Redlands Unified School District (PERB 0235E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
In 	the 	Matter 	of:
REDLANDS 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Employer,
and
REDLANDS 	CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, 	NEA,
Employee 	Organization,
and
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION 	AND 	ITS 	REDLANDS
CHAPTER 	70,
Employee 	Organization,
and
REDLANDS 	TEACHERS 	ASSOCIATION,
CTA/NEA,
Party 	of 	Interest.
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____________________ )
Case 	Nos. 	LA-R-105
LA-D-88
PERB 	Decision No. 	235
August 	27, 	1982
Appearances: 	Lawrence 	J. 	Gartner, 	Attorney 	(Littler,
Mendelson, 	Faitiff 	and 	Tichy) 	for 	Redlands 	Unified 	School
District; 	Robert 	M. 	Dohrmann, 	Attorney 	(Schwartz, 	Steinsapir,
Dohrmann, 	Krepack, 	Sommers 	and 	Edelstein) 	for 	Redlands
Classified 	Employees 	Association, 	NEA; 	Maureen 	c. 	Whelan,
Attorney 	for 	California 	School 	Employees 	Association 	and 	its
Redlands 	Chapter 	70; 	A. 	Eugene 	Huguenin, 	Jr., 	Attorney 	for
Redlands 	Teachers 	Association, 	CTA/NEA.
Before 	Tovar, 	Morgenstern 	and 	Jensen, 	Members.

DECISION
This 	case 	is 	before 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
(Board) 	on 	exceptions 	filed 	by 	the 	Redlands 	Unified 	School
District 	(District) 	and 	the 	California 	School 	Employees
Association 	and 	its 	Redlands 	Chapter 	70 	(CSEA) 	to 	the 	attached
proposed 	decision 	of 	a 	PERB 	hearing 	officer. 	The 	proposed
decision 	issues 	from 	a 	hearing 	on 	CSEA's 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	a
petition 	for 	decertification 	filed 	by 	the 	Redlands 	Classified
Employees 	Association, 	NEA 	(RCEA).
CSEA 	is 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	a 	unit 	of
classified 	employees 	of 	the 	District, 	which 	includes 	the
District's 	teachers' 	aides. 	The 	Redlands 	Teachers 	Association,
CTA/NEA 	(RTA), 	which 	intervened 	as 	a 	party 	of 	interest 	in 	this
action, 	is 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	the 	District's
teachers. 	CSEA 	seeks 	dismissal 	of 	RCEA's 	petition 	on 	the
grounds 	that 	(1) 	some 	Redlands 	teachers 	supervise 	aides,
(2) 	RCEA, 	the 	petitioner, 	and 	RTA, 	the 	teachers'
representative, 	are 	the 	"same 	organization," 	and 	(3) 	that 	RCEA
is 	therefore 	prohibited 	from 	representing 	the 	classified 	unit
by 	subsection 	3545(b) (2) 	of 	the 	Educational 	Employment
Relations 	Act 	(EERA).l
lEERA 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	3540 	et 	seq. 	All
statutory 	references 	are 	to 	the 	Government 	Code 	unless
otherwise 	specified.
Subsection 	3545(b) (2) 	provides 	as 	follows:
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(b) 	In 	all 	cases:
(2) 	A negotiating 	unit 	of 	supervisory
employees 	shall 	not 	be 	appropriate
unless 	it 	includes 	all 	supervisory
employees 	employed 	by 	the 	district 	and
shall 	not 	be 	represented 	by 	the 	same
employee 	organization 	as 	employees 	whom
the 	supervisory 	employees 	supervise.
The 	hearing 	officer 	found 	that 	those 	of 	the 	District's
classroom 	teachers 	who 	direct 	the 	activities 	of 	teachers' 	aides
are 	not, 	by 	virtue 	of 	that 	direction, 	"supervisors" 	within 	the
meaning 	of 	subsections 	3540.l(m)2 	and 	3545(b) (2). 	He 	found
further 	that 	RCEA 	and 	RTA 	are 	not 	the 	"same 	organization" 	for
purposes 	of 	subsection 	3545(b) (2), 	supra. 	Based 	on 	those
findings 	the 	hearing 	officer 	concluded 	that 	nothing 	in EERA
would 	prohibit 	RCEA 	from 	serving 	as 	the 	exclusive
representative 	of 	the 	District's 	classified 	employees,
including 	teachers' 	aides, 	should 	those 	employees 	select
2subsection 	3540.l(m) 	provides 	as 	follows:
(m) 	"Supervisory 	employee" 	means 	any
employee, 	regardless 	of 	job 	description,
having 	authority 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	the
employer 	to 	hire, 	transfer, 	suspend, 	lay
off, 	recall, 	promote, 	discharge, 	assign,
reward, 	or 	discipline 	other 	employees, 	or
the 	responsibility 	to 	assign 	work 	to 	and
direct 	them, 	or 	to 	adjust 	their 	grievances,
or 	effectively 	recommend 	such 	action, 	if, 	in
connection 	with 	the 	foregoing 	functions, 	the
exercise 	of 	such 	authority 	is 	not 	of 	a
merely 	routine 	or 	clerical 	nature, 	but
requires 	the 	use 	of 	independent 	judgment.
. 	. 	. 	. . 	. . 	. 	. 	. . . 	. . 	. 	. 	.
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RCEA 	for 	that 	purpose. 	His 	proposed 	order 	thus 	denies CSEA's
motion 	to 	dismiss 	the 	petition 	for 	decertification 	and 	orders
that 	the 	decertification 	election 	should 	proceed.
The 	Board 	has 	reviewed 	the 	proposed 	decision, 	the
exceptions 	thereto, 	and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	case. 	We
affirm 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	finding 	that 	classroom 	teachers 	of
the 	Redlands 	Unified 	School 	District 	are 	not 	supervisors 	within
the 	meaning 	of 	EERA, 	for 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	proposed
decision.
Because 	we 	find 	that 	classroom 	teachers 	are 	not
supervisors, 	it 	is 	unnecessary 	to 	reach 	the 	issue 	of 	whether
RCEA 	and 	RTA 	are 	the 	same 	organization. 	Nothing 	in 	the 	EERA
prohibits 	an 	employee 	organization 	from 	representing 	two
discrete 	units 	of 	nonsupervisory 	employees 	within 	a 	district.
ORDER
Upon 	the 	foregoing 	facts, 	conclusions 	of 	law 	and 	the 	entire
record 	in 	this 	case, 	it 	is 	hereby ORDERED 	that:
1. 	The Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Decertification 	Petition, 	filed
by 	the 	California 	School 	Employees 	Association 	and 	its 	Redlands
Chapter 	70 	in 	case 	Nos. 	LA-D-88, 	LA-R-105, 	is 	hereby 	DENIED.
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2. 	Upon 	a 	showing 	of 	the 	necessary 	proof 	of 	support, 	the
regional director 	shall 	take 	immediate 	steps 	to 	schedule 	and
direct 	an 	election 	in 	the 	unit 	which 	is 	the 	subject 	of 	the
petition.
By: 	Irene 	Tovar, Member 	Marty 	Morgenstern, 	Member
Member
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STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
In 	the 	Matter 	of:
REDLANDS 	UNIFIED SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Employer,
and
REDLANDS 	CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, 	NEA,
Employee Organization,
and
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION 	AND 	ITS 	REDLANDS
CHAPTER 70,
Employee Organization,
and
REDLANDS 	TEACHERS 	ASSOCIATION,
CTA/NEA,
Party 	of 	Interest.
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____________________ )
Representation
Case Nos. 	LA-R-105
LA-D-88
PROPOSED 	DECISION
(4/29/82)
Appearances: 	Lawrence 	J. 	Gartner, 	Attorney 	(Littler,
Mendelson, 	Fastiff 	and 	Tichy), 	for 	Redlands 	Unified 	School
District; 	Maureen Whelan, 	Attorney, 	California School Employees
Association 	and 	its 	Redlands 	Chapter 	70; 	Robert 	M. 	Dohrmann,
Attorney 	(Schwartz, 	Steinsapir, 	Dohrmann, 	Krepack, 	Sommers 	and
Edelstein), 	for 	Redlands 	Classified Employees 	Association, 	NEA;
A. 	Eugene 	Huguenin, 	Jr., 	Attorney, 	for 	Redlands 	Teachers
Association, 	CTA/NEA 	and 	California Teachers Association.
Before Jeffrey 	Sloan, 	Hearing Officer.
STATEMENT 	OF 	THE 	CASE
Redlands 	Classified Employees Association/NEA 	("RCEA") 	is 	the
Petitioner 	in 	a 	decertification 	action seeking 	to 	oust 	the
California School Employees Association 	and 	its 	Redlands

Chapter 	70 	("CSEA") 	from 	its 	role 	as 	the 	incumbent 	exclusive
representative 	of 	a 	unit 	of 	employees, 	including 	teachers'
aides, 	employed 	by 	the 	Redlands 	Unified School 	District
("District").
The 	instant 	decision 	arises 	from 	a 	hearing 	held 	concerning 	a
motion 	to 	dismiss 	filed 	by CSEA on October 	19, 	1981. 	CSEA's
motion argued 	that 	RCEA 	should 	be 	disqualified 	from
representing 	teachers 	aides 	because 	it 	is 	the 	"same 	employee
organization" 	as 	Redlands 	Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA,l 	the
exclusive 	representative 	of 	teachers 	who 	are 	the 	purported
11 supervisors" 	of 	aides. 	(See 	Educational Employment Relations
Act 	( "EERA 11 ) 	section 354 5 (b) (2) ; 	EERA 	sect ion 	354 O.1 (m) • ) 2
The 	only 	issues 	involved 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	are 	those 	raised
by 	CSEA 	in 	its 	motion 	to 	dismiss:
1. 	Are 	RCEA 	and 	RTA 	the 	II same 	employee
organization" 	under 	EERA 	section 3545 (b) (2)?
lAt 	the 	hearing, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	granted 	a 	motion 	to
intervene 	filed 	by 	RTA 	and 	California Teachers Association.
2The EERA 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	section 3540 	et
seq. 	All 	statutory 	references 	are 	to 	the Government Code
unless 	otherwise 	indicated. 	Section 354 5 (b) (2) 	states:
A negotiating 	unit 	of 	supervisory 	employees
shall 	not 	be 	appropriate 	unless 	it 	includes
all 	supervisory 	employees 	employed 	by 	the
district 	and 	shall 	not 	be 	represented 	by 	the
same 	employee 	organization 	as 	employees 	whom
the 	supervisory 	employees 	supervise.
Section 	3540.l(m) 	states:
"Supervisory employee" 	means 	any 	employee,
regardless 	of 	job description, 	having
authority 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	the 	employer 	to
hire, 	transfer, 	suspend, 	lay 	off, 	recall,
promote, 	discharge, 	assign, 	reward, 	or
discipline 	other 	employees, 	or 	the
responsibility 	to 	assign 	work 	to 	and 	direct
them, 	or 	to 	adjust 	their 	grievances, 	or
effectively 	recommend 	such 	action, 	if, 	in
connection 	with 	the 	foregoing 	functions, 	the
exercise 	of 	such 	authority 	is 	not 	of 	a
merely 	routine 	or 	clerical 	nature, 	but
requires 	the 	use 	of 	indepedent 	judgment.
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2. 	Are 	the 	certificated 	employees 	represented 	by RTA
"supervisors" 	of 	aides 	under 	EERA 	section 3540.1 (m)?
The 	parties 	agree 	that, 	absent 	these 	issues, 	a 	hearing 	would 	be
unnecessary 	and 	an 	election 	in 	the 	unit 	would 	be 	appropriate.3
DISCUSSION
I. 	The 	"Same Employee Organization" 	Issue.
CSEA and 	the 	District 	argue 	that 	because 	of 	certain 	alleged
organizational 	connections 	between 	RTA 	and 	RCEA, 	the 	two 	are
functionally 	"the 	same" 	for 	purposes 	of 	section 3545 (b) (2),
ante 	at 	f n • 	2 •
a. 	The 	Common Affiliation with 	the 	National Education
Association 	("NEA").
First, 	the 	District 	and 	CSEA 	argue 	that 	RCEA 	and 	RTA's 	common
affiliation 	with 	NEA 	permit 	NEA 	to 	dictate 	both 	of 	their
courses 	of 	action.4
The 	Board 	considers 	case 	decisions 	of 	the 	National 	Labor
Relations 	Board 	("NLRB") 	to 	be 	persuasive 	if 	they 	involve
interpretations 	of 	statutory provisions 	that 	are 	similar 	or
identical 	to 	those 	in 	the EERA. 	Under 	section 	9 (c) (3) 	of 	the
National Labor 	Relations 	Act 	( "NLRA") , 5
••• 	no 	labor 	organization shall 	be
certified 	as 	the 	representative 	of 	employees
in 	a 	bargaining 	unit 	of 	guards 	if 	such
organization admits 	to membership, 	or 	is
affiliated 	directly 	or 	indirectly 	with 	an
organization which 	admits 	to membership
employees 	other 	than 	guards. 	(Emphasis
added.)
3At 	the 	hearing, 	the 	parties 	stipulated 	that 	(1) 	CSEA,
RTA 	and 	RCEA 	are 	all 	"employee 	organizations" 	within 	the
meaning of 	the Act; 	(2) 	the 	District 	is 	an 	"employer" 	within
the 	meaning 	of 	the Act; 	anq 	(3) 	the.unit 	req~est~d 	by RCEA 	is
the 	existing 	bargaining 	unit 	for 	which 	the 	District 	granted
voluntary 	recognition on May 	4, 	1976.
4while 	RCEA 	is 	not 	yet 	affiliated 	with 	NEA, 	affiliation
papers 	are 	apparently 	forthcoming.
5The NLRA 	is 	codified 	at 	29 	u.s.c. 	section 151 	et 	seq.
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If 	the 	"direct 	or 	indirect" 	affiliation 	test 	were 	applicable
here, 	the 	common NEA 	affiliation would 	result 	in RCEA's
disqualification.
However, 	in 	Sacramento City Unified School 	District 	(3/25/80)
PERB 	Decision No. 	122 	[4 	PERC 	paragraph 	11052], 	the 	Board 	held
that 	the 	Legislature, 	having omitted 	from 	the EERA 	language
paralleling NLRA 	section 	9 (c) (3), 	intended 	not 	to 	adopt 	the
"affiliation 	test" 	of 	section 9 (c) (3). 	Instead, 	the 	Board
interpreted 	section 	3545 (b) (2) 	as 	follows:
When 	two 	employee 	organizations 	are
affiliated 	with 	the 	same 	International, 	this
Board 	must 	carefully 	scrutinize 	their
relationship 	in 	order 	to 	determine 	whether
they 	are 	in 	fact 	separate 	and 	autonomous
entities 	that 	act 	independently 	from 	each
other 	and 	from 	their 	common parent. 	If
either 	organization 	in 	fact 	dictates 	the
other's 	course 	of 	action, 	they 	are 	the 	"same
employee 	organization." 	Similarly 	if 	their
parent 	organization 	controls 	both 	of 	them 	in
such 	a 	manner 	and 	to 	such 	a 	degree 	as 	to
render 	those 	locals 	mere 	alter 	egos 	of 	the
International, 	unable 	to 	determine 	and
control 	their 	own 	course 	of 	action, 	then 	the
International 	is 	the 	true 	representative 	of
both 	units, 	in 	violation of 	EERA.
Sacramento City, 	supra,
at 	14, 	4 PERC 	at 	237,
emphasis 	added.
In Sacramento City, 	Service Employees 	International Union
("SEIU")--the 	parent 	organization of 	the 	two 	affiliates
involved 	in 	that 	case--had 	the 	power 	to 	impose 	trusteeships 	on
errant 	affiliates. 	The 	Board 	held, 	however, 	that 	such 	power
was 	insufficient 	to 	render 	the 	two SEIU 	affiliates 	to 	be 	"the
same" 	under 	section 	354 5 (b) (2) • 	Under 	the 	Board's 	approach,
the 	mere 	potential 	for 	the 	parent 	organization 	to 	control
sister 	locals 	in 	the 	same 	school 	district 	is 	insufficient 	to
disqualify 	them 	from 	representing 	supervisory 	and
non-supervisory 	units. 	After 	all, 	employee 	organizations 	can
exercise 	their 	authority 	in 	a 	manner 	consistent 	with EERA 	even
though 	a 	potential 	exists 	for 	abuse. 	Further, 	the 	Board
observed, 	PERB 	certainly can 	reconsider 	the 	qualification 	of 	a
bargaining 	agent 	affiliated 	with 	a 	parent 	organization 	if, 	in
the 	future, 	the 	parent 	organization 	exercises 	power
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inconsistent with 	the 	policies 	underlying 	section 3545 (b) (2).
Sacramento City, 	supra, 	at 	page 	17; 	and 	see EERA 	section
3541.3(m). 	Also 	see Fairfield-Suisun Unified School 	District
(3/25/80) 	PERB Decision No. 	121 	[4 	PERC 	paragraph 	11051]; 	Los
Angeles 	Community College 	District 	(3/25/80) 	PERB 	Decision No.
123, 	vacated 	(12/16/81) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	123a.
In 	the 	instant 	case, 	it 	is 	unclear 	whether NEA 	even 	is 	an
"employee 	organization" 	under 	the EERA. 	See Link 	v. 	California
Teachers Association 	& 	National Education Association
(12/29/81) 	PERB Order No. 	Ad-123. 	Even 	if 	NEA 	is 	an 	"employee
organization," 	however, 	NEA's 	guidelines 	permit 	it 	to 	exercise
far 	less 	control 	over 	the 	operations 	of 	its 	affiliates 	than
that 	which 	the 	Board 	found 	not 	to 	disqualify 	the 	union
affiliates 	in Sacramento City. 	NEA's 	guidelines 	state
aspirational 	goals 	for 	its 	affiliates 	to 	seek 	in 	negotiating
and 	administering 	collective 	bargaining 	agreements. 	The 	NEA
Handbook 	uses 	language 	such 	as 	"urges," 	"insists," 	"denounces,"
and 	"believes," 	in 	stating 	the 	positions 	of 	NEA, 	but 	it 	nowhere
mandates 	its 	affiliates 	to 	take 	a 	particular 	course 	of 	action.
Further, 	unlike 	SEIU's 	authority 	to 	impose 	trusteeships 	and
otherwise 	control 	the 	workings 	of 	its 	affiliates, 	NEA's 	powers
of 	sanction 	are 	limited. 	NEA 	does 	not 	have 	the 	power 	to
disband 	its 	affiliates 	for 	non-compliance 	with 	the
guidelines.6 	While NEA 	can 	sever 	affiliates 	fran 	the
national 	organization, 	it 	has 	no 	authority 	to 	impose
trusteeships, 	to 	disintegrate 	them 	or 	replace 	them 	with NEA
agents. 	In 	light 	of 	Sacramento City, 	the 	limited 	authority
vested 	in NEA 	by 	its 	Constitution and 	Bylaws 	thus 	counsels
against 	a 	finding 	that 	RTA 	and RCEA 	are 	"the same 	employee
organization" 	by 	virtue 	of 	their 	NEA 	affiliation.
The 	District 	and 	CSEA 	further 	argue 	that 	the 	NEA 	services
available 	to 	both RTA 	and 	RCEA 	indicate 	a 	strong 	tie 	with 	the
parent 	organization. 	NEA 	affiliates 	have 	access 	to NEA 	field
staff 	for 	assistance 	in 	collective 	bargaining matters, 	and 	the
same 	regional 	field 	staff 	might 	at 	some 	point 	assist 	both 	RTA
and 	RCEA. 	NEA 	also 	offers 	services 	such 	as 	legal 	assistance
through 	a 	special 	fund, 	legal 	opinions 	by 	its 	General Counsel,
6Article VIII, 	section 5, 	of 	the NEA Constitution
provides 	that 	affiliates 	that 	fail 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	standards
and 	procedures 	of 	the 	Bylaws 	will 	be 	subject 	to 	"censure,
suspension, 	or 	disaffiliation" 	(NEA Handbook, 	at 	p. 	15).
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an 	extensive 	computer 	bank 	for 	assorted 	information, 	group
buying 	privileges 	and 	liability 	insurance. 	Such 	sharing of
information 	and 	resources, 	however, 	is 	certainly 	not 	enough 	to
render 	two 	otherwise 	autonomous 	entities 	"the 	same" 	under
section 	3545(b) (2). 	NEA's 	provision 	of 	support 	services 	to 	its
affiliates 	does 	not 	establish 	that NEA 	necessarily controls
them. 7
b. 	Citrus 	Belt 	Uniserv 	("CBU"} 	and Ed 	Hogenson.
Second, 	CSEA 	and 	the District 	argue 	that 	RTA 	and 	RCEA 	are
functionally 	the 	"same 	employee 	organization" 	because 	of 	their
common 	relationship 	with CBU 	and 	its 	Executive Director 	Ed
Hogenson.
The Relafionship Between 	CBU 	and 	RTA. 	It 	is 	unclear 	whether
CBU 	1tse 	f 	is 	an 	"employee 	organization" 	under 	the EERA. 	See
EERA 	section 	3540.l(d). 	CBU 	is 	a 	conglomerate 	of 	five 	employee
organizations, 	including 	RTA, 	each 	of 	which 	represents 	teachers
in 	five 	different 	school 	districts. 	Overseeing CBU's 	operation
is 	its 	board 	of 	directors, 	which 	consists 	of 	one 	representative
from 	each 	of 	the 	five 	member 	organizations. 	Primarily 	through
Hogenson, 	CBU 	shares 	information 	with 	its 	members 	and 	gives
them 	assistance 	in 	matters 	concerning members' 	collective
negotiations 	relationships 	with 	sch~ol 	employers.
While CBU may 	influence 	to 	some 	degree 	the 	actions 	of 	its
member 	organizations, 	the 	ultimate 	decisions 	on 	all 	matters
concerning 	each 	union 	rests 	with 	its 	respective 	leadership and
constituents. 	There 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	any one 	of 	them 	lacks
complete 	autonomy 	in 	controlling 	its 	own 	affairs. 	CBU 	has 	no
power 	to 	sanction 	its 	members, 	who 	can 	abandon 	it 	at 	any 	time.
7The District 	also 	contends 	that 	the 	policy 	resolutions
passed 	at 	national 	NEA 	conventions 	are 	binding 	on 	all 	of 	its
affiliates 	and 	constitute 	the 	type 	of 	conflict 	of 	interest
between supervisory 	and 	non-supervisory 	employees 	which 	section
3545 (b) (2) 	sought 	to 	avoid. 	The 	District 	argues 	that 	because
delegates 	from 	both 	RTA 	and 	RCEA 	would 	be 	able 	to 	vote 	on 	these
policy 	resolutions, 	the 	interests 	of 	one 	or 	the 	other 	would
necessarily 	be 	compromised 	in 	violation 	of 	the Act. 	This
contention 	has 	merit 	only 	if 	the 	national 	executive 	board 	is
empowered 	to 	force 	an 	affiliate 	to 	comply 	with 	a 	policy
resolution 	that 	is 	not 	in 	its 	best 	interests. 	As 	discussed
above, 	however, 	the 	amount 	of 	NEA's 	coercive 	power 	is
negligible.
-6-

Hogenson's 	specific 	responsibilities 	as 	CBU's 	Executive
Director 	do not 	indicate 	that 	he, 	as 	CBU's 	agent, 	controls 	RTA
or 	dictates 	its 	course 	of 	action. 	As 	an advisor 	to 	the 	CBU
board 	of 	directors, 	Hogenson 	has 	only 	as 	much 	authority as 	that
body delegates 	to 	him. 	Because 	the 	board 	of 	directors 	has 	no
compelling 	authority over 	its 	members, 	it 	is 	all 	the 	more 	true
that 	the 	board 	has 	not 	delegated 	such 	authority 	to Hogenson.
Thus, 	neither 	RTA 	nor 	any 	of 	the 	other 	four 	members 	of 	CBU 	are
the 	"same 	employee 	organization" 	as 	CBU 	under 	section
3545 (b) (2).
The Relationship 	between 	CBU 	and 	RCEA. 	Because RTA 	is 	not 	the
"same 	employee 	organization" 	as 	CBU, 	any 	connection 	between CBU
and 	RCEA 	certainly 	would 	lend 	no 	support 	to 	the 	assertion 	that
RTA 	and 	RCEA 	are 	the 	same. 	Even 	if 	RTA 	were 	the 	II same 	employee
organization" 	as 	CBU, 	however, 	it 	is 	clear 	that 	RCEA 	is 	not.
RCEA 	itself 	is 	an 	"employee 	organization" 	as 	defined 	in 	the
EERA. 	A CBU-RCEA 	contract 	for 	services 	explicitly 	states 	that
RCEA 	is 	not 	a 	member 	of 	CBU 	and 	the 	independence 	of 	RCEA 	is 	in
no 	way 	altered 	by 	the 	provisions 	of 	the 	contract. 	No 	evidence
suggests 	that 	the 	contract 	for 	services 	is 	a 	sham 	arrangement
concealing 	an 	intimate 	connection 	between 	RCEA 	and 	CBU.
Hogenson's 	role 	vis-a-vis 	RCEA 	also 	should 	be 	considered. 	As
CBU's Executive Director, 	Hogenson 	gave 	RCEA 	assistance 	in 	its
organizational 	efforts 	free 	of 	charge. 	He 	helped draft 	the
Constitution, 	Bylaws 	and 	the 	petition to 	decertify CSEA,
suggested 	the 	affiliation 	with 	NEA, 	helped with campaign
materials, 	and 	drafted 	the 	contract 	for 	services 	with CBU. 	At
least 	some 	RCEA 	members 	consider 	him 	to 	be 	their 	"Executive
Director." 	Further, 	if 	RCEA 	is 	certified 	as 	the 	exclusive
representative, 	Hogenson 	will 	act 	as 	a 	consultant 	to RCEA 	under
a 	contract 	for 	services 	with CBU.
The 	RCEA-CBU 	contract, 	however, 	restricts 	Hogenson 	to 	functions
assigned 	to 	him 	by 	the RCEA 	president. 	RCEA 	has 	its 	own
operational 	rules 	and 	its 	own elected, 	policy-making 	body.
Nothing 	in 	the 	relationship 	between 	RCEA 	and 	CBU or 	Hogenson
suggests 	that 	Hogenson, 	as 	CBU's 	agent, 	controls 	or 	dictates
RCEA's 	course 	of 	action. 	Further, 	any 	future 	change 	in 	these
circumstances 	can, 	if 	necessary, 	be 	remedied 	by 	the 	Board.
Sacramento 	City, 	supra.
In 	summary, 	the 	facts 	do 	not 	support 	the 	District 	and CSEA's
assertion 	that 	RCEA 	and 	RTA 	depend on CBU 	and 	Hogenson's
expertise 	and 	judgment 	to 	such 	an 	extent 	that 	their 	autooomy
may 	be 	compromised. 	Both RCEA 	and 	CBU 	appear 	to 	be 	independent
-7-

and 	autonomous, 	and 	their 	respective 	leadership 	bodies--not
Hogenson--make 	the 	critical 	decisions 	about 	organizational
policies 	and 	strategic 	courses 	of 	action.
Further, 	the 	practical 	effect 	of 	this 	District/CSEA assertion
cannot 	be 	ignored 	in evaluating 	its 	sensibility. 	Following 	the
argument 	to 	its 	logical 	conclusion, 	virtually any 	effective
representative 	of 	diverse 	labor 	organizations 	would
impermissibly compromise 	their 	freedom 	of 	action. 	This 	would
seriously 	and 	unnecessarily 	impinge 	upon 	the 	ability 	of
patently autonomous 	employee 	organizations 	to 	retain 	effective
advocates 	and 	advisors.
c. 	Funding.
Third, 	CSEA 	argues 	that 	RTA 	and 	RCEA 	members 	directly 	fund 	NEA,
CBU 	and 	Hogenson, 	and 	are 	therefore 	the 	"same 	employee
organization." 	CSEA 	cites 	as 	its 	authority Fairfield-Suisun
Unified School 	District, 	supra, 	in which 	the 	Board 	found 	that
statewide CSEA 	and 	a 	local 	affiliate 	seeking 	to 	represent
District 	supervisors 	were 	the 	"same 	employee 	organization" 	as
statewide CSEA 	and 	another 	local 	affiliate 	under 	EERA 	section
3545(b) (2) 	which 	represented 	non-supervisory District 	employees.
In Fairfield-Suisun, 	CSEA membership dues 	largely 	bypassed 	the
locals 	and 	directly 	funded 	the 	statewide 	organization, 	thereby
indicating 	the 	plenary 	authority 	of 	statewide CSEA over 	the
locals. 	Further, 	in Fairfield-Suisun, 	the 	fact 	that 	the
statewide CSEA was 	a 	Joint pet1t1oner 	with 	the 	two 	locals
alleged 	to 	be 	"the 	same" 	was 	of 	er i tic al 	significance. 	For,
statewide CSEA 	had direct 	control 	over 	the 	use 	of 	funds 	from
membership 	dues, 	and 	could 	decide 	whether 	or 	not 	to 	finance 	the
filing 	and 	prosecution 	of 	a 	grievance 	by 	a 	non-supervisory
employee 	in 	one 	negotiating 	unit 	against 	a 	supervisory 	employee
in 	the 	other. 	This 	is 	a 	situation 	clearly 	sought 	to 	be 	avoided
under 	section 	3545(b) (2), 	which 	is 	not 	involved 	in 	the 	instant
case.
Here, 	the 	majority of 	dues 	paid 	by CBU's 	member 	organizations
goes 	to NEA 	and 	its 	state 	affiliate, 	CTA. 	NEA 	in 	turn 	grants
CBU 	$11,300 	per 	year, 	and CTA 	contributes 	approximately 	$37 	per
year 	per 	certificated 	employee 	of 	CBU's 	member 	organizations.
NEA does 	not 	place 	any 	restrictions 	on the 	use 	of 	funds;
indeed, 	the 	record 	shows 	that 	it 	has 	never 	requested 	an
accounting 	from 	CBU.
Further, 	even 	if NEA did 	control CBU's 	pursestrings, 	the 	record
does 	not 	establish 	that 	RCEA's 	spending 	authority 	has 	been
similarly controlled. 	Under 	its 	dues 	structure, 	RCEA 	is 	to 	pay
-8-

CBU 	directly 	for 	Hogenson's 	services, 	and 	additionally 	is 	to
pay 	a 	membership 	fee 	to NEA. 	RCEA 	membership dues 	are 	to 	be
divided 	between NEA 	and 	CBU 	for 	the 	services 	of 	Hogenson. 	NEA
would 	not 	be 	disbursing 	funds 	back 	to RCEA 	at 	all. 	An
impermissible 	funding 	connection 	between NEA, 	CBU 	and RCEA
cannot 	be 	made 	out 	on the 	record 	in 	this 	case.
d. 	Potential Conflicts 	of 	Interest.
Fourth, 	the 	District 	and CSEA 	allege 	potential 	conflicts 	of
interest 	between RTA 	and 	RCEA 	through 	Hogenson. 	CSEA argues
that 	a 	conflict 	could 	arise 	where 	an 	aide 	from 	RCEA 	filed 	a
grievance 	against 	a 	teacher 	"supervisor" 	from 	RTA 	or 	any 	other
member 	of 	CBU. 	Hogenson, 	it 	is 	argued, 	would 	be 	put 	in 	the
position 	of 	representing 	the adverse 	interests 	of 	both 	parties
to 	the 	complaint. 	This 	argument, 	however, 	rests 	on the
speculative 	and 	suspect 	premise 	that 	Hogenson, 	a 	labor
relations 	specialist 	and 	attorney 	licensed 	to 	practice 	law 	in
California, 	would 	disregard 	his 	fiduciary 	duties 	by 	failing 	to
disqualify 	himself 	in 	the 	event 	of 	a 	cognizable 	conflict
between RTA 	and 	RCEA. 	(See 	Business 	& Professions Code 	section
6068, 	and ABA 	Code 	of 	Professional 	Responsibility, 	Disciplinary
Rule 	5-105.) 	The argument 	also 	ignores 	the 	Board's 	authority
to 	reevaluate 	the 	qualifications 	of 	bargaining agents 	if
circumstances 	change. 	Sacramento City, 	supra.
In 	conclusion, 	the 	record 	does 	not 	support 	the 	contention that
RTA 	and RCEA 	are 	"the 	same 	employee 	organization." 	Thus, 	even
if 	RTA-represen ted 	teachers 	"supervise" 	aides, 	RCEA 	is 	not
disqualified 	from 	representing 	them.
II. 	The 	Supervisory 	Issue.
Under 	the EERA, 	the 	supervisory 	indicia 	of 	section 3540.l(m)
(ante, 	fn. 	2) 	are 	to 	be 	read 	in 	the 	disjunctive. 	Thus, 	the
authority 	to 	make 	or 	effectively 	to 	recommend 	any 	one of 	the
enumerated 	supervisory powers, 	in 	the 	exercise 	of 	"independent
judgment" 	and 	"in 	the 	interest 	of 	the 	employer," 	is 	sufficient
to 	establish 	supervisory 	status. 	Sweetwater 	Unified School
District 	(11/23/76) 	EERB 	Decision No. 	4 	[l 	PERC 	11].8
8Before 	January 	1, 	1978, 	PERB 	was 	called 	the 	"Educational
Employment 	Relations 	Board."
-9-

CSEA 	and 	the 	District 	assert 	that 	because 	teachers 	and
librarians 	exercise 	some 	of 	the 	enumerated 	powers 	and 	"assign"
and 	"direct" 	aides' 	work, 	they 	should 	be 	considered 	aides'
"supervisors" 	under 	the EERA. 	Application 	of 	a 	line 	of
analogous NLRB 	cases,9 	however, 	mandates 	rejection of 	this
assertion. 	The NLRB 	has 	long 	recognized 	a 	distinction 	between
personnel 	who 	supervise 	others 	essentially as 	an 	agent 	of 	the
employer, 	and 	those 	who 	direct 	the 	tasks 	of 	others 	incidentally
to 	the 	performance 	of 	their 	own 	professional 	duties.10
In 	the 	health care 	industry, 	the NLRB 	has 	held 	that 	nurses 	who
were 	alleged 	to 	"supervise" 	staff 	nurses 	and 	ass is tan ts 	were
not 	supervisors 	under 	the NLRA 	because 	they 	spent 	a 	majority 	of
9csEA 	argues 	that NLRA 	precedent 	is 	not 	germane 	to 	the
determination 	of 	an 	employee's 	supervisory 	status 	under EERA
because 	the 	effect 	of 	such 	determination differs 	greatly
between 	the 	two 	bodies 	of 	law. 	The NLRA 	effectively excludes
supervisors 	fran 	representation, 	while EERA 	allows
representation 	by 	a 	different 	unit 	from 	that 	of 	the 	employees
they 	supervise. 	While 	this 	is 	true, 	it 	does 	not 	follow 	that
NLRB 	precedent 	should 	be 	flatly 	discarded. 	The 	Board 	has 	held
that 	regardless 	of 	the 	different 	effects 	of 	the NLRA 	exclusion
and EERA 	sections 	3545(b) (2) 	and 	3540.l(m), 	the 	underlying
intent 	of 	both 	statutes 	is 	essentially 	the 	same:
••• 	to 	protect management's 	interest 	in
the 	undiluted 	loyalty 	of 	those 	employees 	to
whom 	it 	delegates 	supervisory
responsibilities 	and 	to 	guard 	against
potential 	conflicts 	between supervisors 	and
the 	employees 	they 	supervise.
Sacramento City, 	supra, 	at 	p. 	13.
l0csEA 	incorrectly 	states 	that 	the 	validity 	of 	this
distinction 	has 	been 	questioned 	by 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	in
Monongahela 	Power 	Co. 	v. 	NLRB 	(4th 	Cir. 	1981) 	657 	F.2d 	608, 	108
LRRM 	2352, 	denying 	enforcement 	of 	252 	NLRB 	715, 	105 	LRRM 	1351.
252 	NLRB 	No. 	102, 	108 	LRRM 	2352. 	The NLRB's 	decision that
control 	room 	foremen 	(CRF) 	of 	a 	power-generating 	facility 	were
supervisors 	under 	the Act 	was 	based on 	the 	Court's
reexamination 	of 	the 	nature 	of 	the 	CRF's 	actual 	duties, 	and 	not
on 	the 	validity 	of 	the 	distinction between 	professional 	and --
supervisory 	employees.
-10-

their 	time 	in 	direct 	patient 	care. 	Their 	direction 	over 	staff
nurses 	and 	assistants, 	the NLRB 	observed, 	was 	incidental 	to
their 	professional 	responsibility 	to 	provide 	proper 	health care
in 	their 	designated 	areas 	of 	responsibility. 	Mt. 	Airy
Psychiatric Center 	(1981) 	253 	NLRB 	No. 	139 	[106 	LRRM 	1071];
Trustees 	of 	Noble 	Hospital 	(1975) 	218 	NLRB 	1441 	[89 	LRRM
1806]. 	In 	both Mt. 	Airy 	and Noble, 	the 	nurses 	in 	question 	had
input 	into 	the 	decisions 	to 	hire, 	fire, 	discipline 	or 	promote
staff 	nurses 	and 	assistants. 	This 	input was 	held 	not 	to 	be
"supervisory" 	under 	the NLRA, 	because 	rather 	than 	representing
the 	interests 	of 	the 	employer, 	the 	nurses 	in 	question merely
were 	ensuring, 	consistent with 	their 	professional
responsibility 	to 	provide adequate 	health care, 	that 	their
sections 	were 	properly 	staffed with 	competent 	and 	qualified
personnel. 	Mt. 	Airy, 	253 	NLRB 	at 	p. 	1008; 	Noble 	Hospital, 	218
NLRB 	at 	p. 	1443.
The NLRB 	has 	applied 	the 	same 	rationale 	to 	lawyers 	acting 	as
"unit 	heads" 	in 	legal 	services 	offices. 	These 	lawyers 	directed
the 	work 	of 	other 	staff 	attorneys 	and 	paraprofessionals, 	but
the 	Board 	refused 	to 	consider 	them 	supervisors:
••• 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	unit 	heads 	train,
assign, 	or 	direct work 	of 	legal 	assistants
and 	paralegals 	for 	whom 	they 	are
professionally 	responsible, 	we do 	not 	find
the 	exercise 	of 	such 	authority 	to 	confer
supervisory 	status 	within 	the 	meaning 	of
Section 2(11) 	of 	the Act, 	but 	rather 	to 	be
an 	incident 	of 	their 	professional
responsibilities 	as 	attorneys 	and 	thereby 	as
officers 	of 	the 	court."
Neighborhood 	Legal
Services 	(1978) 	236 	NLRB
1269, 	1273, 	98 	LRRM
1414, 	(footnote 	omitted).
The NLRB 	also 	has 	applied 	this 	distinction 	in 	the 	educational
context. 	In Redlands 	Christian Migrant Association 	(1980) 	250
NLRB No. 	27 	[104 	LRRM 	1546], 	the 	Board 	concluded 	that 	a 	head
teacher 	in 	charge 	of 	the 	training 	of 	several 	other 	teachers 	was
not 	a 	II supervisor" 	under 	the Act. 	Ci ting 	the 	head 	teacher's
lack 	of 	authority 	in matters 	such 	as 	hiring 	and 	disciplinary
action, 	the 	Board 	determined 	that 	his 	power 	to 	transfer 	and
assign 	teachers 	was 	in exercise 	of 	his 	professional 	judgment 	as
to 	the 	most 	efficient 	distribution 	of 	his 	teachers, 	and 	not 	an
indication 	that 	the 	head 	teachers 	acted 	in 	the 	interests 	of 	the
employer.
-11-

In 	slightly 	different 	contexts, 	PERB 	itself 	has 	applied 	an
analysis 	akin 	to 	the 	one discussed 	above. 	See SEERA Unit
Determination 	(12/31/80) 	PERB 	Decision No. 	110-c-S 	(ALRB
regional 	field 	examiners); 	San 	Diego Community College District
(9/16/77) 	EERB Decision No. 	28 	(accountants); 	New Haven 	Unified
School 	District 	(3/22/77) 	EERB 	Decision No. 	14 	(high 	school
department 	heads).
Teachers 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	"supervise" 	their 	aides
incidentally 	to 	their 	performance 	of 	professional 	duties 	rather
than 	in 	promotion 	of 	the 	employer's 	interests. 	Extensive
Education Code 	provisions 	specify 	teachers' 	professional 	duties
toward 	students, 	and 	establish 	strict 	standards 	for
professional 	conduct 	and competence 	(see, 	generally, 	Education
Code 	section 	44200 	et 	seq.; 	also 	see Education Code 	sections
44421, 	44630 	et 	seq. 	and 	44938). 	Other 	Education Code 	sections
reveal 	that 	the 	legislative 	intent 	in 	providing 	for
instructional 	and 	teacher 	aides 	was 	to 	allow 	teachers more
freedom 	fran 	other 	duties 	in 	order 	to 	maximize 	the 	use 	of 	their
professional 	knowledge 	and 	skills 	in 	actual 	teaching. 	(See
Education Code 	sections 	45340 	et 	seq. 	and 	45360 	et 	seq.) 	Given
this 	context, 	it 	is 	clear 	that 	the 	"independent 	judgment" 	and
"supervisory" 	functions 	exercised 	by 	teachers 	in 	assigning
tasks 	to 	their 	aides 	is 	consistent with 	their 	professional 	and
statutory 	responsibility 	for 	the 	instruction and 	direction 	of
all 	pupils 	in 	their 	classrooms.
Similarly, 	the 	limited 	input 	that 	some District 	teachers 	may
have 	in 	the 	hiring, 	assignment, 	and 	transfer 	of 	aides 	allows
teachers 	some 	voice 	in 	selecting 	the 	most 	competent 	and
compatible 	aide 	available.11 	These 	quasi-supervisory powers
llThe 	contention that District 	teachers 	are 	"supervisors"
by 	virtue 	of 	this 	input 	is 	not 	supported 	by 	the 	evidence.
Ernest 	Owen, 	principal 	of 	Mission Elementary 	School, 	testified
that 	teachers 	are 	asked 	to sit 	in 	on approximately 	50 	percent
of 	all 	hiring 	interview panels. 	He 	also 	stated 	that while 	he
might 	consider 	a 	teacher's 	recommendation, 	the 	final 	decision
would 	be 	made 	on the 	basis 	of 	his 	own 	judgment. 	The 	initial
assignment 	of 	aides 	is 	the 	responsibility 	of 	the 	principal 	as
administrator 	of 	the 	school's 	personnel, 	and 	while 	teachers'
preferences 	are 	no 	doubt 	considered, 	the 	final 	decision 	is
still 	with 	the 	principal. 	As 	for 	the 	transfer 	of 	aides, 	the
record 	shows 	that Owen 	once 	transferred 	an 	aide 	because a
teacher 	was 	dissatisfied with 	the 	aide's 	performance. 	However,
there 	is 	no 	evidence 	that 	the 	expression 	of 	dissatisfaction 	was
either 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	the 	employer, 	or 	constituted 	an
effective 	recommendation 	under 	section 	3540.l(m). 	Further,
another 	teacher 	in 	the 	same 	District 	was 	told 	by 	a 	vice
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are 	aimed 	at 	the 	professional 	goal 	of 	improving 	the 	quality of
education 	and 	are 	not 	"in 	the 	interest 	of 	the 	employer" 	within
the 	meaning 	of 	section 	3540.l(m).12 	For 	example, 	teachers
and 	librarians 	do 	not 	perform 	such 	duties 	as 	checking 	time
sheets, 	approving 	vacations 	and 	leaves 	of 	absence, 	authorizing
overtime 	pay, 	or 	adjusting 	grievances 	on 	behalf 	of 	the
employer. 	The 	sole 	authority 	for 	accomplishing 	these 	functions
lies 	with 	the 	school's 	principal 	or 	the District's 	personnel
office. 	The 	authority 	in 	"assigning" 	tasks 	to 	an 	aide, 	on 	the
other 	hand, 	stems 	from 	the 	mission 	of 	both 	teacher 	and 	aide 	to
improve 	the 	quality of 	education.
principal 	that 	nothing 	could 	be 	done 	about 	an 	unqualified 	aide
unless 	the 	principal's 	evaluation 	indicated 	problems 	with 	the
aide's 	performance. 	These 	examples 	demonstrate 	that 	the
principal 	has 	final 	authority 	in 	the 	assignment 	and 	transfer 	of
aides 	as 	well 	as 	in 	hiring, 	and 	may 	as 	easily disregard 	as
consider 	the 	recommendations 	of 	teachers. 	PERB 	has 	held 	that
such 	minimal 	participation 	in 	these 	functions 	is 	insufficient
to 	confer 	supervisory 	status 	under 	section 	3540.l(m). 	San
Rafael 	City 	Schools 	(10/3/77) 	EERB 	Decision No. 	32, 	[l 	PERC
paragraph 	433], 	Foothill-DeAnza Community Collefie District
(3/1/77) 	EERB 	Decision No. 	Io, 	[1 	PERC 	paragrap 	64].
~ven 	if 	teachers 	"supervise" 	aides 	in 	the 	interest 	of 	the
employer, 	their 	exercise 	of 	true 	supervisory 	authority 	is 	so
infrequent 	that 	it 	does 	not 	justify 	a 	finding 	of 	"supervisory"
status. 	Adelphi 	University 	(1972) 	195 	NLRB 	639, 	79 	LRRM 1545.
In Adelphi, 	the 	NLRB 	adopted 	the 	rule 	of Westinghouse Electric
Corporation 	(1967) 	163 	NLRB 	No. 	96, 	[64 	LRRM 	1440], 	that
individuals 	who 	spent 	less 	than 	50 	percent 	of 	their 	working
time 	supervising 	non-unit 	employees, 	and 	more 	than 	50 	percent
in 	the 	performance 	of 	regular 	professional 	duties, 	were 	not
"supervisors" 	under 	the 	NLRA. 	Such 	a 	sporadic 	exercise 	of
supervisory 	authority, 	the NLRB 	reasoned, 	did 	not 	align 	the
employee 	so much 	with 	management 	as 	to 	create 	the 	conflict 	of
interest 	sought 	to 	be 	avoided 	by 	section 	2(11) 	of 	the 	NLRA.13
12The 	same 	argument 	applies 	to 	librarians. 	Their
direction 	of 	assistants 	is 	incidental 	to 	their 	professional
duties 	in 	maintaining 	library 	facilities.
13rn 	the 	educational 	context, 	the 	NLRB 	has 	applied 	the
test 	of Adelphi 	to 	professional 	librarians 	in New York
University 	(1973) 	204 	NLRB 	4 	[83 	LRRM 1549], 	to 	determine 	that
staff 	librarians 	are 	not 	supervisors 	under 	the Act.
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The 	reasoning 	of 	this 	line 	of 	cases 	applies 	equally 	to 	the
facts 	in 	the 	instant 	case. 	The 	amount 	of 	time 	teachers 	spend
in 	directing 	their 	aides' 	work 	is 	necessarily 	minimal, 	since
the 	intent 	of 	hiring 	aides 	is 	to 	allow more 	time 	to 	devote 	to
"pure" 	teaching. 	The 	record 	indicates 	that meetings 	between
the 	teachers 	and 	aides 	are 	short, 	and 	do 	not 	always 	occur 	on a
daily 	basis. 	Furthermore, 	teachers 	who 	have 	aides 	in 	their
classrooms 	still 	perform 	essentially 	the 	same 	teaching duties
as 	teachers 	without 	aides. 	For 	these 	reasons, 	even 	assuming
that 	teachers 	sporatically perform 	quasi-"supervisory"
functions, 	this 	fact 	alone would 	be 	insufficient 	to 	confer
supervisory 	status 	upon 	them.
Finally, 	the 	validity 	of 	the 	District 	and 	CSEA's 	argument, 	as 	a
matter 	of 	statutory construction, 	should 	be 	considered. 	EERA
section 3545(b) (1) 	requires 	the 	Board 	to 	place 	in 	one
negotiating 	unit 	"all 	classroom 	teachers 	employed 	by 	the 	public
school 	employer, 	except 	• 	• 	• 	supervisory 	employees." 	Section
3545(b) (2) 	states 	that 	a 	negotiating 	unit 	of 	supervisory
employees 	"shall 	not 	be 	appropriate 	unless 	it 	includes 	all
supervisory 	employees" 	employed 	by 	the 	District. 	Following 	the
District 	and 	CSEA's 	argument 	to 	its 	conclusion, 	however,
teachers 	who 	"supervised" 	aides 	could 	not 	be 	included 	in 	the
unit 	of 	"all 	classroom 	teachers," 	despite 	the 	clear 	community
of 	interest 	that 	all 	classroom 	teachers 	share. 	Further, 	only
teachers 	who 	"supervised" 	aides 	could 	be 	represented 	in 	a
supervisory 	unit which would 	include, 	in 	all 	probability, 	the
school 	principals 	who 	clearly 	supervise 	the 	teachers 	working
under 	them. 	Such 	inclusion 	of 	classroom 	teachers 	in
negotiating 	units 	with 	their 	supervisors 	would 	maximize
conflict 	between supervisors 	and 	their 	subordinates, 	sanction
supervisory 	domination of 	rank-and-file 	activities, 	and 	might
well 	dilute 	the 	loyalty 	of 	districts' 	true 	supervisory cadre.
See Sacramento City, 	supra. 	In 	drafting 	the EERA, 	the
Legislature 	could 	not 	have 	intended 	these 	bizarre 	results.14
14EERA 	section 3540 	states 	in 	part:
It 	is 	the 	purpose 	of 	this 	chapter 	to 	promote
the 	improvement of 	personnel 	management 	and
employer-employee 	relations 	within 	the
public 	school 	systems 	in 	the 	State 	of
California 	by 	providing a 	uniform 	basis 	for
recognizing 	the 	right 	of 	public 	school
employees 	to 	join 	organizations 	of 	their 	own.
choice, 	to 	be 	represented 	by 	such
organizations 	in 	their 	professional 	and
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employment 	relationships 	with 	public 	school
employers, 	to 	select one 	employee
organization as 	the 	exclusive 	representative
of 	the 	employees 	in 	an 	appropriate 	unit, 	and
to 	afford 	certificated 	employees 	a 	voice 	in
the 	formulation 	of 	educational 	policy.
In summary, 	District 	teachers 	have 	a 	statutory duty 	to 	utilize
aides 	in 	a 	manner 	beneficial 	to 	the 	educational 	process. 	This
involves 	the 	use 	of 	independent, 	professional 	judgment 	to
assess 	the 	aide's 	relative 	strengths 	and 	talents 	when
11 assigning" 	tasks. 	The 	limited 	input 	of 	teachers 	in 	hiring,
assigning 	or 	transferring 	aides 	is 	consistent with 	their
professional 	duty 	to 	ensure 	that 	the 	aide 	is 	able 	to 	perform
the 	job and 	is 	compatible 	with 	the 	students 	and 	teacher. 	Thus,
the 	allegedly 	"supervisory" 	authority 	of 	a 	teacher 	over 	an 	aide
is 	actually 	guidance 	11 	• 	• 	• 	derived 	fr an 	his/her 	greater
experience, 	and 	thus 	knowledge 	of 	the 	agency's 	mission 	and
task." 	SEERA 	Unit 	Determination, 	supra, 	at 	page 	22. 	It 	does
not 	arise 	to 	the 	"supervisory" 	dimension 	contemplated 	in
sections 	3541. 3 (m) 	or 	3545 (b) (2).
PROPOSED 	ORDER
Based on the 	foregoing 	and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	matter, 	it
is 	the 	proposed 	order 	that:
1. 	The Redlands 	Classified Employees Association, 	NEA 	and 	the
Redlands 	Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA 	are 	not 	the 	"same
employee 	organization" 	for 	purposes 	of 	Government Code
section 	3545 (b) (2).
2. 	The 	certificated 	personnel 	of 	the 	Redlands 	Unified School
District who 	are 	in 	the 	negotiating 	unit 	represented 	by
Redlands 	Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA do 	not 	"supervise"
classified 	aides 	for 	purposes 	of Government Code 	section
3540.l(m).
3. 	The Regional 	Director 	shall 	take 	immediate 	steps 	to
schedule 	and 	direct 	an election 	in 	the 	unit which 	is 	the
subject 	of 	the 	petition.
Pursuant 	to California Administrative Code, 	title 	8, 	section
32305, 	this 	proposed 	decision 	and 	order 	will 	become 	final
on 	May 19, 	198Z 	unless 	a 	party 	files 	a 	timely 	statement of
exceptions. 	See 	California Administrative Code, 	title 	8,
section 32300. 	Such 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting
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brief 	must 	be 	actually 	received 	by 	the 	Executive Assistant 	to
the 	Board 	at 	the Headquarters Office 	in 	Sacramento 	before 	the
close 	of 	business 	(5:00 	p.m.) 	on 	Ma@l9 	1982 	in 	order 	to
be 	timely 	filed. 	(See Cal. 	Admin. 	C 	e,'tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32135.)
Any 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	served
concurrently 	with 	its 	filing 	upon each 	party 	to 	this
proceeding. 	Proof 	of 	service 	shall 	be 	filed 	with 	the 	Board
itself.
Dated: 	April 	29, 	1982
JANET CARAWAY
Director 	of 	Representation
by:
Hearing Officer
J~~
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