be 	actually 	received 	by 	the 	Executive 	Assistant 	to 	the
Board 	at 	the 	Headquarters 	Office 	in 	Sacramento 	before 	the 	close
of 	business 	(5:00 	p.m.) 	on March 	24, 	1982, 	in 	order 	to 	be
timely 	filed. 	See 	California Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 	32135. 	Any 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	and
supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	served 	concurrently 	with 	its 	filing
10

Stuart C. Wilson
Administrative 	Law Judge
11
upon 	each 	party 	to 	this 	proceeding. 	Proof 	of 	service 	shall 	be
filed 	with 	the 	Board 	itself. 	See 	California 	Administrative
Code, 	title 	8, 	section 	32305 	(as 	amended).
DATED: 	March 	4, 	1982
11