State of California (Department of Corrections) (California Correctional Officers Association) (PERB 0127S)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF
	THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
CALIFORNIA
	CORRECTIONAL
	OFFICERSASSOCIATION
Charging
	Party,
v.
STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA 	(CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT
	OF
	CORRECTIONS),
Respondent.
CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS
Case
	No.
	S-CE-3-S(78-79)
PERB
	Decision
	No.	
127-S
May
	5,
	1980
Case No. S-CE-3-S
Appearances:	
Russell
	L.
	Richeda, 	Attorney
	(Carroll,
	Burdick	
&
McDonough) for the California Correctional Officers
Association;
	Angela
	Pickett,
	Attorney 	for 	the
	California
Department
	of
	Corrections.
Before:
	Gluck,
	Chairperson,
	Gonzales
	and 	Moore, 	Members.	Before: Gluck, Chairperson, Gonzales and Moore, Members.
Russell L. Richeda, Attorney (Carroll, Burdick &
DECISION	DECISION
This 	case
	is
	before 	the
	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
(hereafter
	PERB
	or
	Board) 	on
	exceptions
	filed
	by
	the
	California(hereafter PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by the California
Correctional 	Officers 	Association 	(hereafter
	CCOA)
	to
	the
hearing
	officer's
	attached
	proposed
	decision 	dismissing
	unfair
practice
	charges
	filed
	by
	CCOA
	against
	the
	California
Department
	of 	Corrections 	(hereafter
	Department).
	The
	chargesDepartment of Corrections (hereafter Department) . The charges
were 	based
	on
	the 	Department's 	decision 	to 	discontinue
	its
practice 	of 	providing
	employee
	organizations 	with
	office 	orpractice of providing employee organizations with office or
desk 	space, 	the 	assistance 	of 	inmate
	clerks 	at
	the 	prevailing
institutional
	wage 	and
	separate 	bulletin
	boards 	within 	the
	12
penal institutions operated by the Department.
This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
ASSOCIATION
Charging Party,
v .
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ,
Respondent.
(78-79)
r 	the
	California Correctional 	Officers
PERB Decision No. 127-S
May 5, 1980
Association; Angela Pickett, Attorney for the California
Department of Corrections.
Correctional Officers Association (hereafter CCOA) to the
hearing officer's attached proposed decision dismissing unfair
practice charges filed by CCOA against the California
were based on the Department's decision to discontinue its
desk space, the assistance of inmate clerks at the prevailing
institutional wage and separate bulletin boards within the 12
penal 	institutions 	operated
	by 	the 	Department.

2
The hearing officer's statement of the procedural history
and
	facts
	relevant
	to
	this
	appeal
	is
	substantially 	correct
	and
is
	adopted 	as 	the
	findings
	of 	the
	Board
	itself.
	For
	the
reasons
	that
	follow,
	we
	affirm
	the 	hearing
	officer's
	decision
on
	this
	case
	and
	adopt
	the
	proposed
	order 	as 	the 	order 	of 	the
Board
	itself.
hearing
DISCUSSION	DISCUSSION
A. 	Section 3519 (a)	A.
Government
	Code
	section
	3519(a)	Government Code section 3519 (a)1 provid	
l 	provides
	that
	it
	is
unlawful 	for 	the
	State 	to
	impose
	reprisals
	against
	employees,
to 	discriminate 	against
	employees,
	or 	otherwise 	to
	interfere
with 	or 	coerce
	employees
	because
	of
	their
	exercise 	of
	rights
guaranteed
	under
	the
	State
	Employer 	Employee
	Relations
	Act
(hereafter
	SEERA)
.2	2	
Because
	this 	is
	the
	first
	case 	decided
es that it is
l
lAll 	statutory 	references 	herein 	are
	to
	the
	Government
Code,
	unless 	otherwise 	noted.
All statutory references herein are to the Government
22Employee
	rights
	under
	SEERA
	are
	provided
	in 	section
	3515:	Employee rights under SEERA are provided in section 3515:
Except 	as 	otherwise 	provided
	by
	the
Legislature,
	state
	employees
	shall
	have
	the
right 	to
	form,
	join,
	and
	participate
	in 	the
activities
	of
	employee
	organizations 	of
their
	own
	choosing 	for 	the 	purpose 	of
representation
	on
	all
	matters 	ofemployer-employee
	relations. 	State
employees
	also 	shall
	have
	the
	right 	to
refuse 	to 	join 	or
	participate 	in 	the
activities
	of
	employee
	organizations, 	except
that
	nothing
	shall
	preclude 	the 	parties
	from
agreeing 	to
	a 	maintenance 	of
	membership
Except as otherwise provided by the
N
and facts relevant to this appeal is substantially correct and
is adopted as the findings of the Board itself. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm the hearing officer's decision
on this case and adopt the proposed order as the order of the
Board itself.
Se=tion
	3519(a)
unlawful for the State to impose reprisals against employees,
to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to interfere
with or coerce employees because of their exercise of rights
guaranteed under the State Employer Employee Relations Act
(hereafter SEERA) . 	Because this is the first case decided
Code, unless otherwise noted.
Legislature, state employees shall have the
right to form, join, and participate in the
activities of employee organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of
representation on all matters of
employer-employee relations. 	State
employees also shall have the right to
refuse to join or participate in the
activities of employee organizations, except
that nothing shall preclude the parties from
agreeing to a maintenance of membership
officer's
	statement 	of 	the
	procedural
	history

3
by the Board itself involving section 3519 (a) , we have looked
to 	cases 	decided 	under 	section 	3543.5(a) 	of 	the 	Educational
Employment 	Relations 	Act 	(hereafter 	EERA)3u for 	guidance 	in
interpreting 	this 	section.4 	Although 	the 	Board 	is 	not 	bound
to 	follow 	decisions 	issued 	under 	EERA 	in 	SEERA 	cases, 	the
similarity 	of 	language 	and 	purpose 	found 	in 	the 	two 	sections
compared 	here 	has 	led 	us 	to 	apply 	the 	rationale 	first
articulated 	in 	Carlsbad 	Unified 	School 	District 	(1/30/79) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	89 	and 	later 	applied 	by 	a 	majority 	of 	the 	Board 	as
presently 	constituted 	in 	Santa Monica 	Community 	College
Distric! 	(9/21/79) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	103. 	Those 	cases 	have
been 	considered 	in 	reaching 	the 	conclusions 	in 	the 	present 	case.
the
Both 	section 	3519(a) 	and 	section 	3543.5(a) 	state 	tnat 	it 	is
unlawful 	for 	the 	employer 	to:
Both section 3519 (a) and section 3543.5 (a) state that it is
Impose 	or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	reprisals 	on
employees, 	to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against 	employees, 	or 	otherwise
Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on
provision, 	as 	defined 	in 	subdivision 	(h) 	of
section 	3513, 	pursuant 	to 	a 	memorandum 	of
understanding. 	In 	any 	event, 	state
employees 	shall 	have 	the 	right 	to 	represent
themselves 	individually 	in 	their 	employment
relations 	with 	the 	state.
provision, as defined in subdivision (h) of
33The 	EERA 	is 	codified 	at 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.	The EERA is codified at section 3540 et seq.
4Sections 3519 (1) and 3543.5 (a) parallel sections 8 (a) (1)
and 	8(a) (3) 	of 	the 	federal 	Labor 	Management 	Relations 	Act, 	29
U.S.C.	u.s.c. 	151 	et 	seq., 	which 	may 	be 	used 	to 	guide 	interpretation
of 	the 	SEERA. 	(See 	Firefighters 	Union 	v. 	Ci~f 	Vallejo, 	12
Cal.3d 	608 	(1974).)
4sections
w
Board 	itself 	involving 	section 	3519(a), 	we 	have 	looked
to cases decided under section 3543.5 (a) of the Educational
Employment Relations Act (hereafter EERA) 3 for g idance in
interpreting this section. 4 Although the Board is not bound
to follow decisions issued under EERA in SEERA cases, the
similarity of language and purpose found in the two sections
compared here has led us to apply the rationale first
articulated in Carlsbad Unified School District (1/30/79) PERB
Decision No. 89 and later applied by a majority of the Board as
presently constituted in Santa Monica Community College
District (9/21/79) PERB Decision No. 103. Those cases have
been considered in reaching the conclusions in the present case.
unlawful for the employer to:
employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
section 3513, pursuant to a memorandum of
understanding. In any event, state
employees shall have the right to represent
themselves individually in their employment
relations with the state.
3519 (1) 	and 	3543. 5 (a) 	parallel 	sections 	8 (a) (1)
and 8 (a) (3) of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, 29
151 et seq., which may be used to guide interpretation
of the SEERA. (See Firefighters Union v. City of Vallejo, 12
Cal. 3d 608 (1974) .)

4
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees
	because
	of
	their
	exercise
	of
rights
	guaranteed
	by
	this
	chapter.
interfere
CCOA
	alleges 	that
	the 	Department's
	policy
	change
	denied
employees
	the
	right
	to
	join
	and
	participate
	in
	an 	employee
organization
	in
	that
	withdrawal
	of
	office
	space
	and
	inmate
clerical
	services
	effectively
	denied
	employees
	contact
	with
CCOA
	due
	to
	the
	restrictive
	nature
	and
	rural
	location
	of 	the
Department's
	institutions.
	Specifically,
	CCOA
	alleged
	that
employees
	were
	unable
	to
	learn
	about 	the
	benefits
	of
	CCOA
membership,
	membership
	records
	were
	not
	maintained,
	and
	delays
occurred 	in 	the
	distribution
	of
	CCOA
	literature
	and
	the
processing 	of 	grievance
	and
	insurance
	forms. 	In
	part,
	the
delays 	described
	were 	due
	to
	CCOA's
	historical
	reliance
	on
	the
Department's 	resources
	and
	its
	failure
	to
	establish
	its
	own
field
	organizers
	or
	clerical
	employees
	at
	the 	chapter
	level.
Thus,
	CCOA
	had 	no
	personnel
	readily
	able 	to
	assume
	the
functions 	previously
	performed
	by
	the 	inmates.
CCOA alleges that the Department's policy change denied
It
	is
	not
	disputed
	that
	employees
	experienced
	a
	decline 	in
the
	quality
	of 	services
	rendered
	to
	them 	by
	CCOA
	after 	office
space
	and
	inmate
	clerks
	were
	withdrawn
	from
	CCOA.
	The	The
question,
	however,
	is
	whether 	the 	Department's
	role 	in 	that
decline 	in 	services
	amounted
	to 	unlawful 	employer 	conduct 	which
violated
	employees'
	rights.
	The
	hearing
	officer
	concluded,
	and
we
	agree, 	that
	it
	did 	not.
It is not disputed that employees experienced a decline in
with,
	restrain,
	or
	coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
employees the right to join and participate in an employee
organization in that withdrawal of office space and inmate
clerical services effectively denied employees contact with
CCOA due to the restrictive nature and rural location of the
Department's institutions. Specifically, CCOA alleged that
employees were unable to learn about the benefits of CCOA
membership, membership records were not maintained, and delays
occurred in the distribution of CCOA literature and the
processing of grievance and insurance forms. In part, the
delays described were due to CCOA's historical reliance on the
Department's resources and its failure to establish its own
field organizers or clerical employees at the chapter level.
Thus, CCOA had no personnel readily able to assume the
functions previously performed by the inmates.
the quality of services rendered to them by CCOA after office
space and inmate clerks were withdrawn from CCOA.
question, however, is whether the Department's role in that
decline in services amounted to unlawful employer conduct which
violated employees' rights. The hearing officer concluded, and
we agree, that it did not.

5
The right of employees to join and participate in an
employee
	organization
	of
	their
	choice
	necessarily
	implies
	that
organizations
	have
	the
	right
	to
	communicate
	with
	employees
	and
members
	at 	their
	work
	site,
	where
	they 	are
	generally
	most
accessible.
	Access
	to
	employees
	to
	facilitate
	an
	exchange
	of
information
	is
	clearly
	a
	threshold
	concern 	not 	only
	in
	an
organizing
	campaign
	but 	during 	the 	course
	of
	the
	ongoing
relationship
	between
	the
	employee
	organization
	and
	its
	members.
right
Under
	EERA
	section 	3543.l(b),
	employee
	organizations 	are
expressly
	granted 	access,
	at
	reasonable 	times,
	to
	work
	areas,
institutional
	bulletin
	boards
	and
	mailboxes
	for
	communication
purposes.
	In
	addition, 	organizations
	have
	the
	right
	to
	use
institutional
	facilities
	for 	meetings.
	No
	such
	express
provision
	of
	rights 	is
	contained 	in
	SEERA.5 	However,
notwithstanding 	the
	absence
	of
	such
	a
	specific 	statutory
	right,
the
	Board
	finds
	that
	a
	right
	of 	access
	is 	implicit
	in 	the
purpose
	and
	intent
	of 	the
	SEERA.
	Section
	3512
	of 	the
	SEERA
provides, in part:	
provides, 	in
	part:
Under EERA section 3543. 1(b) , employee organizations are
It
	is
	the 	purpose
	of
	this
	chapter 	to
	promote
full
	communication 	between
	the
	state
	and
	its
employees
	by
	providing
	a
	reasonable
	method
of 	resolving 	disputes 	regarding
	wages,
It is the purpose of this chapter to promote
5under section 3522.9 (c) of SEERA, the employer may adopt
regulations 	providing 	for 	access
	by
	representatives 	of 	employee
organizations 	representing 	supervisors.
	There
	is
	no
	comparable
provision
	under
	SEERA
	for 	nonsupervisory 	employee
representatives.
Sunder
employee organization of their choice necessarily implies that
organizations have the right to communicate with employees and
members at their work site, where they are generally most
accessible. Access to employees to facilitate an exchange of
information is clearly a threshold concern not only in an
organizing campaign but during the course of the ongoing
relationship between the employee organization and its members.
expressly granted access, at reasonable times, to work areas,
institutional bulletin boards and mailboxes for communication
purposes. In addition, organizations have the right to use
institutional facilities for meetings. No such express
provision of rights is contained in SEERA. However,
notwithstanding the absence of such a specific statutory right,
the Board finds that a right of access is implicit in the
purpose and intent of the SEERA. Section 3512 of the SEERA
full communication between the state and its
employees by providing a reasonable method
of resolving disputes regarding wages,
section 	3522.9(c) 	of
	SEERA,
	the
	employer 	may
	adopt
regulations providing for access by representatives of employee
organizations representing supervisors. There is no comparable
provision under SEERA for nonsupervisory employee
representatives.
of
	employees
	to
	join
	and
	participate
	in
	an

6
hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment
	between
	the
	state
	and
	public
employee
	organizations.
	It
	is
	also
	the
purpose 	of
	this
	chapter 	to
	promote
	the
improvement
	of 	personnel
	management 	and
employee-employer
	relations
	within
	the
	State
of
	California
	by
	providing
	a
	uniform
	basis
for
	recognizing
	the
	right
	of
	state
	employees
to
	join
	organizations
	of
	their
	own
	choosing
and 	be
	represented
	by
	such
	organizations 	in
their
	employment
	relations
	with
	the
	state.
and
It
	remains
	for 	the
	Board
	to
	determine 	the 	parameters 	of 	the
right
	of 	access
	which
	we
	have
	concluded
	is
	implicit
	in
	SEERA.
As
	a
	guide
	to
	our
	analysis
	we
	have 	examined
	the
	right
	of 	access
which 	employee
	organizations
	enjoy
	under 	laws
	administered
	by
this
	Board
	as 	well 	as
	under
	federal
	case
	authority.
	As
	noted
above, 	school
	districts
	may
	reasonably
	regulate
	access
	under
the
	terms
	of
	EERA
	section 	3543.l(b).
	The
	Higher
	Education
Employer-Employee
	Relations
	Act
	(hereafter
	HEERA)
	contains
	an
almost
	identical
	provision 	subjecting
	the
	right
	of 	access 	to
reasonable
	regulation.
	(See 	Gov.
	Code,
	sec.
	3568.)
It remains for the Board to determine the parameters of the
6
6Under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (Gov. Code, sec. 3500
et 	seq.), 	local 	public
	employers
	are 	permitted 	to
	adopt
reasonable
	rules 	regulating 	access 	of
	employee
	organization
officers
	and
	representatives 	to
	work
	sites.
	(See 	Gov. 	Code,
sec.
	3507.)
	State
	agencies
	may 	do
	the
	same
	under
	the
George
	M.
	Brown Act 	(Gov. 	Code,
	sec.
	3525
	et
	seq.)
	which
	covers
state
	employees 	not 	covered
	by 	SEERA.
	These
	acts 	are
distinguishable
	from
	the
	EERA, 	SEERA
	and
	HEERA
	in 	that 	the
former 	do
	not
	require 	collective 	bargaining.
	They
	are
	like
SEERA
	in 	that
	they
	do
	not 	provide
	a
	statutory 	right 	of 	access;
nevertheless, 	they 	support 	the 	Board's 	conclusion 	that
	a
	right
of 	reasonable 	access
	is 	implicit 	in 	the
	right 	of 	employees
	to
be
	represented
	by
	organizations 	of 	their 	choice.
Gunder
other
	terms
	and
	conditions 	of
employment between the state and public
employee organizations. It is also the
purpose of this chapter to promote the
improvement of personnel management and
employee-employer relations within the State
of California by providing a uniform basis
for recognizing the right of state employees
to join organizations of their own choosing
and be represented by such organizations in
their employment relations with the state.
right of access which we have concluded is implicit in SEERA.
As a guide to our analysis we have examined the right of access
which employee organizations enjoy under laws administered by
this Board as well as under federal case authority. As noted
above, school districts may reasonably regulate access under
the terms of EERA section 3543. 1(b) . The Higher Education
Employer-Employee Relations Act (hereafter HEERA) contains an
almost identical provision subjecting the right of access to
reasonable regulation. (See Gov. Code, sec. 3568. )6
the 	Meyers-Milias-Brown 	Act
	(Gov. 	Code,
	sec.
	3500
et seq. ), local public employers are permitted to adopt
reasonable rules regulating access of employee organization
officers and representatives to work sites. (See Gov. Code,
sec. 3507. ) State agencies may do the same under the
George M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, sec. 3525 et seq. ) which covers
state employees not covered by SEERA. These acts are
distinguishable from the EERA, SEERA and HEERA in that the
former do not require collective bargaining. They are like
SEERA in that they do not provide a statutory right of access;
nevertheless, they support the Board's conclusion that a right
of reasonable access is implicit in the right of employees to
be represented by organizations of their choice.

7
Furthermore, although the Labor Management Relations Act does
not 	provide 	an 	explicit 	right 	of 	access, 	the 	NLRB 	and 	the
federal 	courts 	have 	developed 	rules 	governing 	access 	to
employer 	property 	by 	union 	organizers. 	While 	there 	are
distinct 	rules 	covering 	access 	by 	employee 	and 	non-employee
organizers, 	we 	are 	concerned 	here 	primarily 	with 	the 	effect 	of
these 	rules 	on 	employees' 	right 	to 	organize. 	In 	Babcock-Wilcox
Co., 	(1956) 	351 	U.S. 	105 	[38 	LRRM 	2001], 	the 	United 	States
Supreme 	Court 	held 	that 	the 	employer 	may 	legitimately 	restrict
access 	to 	its 	property 	by 	non-employee 	union 	representatives,
where 	alternative 	effective 	channels 	of 	communication 	are
available 	between 	representatives 	and 	employees 	and 	the
employer 	does 	not 	discriminate 	against 	any 	employee
organization.	organization. 	In 	an 	earlier 	case, 	Republic 	Aviation 	Corp. 	v.
NLRB, 	(1945) 	324 	U.S. 	793, 	the 	court 	held 	that 	a 	rule
prohibiting 	union 	solicitation 	during 	working 	hours 	is
presumptively 	valid 	unless 	overcome 	by 	evidence 	that 	the 	rule
was 	adopted 	for 	a 	discriminatory 	purpose. 	The 	same 	type 	of
rule 	covering 	solicitation 	outside 	working 	hours 	is 	presumed
invalid 	unless 	evidence 	shows 	that 	special 	circumstances 	make
the 	rule 	necessary 	to 	maintain 	production 	or 	discipline.
although
While 	the 	Board 	takes 	cognizance 	of 	the 	above 	cited 	cases,
we 	must 	consider 	the 	inherent 	and 	substantial 	distinction
between 	the 	property 	interest 	of 	the 	private 	employer 	and 	that
of 	the 	public 	employer. 	The 	public 	employer 	may 	not 	exclude
While the Board takes cognizance of the above cited cases,
7
the 	Labor 	Management 	Relations 	Act 	does
not provide an explicit right of access, the NLRB and the
federal courts have developed rules governing access to
employer property by union organizers. While there are
distinct rules covering access by employee and non-employee
organizers, we are concerned here primarily with the effect of
these rules on employees' right to organize. In Babcock-Wilcox
Co. , (1956) 351 U.S. 105 [38 LRRM 2001] , the United States
Supreme Court held that the employer may legitimately restrict
access to its property by non-employee union representatives,
where alternative effective channels of communication are
available between representatives and employees and the
employer does not discriminate against any employee
In an earlier case, Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, (1945) 324 U.S. 793, the court held that a rule
prohibiting union solicitation during working hours is
presumptively valid unless overcome by evidence that the rule
was adopted for a discriminatory purpose. The same type of
rule covering solicitation outside working hours is presumed
invalid unless evidence shows that special circumstances make
the rule necessary to maintain production or discipline.
we must consider the inherent and substantial distinction
between the property interest of the private employer and that
of the public employer. The public employer may not exclude

8
members of the public wishing to conduct business with the
public
	agency.
	However,
	the 	public
	employer
	may
	reasonably
regulate
	access
	where
	necessary 	to 	assure
	the
	safety
	of
	its
employees,
	wards
	and
	facilities
	and
	the
	efficient
	operation 	of
its
	official
	business.
of
?ula
In
	particular,
	prison
	officials
	may
properly
	restrict
	entry 	of
	persons
	and
	certain
	articles
	into
their 	institutions.
properly restrict entry of persons and certain articles into
8	
It
	is
	thus
	clear 	that
	access
	to 	public
property
	may 	be
	reasonably
	regulated
	under
	varied
circumstances. With this in mind, we turn to the particular
circumstances 	of 	the
	present 	case.
clear that access to public	us
As
	noted
	earlier,
	after
	the
	Department 	withdrew
	the
	office
space,
	et
	cetera,
	CCOA
	was
	still
	able
	to
	distribute
	its
As noted earlier, after the Department withdrew the office
7For example, the California State Police are authorized	
7For 	example,
	the
	California 	State 	Police 	are 	authorized
to
	remove 	from
	state
	buildings 	persons
	who
	have 	no
	legitimate
reason 	for
	their
	presence, 	persons
	creating
	noise
	which 	impedes
the
	performance 	of 	employees'
	duties
	or
	impedes
	the
	public's
receipt
	of
	administrative 	services,
	persons
	who
	obstruct
passageways.
	(See
	Cal.
	Adm
in.
	Code,
	tit.
	2,
	sec.
	1201
	et
	seq.
)
to remove from state buildings persons who have no legitimate
State
	Personnel
	Board
	regulations
	under
	the 	Meyers-Milias
Brown
	Act,
	supra,
	restrict
	access 	"so 	as 	not
	to
	interfere
	with
state
	business 	or
	established 	safety
	or
	security
requirements. " 	(Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 2, sec. 544 (d) . )
State Personnel Board regulations under the Meyers-Milias
The
	question 	of
	whether
	the 	public
	has
	a
	right
	to 	enter
prisons
	has 	not 	been 	answered 	by
	the
	courts.
	In
	KQED
	v.
Houchins,
	546
	F.2d
	284
	(1976),
	the 	Ninth
	Circuit
	held
	that
	the
press
	and
	public
	have 	a
	constitutional 	right
	of 	access
	under
the
	First
	Amendment
	to
	be
	informed 	about
	prison 	conditions
since 	prisons 	are 	public
	institutions.
	However,
	the 	United
States
	Supreme
	Court
	rejected 	this
	finding
	on
	appeal,
	and
	left
the 	issue 	of 	public 	access 	undetermined. 	(See KQED v.	(See
	KQED
	v.
Houchins,
	(1978) 	438 	u.s.
	1.)
The question of whether the public has a right to enter
8 See, e.g., Penal Code section 4570 et seq.	
Bsee,
the
	public
	wishing
	to
	conduct
	business
	with
	the
public agency. However, the public employer may reasonably
regulate access where necessary to assure the safety of its
employees, wards and facilities and the efficient operation of
its official business.7 In partic 	r, prison officials may
their institutions. 8 It is th
property may be reasonably regulated under varied
circumstances.
	With
	this
	in
	mind,
	we
	to
	the
	particular
	turn
circumstances of the present case.
space, et cetera, CCOA was still able to distribute its
reason for their presence, persons creating noise which impedes
the performance of employees' duties or impedes the public's
receipt of administrative services, persons who obstruct
passageways. (See Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 2, sec. 1201 et seq. )
Brown Act, supra, restrict access "so as not to interfere with
state business or established safety or security
requirements."
	{Cal.
	Admin.
	Code,
	tit.
	2,
	sec. 	544(d).)
prisons has not been answered by the courts. In KQED v.
Houchins, 546 F. 2d 284 (1976) , the Ninth Circuit held that the
press and public have a constitutional right of access under
the First Amendment to be informed about prison conditions
since prisons are public institutions. However, the United
States Supreme Court rejected this finding on appeal, and left
the issue of public access undetermined.
Houchins, (1978) 438 U.S. 1.)
e.g.,
	Penal
	Code
	section
	4570
	et
	seq.

9
literature through Department mailboxes and bulletin boards and
was 	able 	to 	meet 	with 	employees 	concerning 	grievances.
through
9 	CCOA
"9The 	Department's 	access 	policy, 	which 	was 	not 	changed,
does 	not 	appear 	to 	distinguish 	between 	employee 	and
non-employee 	representatives. 	Nor 	does 	the 	policy 	specify 	when
and 	where 	representatives 	may 	have 	access 	to 	employees 	for
purposes 	of 	solicitation. 	It 	has 	not 	been 	contended 	on 	appeal
that 	the 	Department's 	policy 	illegally 	limited 	solicitation 	and
we 	see 	nothing 	in 	the 	policy 	itself 	which 	precludes
solicitation 	in 	nonwork 	areas 	or 	during 	nonworking 	hours. 	The
policy 	provides:
The Department's access policy, which was not changed,
Department 	Administrative 	Manual, 	section 	2504.	Department Administrative Manual, section 2504.
Access 	to 	Employee 	Work 	Locations.	Access to Employee Work Locations.
(a) 	Reasonable 	access 	to 	employee 	work
locations 	during 	working 	hours 	shall 	be
granted 	to 	employee 	organization 	officers
and 	representatives 	on 	employment 	relations
matters. 	This 	does 	not 	include 	visits 	for
the 	purpose 	of 	solicitation 	of 	membership 	or
routine 	contact, 	but 	only 	where 	specific
problems 	exist 	which 	necessitate 	the
employee 	organization 	representative 	seeing
the 	work 	location 	to 	understand 	the
situation.
(a)
(b) 	Such 	employee 	organization
representatives 	shall 	notify 	and 	obtain 	the
approval 	of 	the 	appropriate 	official 	before
entering 	an 	employee 	work 	location 	as
follows:
(b)
(1) 	Any 	institution 	- 	warden 	or
superintendent.
(1)
(2) 	District 	office 	of 	Parole 	and
Community 	Services 	Division - 	district
administrator.
(2)
(3) 	Regional 	office 	of 	Parole 	and	(3)
9
Department 	mailboxes 	and 	bulletin 	boards 	and
was able to meet with employees concerning grievances. 9 CCOA
does not appear to distinguish between employee and
non-employee representatives. Nor does the policy specify when
and where representatives may have access to employees for
purposes of solicitation. It has not been contended on appeal
that the Department's policy illegally limited solicitation and
we see nothing in the policy itself which precludes
solicitation in nonwork areas or during nonworking hours. The
policy provides:
Reasonable access to employee work
locations during working hours shall be
granted to employee organization officers
and representatives on employment relations
matters. 	This does not include visits for
the purpose of solicitation of membership or
routine contact, but only where specific
problems exist which necessitate the
employee organization representative seeing
the work location to understand the
situation.
Such employee organization
representatives shall notify and obtain the
approval of the appropriate official before
entering an employee work location as
follows :
Any institution - warden or
superintendent.
District office of Parole and
Community Services Division - district
administrator .
Regional office of Parole and

10
argues that these alternatives were inadequate and that
employees
	did
	not
	continue 	to
	have
	easy 	access
	to
	the
organization.
	Because
	of
	CCOA's
	long-term
	reliance
	on
	the
	use
of
	Department
	resources,
	it
	had 	no
	place 	to
	store 	written
materials,
	had
	greater
	diffi~ulty
	producing
	and
	distributing
chapter
	bulletins,
	and 	had 	no
	central
	location
	at
	which
	members
could
	gather 	to
	air
	complaints 	or
	exchange
	information.
Consideration
	was
	given
	by
	CCOA
	to
	alternative
	sites
	outside
the
	institutions,
	but
	were
	rejected,
	primarily
	because
	these
CCOA
	felt
	that
	office
	space,
	clerical
	help, 	mail
	distribution
and
	other
	communication
	costs
	were
	excessive.
	Whether
	or
	not
CCOA's
	limited 	financial
	resources 	prevented
	CCOA
	from
	filling
the 	void
	left
	by
	the
	Department's
	action,
	we
	are 	not 	persuaded
that 	that
	action
	was
	unreasonable.
that
The
	record
	shows
	that
	the
	Department 	faced
	a 	number
	of
problems
	throughout 	the 	period 	during
	which 	employee
organizations
	were
	granted
	use
	of
	institutional 	facilities.
	At
The record shows that the Department faced a number of
Community
	Services 	Division
	-
	regional
administrator.
Community Services Division - regional
(4)
	Central 	office
	of 	Parole
	and
Community
	Services 	Division
	- 	Deputy
Director
	-
	Parole
	and 	Community
	Services
Division.
(4)
(5)
	Central 	office 	of 	Department 	of
Corrections
	-
	personnel 	officer
	(who
	willclear 	with 	appropriate 	division 	chief.)
(5)
10
these
	alternatives
	were
	inadequate
	and
	that
employees did not continue to have easy access to the
organization. Because of CCOA's long-term reliance on the use
of Department resources, it had no place to store written
materials, had greater difficulty producing and distributing
chapter bulletins, and had no central location at which members
could gather to air complaints or exchange information.
Consideration was given by CCOA to alternative sites outside
the institutions, but these were rejected, primarily because
CCOA felt that office space, clerical help, mail distribution
and other communication costs were excessive. Whether or not
CCOA's limited financial resources prevented CCOA from filling
the void left by the Department's action, we are not persuaded
that that action was unreasonable.
problems throughout the period during which employee
organizations were granted use of institutional facilities. At
administrator .
Central office of Parole and
Community Services Division - Deputy
Director - Parole and Community Services
Division.
Central office of Department of
Corrections - personnel officer (who will
clear with appropriate division chief. )

11
times, there was conflict between competing organizations over
the 	use 	of 	space 	or 	desks, 	or 	the 	amount 	of 	time 	an 	inmate
clerk 	spent 	on 	a 	given 	organization's 	work. 	In 	addition, 	there
had 	been 	disputes 	over 	which 	organization 	should 	have 	the 	right
to 	carry 	out 	particular 	programs 	such 	as 	running 	snack 	bars 	and
selling 	employee 	badges. 	Further, 	organizations 	claimed 	that
competitors 	had 	better 	bulletin 	board 	locations 	or 	were
assigned 	inmate 	clerks 	with 	better 	security 	clearances 	that
allowed 	them 	to 	move 	about 	the 	institution 	more 	freely, 	or 	that
some 	representatives 	received 	identification 	cards 	permitting
easier 	access 	to 	the 	prisons. 	Coupled 	with 	this 	history 	of
conflict 	was 	the 	fact 	that 	under 	SEERA, 	the 	Department 	faced
the 	prospect 	of 	even 	more 	organizations 	competing 	for 	the
limited 	space 	and 	resources 	then 	available. 	The Department	The 	Department
clearly 	faced 	the 	dilemma 	of 	continuing 	to 	provide 	the
substantial 	aid 	it 	had 	in 	the 	past 	without 	favoring 	any
organization 	over 	another. 	To 	choose 	to 	accommodate 	only 	as
many 	groups 	as 	it 	could 	would 	have 	put 	the 	Department 	in 	the
position 	of 	violating 	the 	new 	law. 	Under 	these 	circumstances,
the 	Department 	was 	forced 	to 	follow 	a 	course 	that 	continued 	to
permit 	reasonable 	access 	yet 	did 	not 	improperly 	aid 	any
organization.
there
Notwithstanding 	our 	determination 	that 	CCOA 	had 	reasonable
alternatives 	available 	by 	which 	to 	maintain 	communication 	with
existing 	and 	potential 	members, 	the 	Board 	acknowledges 	that
Notwithstanding our determination that CCOA had reasonable
11
was 	conflict 	between 	competing 	organizations 	over
the use of space or desks, or the amount of time an inmate
clerk spent on a given organization's work. In addition, there
had been disputes over which organization should have the right
to carry out particular programs such as running snack bars and
selling employee badges. Further, organizations claimed that
competitors had better bulletin board locations or were
assigned inmate clerks with better security clearances that
allowed them to move about the institution more freely, or that
some representatives received identification cards permitting
easier access to the prisons. Coupled with this history of
conflict was the fact that under SEERA, the Department faced
the prospect of even more organizations competing for the
limited space and resources then available.
clearly faced the dilemma of continuing to provide the
substantial aid it had in the past without favoring any
organization over another. To choose to accommodate only as
many groups as it could would have put the Department in the
position of violating the new law. Under these circumstances,
the Department was forced to follow a course that continued to
permit reasonable access yet did not improperly aid any
organization.
alternatives available by which to maintain communication with
existing and potential members, the Board acknowledges that

12
some slight harm may have been done to employees' organizing
rights
	by
	the
	withdrawal
	of
	office
	space,
	clerks
	and
	separate
bulletin
	boards.
	However,
	the
	Board
	finds
	that
	even
	if
	there
was 	some
	slight
	harm,
	the
	Department
	did
	not
	commit
	an
	unfair
practice.
	In
	reaching
	this
	conclusion 	the
	Board
	has
	considered
our
	decision 	in
	Carlsbad 	Unified
	School
	District,
	supra,
	where
we
	first
	set
	forth
	a
	balancing
	test
	for 	determining
	violations
of
	EERA
	section
	3543.S(a).
	As
	noted
	earlier,
	section
	3543.S(a)
is the counterpart to SEERA section 3519(a) .
slight
In
	Carlsbad, 	the
	Board
	held
	that
	where
	there
	is
	a
connection
	between
	the 	employer's
	act
	and
	the
	exercise 	of
employee
	rights,
	a
	prima
	facie
	case
	is
	established
	upon 	a
showing
	that
	the 	employer's
	action
	tended
	to
	harm
	or 	did
	harm
employee
	rights. 	If
	the
	employer
	offers
	a
	justification
	that
its
	action
	was
	based
	on
	operational 	necessity,
	the
	competing
interests
	of 	the
	employer
	and
	employees
	are 	balanced. 	The
facts
	underlying 	the 	Department's
	action
	have 	been
	detailed
above. 	In sum, the inadequate space available for all employee
organizations
	and
	the
	potential
	for 	providing 	unlawful
assistance
	combined
	with 	the
	many
	conflicts 	resulting
	from
sharing 	space 	to 	motivate 	the
	Department
	to
	withdraw
	the
assistance
	it
	had
	previously 	offered.
	The 	Board
	concludes
	that
this 	justification
	outweighs 	the 	comparatively
	slight
	harm
	to
In Carlsbad, the Board held that where there is a
12
harm may
	have
	been
	done
	to
	employees'
	organizing
rights by the withdrawal of office space, clerks and separate
bulletin boards. However, the Board finds that even if there
was some slight harm, the Department did not commit an unfair
practice. In reaching this conclusion the Board has considered
our decision in Carlsbad Unified School District, supra, where
we first set forth a balancing test for determining violations
of EERA section 3543.5 (a) . As noted earlier, section 3543.5(a)
3519(a).
	is
	the
	counterpart 	to
	SEERA
	section
connection between the employer's act and the exercise of
employee rights, a prima facie case is established upon a
showing that the employer's action tended to harm or did harm
employee rights. If the employer offers a justification that
its action was based on operational necessity, the competing
interests of the employer and employees are balanced. The
facts underlying the Department's action have been detailed
above.	
space
	available
	for
	all
	employee
	In
	sum,
	the 	inadequate
organizations and the potential for providing unlawful
assistance combined with the many conflicts resulting from
sharing space to motivate the Department to withdraw the
assistance it had previously offered. The Board concludes that
this justification outweighs the comparatively slight harm to

13
employees which resulted from the interruption of CCOA services
inside 	the 	institutions.
which
10
CCOA's 	second 	contention 	alleging 	a 	violation 	of 	section
3519(a) 	is 	that 	withdrawal 	of 	the 	office 	space, 	etc., 	amounted
to 	illegal 	withdrawal 	of 	an 	employee 	benefit 	during 	a
pre-election 	campaign 	period. 	It 	is 	apparent 	that 	the
Department's 	provision 	of 	space 	and 	clerks 	benefited 	employees
in 	some 	way. 	However, 	the 	present 	case 	is 	clearly
distinguishable 	from 	those 	cases 	cited 	by CCOA 	in 	which 	the
employer 	withdrew 	benefits 	that 	directly 	affected 	wages 	and
employment 	conditions.
CCOA's second contention alleging a violation of section
11 	Whatever 	benefit 	may 	have 	accrued	Whatever benefit may have accrued
10Member Gonzales also concludes that the Department did	10Member 	Gonzales 	also 	concludes 	that 	the 	Department 	did
not 	violate 	section 	3519(a). 	However, 	he 	would 	apply 	the 	test
set forth in his concurring opinion in Carlsbad, supra. There,
he 	stated 	that 	"employer 	intent 	is 	an 	integral 	part 	o 	the
behavior 	prohibited 	by 	section 	3543.5." 	Unlawful 	intent 	may 	be
actually 	proven 	or 	inferred 	from 	the 	entire 	record. 	An
inference 	of 	unlawful 	intent 	may 	be 	rebutted 	by 	the 	employer
with 	a 	showing 	of 	legitimate 	and 	substantial 	justification 	for
its 	action. 	Applying 	this 	test, 	Member 	Gonzales 	concludes 	that
any 	inference 	of 	the 	Department's 	intent 	to 	harm 	employee
rights 	is 	rebutted 	by 	the 	Department's 	reasons 	for 	its 	action
(inadequate 	space, 	conflict 	among 	organizations 	over 	shared
space, 	and 	a 	potential 	3519(d) 	violation). 	These 	are
legitimate 	and 	substantial 	reasons, 	particularly 	since 	there 	is
a 	unique 	need 	for 	order 	and 	stability 	within 	penal 	institutions.
not violate section 3519 (a) . However, he would apply the test
llsee, e.g. , NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, Inc. (5th Cir. 1970)	llsee, 	e.g., 	NLRB 	v. 	Dothan 	Eagle 	Inc. 	(5th 	Cir. 	1970)
434 	F. 2d 	93 	[7 5 LRRM 	2531] 	(employer 	denied 	a 	pay 	increase
automatically 	given 	every 	six 	months 	in 	the 	past); 	Davis
Wholesale 	Co. 	(1967) 	165 	NLRB 	271 	[65 	LRRM 	1494], 	enfd. 	(D.C.
Cir. 	1969) 	413 	F.2d 	407 	[70 	LRRM 	3436] 	(employer 	discontinued
coffee 	break 	during 	the 	night 	shift)~ 	Buddy 	Schoellkopf
Products 	Inc. 	(1967) 	164 	NLRB 	660 	[ 65 	LRRM 	1231] 	enfd. 	( 5th
Cir. 	1969) 	410 	F.2d 	82 	[71 LRRM 	2089] 	(employer 	discontinued
employee 	privilege 	of 	purchasing 	employer's 	products).
434 F. 2d 93 [75 LRRM 2531] (employer denied a pay increase
13
resulted 	from 	the 	interruption 	of 	CCOA 	services
inside the institutions. 10
3519(a) is that withdrawal of the office space, etc. , amounted
to illegal withdrawal of an employee benefit during a
pre-election campaign period. It is apparent that the
Department's provision of space and clerks benefited employees
in some way. However, the present case is clearly
distinguishable from those cases cited by CCOA in which the
employer withdrew benefits that directly affected wages and
employment conditions. ll
set 	forth 	in 	his 	concurring 	opinion 	in 	Carlsbad, 	~uprf. 	There,
he stated that "employer intent is an integral part of the
behavior prohibited by section 3543.5." Unlawful intent may be
actually proven or inferred from the entire record. An
inference of unlawful intent may be rebutted by the employer
with a showing of legitimate and substantial justification for
its action. 	Applying this test, Member Gonzales concludes that
any inference of the Department's intent to harm employee
rights is rebutted by the Department's reasons for its action
(inadequate space, conflict among organizations over shared
space, and a potential 3519 (d) violation) . These are
legitimate and substantial reasons, particularly since there is
a unique need for order and stability within penal institutions.
automatically given every six months in the past) ; Davis
Wholesale Co. (1967) 165 NLRB 271 [65 LRRM 1494] , end. (D.C.
Cir. 1969) 413 F. 2d 407 [70 LRRM 3436] (employer discontinued
coffee break during the night shift) ; Buddy Schoellkopf
Products Inc. (1967) 164 NLRB 660 [65 LRRM 1231] enfd. (5th
Cir. 1969) 410 F. 2d 82 [71 LRRM 2089] (employer discontinued
employee privilege of purchasing employer's products) .

14
to employees here was of an indirect nature.
Further,
	the
period 	of
	time
	involved 	here
	was
	not
	preceding
	an
	election,
	but
was
	rather
	before
	even
	an
	organizing
	campaign 	under
	SEERA
	had
begun. 	Although
	CCOA
	claims
	it
	was
	unable
	to
	process
	its
	own
benefit
	programs
	as
	a
	result
	of 	the
	Department's
	action,
	the
Board
	finds
	that
	removal
	of 	the
	benefit
	of
	office
	space,
	et
cetera,
	was 	amply
	justified
	and 	any 	harm
	resulting
	from
	its
loss
	was
	slight.
	Moreover,
	as
	noted
	earlier,
	the
	decline 	in
CCOA's
	programs
	was
	attributable
	in
	part
	to
	CCOA's 	own
	lack 	of
resources.
	For
	the 	reasons 	expressed
	here
	and
	in 	the 	foregoing
discussion,
	we
	conclude
	that
	no
	unfair 	practice
	was
	committed
by
	the 	Department.
employees
B.
	Section
	3519(b).	B.
CCOA's
	second
	charge
	alleges 	that
	the
	Department
	interfered
with
	CCOA's
	organizing
	rights
	under
	section
	3519(b). 	This
subsection 	also
	has
	an
	EERA
	counterpart, 	section
	3543.S(b),
whose
	language
	is 	identical.
	Both
	sections
	make
	it
	unlawful
for 	the 	employer
	to 	"[d]eny 	to
	employee
	organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to
	them	
by	
this
	chapter."
CCOA's second charge alleges that the Department interfered
12guaranteed to them by this chapter. "12
12	12 SEERA section 3515.5 provides, in relevant part:	sEERA
Employee
	organizations 	shall
	have
	the
	right
to 	represent 	their
	members
	in 	their
employment
	relations
	with 	the
	state,
	except
that
	once 	an 	employee
	organization 	is
recognized 	as 	the 	exclusive 	representativeof
	an
	appropriate 	unit, 	the 	recognized
Employee organizations shall have the right
14
here
	was
	of
	an
	indirect
	nature. 	Further, the
period of time involved here was not preceding an election, but
was rather before even an organizing campaign under SEERA had
begun. 	Although CCOA claims it was unable to process its own
benefit programs as a result of the Department's action, the
Board finds that removal of the benefit of office space, et
cetera, was amply justified and any harm resulting from its
loss was slight. 	Moreover, as noted earlier, the decline in
CCOA's programs was attributable in part to CCOA's own lack of
resources. For the reasons expressed here and in the foregoing
discussion, we conclude that no unfair practice was committed
by the Department.
Section 3519 (b) .
with CCOA's organizing rights under section 3519 (b) . This
subsection also has an EERA counterpart, section 3543.5(b) ,
whose language is identical. Both sections make it unlawful
for the employer to " [dleny to employee organizations rights
section
	3515.5
	provides, 	in 	relevant 	part:
to represent their members in their
employment relations with the state, except
that once an employee organization is
recognized as the exclusive representative
of an appropriate unit, the recognized

15
The hearing officer's discussion of the alleged violation
of 	section 	3519(b) 	noted 	that 	PERB 	had 	not 	fully 	delineated 	the
dimensions 	of 	a 	non-exclusive 	employee 	organization's 	"right 	to
represent," 	although 	the 	Board 	had 	made 	references 	to 	this
right 	in 	a 	decision 	involving 	employee 	organization 	rights
under 	EERA 	section 	3543.1. 	(Hanford 	Joint 	Union High 	School
District 	Board 	of 	Trustees, 	(6/27/78) 	PERE.Decision No. 	58.)
In 	Hanford, 	the 	Board 	acknowledged 	that 	a 	nonexclusive 	employee
organization 	has 	"some'' 	representation 	rights 	prior 	to
recognition 	or 	certification 	of 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
hearing
In 	a 	more 	recent 	decision, 	Professional 	Engineers 	in
California 	Government 	(PECG), 	(3/19/80) 	PERB 	Decision 	No.
118-S, 	a 	majority 	of 	the 	Board 	expanded 	the 	non-exclusive
representative's 	right 	to 	represent 	its 	members 	in 	their
employment 	relations. 	To 	protect 	the 	employees' 	right 	to 	be
represented 	when 	an 	exclusive 	representative 	has 	not 	been
selected, 	the 	Board 	held 	that 	the 	nonexclusive 	representative's
right 	encompasses 	"at 	a 	minimum 	••.. the right to meet and	the 	right 	to 	meet 	and
discuss 	with 	the 	state 	employer 	a 	subject 	as 	basic 	to 	the
employment 	relationship 	as 	wages." 	(PECG, 	supra, 	maj. 	opn. 	at
p. 	9.) 	The 	employer 	was 	found 	to 	have 	a 	corresponding
In a more recent decision, Professional Engineers in
employee 	organization 	is 	the 	only
organization 	that 	may 	represent 	that 	unit 	in
employment relations with the state. .
employee organization is the only
15
officer's 	discussion 	of 	the 	alleged 	violation
of section 3519 (b) noted that PERB had not fully delineated the
dimensions of a non-exclusive employee organization's "right to
represent," although the Board had made references to this
right in a decision involving employee organization rights
under EERA section 3543.1. (Hanford Joint Union High School
District Board of Trustees, (6/27/78) PERB. Decision No. 58.)
In Hanford, the Board acknowledged that a nonexclusive employee
organization has "some" representation rights prior to
recognition or certification of an exclusive representative.
California Government (PECG) , (3/19/80) PERB Decision No.
118-S, a majority of the Board expanded the non-exclusive
representative's right to represent its members in their
employment relations. To protect the employees' right to be
represented when an exclusive representative has not been
selected, the Board held that the nonexclusive representative's
right encompasses "at a minimum .
discuss with the state employer a subject as basic to the
employment relationship as wages. " (PECG, supra, maj. opn. at
p. 9.) The employer was found to have a corresponding
organization that may represent that unit in
employment 	relations 	with 	the 	state ••••

--
16
obligation to meet and discuss wages with the nonexclusive
representative.
to
13
Here,
	the
	hearing
	officer
	discussed
	whether
	CCOA's
	"right
to
	represent"
	included 	the
	right
	to 	discuss
	the
	termination 	of
office
	space
	with 	the
	Department
	before
	the 	Department's
	action
was
	taken.
	The
	Board's
	decision 	in
	PECG,
	supra,
	was
	expressly
limited
	to
	apply
	to
	a
	matter 	of
	"fundamental"
	interest
	to
employees.
	Whether
	or 	not
	the
	subject
	at
	issue
	here
	is
	such
	a
matter
	or
	otherwise 	included 	in
	the
	"right
	to 	represent"
	CCOA
did
	discuss
	the
	proposed
	change
	before
	it
	was
	implemented,
	with
the
	result
	that
	the
	effective
	date 	of
	the
	change
	was
postponed.
	Under
	the
	circumstances,
	we
	find
	no
	violation 	of
CCOA's
	rights
	under
	section
	3515.5.
Here, the hearing officer discussed whether CCOA's "right
C.	
Section
	3519(d)	
C. 
SEERA
	section
	3519(d)
	provides
	that
	it
	is
	unlawful
	for 	the
employer
	to:
SEERA section 3519 (d) provides that it is unlawful for the
Dominate
	or
	interfere
	with 	the 	formation 	or
administration
	of
	any 	employee
	organization,
or
	contribute 	financial
	or 	other 	support 	to
Dominate or interfere with the formation or
13Member Gonzales dissented from these findings.	13Member
	Gonzales
	dissented
	from
	these 	findings.
	He
found
	that
	"unlike 	the
	explicit 	right
	of
	a
	recognized 	employee
organization 	to
	meet 	and
	confer 	in
	good
	faith
	(sections
	3517
and
	3519(c)),
	a
	right 	to 	discuss 	appears
	nowhere
	in 	the
statute."
	Allowing
	a
	multitude 	of
	employee
	organizations 	to
exercise
	a
	right 	to
	meet 	and
	confer
	would
	lead 	to 	"endless 	and
confusing" 	meetings
	and 	would
	encourage 	minority 	organizations
"to attempt to thwart [the] exclusive representation" design
contemplated
	by
	the
	SEERA. 	(PECG, supra, dis. opn. at pp.
19-20.)
found that "unlike the explicit right of a recognized employee
16
representative. 13
meet
	and
	discuss
	wages
	with
	the 	nonexclusive
to represent" included the right to discuss the termination of
office space with the Department before the Department's action
was taken. 	The Board's decision in PECG, supra, was expressly
limited to apply to a matter of "fundamental" interest to
employees. Whether or not the subject at issue here is such a
matter or otherwise included in the "right to represent" CCOA
did discuss the proposed change before it was implemented, with
the result that the effective date of the change was
postponed. Under the circumstances, we find no violation of
CCOA's rights under section 3515.5.
Section 3519 (d)
employer to:
administration of any employee organization,
or contribute financial or other support to
organization to meet and confer in good faith (sections 3517
and 3519 (c) ) , a right to discuss appears nowhere in the
statute. " Allowing a multitude of employee organizations to
exercise a right to meet and confer would lead to "endless and
confusing" meetings and would encourage minority organizations
11
to 	attempt 	to 	thwart 	[the] 	exclusive 	representation
11
design
contemplated by the SEERA. 	{PECG,
	supra, 	dis.
	opn.
	at
	pp.
19-20.)

17
it, or in any way encourage employees to
join 	any 	organization 	in 	preference 	to
another.
or
The 	evidence 	here 	demonstrates 	clearly 	that 	the 	Department's
action 	was 	a 	justifiable 	response 	to 	the 	enactment 	of 	SEERA, 	as
well 	as 	to 	the 	problems 	revealed 	in 	the 	Department's
investigation 	of 	its 	previous 	policy. 	In 	no 	way 	did 	the
Department 	dominate 	CCOA or 	interfere 	with 	its 	activities 	nor
encourage 	participation 	in 	any 	other 	organization 	preferred 	by
the 	Department. 	To 	the 	contrary, 	the 	record 	shows 	that
throughout 	the 	period 	during 	which 	the 	Department 	began 	to
phase 	out 	various 	ties 	with 	employee 	organizations, 	all
organizations 	were 	evaluated 	and 	treated 	equally. 	We 	must,
therefore, 	conclude 	that 	CCOA 	has 	failed 	to 	support 	its 	claim
that 	the 	Department 	violated 	section 	3519(d).
The evidence here demonstrates clearly that the Department's
D. 	Section 	3530	D. Section 3530
Government 	Code 	section 	3530 	is 	a 	provision 	of 	the 	George
Brown 	Act, 	supr~, 	a 	statute 	which 	covers 	state 	employees 	not
covered 	by 	SEERA. 	PERB 	has 	statutory 	authority 	to 	administer
the 	SEERA 	but 	not 	the 	Brown Act. 	Therefore, 	we 	affirm 	the
hearing 	officer's 	dismissal 	of 	this 	charge.
Government Code section 3530 is a provision of the George
ORDER	ORDER
Based 	upon 	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of
law 	and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	matter, 	the 	unfair 	practice
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
17
in 	any 	way 	encourage 	employees 	to
join any organization in preference to
another .
action was a justifiable response to the enactment of SEERA, as
well as to the problems revealed in the Department's
investigation of its previous policy. In no way did the
Department dominate CCOA or interfere with its activities nor
encourage participation in any other organization preferred by
the Department. To the contrary, the record shows that
throughout the period during which the Department began to
phase out various ties with employee organizations, all
organizations were evaluated and treated equally. We must,
therefore, conclude that CCOA has failed to support its claim
that the Department violated section 3519(d) .
Brown Act, supra, a statute which covers state employees not
covered by SEERA. 	PERB has statutory authority to administer
the SEERA but not the Brown Act. Therefore, we affirm the
hearing officer's dismissal of this charge.
law and the entire record in this matter, the unfair practice

/ty1/
Raymonf-1.
	¥nzal~s,
	Member
18
charge filed by the california Correctional Officers
Association
	is
	hereby
	DISMISSED.
filed
By:/ Raymond J. Gonzales, Member B
Barbara
	D.
	Moore,
	Memberarbara D. Moore, Member
Harry 	Gluck,
	Chairperson, 	concurring:	Harry Gluck, Chairperson, concurring:
While
	I
	concur
	in
	the
	ultimate
	conclusion 	reached
	by
	the
majority,
	I 	do
	not 	find 	the 	business
	justification 	test
	of
Carlsbad 	Unified
	School
	District
	(1/30/79)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	89,
to
	be
	the 	appropriate
	measure
	of
	the 	Department's 	conduct
	in 	this
case.
While I concur in the ultimate conclusion reached by the
Interference
	with 	organizing
	is
	not
	necessarily
	unlawful.
It
	is
	interference
	with 	protected 	organizational
	activities
	which
are 	to
	be
	condemned.
	An
	employer's
	refusal
	to
	release
	employees
from
	their
	work
	during 	working 	hours
	may
	"interfere"
	with
	the
employees'
	organizing 	preferences 	or 	ambitions. 	Similarly, an	
Similarly,
	an
employer's
	refusal
	to 	finance 	organizing
	activities
	may
	have
	a
dampening
	effect
	on
	such
	efforts.
	Yet,
	it
	should not
	be
	necessary
to 	prove
	that 	neither 	of 	these
	employer
	decisions
	would
	constitute
employees'
	a
	violation 	of 	statutory 	rights.
	It
	may
	be
	true 	that 	the
opportunity 	to 	organize 	and
	CCOA's
	opportunity 	to
	communicate 	with
Departmental 	employees 	were
	interfered with 	by 	the 	Department's
Interference with organizing is not necessarily unlawful.
18
by
	the
	California 	correctional 	Officers
Association is hereby DISMISSED.
majority, I do not find the business justification test of
Carlsbad Unified School District (1/30/79) PERB Decision No. 89,
to be the appropriate measure of the Department's conduct in this
case .
It is interference with protected organizational activities which
are to be condemned. An employer's refusal to release employees
from their work during working hours may "interfere" with the
employees' organizing preferences or ambitions.
employer's refusal to finance organizing activities may have a
dampening effect on such efforts. Yet, it should not be necessary
to prove that neither of these employer decisions would constitute
a violation of statutory rights. It may be true that the employees'
opportunity to organize and CCOA's opportunity to communicate with
Departmental employees were interfered with by the Department's

19
withdrawal of free office space, utilities, and inmate clerical
services.
	Whether
	the
	alleged 	interference
	was
	unlawful
	eventually
must
	rest
	on
	whether
	the
	employees 	and
	CCOA
	had
	a
	statutory 	right
to
	such
	facilities.
of
It
	is
	not 	necessary
	to
	repeat
	here 	the
	majority's 	analysis 	of
the
	right
	of
	access
	afforded
	employees 	and 	employee
	organizations
under
	the
	SEERA.
	It
	is 	sufficient
	to
	indicate
	my
	substantial
agreement
	with 	those
	portions 	of
	the
	primary
	decision.
	I
	would
	add,
however,
	that
	I
	find 	nothing 	in 	the
	SEERA
	or 	in 	the
	pertinent
literature
	which
	obligates
	an 	employer
	to 	provide 	to
	an 	employee
organization
	the
	type
	of
	facility
	involved
	in
	this
	case.
	Indeed,
it
	is
	arguable
	that
	such
	action
	is
	prohibited.
	Section 	3519(d),
prohibits
	the
	state
	from
	contributing 	financial
	or 	other
	support
to
	an 	employee
	organization.
	However,
	it
	is
	not 	necessary 	to
decide 	whether
	by
	providing 	the 	requested
	facilities
	the
	state,
in 	this
	case,
	would 	be
	violating
	the
	Act
	or
	merely
	cooperating
with
	CCOA.
It is not necessary to repeat here the majority's analysis of
1
with CCOA. 	The
	absence
	of
	a
	statutory 	prohibition 	against 	the
state's
	donation
	of
	such
	facilities 	is
	not 	equivalent 	to
	a
	statutory
grant 	of
	a
	right
	to
	such 	space
	and
	services 	to 	the
	employees
	or
	the
organization.
The absence of a statutory prohibition against the
I
	find
	no
	basis· for
	a
	finding 	that
	the
	state 	violated 	section
3519(a) 	by
	unilaterally
	changing 	"an
	established 	past 	practice."
Absent
	a 	showing
	that 	the 	Charging 	Party 	enjoyed
	a
	right 	to 	the
facilities,
	the 	requirement 	for 	finding
	a
	violation 	based on
I find no basis for a finding that the state violated section
1
See Morris, The Developing Labor Law (1971) p. 140 et seq.	see
19
free
	office
	space,
	utilities,
	and
	inmate
	clerical
services . 	Whether the alleged interference was unlawful eventually
must rest on whether the employees and CCOA had a statutory right
to such facilities.
the right of access afforded employees and employee organizations
under the SEERA. It is sufficient to indicate my substantial
agreement with those portions of the primary decision. I would add,
however, that I find nothing in the SEERA or in the pertinent
literature which obligates an employer to provide to an employee
organization the type of facility involved in this case. Indeed,
it is arguable that such action is prohibited. Section 3519(d),
prohibits the state from contributing financial or other support
to an employee organization. However, it is not necessary to
decide whether by providing the requested facilities the state,
in this case, would be violating the Act or merely cooperating
state's donation of such facilities is not equivalent to a statutory
grant of a right to such space and services to the employees or the
organization.
3519(a) by unilaterally changing "an established past practice."
Absent a showing that the Charging Party enjoyed a right to the
facilities, the requirement for finding a violation based on
Morris, 	The 	Developing 	Labor 	Law 	(1971) 	p. 	140
	et 	seq.

20
unilateral change is that the employer failed to meet its obligation
to
	first
	provide
	notice
	and
	opportunity
	to
	negotiate
	to 	the 	exclusive
representative.
change
2
h	
At
	the
	time
	the
	Department
	adopted
	its
	current
policy, 	the
	collective
	bargaining
	law
	for
	state
	employees
	had
	only
recently
	been 	implemented.
	Units
	of 	representation
	had
	not
	been
determined
	and
	no
	exclusive
	representative
	had 	been
	selected.
	The
Department,
	however,
	did
	confer with
	CC0A
	pri?r
	to
	implementing
	the
change 	and
	actually
	delayed 	withdrawal
	of
	facilities 	after 	this
consultation.	
consultation. 	Prior
	to
	selection 	of
	an
	exclusive
	representative,
the
	employer
	satisfied
	its
	obligation
	to
	meet 	and
	consult.
e time the Department adopted its current
3
the employer satisfied its obligation to meet and consult.
There
	is
	a
	further 	consideration
	which
	militates
	against
	CC0A's
past 	practice
	argument.
	The
	original 	practice
	was
	developed
	and
maintained
	under
	a
	different
	law
	involving
	substantially 	different
employer
	obligations
	and
	constraints.
	Under
	SEERA,
	the
	state 	is
the
	single
	employer,
	a
	matter 	recognized
	by
	CC0A
	in
	its
	charge.
To
	require
	the
	state
	to 	maintain 	the
	CC0A
	facilities
	now
would 	be
to
	require
	it
	either
	to
	make
	available
	comparable
	facilities
	in
every
	state
	department 	to 	every
	employee
	organization with
membership
	among
	those 	departments'
	employees
	or 	face 	the
	possibility
of
	an
	unfair 	practice
	charge 	based
	on
	the 	discriminatory 	treatment
There is a further consideration which militates against CCOA's
2Pajaro Valley Unified School District (5/22/78) PERB2
Pajaro 	Valley 	Unified 	School
	District
	(5/22/78)
	PERB
Decision
	No. 	51;
	NLRB
	v. 	Katz 	(1962) 	359
	U.S. 	735 	[50
	LRRM
	2177].	Decision No. 51; NLRB v. Katz (1962) 359 U. S. 735 [50 LRRM 2177].
3
'See Professional Engineers in California Government
(3/19/80)
	PERB
	Decision
	No. 	118-S.see
20
is
	that
	the
	employer
	failed
	to
	meet
	its
	obligation
to first provide notice and opportunity to negotiate to the exclusive
representative." At t
policy, the collective bargaining law for state employees had only
recently been implemented. Units of representation had not been
determined and no exclusive representative had been selected. The
Department, however, did confer with CCOA prior to implementing the
change and actually delayed withdrawal of facilities after this
Prior to selection of an exclusive representative,
past practice argument. The original practice was developed and
maintained under a different law involving substantially different
employer obligations and constraints. Under SEERA, the state is
the single employer, a matter recognized by CCOA in its charge.
To require the state to maintain the CCOA facilities now would be
to require it either to make available comparable facilities in
every state department to every employee organization with
membership among those departments' employees or face the possibility
of an unfair practice charge based on the discriminatory treatment
Professional 	Engineers 	in 	California
	Government
(3/19/80) PERB Decision No. 118-S.

cite.irperson
21
among eligible labor organizations. Unequal application of employee
access 	policy 	is 	at 	least 	arguably 	a 	violation 	of 	section 	3519. 	To
place 	on 	the 	state 	that 	double 	burden, 	particularly 	to 	sustain 	a
voluntary 	practice 	relevant 	to 	and 	adopted 	at 	a 	different 	time 	and
under 	a 	different 	law, 	would 	be 	a 	distortion 	of 	the 	Board's
obligation 	to 	protect 	employee 	rights 	under 	the 	Act.
eligible
Harry Gluck, Chairperson
21
labor 	organizations. 	Unequal 	application 	of 	employee
access policy is at least arguably a violation of section 3519. To
place on the state that double burden, particularly to sustain a
voluntary practice relevant to and adopted at a different time and
under a different law, would be a distortion of the Board's
obligation to protect employee rights under the Act.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
_________________ )
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
OF
	THE
	STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
EMPLOYMENT
CALIFORNIA
	CORRECTIONAL
	OFFICERS
ASSOCIATION,
Charging
	Party,
v.
STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA 	(CALIFORNIA
DEPARTI1ENT
	OF
	CORRECTIONS)
,
Respondent.
CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS
Unfair
	Practice
Case
	No.
	S-CE-3-S
	(78-79)
PROPOSED
	DECISION
(4/27/79)
Unfair Practice
Appearances:	Appearances: R	
Russell
	L,
	Richeda,
	Attorney
	(Carroll,
	Burdick	
&
McDonough),
	for 	the
	California Correctional 	Officers 	Association;
Angela
	Pickett,
	Attorney,
	for
	the
	California
	Department
	of
Corrections.
ssell L. Richeda, Attorney (Carroll, Burdick &	u
Before 	Ronald
	E,
	Blubaugh,
	Hearing
	Officer.	Before Ronald E. Blubaugh, Hearing Officer.
PROCEDURAL
	HISTORY	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This 	case
	raises
	the
	issue 	of
	whether 	the
	California
Department
	of 	Corrections
	committed 	an
	unfair 	practice
	by
abandoning
	a
	long-standing 	policy 	of 	providing
	employee
	organiza-
tions 	with
	office
	space 	and
	the 	assistance 	of
	inmate
	clerks
	and
permitting
	them
	to 	have
	their
	own,
	separate 	bulletin
	boardso
	The
policy
	was 	abandoned
	just
	as 	the 	State
	Employer-Employee
	Relations
Act 	(Gov.
	Code§
	3512
	et 	seq.)
	went
	into 	effect.
This case raises the issue of whether the California
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
V .
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ,
Respondent.
Case No. S-CE-3-S (78-79)
PROPOSED DECISION
(4/27/79)
McDonough) , for the California Correctional Officers Association;
Angela Pickett, Attorney, for the California Department of
Corrections.
Department of Corrections committed an unfair practice by
abandoning a long-standing policy of providing employee organiza-
tions with office space and the assistance of inmate clerks and
permitting them to have their own, separate bulletin boards. The
policy was abandoned just as the State Employer-Employee Relations
Act (Gov. Code $ 3512 et seq. ) went into effect.
RELATIONS
	BOARD

-2-
The present charge was filed by the California Correctional
Officers 	Association
	(hereafter
	CCOA)
	on
	August
	18,
	1978. 	The	
The
charge
	alleges
	that
	the
	California
Department
	of 	Corrections
(hereafter
	Department)
	violated
	Government
	Code
	sections
	3519(a),
(b) 	and 	(d)
present
1
and
	3530
2
by
	its
	policy
	change
	in
	July 	of
	1978.	(b)
Following
	an
	unsuccessful
	effort
	to
	settle
	this
	case
	at
	an
informal 	conference,
	a
	formal
	hearing
	was
	scheduled
	and
	held
	in
Sacramento
	on
	October
	27,
	October
	31
	and
	November
	3, 	1978.
Following an unsuccessful effort to settle this case at an
It shall be unlawful for the state to:
l
Government
	Code
	section
	3519
	provides
	as
	follows:	Government Code section 3519 provides as follows:
It
	shall
	be
	unlawful
	for 	the
	state
	to:
(a)
	Impose
	or 	threaten 	to
	impose
	reprisals
	on
	employees,
to 	discriminate 	or 	threaten
	to 	discriminate 	against
employees,
	or 	otherwise 	to
	interfere
	with,
	restrain,
	or
coerce
	employees
	because
	of
	their
	exercise 	of
	rights
guaranteed
	by
	this
	chapter.
(b)
	Deny
	to
	employee
	organizations 	rights
	guaranteed
to
	them by
	this
	chapter.
(b)
(a)
(c) 	Refuse
	or
	fail
	to
	meet 	and
	confer 	in
	good
	faith
with
	a
	recognized
	employee
	organization.
c) Refuse or fail to meet and confer in good faith
(d) 	Dominate
	or
	interfere
	with 	the 	formation 	or
	admin-
istration
	of
	any 	employee
	organization, 	or 	contribute
financial 	or 	other 	support 	to
	it,
	or 	in
	any
	way
	encourage
employees
	to 	join
	any
	organization 	in 	preference 	to
another.
Dominate or interfere with the formation or admin
(e) 	Refuse
	to 	participate 	in
	good
	faith
	in 	the 	mediation
procedure
	set 	forth 	in 	Section
	3518.
) Refuse to participate in good faith in the mediation
Government Code section 3530 provides as follows:2
Government 	Code
	section
	3530
	provides 	as 	follows:
The state by means of such boards, commissions, admin
istrative 	officers 	or 	other 	representatives
	as
	may
	be
properly 	designated by 	law,
	shall
	meet 	and 	confer with
representatives 	of
	employee
	organizations
	upon
	request,
and
	shall 	consider 	as
	fully
	as 	such 	representatives
deem
	reasonable 	such 	presentations 	as 	are
	made 	by 	the
employee 	organization
	on
	behalf 	of
	its
	members
	prior
to 	arriving 	at
	a
	determination 	of 	policy 	or 	course
of 	action.	of action.
The
-2-
charge
	was
	filed
	by
	the
	California
	Correctional
Officers Association (hereafter CCOA) on August 18, 1978.
charge alleges that the California Department of Corrections
(hereafter Department) violated Government Code sections 3519(a),
and (d) and 3530 by its policy change in July of 1978.
informal conference, a formal hearing was scheduled and held in
Sacramento on October 27, October 31 and November 3, 1978.
with a recognized employee organization.
Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees,
to discriminate or threaten to discriminate against
employees, or otherwise to interfere with, restrain,
coerce employees because of their exercise of rights
guaranteed by this chapter.
Deny to employee organizations rights guaranteed
to them by this chapter.
(d) 	-
istration of any employee organization, or contribute
financial or other support to it, or in any way encourage
employees to join any organization in preference to
another.
procedure set forth in Section 3518.
state
	by means
	of
	such boards, 	commissions,
	admin~	-
istrative officers or other representatives as may be
properly designated by law, shall meet and confer with
representatives of employee organizations upon request,
and shall consider as fully as such representatives
deem reasonable such presentations as are made by the
employee organization on behalf of its members prior
to arriving at a determination of policy or course

-.3-
FINDINGS OF FACT	
OF
The
	Department
	of 	Corrections
	is
	the
	state
	agency 	which
operates 	the
	state
	prisons
	and
	which
	has
	"responsibility 	for
	the
care,
	custody,
	treatment,
	training, 	discipline
	and 	employment"
The Department of Corrections is the state agency which
3
of
	all
	prison
	inmates.
	The
	Department
	operates
	12
	institutions
throughout 	the
	state
	and 	employs
	approximately 	8,900
	persons.
As
	of
	October
	25, 	1978,
	there
	were 	20,821 	inmates
	confined
	in
	the
Department's 	custody.
care, custody, treatment, training, discipline and employment"
CCOA
4
has 	about 	3,675
	members
	who
	are
	employed by
	the
Department,
	All 	but
	about
	175
	of
	these
	members
	are 	peace
	officers
employed
	either
	in
	the
	correctional 	officer 	series
	or 	the
	correc-
tional
	program
	supervisor
	series
	of 	jobs.
	As
	peace
	officers,
	they
have
	the
	responsibility
	for
	the 	custody
	of 	the 	prison
	inmates.
Correctional
	officers
	are
	on
	duty
	in
	shifts
	around
	the 	clock.
They
	supervise
	inmates
	in
	the 	housing
	units, 	in
	the 	yard,
	in
	the
dining
	rooms
	and
	elsewhere
	in 	the
	institutions.
	Correctional
officers
	are 	assigned 	to
	specific
	posts
	and
	they
	are 	required 	to
remain
	at
	those 	posts 	during
	their 	shifts.
	They
	may
	not
	move
freely
	about 	the
	institution,
	Correctional 	officers 	live 	off
institutional
	grounds.
CCOA" has about 3,675 members who are employed by the
C
For
	at 	least
	15
	years 	the
	Department
	made
	it
	a
	practice
	to
provide 	office
	space 	for
	employee
	organizations 	within 	various
institutions.
	The
	practice
	has 	been 	subject 	to 	the
	availability
For at least 15 years the Department made it a practice to
Penal Code section 5054.3
Penal 	Code
	section 	5054.
4
"It was stipulated at the hearing that CCOA is an employee organiza
tion 	as 	that 	term 	is 	defined 	in 	Government 	Code 	section 	3513(a).rt
-3-
FACT
operates the state prisons and which has "responsibility for the
of all prison inmates. The Department operates 12 institutions
throughout the state and employs approximately 8,900 persons.
As of October 25, 1978, there were 20, 821 inmates confined in the
Department's custody.
Department. All but about 175 of these members are peace officers
employed either in the correctional officer series or the correct
tional program supervisor series of jobs. As peace officers, they
have the responsibility for the custody of the prison inmates.
orrectional officers are on duty in shifts around the clock.
They supervise inmates in the housing units, in the yard, in the
dining rooms and elsewhere in the institutions. Correctional
officers are assigned to specific posts and they are required to
remain at those posts during their shifts. They may not move
freely about the institution. Correctional officers live off
institutional grounds.
provide office space for employee organizations within various
institutions. The practice has been subject to the availability
was 	stipulated 	at 	the 	hearing 	that
	CCOA
	is 	an 	employee 	organiza-	-
tion as that term is defined in Government Code section 3513(a) .

-4-
of space and from time to time two or more organizations were
required 	to 	share 	the 	same 	office 	in 	some 	prisons.
space
The 	Department 	also 	made 	it 	a 	practice 	for 	at 	least 	12 	years
to 	permit 	employee 	organizations 	to 	hire 	inmates 	to 	perform
clerical 	taskso 	An 	inmate 	clerk worked 	in 	an 	organization's
office within 	the 	prison 	and 	from 	time 	to 	time 	two 	or- more 	organiza-
tions 	were 	required 	to 	share 	the 	same 	inmate 	clerk. 	The 	Department's
long-standing 	policy 	on 	the 	use 	of 	facilities 	and 	the 	employment 	of
inmate 	clerks 	provided 	as 	follows:
The Department also made it a practice for at least 12 years
Sec. 	2506. 	Use 	of 	State 	Facilities 	and Time.
Uniform 	standards 	of 	treatment 	will 	be 	applied
to 	all 	employee 	organizations 	concerning 	the
use 	of 	state 	facilities, 	equipment, 	and work
time.
Sec. 2506. Use of State Facilities and Time.
(d) 	Subject 	to 	the 	approval 	of 	the 	warden 	or
superintendent, 	employee 	organizations 	may 	be
jointly 	assigned 	office 	space 	and 	the 	use 	of
an 	inmate 	clerk 	if 	such 	space 	and 	assistance
are 	available. 	The 	costs 	of 	each 	shall 	be
shared 	equally by 	all 	organizations 	involved.
(d) Subject to the approval of the warden or
shared equally by all organizations involved.
CCOA 	took 	full 	advantage 	of 	the 	policy. 	The 	organization had
a 	number 	of 	institutional 	offices 	and 	employed 	a 	number 	of 	inmate
clerks. 	Evidence 	presented 	at 	the 	hearing 	demonstrates 	that 	CCOA
at 	one 	time 	or 	another 	has 	used 	an 	office 	and/or 	the 	services 	of
an inmate clerk in 11 of the state's 12 prisons. Through stipula
tion 	and 	testimony, 	it was 	established 	that:
CCOA took full advantage of the policy. The organization had
1)	1) 	At 	the 	California 	Correctional 	Center, 	Susanville, 	CCOA
had 	the 	use 	of 	an 	inmate 	clerk 	for 	three 	years 	and 	two 	months,
ending in December of 1977. This clerk was shared with the
At the California Correctional Center, Susanville, CCOA
-4-
and 	from 	time 	to 	time 	two 	or more 	organizations 	were
required to share the same office in some prisons.
to permit employee organizations to hire inmates to perform
clerical tasks. An inmate clerk worked in an organization's
office within the prison and from time to time two or more organiza
tions were required to share the same inmate clerk. The Department's
long-standing policy on the use of facilities and the employment of
inmate clerks provided as follows:
Uniform standards of treatment will be applied
to all employee organizations concerning the
use of state facilities, equipment, and work
time.
superintendent, employee organizations may be
jointly assigned office space and the use of
an inmate clerk if such space and assistance
are available. The costs of each shall be
a number of institutional offices and employed a number of inmate
clerks. Evidence presented at the hearing demonstrates that CCOA
at one time or another has used an office and/ or the services of
an 	inmate 	clerk 	in 	11 	of 	the 	state's 	12 	prisons. 	Through	- 	stipula-
tion and testimony, it was established that:
had the use of an inmate clerk for three years and two months,
ending 	iri 	December 	of 	1977. 	This 	clerk was 	shared with 	the

A
-5-
) 	t the California Men's Colony, San Luis Obispo, CCOA
California State Employees Association (hereafter CSEA) and
Teamsters
	Local
	960
	(hereafter
	the 	Teamsters).	
CCOA	
shared
an
	office 	at
	the
	institution
	for
	the
	last
	four
	years 	with
	CSEA
and
	the
	Teamsters.
State
2)	2)	
At
	the
	California
	Institution
	for
	Men,
	Chino,
	CCOA
	had
the
	use
	of
	an
	inmate
	clerk
	for
	approximately
	12
	years. 	Services
of
	the
	clerk
	were
	shared
	at
	various
	times
	between	
CCOA	
and
	CSEA.
CCOA
	also
	shared
	an
	office 	at
	the
	institution
with
	CSEA
	for
	a
period 	of
	time
	until
	1975 	when
	the
	office
	was
	converted 	to
	an
institutional
	use.
	After 	that
	date,
	CCOA
	had
	the
	use
	of
	a
	desk
at
	the
	Chino
	prison.
At the California Institution for Men, Chino, CCOA had
3)	3 	At
	the
	California
	Medical
	Facility,
	Vacaville,
	CCOA
	used
an
	office
	for
	15
	years
	and 	employed
	a
	clerk 	for
	11
	years.
	At
	all
times
	prior
	to
	February
	of
	1978,
	CCOA
	had
	shared 	the
	office 	in
this 	institution
	with 	other
	employee
	organizations.
4) 	At
	the
	California
	Men's 	Colony,
	San
	Luis 	Obispo,
	CCOA
employed the services of an inmate clerk for the last 10 years.	
employed
	the 	services 	of
	an
	inmate
	clerk 	for 	the
	last
	10
	years.
For part of that time, the clerk was shared with CSEA.	
For
	part
	of 	that
	time, 	the
	clerk
was
	shared with
	CSEA. 	CCOA had	
CCOA	
had
the use of an office for 10 years ending in February of 1978.	
the 	use 	of
	an
	office
	for
	10
	years 	ending
	in
	February
	of
	1978.
During part of that time, the office was shared with CSEA.	
During
	part 	of 	that
	time, 	the
	office
	was
	shared with
	CSEA.
At the California Medical Facility, Vacaville, CCOA used
5)	5) At Folsom State Prison, CCOA had the unshared services	
At 	Folsom
	State 	Prison,
	CCOA
	had 	the 	unshared
	services
of a clerk and the unshared use of an office for the three years	
of
	a
	clerk
	and
	the 	unshared 	use 	of
	an
	office 	for 	the 	three 	years
immediately prior to the 1978 change in policy.	
immediately
	prior 	to 	the
	1978 	change
	in 	policy.
6)	6) At San Quentin State Prison, CCOA had the unshared	At 	San
	Quentin 	State 	Prison,
	CCOA
	had 	the 	unshared
services of an inmate clerk for at least the last seven years prior	
services 	of
	an 	inmate 	clerk 	for 	at 	least 	the 	last
	seven 	years 	prior
to the change in policy and the use of an office which it shared	
to 	the 	change 	in 	policy 	and 	the 	use 	of 	an 	office which
	it
	shared
with CSEA for the same seven years.	with 	CSEA
	for 	the 	same 	seven 	years.
-5-
Employees
	Association
	(hereafter
	CSEA)
	and
Teamsters Local 960 (hereafter the Teamsters). CCOA shared
an office at the institution for the last four years with CSEA
and the Teamsters.
the use of an inmate clerk for approximately 12 years. Services
of the clerk were shared at various times between CCOA and CSEA.
CCOA also shared an office at the institution with CSEA for a
period of time until 1975 when the office was converted to an
institutional use. After that date, CCOA had the use of a desk
at the Chino prison.
)
an office for 15 years and employed a clerk for 11 years. At all
times prior to February of 1978, CCOA had shared the office in
this institution with other employee organizations.

-6-
7)	
At
	the
	Sierra
	Conservation
	Center,
	Jamestown,
	CCOA
employed
	an
	inmate
	clerk 	for
	the
	five
	years
	prior
	to
	the
	change
in 	policy,
	The
	services 	of
	this 	clerk
were
	shared with 	the
Teamsters .	
CCOA
	also
	had 	an
	office 	at
	the
	Jamestown
	institution
	for
the
	same
	five 	years, 	sharing
	it
	part
	of
	the
	time
	with 	the 	Teamsters.
At the Sierra Conservation Center, Jamestown, CCOA
8)	8)	
On
	July
	3, 	1978,
	the 	date
	on
which
	the
	Department 	announced
elimination 	of
	its
	previous
	office
	and
	inmate
	clerk
	policies,
	CCOA
had
	no
	office
	in
	four
	institutionso
	Those
	four
	were:
On July 3, 1978, the date on which the Department announced
---
	The
	California 	Correctional
	Institution 	at
	Tehachapi
where
	CCOA
	had
	shared
	an
	office
	with
	CSEA
	from
	October
	of
	1975
through
	March
	of
	1977.
	CCOA
	had
	the 	unshared
	part-time 	services
of
	an
	inmate
	clerk
	at
	Tehachapi
	from
	October
of
	1975
	through
March
	of
	1977;
The California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi
---
	The
	California
	Institution
	for
	Women
	at
	Frontera
	where
CCOA
	once
	had 	shared
	an
	office
	for
	about
	three
	years 	with 	another
organization but
	had
	elected not 	to
	use
	the
	office
	space
	in 	the
four
	to 	five
	years
	prior
	to 	July 	of
	19780
	At 	one
	time
	CCOA
	had
employed 	an
	inmate
	clerk 	at
	Frontera but
	it
	has 	not
	done
	so
	for
	the
last
	four 	to 	five
	years
	prior
	to 	July 	of
	1978;
--- The California Institution for Women at Frontera where
--- The California Correctional Training Facility at
Soledad where
	for
	about
	15
	years,
	ending
	in
	1973,
	CCOA
	had
	the
	use
of
	an
	office
	which
	it
	shared with
	CSEA.
	CCOA
	had 	employed 	an
inmate
	clerk 	at
	Soledad 	from 	November
	of
	1972
	through
	March
	of
1975,
	sharing 	the 	clerk 	part 	of 	the 	time with
	CSEA;
The
---
	The 	Deuel 	Vocational
	Institution 	at
	Tracy where 	an
office
	was 	made
	available 	to
	CCOA
	for 	less 	than 	a
	year 	but 	the
office
	was 	not 	used 	by 	CCOA. 	CCOA
	had 	the 	unshared 	services 	of 	an
inmate 	clerk 	at 	Deuel 	for 	the 	last 	six years 	prior 	to 	July 	of 	1978.
--- The Deuel Vocational Institution at Tracy where an
employed an inmate clerk for the five years prior to the change
in policy. The services of this clerk were shared with the
Teamsterso 	CCOA also had an office at the Jamestown institution for
the same five years, sharing it part of the time with the Teamsters.
elimination of its previous office and inmate clerk policies, CCOA
ii
had no office in four institutions. Those four were:
where CCOA had shared an office with CSEA from October of 1975
through March of 1977. CCOA had the unshared part-time services
of an inmate clerk at Tehachapi from October of 1975 through
March of 1977;
CCOA once had shared an office for about three years with another
organization but had elected not to use the office space in the
four to five years prior to July of 1978. At one time CCOA had
employed an inmate clerk at Frontera but it has not done so for the
last four to five years prior to July of 1978;
California 	Correctional 	Training
	Facility 	at
Soledad where for about 15 years, ending in 1973, CCOA had the use
of an office which it shared with CSEA. CCOA had employed an
inmate clerk at Soledad from November of 1972 through March of
1975, sharing the clerk part of the time with CSEA;
office was made available to CCOA for less than a year but the
office was not used by CCOA. CCOA had the unshared services of an
inmate clerk at Deuel for the last six years prior to July of 1978.

-7-
In 	the 	four 	institutions 	where 	CCOA 	had no 	office 	in 	July 	of
1978, 	its 	membership 	was 	lower 	than 	its 	statewide 	average 	of 	70 	percent
of 	those 	law 	enforcement 	employees 	in 	job 	classes 	sought 	by 	CCOA.
'In the four institutions where CCOA had no office in July of
CCOA 	used 	bulletin boards 	at 	various 	institutions 	for 	many
years. 	The 	parties 	stipulated 	that 	CCOA had 	the 	unshared 	use 	of
bulletin boards 	at 	seven 	institutions 	for 	periods 	of 	two 	to 	twenty
years. 	The 	parties 	also 	stipulated 	that 	CCOA had 	shared 	the 	use
of bulletin boards 	at 	two 	other institutions 	for 	periods 	of 	four
to 	twenty 	years.
CCOA used bulletin boards at various institutions for many
CCOA 	offices 	in 	the 	prisons 	were 	used 	to 	prepare 	and 	store
records, 	to 	distribute 	CCOA 	literature, 	and 	to 	prepare 	and 	process
grievances. 	CCOA members 	went 	to 	the 	offices 	to 	obtain 	insurance
forms 	and materials 	relating 	to 	various 	CCOA benefits. 	The 	offices
also 	served 	as 	lounges 	and 	places 	where 	employees 	could 	assemble
during 	times 	of 	tension 	in 	the 	institution. 	In 	general, 	CCOA 	used
its 	institutional 	offices 	as 	the 	primary 	location- for 	the 	trans-
action 	of business 	with 	its 	members.
CCOA offices in the prisons were used to prepare and store
Of 	perhaps 	even 	greater 	importance 	to 	the 	CCOA were 	the
inmate 	clerks 	who 	operated 	the 	organization's 	offices 	in 	the
prisons. 	Basically, 	the 	inmate 	clerks 	served 	the 	role 	of 	a 	field
staff 	for 	CCOA. 	CCOA 	has 	no 	employees 	other 	than 	those who 	work
in 	the 	organization's 	Sacramento headquarters 	office. 	The inmate	The 	inmate
clerks 	historically 	filled 	a 	role 	of 	the 	type 	that 	paid 	organizers
have 	performed 	for 	many 	labor 	organizations. 	They 	also 	have 	been
the 	entire 	clerical 	staff 	for 	the 	local 	chapters.
Of perhaps even greater importance to the CCOA were the
The 	duties 	which 	an 	inmate 	clerk performed 	for 	CCOA were
legion. 	Among 	the 	clerk's 	tasks 	which 	a 	field 	organizer might
otherwise 	perform was 	the 	explanation 	of 	the 	various 	benefits 	of
CCOA membership. 	Inmate 	clerks 	were 	conversant with 	all 	facets
The duties which an inmate clerk performed for CCOA were
- 7-
1978, its membership was lower than its statewide average of 70 percent
of those law enforcement employees in job classes sought by CCOA.
yearsc 	The parties stipulated that CCOA had the unshared use of
bulletin boards at seven institutions for periods of two to twenty
years. The parties also stipulated that CCOA had shared the use
of bulletin boards at two other institutions for periods of four
to twenty years.
records, to distribute CCOA literature, and to prepare and process
grievances. CCOA members went to the offices to obtain insurance
forms and materials relating to various CCOA benefits. The offices
also served as lounges and places where employees could assemble
during times of tension in the institution. In general, CCOA used
its institutional offices as the primary location for the trans
action of business with its members.
inmate clerks who operated the organization's offices in the
prisons. Basically, the inmate clerks served the role of a field
staff for CCOA. 	CCOA has no employees other than those who work
in the organization's Sacramento headquarters office.
clerks historically filled a role of the type that paid organizers
have performed for many labor organizations. They also have been
the entire clerical staff for the local chapters.
legion. Among the clerk's tasks which a field organizer might
otherwise perform was the explanation of the various benefits of
CCOA membership. Inmate clerks were conversant with all facets

-8-
of the CCOA benefit package including life and dental insurance
programs 	and 	such 	vacation 	benefits 	as 	discounts 	at 	amusement
parks. 	Inmate 	clerks 	also 	distributed 	CCOA 	literature 	to 	new
employees and sometimes signed up new members for the organization.
the
Among 	the 	secretarial 	tasks 	of 	the 	inmate 	clerk were 	the
typing, 	filing 	and 	completion 	of 	forms 	which 	accompany 	the 	running
of 	any 	organization. 	The 	inmate 	clerk maintained 	the 	membership
records, 	typed 	and 	distributed 	the 	chapter 	publications, 	received
and 	distributed 	materials 	from 	the 	CCOA 	office 	in 	Sacramento,
typed 	most 	of 	the 	grievances, 	placed 	literature 	on 	the bulletin
boards 	and 	distributed 	dental 	claim 	forms. 	Typically, 	inmate
clerks 	worked 	a 	40-hour week 	but 	one 	inmate 	clerk 	testified 	that
he 	routinely 	took 	messages 	and 	received 	requests 	for 	insurance
forms 	during his 	off-duty hours.
Among the secretarial tasks of the inmate clerk were the
Inmate 	clerks 	were 	paid 	varying 	amounts 	by 	the 	local 	chapters
which 	employed 	them. 	According 	to 	law, 	the 	rate 	of 	compensation
could 	range 	between 	2 	cents 	per 	hour 	and 	35 	cents 	per hour.
Inmate clerks were paid varying amounts by the local chapters
5
The 	particular 	rate 	of 	pay 	for 	an 	individual 	clerk was 	determined
according 	to 	that 	clerk's 	level 	of 	experience 	and 	competence.
In 	those 	institutions 	where 	two 	or more 	organizations 	shared
the 	services 	of 	a 	single 	inmate 	clerk 	the 	salary 	of 	the 	clerk was
split 	between 	the 	organizations. 	In 	such 	situations, 	there 	were
occasional 	complaints 	to 	the 	Department 	that 	a 	clerk 	did more 	work
for 	one 	organization 	than 	another 	or 	that 	a 	clerk 	favored 	one
organization 	over 	the 	other. 	In 	a 	shared 	office 	at 	San 	Quentin
could range between 2 cents per hour and 35 cents per hour.
Penal Code section 2700.5 Penal 	Code 	section 	2700.
-8-
CCOA 	benefit 	package 	including 	life 	and 	dental 	insurance
programs and such vacation benefits as discounts at amusement
parks . 	Inmate clerks also distributed CCOA literature to new
employees 	and 	sometimes 	signed 	up 	new members 	for 	the 	organization ..
typing, filing and completion of forms which accompany the running
of any organization. The inmate clerk maintained the membership
records, typed and distributed the chapter publications, received
and distributed materials from the CCOA office in Sacramento,
typed most of the grievances, placed literature on the bulletin
boards and distributed dental claim forms. Typically, inmate
clerks worked a 40-hour week but one inmate clerk testified that
he routinely took messages and received requests for insurance
forms during his off-duty hours.
which employed them. According to law, the rate of compensation
The particular rate of pay for an individual clerk was determined
according to that clerk's level of experience and competence.
In those institutions where two or more organizations shared
the services of a single inmate clerk the salary of the clerk was
split between the organizations. In such situations, there were
occasional complaints to the Department that a clerk did more work
for one organization than another or that a clerk favored one
organization over the other. In a shared office at San Quentin

-9-
there also was an occasional complaint that some of CCOA's paper
supply
	was
	missing.
also
The
	Department's
	decision 	to
	change
	its
	policies
	on
	office
space
	and
	inmate
	clerks
	can
	be
	traced 	to
	a
	study undertaken
	by
Gil
	Hawkins
	shortly
	after
	he
	was
	employed
	as 	Department
	industrial
relations 	director 	in
	the
	fall
	of
	1977.
	Mr. 	Hawkins 	was
	asked
	to
review
	the 	Department's
	policies
	toward
	employee
	organizations 	to
determine
	if
	there
	was 	any
	basis 	to
	various
	complaints
	that
	the
Department
	afforded
	preferential
	treatment 	to
	some
	organizations.
The Department's decision to change its policies on office
What 	Mr. 	Hawkins 	fotmd was 	a
	welter 	of 	crossing 	accusations
of favoritism.	
of 	favoritism.
	The
	Teamsters
	were
	complaining
	that
	the
	best
locations for bulletin boards already were taken by other organiza
tions.
	CSEA
	was
	complaining
	that
	the
	Department
	improperly
	permitted
CCOA
	to 	operate
	a
	badge 	program.
	CCOA
	was
	complaining
	that
	the
Department 	improperly
	permitted
	CSEA
	to 	operate
	snack
	bars
	and
employee
	canteens.
What Mr. Hawkins found was a welter of crossing accusations
The
	badge
	project
	and
	the 	snack
	bar
	complaints
	were
	closely
tied
	together.
	The
	Department had
	entered
	an
	agreement
	with
	CCOA
whereby
	CCOA
	would
	collect
	monies
	for
	badges
	to
	be
	worn by
	the
Department's 	peace
	officer
	employees.
	CSEA
	contended
	this 	project
provided
	CCOA
	an
	unfair
	advantage
	at
	signing
new 	employees 	because
new 	employees 	would 	have 	to 	get
	their
	badges 	from
	CCOA.
	As 	a
result 	of
	CSEA's
	complaints, 	the 	Department 	cancelled 	the 	project
with
	CCOA.
The badge project and the snack bar complaints were closely
Following 	the 	Department's 	cancellation of 	the badge
	project,
CCOA
	initiated
	a 	complaint 	about 	CSEA 	snack bars 	and 	concessions
Following the Department's cancellation of the badge project,
was 	an
	occasional
	complaint
	that
	some
	of
	CCOA's
	paper
supply was missing.
space and inmate clerks can be traced to a study undertaken by
Gil Hawkins shortly after he was employed as Department industrial
relations director in the fall of 1977. Mr. Hawkins was asked to
review the Department's policies toward employee organizations to
determine if there was any basis to various complaints that the
Department afforded preferential treatment to some organizations.
The Teamsters were complaining that the best
locations 	for
	bulletin
	boards
	already
	were
	taken
	by	-	
other 	organiza-
tions . 	CSEA was complaining that the Department improperly permitted
CCOA to operate a badge program. CCOA was complaining that the
Department improperly permitted CSEA to operate snack bars and
employee canteens.
tied together. 	The Department had entered an agreement with CCOA
whereby CCOA would collect monies for badges to be worn by the
Department's peace officer employees. CSEA contended this project
provided CCOA an unfair advantage at signing new employees because
new employees would have to get their badges from CCOA. As a
result of CSEA's complaints, the Department cancelled the project
with CCOA.
CCOA initiated a complaint about CSEA snack bars and concessions

at
	the
	California
	Institution
	for
	Women,
	the
	California
	Rehabili-
tation
	Center
	and
	the
	California
	Institution
	for
	Men.
	By
	a
	letter
of
	November
	9,
	1977,
	CCOA
	called
	upon
	the
	Department
	to
	halt
	all
employee
	benefit
	functions
	then
	existing
	under
	the 	sponsorship
of
	CSEA.
	CCOA
	renewed
	this
	complaint
	in
	a
	letter
	to
	the
	Department
on March 31, 1978. CCOA raised the matter a third time at an
April
	10,
	1978
	meeting
	with
	the
	director
	of·
the
	Department
	of
Corrections.
at the California Institution for Women, the California Rehabili-
There
	also
	were
	complaints
	that
	some
	employee
	organizations
received
	favored 	treatment
	in 	the
	assignment
	of
	inmate
	clerks
	by
receiving 	clerks
	with
	a
	better
	security
	clearance
	than
	those 	of
a
	competing
	organization.
	Inmates
	with 	the
	best 	security
	clearance
to 	the
	largest 	portion 	of 	the 	prison
	grounds.
	Thus,
have
	access
employee
	better
	security
	clearances 	are
	more
	useful 	to
clerks
	with
organizations
	than 	inmate
	clerks
	with
	less
	good
	security 	clearances,
There also were complaints that some employee organizations
Finally, 	there
	were
	complaints
	of 	favoritism 	in 	the 	issuance
of 	prison
	identification
	cards.
	Employee
	organization 	representa-
tives
	with
	identification
	cards
	had
	easier
	access 	to
	Department
institutions
	than 	organizations
	whose
	representatives 	did not
	have
identification
	cards.
Finally, there were complaints of favoritism in the issuance
Mr. 	Hawkins
	testified 	that 	after
	reviewing 	these 	various
complaints he concluded that "Number one, . . . there wasn't a
sufficient 	policy 	or 	enforcement 	of 	the 	policy 	to 	ensure
	that
	the
employee
	organizations
	would be 	treated 	equally;
	number 	two, 	they
were 	not 	being 	treated 	equally;
	number
	three, 	just
	about 	every
institution
had 	a 	separate 	set 	of policies 	in 	practice 	and 	there
Mr. Hawkins testified that after reviewing these various
-10-	-10-
tation Center and the California Institution for Men. By a letter
of November 9, 1977, CCOA called upon the Department to halt all
employee benefit functions then existing under the sponsorship
of CSEA. CCOA renewed this complaint in a letter to the Department
third
	on March
	31,
	1978
..
CCOA
	raised
	the
	matter
	a
	time
	at
	an
April 10, 1978 meeting with the director of the Department of
Corrections.
received favored treatment in the assignment of inmate clerks by
receiving clerks with a better security clearance than those of
a competing organization. 	Inmates with the best security clearance
have access to the largest portion of the prison grounds. Thus,
clerks with better security clearances are more useful to employee
organizations than inmate clerks with less good security clearances.
of prison identification cards. Employee organization representa-
tives with identification cards had easier access to Department
institutions than organizations whose representatives did not have
identification cards.
concluded
	that
	"Number
	one,
	•••
	there wasn't
	a
complaints 	he
sufficient policy or enforcement of the policy to ensure that the
employee organizations would be treated equally; number two, they
were not being treated equally; number three, just about every
institution had a separate set of policies in practice and there

-11-
wasn't any uniformity whatsoever that I could detect and I looked
hard."
any
The 	problem with 	office 	space was 	especially 	complexo 	Three	Three
employee 	organizations 	already had used 	office 	space 	in 	some
institutions 	and 	the 	Department 	had 	good 	reason 	to 	anticipate 	that
more 	organizations 	would 	seek 	institutional 	offices 	as 	the 	State
Employer-Employee 	Relations 	Act (hereafter 	SEERA) 	went 	into 	effect.
How 	many 	organizations 	might 	seek 	institutional 	office 	space 	was
unclear but 	it 	was 	apparent 	to 	Department 	officials 	that 	the
number 	could be 	substantial. 	Nine 	Organizations 	each had 	paid
$30 	to 	purchase 	a 	list 	of 	the 	Department's 	employees, 	an 	action
indicating 	an 	interest 	in 	organizing 	the 	Department's 	employees. 	In
the months after October of 1977, between six and twelve organiza
tions had made direct inquiries with Mr. Hawkins about the avail
ability 	of 	institutional 	office 	spaceo 	Mr. 	Hawkins 	advised 	these
organizations 	that 	the 	policy 	of 	providing 	office 	space 	and 	inmate
clerks 	was 	under 	review.
The problem with office space was especially complex.
It 	was 	Mr. 	Hawkins' 	uncontradicted 	testimony 	that 	all 	12
prisons 	have 	space 	problems, 	a 	factor 	which 	limits 	the 	amount 	of
space 	available 	for 	employee 	organization 	offices. 	He 	said 	he 	did
not favor placing all employee organizations into a single office
at 	each 	institution. 	He 	testified 	that 	in 	the 	expected 	election
campaigns 	the 	various 	organizations 	would be 	in 	a 	competition 	for
survival 	and 	should not 	be 	in 	the 	same 	office 	together. 	The 	spirit
of 	competition had 	reached 	such 	intensity 	in 	late 	1977 	that 	material
had been torn from the bulletin boards of various organizations.
It was Mr. Hawkins' uncontradicted testimony that all 12
-11-
uniformity 	whatsoever 	that 	I 	could 	detect 	and 	I 	looked
hard."
employee organizations already had used office space in some
institutions and the Department had good reason to anticipate that
more organizations would seek institutional offices as the State
Employer-Employee Relations Act (hereafter SEERA) went into effect.
How many organizations might seek institutional office space was
unclear but it was apparent to Department officials that the
number could be substantial. Nine Organizations each had paid
$30 to purchase a list of the Department's employees, an action
indicating an interest in organizing the Department's employees. In
the 	months 	after 	October 	of 	1977, 	between 	six 	and 	twelve -organiza-
tions 	had made 	direct 	inquiries 	with Mr. 	Hawkins 	about	- 	the 	avail-
ability of institutional office space. Mr. Hawkins advised these
organizations that the policy of providing office space and inmate
clerks was under review.
prisons have space problems, a factor which limits the amount of
space available for employee organization offices. He said he did
not 	favor 	placing 	all 	employee 	organi1,ations 	into 	a 	single 	office
at each institution. He testified that in the expected election
campaigns the various organizations would be in a competition for
survival and should not be in the same office together. The spirit
of competition had reached such intensity in late 1977 that material
had been 	torn 	from 	the 	bulletin boards 	of 	various 	organizationso

The change in Department policies toward employee organiza
tions began in about February of 1978. The operation of snack
bars and employee canteens was the first area subject to change.
The organizations which operated those facilities were advised
that the Department intended to buy out all food and canteen
operations by July 1, 1978. The Department first assumed
operation of a snack bar run by the San Quentin Employees Mutual
Benefit Association. As soon as the policy change was announced,
the San Quentin organization requested the Department to take over
its facility, immediately. The San Quentin snack bar had failed
a Department of Health sanitary inspection and the employee
organization did not want to commit the funds necessary to bring
the snack bar up to the required health standards. The Department
also took over a canteen facility operated by an employee benevolent
organization at the California Correctional Institution, Tehachapi.
As was the case at San Quentin, the Department moved rapidly at
Tehachapi because the employee organization wanted relief from the
operation of the canteen.
employee
Before 	the 	Department 	could 	acquire 	the 	other
	employee
organization-operated
	snack
	bars, 	the 	California 	electorate
approved
	Proposition
	13,
	a
	measure which
	significantly
	reduced
tax revenues to local government. Following the passage of
Proposition 13, the State Department of Finance instituted new
cost-control procedures which delayed further acquisition of the
employee-operated snack bars. As of the date of the hearing in
this matter, the Department still had not purchased the CSEA
snack bars.
Before the Department could acquire the other employee
-12-	-12-
change
	in
	Department
	policies
	toward
	organiza-
The 	-
began
	in
	about
	February
	of
	1978.
	The
	operation
	of
	snack
tions
area
	subject
	to
	change.
bars
	and
	employee
	canteens
	was
	the
	first
were
	advised
The
	organizations
	which
	operated 	those
	facilities
Department
	intended 	to
	buy
	out
	all
	food 	and
	canteen
that
	the
operations
	by
	July
	1,
	1978.
	The
	Department
	first
	assumed
Mutual
	bar
	run
	by
	the
	San
	Quentin
	Employees
operation 	of
	a
	snack
Benefit 	Association.
	As
	soon
	as
	the 	policy
	change
	was
	announced,
the
	San
	Quentin
	organization 	requested 	the
	Department
	to
	take
	over
immediately.
	The
	San
	Quentin 	snack
	bar
	had
	failed
its
	facility, 
sanitary 	inspection
	and
	the
	employee
a
	Department
	of 	Health
organization
	did 	not
	want
	to
	commit
	the
	funds
	necessary 	to
	bring
the
	snack
	bar
	up
	to 	the 	required health 	standards.
	The
	Department
by 	an
	employee
	benevolent
also
	took 	over
	a
	canteen
	facility
	operated
Correctional
	Institution,
	Tehachapi.
organization
	at
	the
	California
Quentin,
	the
	Department
	moved
	rapidly
	at
As
	was
	the
	case
	at
	San
Tehachapi 	because 	the
	employee
	organization
wanted
	relief
	from
	the
operation 	of 	the 	canteen.
organization-operated snack bars, the California electorate
approved Proposition 13, a measure which significantly reduced
government. 	Following 	the 	passage 	oftax 	revenues 	to 	local
Proposition 	13, 	the 	State
	Department 	of 	Finance
	instituted
new
acquisition 	of 	thecost-control 	procedures 	which 	delayE,d
	further
in	bars.
	As
	of 	the 	date 	of 	the 	hearingemployee-operated 	snack
this 	matter, 	the 	Department
	still
	had not 	purchased 	the
	CSEA
snack 	bars.

GOOOCOOC>O&IIIOCeOeoGO•OO
-13-
On approximately May 1, 1978, Mr. Hawkins recommended to the
Department's top management that the use by employee organizations
of 	institutional 	office 	space 	and 	inmate 	clerks 	be 	eliminated.
On 	July 	3, 	1978, 	the 	Department's 	assistant 	director, 	Carlos 	M.
Sanchez, 	sent 	to 	all wardens, 	superintendents 	and 	regional 	admin-
istrators 	a 	memorandum which 	implemented Mr. 	Hawkin's 	recommenda-
tions. With respect to the use of office space and inmate clerks,
the memorandum 	directed 	as 	follows:
approximately
There 	is 	a 	lack 	of 	uniformity 	in 	the 	procedure
in 	which we 	provide 	office 	space 	for 	employee
organizations. In an attempt to uniform [sic]
that 	practice, 	the 	following 	will 	be 	implemented
within 	30 	days:
There is a lack of uniformity in the procedure
The 	use 	of 	state 	property 	should be 	directly
related 	to 	the 	goals 	and mission 	of 	the
Department. 	Inasmuch 	as 	membership 	in 	labor
organizations 	is 	not 	a 	mission 	of 	the 	Department
of 	Corrections, 	the 	department 	will not 	provide
to 	labor 	organizations 	office 	space, 	telephones,
and 	inmate 	assistance 	(whether 	free 	or 	rented)
for 	the 	purpose 	of 	organizational 	or membership
activities. 	Institutions 	that 	currently 	lease
office 	space 	to 	labor 	organizations 	will 	terminate
all 	such 	arrengements 	[sic] 	no 	later 	than 	30 	days
hence.
The use of state property should be directly
With 	respect 	to 	bullet in 	boards, 	the new 	policy provided
that 	the 	Department would"provide 	bulletin boards 	and 	that 	the
bulletin 	boards 	would 	be 	placed 	in 	locations 	"reasonably 	visible
and 	accessible 	to 	all 	employees." 	The 	July 	3 memorandum 	directed
that 	all 	bulletin boards 	would be 	shared 	equally by 	all 	employee
organizations.
With respect to bulletin boards, the new policy provided
In 	the 	words 	of 	CCOA 	Executive 	Director Ken 	Brown, 	the 	change
was 	"a major 	disaster" 	for 	his 	organization. 	Because 	CCOA had
In the words of CCOA Executive Director Ken Brown, the change
-13-
May 	1, 	1978, 	Mr. 	Hawkins 	recommended 	to 	the
Department's 	top 	management 	that 	the 	use 	by 	employee 	organizations
of institutional office space and inmate clerks be eliminated.
On July 3, 1978, the Department's assistant director, Carlos M.
Sanchez, sent to all wardens, superintendents and regional admin-
istrators a memorandum which implemented Mr. Hawkin's recommenda-
tionso 	With 	respect 	to 	the 	use 	of 	office 	space 	and 	inmate 	clerks,
the memorandum directed as follows:
in which we provide office space for employee
organizationso 	In 	an 	attempt 	to 	uniform 	[sic]
that practice, the following will be implemented
within 30 days :
related to the goals and mission of the
Department . 	Inasmuch as membership in labor
organizations is not a mission of the Department
of Corrections, the department will not provide
to labor organizations office space, telephones,
and inmate assistance (whether free or rented)
for the purpose of organizational or membership
activities. Institutions that currently lease
office space to labor organizations will terminate
all such arrengements [sic] no later than 30 days
hence.
that the Department would provide bulletin boards and that the
bulletin boards would be placed in locations "reasonably visible
and accessible to all employees." The July 3 memorandum directed
that all bulletin boards would be shared equally by all employee
organizations.
was "a major disaster" for his organization. Because CCOA had

-14-
relied heavily on the use of inmate clerks and institutional
offices,
	the 	elimination 	of
	those
	services
	had
	a
	detrimental
effect
	upon
	that
	organization.
	With 	no
	field
	organizers
	and
	no
clerical
	employees
	at
	the 	chapter
	level,
	CCOA
	found
	itself
	hard-
pressed 	to
	continue
	a
	number
	of 	routine
	operations
	at
	the 	chapter
level.
	At
	those
	institutions
	where
	CCOA
	had
	employed
	inmate
	clerks,
an
	effort
	was
	made
	to
	shift
	the
	work
	of
	the
	clerks
	onto
	the 	chapter
officers.	
But
	this 	effort
	was
	only
	marginally
	successful.
	Delays
began
	to 	occur
	in 	the
	distribution
	of
	CCOA
	literature,
	in 	the
processing
	of
	grievance
	and
	insurance
	forms,
	in
	the
	preparation
of 	chapter
	bulletins.
	Records 	were
	not 	maintained
	and
	the 	process
of 	signing
	up 	new
	members
	became
	less
	efficient.
heavily
With
	the
	elimination 	of
	a
	CCOA
	office,
	there
	was
	no
	convenient
location 	for
	members
	to
	pick
	up
	forms
	or
	other materials 	or 	to
leave
	messages
	to
	officers
	of 	the 	local 	chapter.
	The
	offices
	long
had been 	used 	as
	places
	where
	members
	could 	speak
with
	CCOA
	officers
about
	grievances. 	After 	the
	offices
	were
	closed,
	CCOA
	officers
could
	make
	special
	arrangements
	with 	prison 	administrators 	in 	order
to
	have
	a
	private
	room
	in
which
	to 	interview
	members. 	However,
	in
at 	least
	one
	institution
	CCOA
	officers
	have 	had
	to
	meet
	with
	members
in 	the 	hallways 	to 	discuss 	grievances.
With the elimination of a CCOA office, there was no convenient
Members
	have 	complained
	to
	CCOA
	officers
	about 	the 	erosion
of 	services
	which 	followed 	the 	Department's 	change
	in 	policy.
However,
	the 	change has 	had 	no
	significant
	impact 	on
	CCOA's
	total
membership, 	although 	the 	organization's 	officers 	attribute 	several
resignations 	to 	the 	Department's 	action.
Members have complained to CCOA officers about the erosion
-14-
on
	the
	use
	of
	inmate
	clerks
	and
	institutional
offices, the elimination of those services had a detrimental
effect upon that organization. With no field organizers and no
clerical employees at the chapter level, CCOA found itself hard-
pressed to continue a number of routine operations at the chapter
level. At those institutions where CCOA had employed inmate clerks,
an effort was made to shift the work of the clerks onto the chapter
officers. 	But this effort was only marginally successful. Delays
began to occur in the distribution of CCOA literature, in the
processing of grievance and insurance forms, in the preparation
of chapter bulletins. Records were not maintained and the process
of signing up new members became less efficient.
location for members to pick up forms or other materials or to
leave messages to officers of the local chapter. The offices long
had been used as places where members could speak with CCOA officers
about grievances. 	After the offices were closed, CCOA officers
could make special arrangements with prison administrators in order
to have a private room in which to interview members. However, in
at least one institution CCOA officers have had to meet with members
in the hallways to discuss grievances.
of services which followed the Department's change in policy.
However, the change has had no significant impact on CCOA's total
membership, although the organization's officers attribute several
resignations to the Department's action.

-15-
The Department did not meet with the CCOA prior to announcing
its
	change
	in 	policy.
	At
	CCOA's
	request,
	Department
	administrators
met
	with 	the 	organization
	on
	August 	3,
	1978
	to 	discuss
	the
	change
in 	policy.
	CCOA
	offered
	various
	alternatives
	to 	the 	closure 	of
the
	organization's
	institutional
	offices
	and
	the 	elimination 	of
inmate
	clerk
	program.
	However,
	in
	a
	letter
	dated
August
	9,
	the
1978,
	Assistant
	Department
	Director
	Sanchez
	restated
	the 	Department's
decision
	to 	conclude
	the
	programs. 	That
	letter
	reads, 	in
	part,
as
	follows:
Department
As 	a
	result
	of
	our
	meet 	and
	confer 	of
	August 	3,
1978,
	we
	re-evaluated
	this
	decision.
	The
	re-
evaluation
	confirmed 	our
	belief
	that
	we
	must
take
	this
	action 	in 	order 	to
	be
	fair
	to
	all
organizations
	and
	to 	prevent
	what
	we
	perceive
to
	be
	unavoidable
	problems
	in
	the
	future
	if
we
continue 	to 	provide
	office
	space
	and 	inmate
help.
	However,
	as
	agreed
	upon
	at
	the
	meet 	and
confer 	session, 	the 	current 	office
	arrangements
will
	not
	be
	terminated
	on
	August 	15, 	1978,
	but
will
	be
	terminated
	on
	August 	31, 	1978.
As a result of our meet and confer of August 3,
Although
	there
	is
	a
	difference 	of
	opinion
regarding 	the
	interpretation
	of
	SEERA we
	believe
that 	to 	continue 	to 	provide
	office
	space
	and
inmate
	help
	is
	prohibited 	unless
	we
	provide
	it
to
	all
	organizations 	requesting 	the
	same
	consid-
eration.
	We
	do
	not 	believe 	that
	we
	can
	accommo-
date
	all
	those
	who
	would
	request 	office
	space;
nor
	do we
	believe
	it
	would be
	in
	our
	best
interests
	to 	begin 	providing
	office
	space 	to
all
	who
	request
	it.·
Additionally,
	we
	believe
that
	by
	providing 	office
	space 	and 	inmate 	help
we are indirectly subsidizing employee organiza
tions
	which
	we
	feel 	is
	inappropriate.
Although there is a difference of opinion
CCOA
has 	developed no 	long 	range 	solution 	to 	the 	loss 	of
institutional 	office
	space 	and 	the 	services 	of 	inmate
	clerks.
CCOA's
	Board 	of Directors 	has 	concluded 	that 	the 	circumstances
at 	each 	institution 	are 	so 	different 	that 	no 	uniform statewide
CCOA has developed no long range solution to the loss of
-15-
did 	not
	meet
	with 	the
	CCOA
	prior
	to
	announcing
its change in policy. At CCOA's request, Department administrators
met with the organization on August 3, 1978 to discuss the change
in policy. CCOA offered various alternatives to the closure of
the organization's institutional offices and the elimination of
the inmate clerk program. However, in a letter dated August 9,
1978, Assistant Department Director Sanchez restated the Department's
decision to conclude the programs. That letter reads, in part,
as follows :
1978, we re-evaluated this decision. The re-
evaluation confirmed our belief that we must
take this action in order to be fair to all
organizations and to prevent what we perceive
to be unavoidable problems in the future if we
continue to provide office space and inmate
help. However, as agreed upon at the meet and
confer session, the current office arrangements
will not be terminated on August 15, 1978, but
will be terminated on August 31, 1978.
regarding the interpretation of SEERA we believe
that to continue to provide office space and
inmate help is prohibited unless we provide it
to all organizations requesting the same conside
eration. 	We do not believe that we can accommo-
date all those who would request office space;
nor do we believe it would be in our best
interests to begin providing office space to
all who request it. Additionally, we believe
that by providing office space and inmate help
we
	are
	indirectly 	subsidizing
	employee -
organiza-
tions which we feel is inappropriate.
institutional office space and the services of inmate clerks.
CCOA's Board of Directors has concluded that the circumstances
at each institution are so different that no uniform statewide

solution
	is
	possibleo
	Local
	chapters
	have
	considered
	leasing
offices
	and
	hiring
	clerical
	employees
	but
	as
	of 	the
	time
	of 	the
hearing
	no
	chapter
	had
	elected
	to 	pursue
	this
	course.
solution is possible. Local chapters have considered leasing
There
	are
	significant
	costs
	involved
	in 	leasing
	offices
	and
hiring
	clerical
	employees.
	A
real 	estate
	appraiser
who
	inspected
the
	former
	CCOA
	office
	at
	the
	California
Medical
	Facility
	testified
that
	comparable
	space
	in
	Vacaville
	would
	cost
	between
	$140
	and
Brown
	$150
	per
	month
	including
	utilities.
	CCOA
	Executive
	Director
to
testified that it would cost the organization from $400 to $500
per
	month
	at
	each
	chapter 	to
	rent
	adequate
	facilities
	and
	employ
part-time
	clerical 	assistants.
	Mr.
	Brown
	said
	the
	organization
would have to increase its dues substantially to cover such costs.
He
	said
	CCOA
	members
	had 	agreed
	to
	a
	dues
	increase
	$5
	per
month
	to
	$8.50
	per
	month
	just
	prior
	to 	the 	Department's
	decision
to
	remove 	employee
	organization
	offices.
	He
	said 	that
	another
	dues
increase proposal would not be well-received so soon after the
earlier
	increase.
There are significant costs involved in leasing offices and
CCOA
	also 	considered using
	mass
	mailings 	as
	a
	method
	of
replacing 	the 	information
	distribution 	services
	formerly 	provided
by 	inmate
	clerks.
	However,
	it
	would
	cost
	between
	$900 	and 	$1,000
for
	each
	mass
	mailing
	from 	Sacramento
	to
	all
	members. 	Mr. 	Brown
testified 	that
	such
	costs
	were 	too 	expensive 	for
	CCOAo
CCOA also considered using mass mailings as a method of
After 	the
	employee
	organizations
	were 	removed 	from
	offices
in 	the 	Department's 	various 	institutions, 	the 	Department
continued 	to 	allow
	some
	outside 	organizations 	to 	retain 	offices
within 	prisons. 	Employee
	credit 	unions 	retain 	offices 	within 	the
After the employee organizations were removed from offices
-16-
testified that such costs were too expensive for CCOA.
-16-
offices and hiring clerical employees but as of the time of the
hearing no chapter had elected to pursue this course.
hiring clerical employees. A real estate appraiser who inspected
the former CCOA office at the California Medical Facility testified
that comparable space in Vacaville would cost between $140 and
$150 per month including utilities. CCOA Executive Director Brown
testified
	that
	it
	would
	cost 	the 	organization
	from
	$400 	$500
per month at each chapter to rent adequate facilities and employ
part-time clerical assistants. Mr. Brown said the organization
increase
	its
	dues
	substantially
	to
	cover
	such
	costs.
	would
	have
	to
from
He said CCOA members had agreed to a dues increase from $5 per
month to $8.50 per month just prior to the Department's decision
to remove employee organization offices. He said that another dues
well-received
	so
	soon
	after
	the	increase 	proposal
	would
	not
	be
earlier increase.
replacing the information distribution services formerly provided
by inmate clerks. However, it would cost between $900 and $1,000
for each mass mailing from Sacramento to all members. Mr. Brown
in the Department's various institutions, the Department
continued to allow some outside organizations to retain offices
within prisons. Employee credit unions retain offices within the

-17-
institutions. Two organizations designed to help parolees return
to society -- the 7th Step Foundation and Friends Outside -- both
retain offices within the prisons. Offices also are maintained
by an Indian cultural group and by groups involved in inmate
recreational activities such as those for artists and model train
enthusiasts. Mr. Hawkins testified that these organizations are
permitted to remain in the institutions because they support the
Department's mission of care, custody and treatment of the
incarcerated.
Two
Although 	the 	Department 	changed 	its 	policy 	on 	the 	provision
of 	offices 	and 	inmate 	clerks 	for 	employee 	organizations, 	it 	made
no 	change 	in 	its 	practice 	of 	allowing 	organization 	representatives
to 	have 	access 	to 	employee work 	sites. 	The 	access 	policy, 	which
is 	contained 	in 	section 	2504 	of 	the 	Department's 	administrative
manual, 	provides 	as 	follows:
Although the Department changed its policy on the provision
Access 	to 	Employee Work Locations.	Access to Employee Work Locations. (a) 	(a)
Reasonable 	access 	to 	employee work 	locations
during working 	hours 	shall 	be 	granted 	to
employee organization officers and represen
tatives 	on 	employment 	relations 	matters. 	This
does 	not 	include 	visits 	for 	the 	purpose 	of
solicitation 	of membership 	or 	routine 	contact,
but 	only where 	specific 	problems 	exist which
necessitate the employee organization repre
sentative seeing the work location to under
stand 	the 	situation.
Reasonable access to employee work locations
(b)	(b) 	Such 	employee 	organization 	representatives
shall 	notify 	and 	obtain 	the 	approval 	of 	the
appropriate 	official 	before 	entering 	an
employee work 	location 	as 	follows:
Such employee organization representatives
(1)	(1)Any institution - warden or super
intendent.
Any
(2)	(2) 	District 	office 	of 	Parole 	and
Community 	Services 	Division 	- 	district
administrator.
District office of Parole and
-17-
organizations 	designed 	to 	help 	parolees 	return
to 	society 	-- 	the 	7th 	Step 	Foundation 	and 	Friends 	Outside 	-- 	both
retain 	offices 	within 	the 	prisons. 	Offices 	also 	are 	maintained
by 	an 	Indian 	cultural 	group 	and by 	groups 	involved 	in 	inmate
recreational 	activities 	such 	as 	those 	for 	artists 	and model 	train
enthusiasts. 	Mr. 	Hawkins 	testified 	that 	these 	organizations 	are
permitted 	to 	remain 	in 	the 	institutions 	bec·ause 	they 	support 	the
Department's 	mission 	of 	care, 	custody 	and 	treatment 	of 	the
incarcerated.
of offices and inmate clerks for employee organizations, it made
no change in its practice of allowing organization representatives
to have access to employee work sites. The access policy, which
is contained in section 2504 of the Department's administrative
manual, provides as follows :
during working hours shall be granted to
employee 	organization 	officers 	and- represen-
tatives on employment relations matters. This
does not include visits for the purpose of
solicitation of membership or routine contact,
but only where specific problems exist which
necessitate 	the 	employee 	organization	- 	repre-
sentative 	seeing 	the 	work 	location - to 	under-
stand the situation.
shall notify and obtain the approval of the
appropriate official before entering an
employee work location as follows:
institution 	... 	warden	- 	or 	super-
intendent.
Community Services Division - district
administrator.

(3)	
Regional
	office
	of
	Parole
	and
Community
	Services 	Division
	-
	regional
administrator.
Regional office of Parole and
(4)	
Central
	office
	of
	Parole
	and
Community
	Services 	Division
	-
	Deputy
Director
	-
	Parole
	and
	Community
	Services
Division.
C
(5)	(5) C
Central
	office
	of
	Department
	of
Corrections
	-
	personnel
	officer
	(who
	will
clear with appropriate division chief.)
entral office of Department of
-18-
In 	accord 	with
	this
	policy,
	CCOA
	officers
	and
	representatives
including
	Executive
	Director
	Brown
	have 	been 	allowed 	access 	during
work
	hours 	to
	employees
	with
	grievances.
	This
	access,
	in
	some
situations,
	has
	included 	the
	time
	off
	for
	both 	the
	CCOA
	officer
and
	the
	grievant 	to 	discuss 	the
	problem.
In accord with this policy, CCOA officers and representatives
LEGAL 	ISSUES	LEGAL ISSUES
Did
	the
	Department,
	by
	its
	unilateral
	removal
	of
	employee
organizations
	from
	institutional 	offices, 	cancellation 	of
	the
inmate
	clerk
	program 	and
	elimination 	of 	separate 	organizational
bulletin
	boards:
Did the Department, by its unilateral removal of employee
1)	1)	
Violate
	Government
	Code
	section
	3519
(a)?	iolate Government Code section 3519 (a) ?	V
2)	
2)	
Violate
	Government
	Code
	section
	3519
(b)?	Violate Government Code section 3519 (b) ?
3)	3	
Violate
	Government 	Code
	section
	3519(d)?	Violate Government Code section 3519(d) ?
4)	4) 	V
Violate
	Government 	Code
	section
	3530?	iolate Government Code section 3530?
-18-
Community Services Division - regional
administrator.
entral office of Parole and
Community Services Division - Deputy
Director - Parole and Community Services
Division.
Corrections - personnel officer (who will
clear ~ith
	appropriate 	division
	chief.)
including Executive Director Brown have been allowed access during
work hours to employees with grievances. This access, in some
situations, has included the time off for both the CCOA officer
and the grievant to discuss the problem.
organizations from institutional offices, cancellation of the
inmate clerk program and elimination of separate organizational
bulletin boards:
)

-19-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW	
OF
Section
	3519(a)	Section 3519 (a)
Government
	Code
	section
	3519(a)
	makes
	it
	unlawful
	for
	the
	state
employer
	to 	take
	reprisals
	or 	discriminate 	against
	employees
	or
	to
otherwise
	interfere
	with
	their
	participation 	in 	rights
	given
	them
by
	SEERA.
	CCOA
	advances
	two
	theories 	in
	its
	effort
	to
	establish
	a
violation
	of 	section
	3519(a)
	(all
	references 	are 	to 	the
	Government
Code).
	CCOA
	first
	contends
	that
	by
	its
	actions, 	the
	Department
	of
Corrections
	effectively
	has
	deprived
	Department
	employees
	of
	their
right to join or participate in the activities of employee organiza
tions.
Government Code section 3519 (a) makes it unlawful for the state
6	
Secondly,
	CCOA
	contends
	that
	the
	Department has
	coerced
employees 	by
	the
	withdrawal
	of
	expected
	benefits 	prior
	to
	an
election. 	CCOA supports both theories through the extensive citation
of 	National
	Labor
	Relations
	Board
	cases.
Secondly, CCOA contends that the Department has coerced
7
of National Labor Relations Board cases.'
6
Government 	Code
	section
	3515
	provides
	as
	follows:
Except 	as
	otherwise 	provided by
	the
	Legislature,
	state
employees
	shall
	have
	the
	right
	to
	form,
	join,
	and
participate 	in 	the
	activities
	of
	employee
	organizations
of
	their
	own
	choosing
	for 	the 	purpose
	of 	representation
on
	all
	matters 	of
	employer-employee
	relations. 	State	
State
employees
	also 	shall
	have
	the
	right
	to 	refuse 	to
	join
or participate in the activities of employee organiza
tions,
	except
	that
	nothing
	shall
	preclude 	the
	parties
from
	agreeing 	to
	a
	maintenance
	of
	membership
	provision,as 	defined 	in 	subdivision
	(h)
	of 	Section
	3513,
	pursuant
to
	a 	memorandum
	of 	understanding. 	In
	any
	event,
	state
employees
	shall
	have 	the
	right 	to 	represent 	themselves
individually 	in 	their
	employment
	relations 	with 	the
state.
Except as otherwise provided by the Legislature, state
Government Code section 3515 provides as follows:
7
Relevant 	cases 	under 	the 	National Labor 	Relations 	Act 	are 	persuasive
precedent 	in 	the 	interpretation 	of 	California 	labor 	relations
statutes. 	Fire 	Fighters 	Union 	v. 	City 	of Vallejo 	(1974) 	12
Cal. 3d 	608 	[ 116 	Cal.Rptr. 	507]; 	Los 	Angeles 	Countl7 	Civil 	Service
Comm. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal. 3d 55 [
Relevant cases under the National Labor Relations Act are persuasive
-19-
LAW
employer to take reprisals or discriminate against employees or to
otherwise interfere with their participation in rights given them
by SEERA. CCOA advances two theories in its effort to establish a
violation of section 3519(a) (all references are to the Government
Code) . CCOA first contends that by its actions, the Department of
Corrections effectively has deprived Department employees of their
right
	to
	join
	or
	participate
	in 	the
	activities
	of
	employee	-	
organiza-
tions.
employees by the withdrawal of expected benefits prior to an
election.
	CCOA
	supports 	both
	theories
	through
	the 	extensive
	citation
employees shall have the right to form, join, and
participate in the activities of employee organizations
of their own choosing for the purpose of representation
on all matters of employer-employee relations.
employees also shall have the right to refuse to join
or
	participate 	in 	the
	activities
	of
	employee	-	
organiza-
tions, except that nothing shall preclude the parties
from agreeing to a maintenance of membership provision,
as defined in subdivision (h) of Section 3513, pursuant
to a memorandum of understanding. In any event, state
employees shall have the right to represent themselves
individually in their employment relations with the
state.
precedent in the interpretation of California labor relations
statutes. Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12
Cal. 3d 608 [116 Cal . Rptr. 507); Los Angeles County Civil ServiceComm. 	v. 	Superior Court 	(1978) 	23 	Cal.3d 	55
	[_	Cal. Rptr.	Cal.Rptr. 	_·_].

-20-
To support its contention that the Department has denied
employee
	rights,
	CCOA
	asserts 	that
	the
	new
	policy
	has
	inhibited
the
	ability
	of
	employees
	to
	learn
	about
	the
	benefits
	of
	membership
in
	CCOA.
	The
	organization
	further 	asserts 	that
	the
	policy
	has
hindered
	CCOA's
	access
	to
	employees
	and
	that
	there
	are
	no
	reasonable
alternative
	means
	of
	communications,
	citing
	NLRB
	v.
	Babcock	
&
Wilcox
	Co.
	(1956)
	351
	U.S.
	105 	[38
	LRRM
	2001]
	and
	related
	cases.
CCOA
	argues
	that
	because
	of 	the
	restrictive
	nature 	of
	a
	prison,
	the
organization
	no
	longer
	has
	an
	adequate
	ability
	to 	reach
	employees.
Restriction
	of
	this
	access,
	CCOA
	contends,
	is
	a
	restriction
	on
	the
rights 	of
	employees
	to 	exercise
	their
	section
	3515
	rights.
support
To
	support
	its
	contention
	that
	the
	Department
	has 	coerced
employees,
	CCOA
	argues
	that
	the
	change
	in 	policy
	is
	an
	illegal
withdrawal 	of 	expected
	benefits 	prior
	to 	the 	conduct
	of
	an
	election.
CCOA
	relies
	on
	National
	Labor
	Relations
	Board
	precedent
	that
	a
preelection
	withdrawal 	of
	benefits
	coerces
	employees
	in 	the 	exercise
of
	their 	right
	to 	freely
	choose
	a
	union. 	See,
	e,g.,
	NLRB
	v.
	Dothan
Eagle, 	Inc. 	(5th
	Cir.
	1970) 	434
	F.2d
	93 	[75
	LRRM
	2531]
	(employer
denied
	a
	pay
	increase 	automatically 	given 	every
	six
	months
	in
	the
past);
	Davis 	Wholesale
	Co. 	(1967) 	165
	NLRB
	271 	[65
	LRRM
	1494], 	enfd.
(D.C.	
Cir.
	1969) 	413
	F.2d
	407 	[70
	LRRM
	3436] 	(employer
	discontinued
coffee break 	during 	the 	night
	shift);
	Buddy
Schoellkopf Products
Inc.
	(1967) 	164
	NLRB
	660 	[65
	LRRM
	1231]
	enfd. 	(5th Cir.
	1969) 	410
F.2d
	82 	[71
	LRRM
	2089) 	(employer 	discontinued
	employee
	privilege
of 	purchasing 	employer's 	products).
To support its contention that the Department has coerced
of purchasing employer's products).
-20-
its
	contention
	that
	the
	Department 	has
	denied
employee rights, CCOA asserts that the new policy has inhibited
the ability of employees to learn about the benefits of membership
in CCOA. The organization further asserts that the policy has
hindered CCOA's access to employees and that there are no reasonable
alternative means of communications, citing NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co. (1956) 351 U.S. 105 [38 LRRM 2001] and related cases.
CCOA argues that because of the restrictive nature of a prison, the
organization no longer has an adequate ability to reach employees.
Restriction of this access, CCOA contends, is a restriction on the
rights of employees to exercise their section 3515 rights.
employees, CCOA argues that the change in policy is an illegal
withdrawal of expected benefits prior to the conduct of an election.
CCOA relies on National Labor Relations Board precedent that a
preelection withdrawal of benefits coerces employees in the exercise
of their right to freely choose a union. See, e, g. , NLRB v. Dothan
Eagle, Inc. (5th Cir. 1970) 434 F. 2d 93 [75 LRRM 2531] (employer
denied a pay increase automatically given every six months in the
past) ; Davis Wholesale Co. (1967) 165 NLRB 271 [65 LRRM 1494], end.
(D.C. Cir. 1969) 413 F. 2d 407 [70 LRRM 3436] (employer discontinued
coffee break during the night shift) ; Buddy Schoellkopf Products
Inc. (1967) 164 NLRB 660 [65 LRRM 1231] enfd. (5th Cir. 1969) 410
F. 2d 82 [71 LRRM 2089] (employer discontinued employee privilege

-21-
In response to these contentions, the Department simply
asserts 	that 	CCOA has 	failed 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	any 	Department
action 	intruded 	upon 	the 	section 	3515 	rights 	of 	employees.
Therefore, 	the 	Department 	concludes, 	the 	allegation 	that 	the
Department violated section 3519(a) should be dismissed.
response
It 	is 	concluded 	that 	the 	Department 	is 	correct 	and 	that 	CCOA
has 	failed 	to 	establish 	a 	violation 	of 	section 	3519(a).
It is concluded that the Department is correct and that CCOA
CCOA 	relies 	upon 	NLRB 	precedent 	which 	simply 	does 	not 	fit
the facts of its case. The evidence totally rebuts CCOA's conten
tion 	that 	the 	Department's 	new 	regulations 	deny 	the 	organization
access 	to 	employeesc 	The 	new 	Department 	policies 	do 	not 	prohibit
the 	circulation 	of 	CCOA 	material 	by 	employee 	members 	within 	the
institutions. 	The 	policies 	do 	not 	prohibit 	the 	posting 	of 	CCOA
materials 	on 	institutional 	bulletin 	boards. 	The 	policies 	do 	not
prohibit 	CCOA members 	from 	soliciting 	for 	new 	members 	within 	the
institutions. 	Moreover, 	Department 	policy 	2504 	specifically 	permits
"reasonable 	access 	to 	employee work 	locations 	during working 	hours"
by 	nonemployee 	representatives 	of 	employee 	organizations. 	Evidence
presented 	at 	the 	hearing 	demonstrates 	conclusively 	that 	nonemployee
representatives 	of CCOA, 	including Executive 	Director 	Brown, 	have
regular 	access 	to 	the 	Department's 	institutions 	and have 	met
frequently 	with 	employees 	inside 	institutional walls. 	CCOA 	continues
to 	have 	easy 	access 	to 	Department 	employees 	through 	the 	use 	of both
employee 	members 	and 	nonemployee 	representatives. 	The new 	Department
policies 	merely 	remove 	the 	Department 	from 	its 	former 	role 	of
affording 	support 	to 	the 	organizing process.
CCOA relies upon NLRB precedent which simply does not fit
-21-
to 	these 	contentions, 	the 	Department 	simply
asserts that CCOA has failed to demonstrate that any Department
action intruded upon the section 3515 rights of employees.
Therefore, the Department concludes, the allegation that the
Department 	violated 	section 	3519(~) 	should be 	dismissed.
has failed to establish a violation of section 3519(a).
the 	facts 	of 	its 	case. 	The 	evidence 	totally 	rebuts - CCOA's 	conten-
tion that the Department's new regulations deny the organization
access to employees. The new Department policies do not prohibit
the circulation of CCOA material by employee members within the
institutions. 	The policies do not prohibit the posting of CCOA
materials on institutional bulletin boards. The policies do not
prohibit CCOA members from soliciting for new members within the
institutions. Moreover, Department policy 2504 specifically permits
"reasonable access to employee work locations during working hours"
by nonemployee representatives of employee organizations. Evidence
presented at the hearing demonstrates conclusively that nonemployee
representatives of CCOA, including Executive Director Brown, have
regular access to the Department's institutions and have met
frequently with employees inside institutional walls. CCOA continues
to have easy access to Department employees through the use of both
employee members and nonemployee representatives. The new Department
policies merely remove the Department from its former role of
affording support to the organizing process.

-22-
Neither is CCOA persuasive in its contention that the
Department 	has 	withdrawn
	a
	"benefit"
	from
	employees
	at
	a
	time
	prior
to 	the 	electiono
	Every
	NLRB
	case
	cited
by
	CCOA
	involves
	an
	employer's
removal
	of
	a
	direct 	benefit
	to
	employees. 	In
	the 	cases
	cited
	by
CCOA,
	the
	employees 	were
	deprived
	of
	a
	pay
	raise,
	a
	coffee 	break,
the
	right
	to
	purchase
	the
	employer's
	product.
	Employees
	suffered
no
	such
	deprivation 	in
	the
	present 	case.
	They
	suffered
	no
	loss
	of
benefits,
	no 	change
	in
	hours.
	CCOA
	contends
	that
	the
	loss 	of
benefits
	can be 	found
	in 	the 	delays
	which 	removal
	of 	the
	inmate
clerk
	program
	brought
	to
	CCOA's
	processing 	of
	its
	own
	benefit
program,
	e.g.,
	dental 	insurance, 	passes 	for
	amusement
	parks.
	But
these
	problems 	cannot 	be 	charged
	to 	the
	Department.
	They
	are 	the
product
	of
	CCOA's
	decision 	not 	to
	hire
	a
	professional
	staff
	to
process
	its
	benefit
	program
	at
	the
	institutions.
is
Precedent
	from
	the 	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
	also
demonstrates
	that
	the
	CCOA
	has
	failed
	to
	show 	a
	violation
	of
section
	3519(a). 	In
	a
	recent
	case 	construing
	a
	comparable
	section
of 	the 	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(Gov. 	Code
	sec.
3540
	et 	seq.),
	the
	PERB
	established 	the 	following 	guidelines
for disposition of alleged violations of section 3543.5(a) :
Precedent from the Public Employment Relations Board also
1.	
1.	
A
single 	test 	shall
	be
	applicable 	in
	all
instances 	in
	which
	violations 	of 	section
	3543.S(a)
are 	alleged;
A single test shall be applicable in all
are alleged;
2.	
2.	
Where
	the 	charging 	party 	establishes 	that
the 	employer's 	conduct 	tends 	to 	or
	does
	result 	in
some harm
	to
	employee
	rights 	granted 	under 	the
EERA, 	a
	prima 	facie 	case 	shall
	be 	deemed
	to 	exist;
Where the charging party establishes that
-22-
CCOA
	persuasive
	in
	its
	contention
	that
	the
Department has withdrawn a "benefit" from employees at a time prior
to the election. Every NLRB case cited by CCOA involves an employer's
removal of a direct benefit to employees. In the cases cited by
CCOA, the employees were deprived of a pay raise, a coffee break,
the right to purchase the employer's product. Employees suffered
no such deprivation in the present case. They suffered no loss of
benefits, no change in hours. CCOA contends that the loss of
benefits can be found in the delays which removal of the inmate
clerk program brought to CCOA's processing of its own benefit
program, e. g. , dental insurance, passes for amusement parks. But
these problems cannot be charged to the Department. They are the
product of CCOA's decision not to hire a professional staff to
process its benefit program at the institutions.
demonstrates that the CCOA has failed to show a violation of
section 3519(a). In a recent case construing a comparable section
of the Educational Employment Relations Act (Gov. Code sec.
3540 et seq.), the PERB established the following guidelines
for 	disposition 	of 	alleged 	violations 	of 	section 	3543.S(a):
instances in which violations of section 3543.5(a)
the employer's conduct tends to or does result in
some harm to employee rights granted under the
EERA, a prima facie case shall be deemed to exist;

3. 	Where
	the
	harm
	to
	the
	employees'
	rights
is 	slight,
	and
	the
	employer
	offers
	justification
based
	on
	operational
	necessity,
	the
	competing
interest
	of 	the
	employer
	and
	the
	rights
	of
	the
employees
	will
	be
	balanced
	and
	the
	charge
	resolvedaccordingly;
Where the harm to the employees' rights
4.	
4.	
Where
	the
	harm
	is
	inherently 	destructiveof
	employee
	rights,
	the 	employer's
	conduct
	will
be 	excused 	only
	on
	proof
	that
	it
	was
	occasioned
by
	circumstances
	beyond
	the
	employer's
	control
and
	that
	no
	alternative
	course
	of
	action
	was
available;
Where the harm is inherently destructive
5.	
5.	
Irrespective 	of 	the
	foregoing,
	a
	charge
will
	be
	sustained
where
	it
	is
	shown
	that
	the
employer would
	not
	have 	engaged
	in
	the
	complained-
of
	conduct
	but 	for
	an
	unlawful
	motivation,
	purpose
of	of intent.	
intent.
Irrespective of the foregoing, a charge
Oceanside-Carlsbad
	Federation 	of
	Teachers, 	Local
	1344 1 	CFT/AFT
	v.
Carlsbad 	Unified
	School
	District
	(1/30/79)
	PERB
	Decision
	No. 	89.
Oceanside-Carlsbad Federation of Teachers, Local 1344, CFT/AFT v.
Because
	section
	3543.5(a) 	of 	the
	EERA
	is
	identical
	in
	wording
to
	section
	3519(a)
	of
	SEERA,
Because section 3543.5(a) of the EERA is identical in wording
8
it
	is 	likely 	that
	the
	PERB
	will	to section 3519(a) of SEERA, . it is likely that the PERB will
B
It
	also
	should be
	noted
	that
	the
	rights
	guaranteed
	to
	state
	employees
under
	SEERA
	(footnote
	no. 	6,
	supra) 	are 	in 	relevant 	part 	identical
	to
the
	rights
	provided 	school
	district
	employees
	under
	EERA. 	Section	
Section
3543 	(EERA)
	provides
	as
	follows:
It also should be noted that the rights guaranteed to state employees
Public 	school
	employees
	shall
	have
	the
	right
	to
	form,
	Join,
and
	participate 	in
	the
	activities
	of
	employee
	organizations
of
	their
	own
	choosing
	for 	the 	purpose
	of 	representation
	on
all
	matters 	of
	employer-employee
	relations.
	Public 	school
employees
	shall
	also
	have
	the
	right
	to
	refuse 	to
	join 	or
participate 	in
	the
	activities
	of
	employee
	organizations
	and
shall have the right to represent themselves individually
in 	their
	employment
	relations
	with 	the 	public 	school 	employer,
except
	that
	once
	the
	employees
	in
	an
	appropriate 	unit
	have
selected
	an
	exclusive 	representative
	and
	it
	has 	been 	recognized
pursuant 	to 	Section
	3544.1
	or
	certified
	pursuant 	to 	Section3544.7,
	no 	employee
	in 	that
	unit
may meet 	and
	negotiate with
the 	public 	school 	employer.
Public school employees shall have the right to form, join,
Any 	employee 	may
	at
	any 	time 	present 	grievances 	to his
employer, 	and have 	such 	grievances 	adjusted, 	without 	the
intervention 	of 	the 	exclusive 	representative, 	as 	long 	as
the 	adjustment
	is
	reached prior 	to 	arbitration 	pursuant
to 	Sections 	3548.5, 	3548.6, 3548.7, 	and 	3548.8 	and 	the
adjustment 	is 	not 	inconsistent with 	the 	terms 	of
	a
	writtenagreement 	then 	in 	effect; 	provided 	that 	the 	public 	schoolemployer 	shall 	not 	agree 	to 	a 	resolution 	of 	the 	grievance
until 	the 	exclusive 	representative has 	received 	a 	copy 	of
the 	grievance 	and 	the 	proposed 	resolution 	and has 	been
given 	the 	opportunity 	to 	file 	a 	response.
Any employee may at any time present grievances to his
is slight, and the employer offers justification
based on operational necessity, the competing
interest of the employer and the rights of the
employees will be balanced and the charge resolved
accordingly ;
of employee rights, the employer's conduct will
be excused only on proof that it was occasioned
by circumstances beyond the employer's control
and that no alternative course of action was
available;
will be sustained where it is shown that the
employer would not have engaged in the complained-
of conduct but for an unlawful motivation, purpose
Carlsbad Unified School District (1/30/79) PERB Decision No. 89.
under SEERA (footnote no. 6, supra) are in relevant part identical to
the rights provided school district employees under EERA.
3543 (EERA) provides as follows:
and participate in the activities of employee organizations
of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on
all matters of employer-employee relations. Public school
employees shall also have the right to refuse to join or
participate in the activities of employee organizations and
sharl
	have
	the
	right 	to 	represent
	themselves
	individually
in their employment relations with the public school employer,
except that once the employees in an appropriate unit have
selected an exclusive representative and it has been recognized
pursuant to Section 3544.1 or certified pursuant to Section
3544.7, no employee in that unit may meet and negotiate with
the public school employer.
employer, and have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the exclusive representative, as long as
the adjustment is reached prior to arbitration pursuant
to Sections 3548.5, 3548.6, 3548.7, and 3548.8 and the
adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a written
agreement then in effect; provided that the public school
employer shall not agree to a resolution of the grievance
until the exclusive representative has received a copy of
the grievance and the proposed resolution and has been
given the opportunity to file a response.

-24-
construe them in the same manner. Applying the Oceanside-Carlsbad
test
	to 	the
	present 	case,
	it
	is
	concluded
	that
	the
	harm
	to
	employees'
rights
	is 	slight.
	The 	new
	policies
	of
	the
	Department have
	not
precluded
	employees 	from
	distributing
	CCOA
	materials,
	from
	soliciting
on
	behalf
	of
	CCOA,
	from
	posting
	CCOA
	materials
	on
	the
bulletin
	boards,
or
	from
	having 	access
	within 	the
	institutions
	to
	CCOA's
	nonemployee
representatives.
	All
	the
	Department 	has
	done
	is
	to
	tell
	the
	CCOA	representatives .
that
	it
	will
	no
	longer
	be
	allowed
	to
	use 	inmates 	under
	the 	Department's
custody
	and
	offices
	provided
	by
	the
	Department
	to
	further
	these
activities.
them
Furthermore, 	the 	Department's
	policy
	change
	was 	a
	justifiable
reaction
	to 	the
	changing
	conditions 	brought
	about
	by
	the
	enactment
of SEERA.	
of
	SEERA. 	The 	new
	statute
	requires
	the
	state
	employer
	to
	be
	fair
in
	its
	dealings 	with
	competing 	employee
	organizations.
	(See
	section
3519 (d), footnote no. 1, supra.) Where two or more employee organiza
tions
	are
	competing
	for
	membership,
	the
	employer must 	be
	strictly
neutral in extending organizational opportunities. In order to be
Furthermore, the Department's policy change was a justifiable
9
In
	order 	to
	be
fair
	to
	all
	organizations, 	the
	Department had
	three 	choices:
(1)
	Provide
	individual 	offices
	and 	inmate
	clerks 	for
	all
	organizations
which
	requested
	them; 	(2)
	place
	all
	organizations 	in 	shared
	offices
with
	their
	own
	individual 	or 	shared 	inmate
	clerks; 	or
	(3)
	provide
no
	offices 	or 	inmate
	clerks 	for
	any
	organization.
neutral
9Azusa 	Federation 	of 	Teachers,
	AFT
	Local 	3298 	v. 	Azusa UnifiedSchool
	District 	(11/23/77)
	EERB
	Decision 	No. 	38;
	NLRB
	v. 	Waterman
S. S. Co. (1940) 309 U.S. 206 [5 LRRM 682 ]; NLRB v. Corning Glass
Works
	(lst 	Cir., 	1953) 	204 	F.2d 	422 	[32 	LRRMTI36]; 	Wyco 	Metal
Products 	(1970) 	183 	NLRB 	901 	[74 LRRM
	1411].
Azusa Federation of Teachers, AFT Local 3298 v. Azusa Unified
-24-
in
	the
	same
	manner.
	Applying
	the 	Oceanside-Carlsbad
test to the present case, it is concluded that the harm to employees'
rights is slight. The new policies of the Department have not
precluded employees from distributing CCOA materials, from soliciting
on behalf of CCOA, from posting CCOA materials on the bulletin boards,
or from having access within the institutions to CCOA's nonemployee
All the Department has done is to tell the CCOA
that it will no longer be allowed to use inmates under the Department's
custody and offices provided by the Department to further these
activities,
reaction to the changing conditions brought about by the enactment
The new statute requires the state employer to be fair
in its dealings with competing employee organizations. (See section
3519(d), 	footnote
	no. 	1,
	supra.)
	Hhere
	two
	or
	more 	employee
	organiza--
tions are competing for membership, the employer must be strictly
in
	extending
	organizational 	opportunities.
fair to all organizations, the Department had three choices:
(1) Provide individual offices and inmate clerks for all organizations
which requested them; (2) place all organizations in shared offices
with their own individual or shared inmate clerks; or (3) provide
no offices or inmate clerks for any organization.
School District (11/23/77) EERB Decision No. 38; NLRB v. Waterman
S.S. 	Co. 	(1940) 	309 	U.S. 	206 	[5
	LRRM
	682];
	NLRB
	v:--COrning 	Glass
Works (Ist Cir. , 1953) 204 F. 2d 422 [32 LRRM 2136]; Wyco Metal
Products (1970) 183 NLRB 901 [74 LRRM 1411].

-25-
There was uncontradicted evidence that the Department has a
shortage
	of
	space
	at
	all
	of
	its
	institutionso
	Based
	upon
	various
inquiries,
	the
	Department
	reasonably
	concluded
	that
	as
	many
	as
	12
employee
	organizations
	might
	organize
	some
	Department 	employees,
although 	not
	all
	of 	these
	groups 	wanted
	correctional
	officers.
The
	Department
	reasonably
	concluded
	that
	it
	did not
	have
	separate
office space for 12 organizations or even a small portion of that
number .
was
The
	Department
	also
	reasonably
	rejected
	the
	alternative 	that
the 	organizations
	be
	placed
	into
	shared
	officeso
	Bickering
	between
CCOA
	and
	CSEA
	over
	the
	badges
	and
	over
	the
	snack
	bars 	already
	had
become 	a
	constant 	source
	of
	friction.
	Reasonably,
	the
	Department
concluded
	that
	the
	situation
	would
	only
	get
	worse 	as
	the
	competing
organizations
	approached
	an
	election 	for
	an
	exclusive
	representative.
The
	Department
	reasonably
	concluded
	that
	the
	placement
	of
	rival
employee
	organizations 	in
	the
	same
	office
	would
	not
	be 	conducive
to
	the
	stability
	needed
	to 	properly 	operate
	a
	prison.
The Department also reasonably rejected the alternative that
That
	left
	the
	third 	alternative,
	removal
	of
	all
	organizations
from
	offices
	within 	the
	institutions,
	an
	action
	which
	the
	Department
ordered. 	Elimination 	of 	the
	inmate
	clerk
	program
was
	the
	inevitable
result
	of 	the 	decision 	to 	eliminate
	institutional 	offices.
	Without
a
	place 	to
	work,
	without
	a
	typewriter
	and
materials,
	inmate
	clerks
could 	provide
	no
	service 	to
	any
	organization.
That left the third alternative, removal of all organizations
Finally, 	the 	Department
	also 	reasonably 	concluded
	that 	individual
organizations 	could not 	have 	individual 	bulletin boards. 	Faced with
the 	complaint 	that 	all
	good
	locations 	for 	bulletin boards 	had been
Finally, the Department also reasonably concluded that individual
-25-
uncontradicted
	evidence
	that
	the
	Department
	has
	a
shortage of space at all of its institutions. Based upon various
inquiries, the Department reasonably concluded that as many as 12
employee organizations might organize some Department employees,
although not all of these groups wanted correctional officers.
The Department reasonably concluded that it did not have separate
office
	space
	for
	12
	organizations 	or
	even
	a.small 	portion 	of
	that
number c
the organizations be placed into shared offices. Bickering between
CCOA and CSEA over the badges and over the snack bars already had
become a constant source of friction. Reasonably, the Department
concluded that the situation would only get worse as the competing
organizations approached an election for an exclusive representative.
The Department reasonably concluded that the placement of rival
employee organizations in the same office would not be conducive
to the stability needed to properly operate a prison.
from offices within the institutions, an action which the Department
ordered. Elimination of the inmate clerk program was the inevitable
result of the decision to eliminate institutional offices. Without
a place to work, without a typewriter and materials, inmate clerks
could provide no service to any organization.
organizations could not have individual bulletin boards. Faced with
the complaint that all good locations for bulletin boards had been

organizations 	shall
	have 	the
	ri
-26-
taken
	by
	the
	older 	organizations,
	the
	Department 	once
	more
	had
	the
obligation
	to 	insure
	equal 	treatmento
	It
	chose
	to
	mount
	all
	bulletin
boards
	in
	the
	same
	location
	and
	permit
	all
	organizations 	to
	have
equal 	access 	to 	those
	bulletin
	boards.
	There
was
	no
	demonstration
that
	the
	Department had
	an
	unlawful
	motivation,
	purpose
	or
	intent
in
	any
	of
	these
	actions.
	Therefore, 	the
Department
	did not
	violate
section
	3519(a).
taken by the older organizations, the Department once more had the
For
	these 	reasons, 	the
	charge
	that
	the
	Department
	violated
Government Code section 3519 (a) is hereby dismissed.
For these reasons, the charge that the Department violated
Section
	3519(b)	Section 3519 (b)
Government 	Code
	section
	3519(b)
	makes
	it
	unlawful
	for
	the
state
	employer
	to
	deny 	employee
	organizations
	rights
	guaranteed 	to
them
by
	SEERA.
Government Code section 3519(b) makes it unlawful for the
10
In
	support
	of
	its
	theory
	that
	the
	Department
violated 	section
	3519(b),
	CCOA
	asserts 	that 	at
	minimum
	the
	"right
to 	represent" 	includes 	the
	right
	to 	organize.
	CCOA
	contends
	that
the 	Department's
	new
	regulations 	effectively
	have 	denied
	it
	the
right
	to 	organize.
	This
	rationale 	is 	rejected.
	For
	the 	reasons
stated
	above,
	it
	is
	concluded
	that
	CCOA
	has 	not 	been
	deprived
	of
the right to organize within the state's prisons.
lO 
the
them by SEERA. In support of its theory that the Department
By Government Code section 3515,5, employee organizations are	By 	Government 	Code
	section
	3515.5, 	employee
	organizations 	are
given 	the 	following
	specific 	rights:	given the following specific rights:
Employee organizations shall have the right to represent
their members in their employment relations with the state,
except that once an employee organization is recognized as
the exclusive representative of an appropriate unit, the
recognized employee organization is the only organization
that may represent that unit in employment relations with
the state. Employee organizations may establish reasonable
restrictions regarding who may join and may make reasonable
provisions for the dismissal of individuals from membership.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from
appearing in his own behalf in his employment relations
with 	the 	state.
Employee
	ght 	to 	represent
their
	members
	in 	their
	employment
	relations 	with 	the
	state,
except:
	that
	once 	an 	employee
	organization 	is
	recognized 	as
the 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	an
	appropriate 	unit, 	the
recognized 	employee
	organization 	is 	the 	only 	organization
that
	may
	represent 	that 	unit 	in
	employment
	relations 	with
the 	stateo 	Employee 	organizations 	may
	establish 	reasonable
regarding who 	may
	join 	and may make 	reasonable	restrictionsprovisions 	for 	the 	dismissal 	of 	individuals 	from membership.
Nothing 	in 	this 	section 	shall 	prohibit 	any 	employee 	from
his 	own 	behalf 	in 	his 	employment 	relations	appearing 	in
with the state. -26-
obligation to insure equal treatment. It chose to mount all bulletin
boards in the same location and permit all organizations to have
equal access to those bulletin boards. There was no demonstration
that the Department had an unlawful motivation, purpose or intent
in any of these actions. Therefore, the Department did not violate
section 3519 (a) .
Government 	Code
	section
	3519(a)
	is
	hereby 	dismissedo
state employer to deny employee organizations rights guaranteed to
violated section 3519(b), CCOA asserts that at minimum the "right
to represent" includes the right to organize. CCOA contends that
the Department's new regulations effectively have denied it the
right to organize. This rationale is rejected. For the reasons
stated above, it is concluded that CCOA has not been deprived of
the
	right 	to 	organize within
	state's
	prisons.

-27-
The meaning of the "right to represent" has not yet been fully
analyzed by the PERB. In an early case, San Diegueto Faculty
Association v. San Diegueto Union High School District (9/2/77)
EERB Decision No. 22, the "right to represent" was construed very
narrowly. In that case, which involved the interpretation of
section 	3543.l(a) 	of 	the 	EERA,
meaning
11 the 	PERE 	held 	that 	a 	public 	school
employer was 	not 	obligated 	to 	"consult" 	with 	an 	employee 	organization
prior 	to 	the 	selection 	of 	an 	exclusive 	representative.	prior to the selection of an exclusive representative.
section 3543.1(a) of the EERA, the PERB held that a public school
However, in Hanford High School Federation of Teachers,	However, in 	Hanford High 	School 	Federation 	of Teachers,
AFT, 	AFL-CIO 	v. 	Hanford 	Joint 	Union 	High 	School 	District 	Board
of 	Trustees 	(6/27/78) 	PERB 	Decision 	No. 	58, 	the 	PERE 	wrote:
AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hanford Joint Union High School District Board
It 	is 	unarguable 	that 	section 	3543.l(a) 	grants
some 	representation 	rights 	to 	a 	nonexclusive
employee 	organization 	prior 	to 	the 	time 	an
exclusive 	representative 	is 	recognized 	or
certified. 	The 	nature 	and 	extent 	of 	those
rights 	have 	not 	been 	clearly 	articulated by
the 	Board 	in 	any 	of 	its 	decisions 	to 	date ...
It is unarguable that section 3543. 1(a) grants
11Government 	Code 	section 	3543.l(a) 	of 	the 	EERA 	provides 	as 	follows:	Government Code section 3543.1(a) of the EERA provides as follows:
Employee 	organizations 	shall 	have 	the 	right 	to 	represent
their members 	in 	their 	employment 	relations 	with public
school employers, except that once an employee organiza
tion is recognized or certified as the exclusive repre
sentative of an appropriate unit pursuant to Section
3544.1 or 3544.7, respectively, only that employee
organization may represent that unit in their employment
relations with the public school employer. Employee
organizations may establish reasonable restrictions
regarding who may join and may make reasonable provisions
for the dismissal of individuals from membership.
Employee organizations shall have the right to represent
school
-27-
analyzed 	by 	the 	PERB. 	In 	an 	early 	case, 	San Dieguito 	Faculty
Association 	Vo 	San 	Dieguito Union 	High 	School 	District 	(9/2/77)
EERB 	Decision 	No. 	22, 	the 	"right 	to 	represent" 	was 	construed very
narrowly. 	In 	that 	case, 	which 	involved 	the 	interpretation 	of
employer was not obligated to "consult" with an employee organization
of Trustees (6/27/78) PERB Decision No. 58, the PERB wrote:
some representation rights to a nonexclusive
employee organization prior to the time an
exclusive representative is recognized or
certified. The nature and extent of those
rights have not been clearly articulated by
the Board in any of its decisions to date. .
employers, 	except 	that 	once 	an 	employee	- 	organiza-
tion 	is 	recognized 	or 	certified 	as 	the -exclusive 	repre-
sentative 	of 	an 	appropriate 	unit 	pursuant 	to 	Section
3544.1 	or 	3544.7, 	respectively, 	only 	that 	employee
organization may 	represent 	that 	unit 	in 	their 	employment
relations 	with 	the 	public 	school 	employer. 	Employee
organizations 	may 	establish 	reasonable 	restrictions
regarding who 	may 	join 	and may make 	reasonable 	provisions
for 	the 	dismissal 	of 	individuals 	from membership.
their members in their employment relations with public
of 	the 	"right 	to 	represent" 	has 	not 	yet 	been 	fully

-28-
This language implies clearly that the narrow San Diegueto
interpretation
	of
	"right
	to 	represent"
	may 	no
	longer
	be
	viable.
language
However, even on the assumption that San Diegueto is no longer
valid, CCOA cannot prevail in its contention that it was denied the
right to represent its members. The evidence establishes unequiv
ocally that at CCOA's request Department officers met with CCOA
on August 3, 1978. At that meeting, CCOA presented various
alternatives to the elimination of the institutional office and
inmate clerk programs. As a result of that meeting, the Department
agreed to postpone the termination date of the programs. Moreover,
the evidence suggests and it is found that after the August 3
meeting, the Department reevaluated its decision and then concluded
that it should proceed with its original plan.
However,
It
	is
	plain 	that
	the
	Department
	met
	with
	CCOA,
	considered
	CCOA's
position,
	modified 	the 	date
	of
	the
	change,
	reevaluated
	its
	decision
but 	then 	decided 	to
	go
	forward.
	CCOA
was
	thus 	allowed
	the
	right
to represent its members.
It is plain that the Department met with CCOA, considered CCOA's
For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	charge
	that
	the
	Department
	violated
Government 	Code
	section
	3519(b)
	is
	hereby 	dismissed.
For these reasons, the charge that the Department violated
Section
	3519 ( d)	Section 3519 (d)
Government 	Code
	section
	3519(d) 	makes
	it
	unlawful 	for 	the
state
	employer 	to 	dominate
	or 	interfere with 	the 	formation
	of
	an
employee
	organization 	or 	to 	contribute 	financial 	or 	other 	support
to
	it
	or 	to 	encourage 	employees 	to 	join
	one 	organization 	in
Government Code section 3519 (d) makes it unlawful for the
-28-
interpretation of "right to represent" may no longer be viable.
even
	on
	the
	assumption
	that
	San
	Dieguito
	is
	no
	longer
valid,
	CCOA
	cannot
	prevail 	in
	its
	contention
	that
	it
	was
	denied
	the
right
	to 	represent
	its
	members.
	The
	evidence
	establishes
	unequiv-
ocally
	that 	at
	CCOA's
	request
	Department
	officers
	met
	with
	CCOA
on
	August 	3,
	19780
	At
	that
	meeting,
	CCOA
	presented various
alternatives
	to 	the
	elimination
	of 	the
	institutional
	office
	and
inmate
	clerk
	programs.
	As 	a
	result
	of 	that
	meeting,
	the
	Department
agreed
	to
	postpone 	the 	termination 	date 	of 	the
	programs. 	Moreover,
the 	evidence 	suggests
	and
	it
	is
	found
	that
	after
	the
	August
	3
meeting, 	the
	Department
	reevaluated
	its
	decision
	and
	then 	concluded
that
	it
	should 	proceed with
	its
	original
	plan.
position, modified the date of the change, reevaluated its decision
but then decided to go forward. CCOA was thus allowed the right
to 	represent
	its
	memberso
Government Code section 3519(b) is hereby dismissed.
state employer to dominate or interfere with the formation of an
employee organization or to contribute financial or other support
to it or to encourage employees to join one organization in
implies
	clearly 	that
	the
	narrow
	San
	Dieguito

preference to another. In support of its theory that the Department
violated this section, CCOA argues that the state can violate
section 3519(d) by taking any action "deleterious to full communi
cation." CCOA contends that the Department took such an action
and therefore violated the section.
to
In this argument, CCOA uses section 3519(d) in an unusual
fashion. The evidence demonstrates that the Department's primary
reason for ending the institutional office and inmate clerk programs
was to avoid the accusation that it was violating section 3519(d) .
The section specifically requires the state employer to be equal
in its treatment of employee organizations. CCOA has presented no
evidence of employer domination. There is no evidence of inter
ference in the formation of an employee organization. Any inter
ference in the operation of CCOA was due to the justifiable removal
of the Department's past assistance to CCOA. There is no evidence
the Department's action constituted support to an employee organiza
tion or the encouragement of employees to join one organization in
preference to another.
In
For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	charge
	that 	the
	Department
	violated
Government 	Code
	section
	3519(d)
	is
	hereby 	dismissed.
For these reasons, the charge that the Department violated
another.
	In
	support
	of
	its
	theory
	that
	the
	Department
violated 	this 	section,
	CCOA
	argues
	that
	the
	state
	can
	violate
section
	3519(d) 	by
	taking
	any
	action 	"deleterious
	to
	full 	-
conrrnuni-
cation."
	CCOA
	contends
	that
	the
	Department 	took 	such
	an
	action
and
	therefore 	violated
	the
	section.
this
	argument,
	CCOA
	uses
	section
	3519(d)
	in
	an
	unusual
fashion.
	The
	evidence 	demonstrates
	that
	the
	Department's 	primary
reason
	for
	ending
	the
	institutional
	office
	and
	inmate
	clerk
	programs
was
	to
	avoid 	the 	accusation
	that
	it
	was
	violating 	section
	3519(d).
The
	section
	specifically
	requires
	the
	state
	employer
	to
	be
	equal
in
	its
	treatment 	of
	employee
	organizations.
	CCOA
	has
	presented
	no
evidence
	of
	employer
	domination. 	There
	is
	no
	evidence	-	
of
	inter-
ference
	in 	the 	formation
	of
	an 	employee
	organization. - Any
	inter-
ference 	in
	the 	operation 	of
	CCOA
	was 	due
	to 	the
	justifiable
	removal
of 	the 	Department's
	past 	assistance
	to
	CCOA.
	There
	is
	no
	evidence
the 	Department's
	action 	constituted
	support 	to
	an 	employee	-	
organiza-
tion 	or 	the
	encouragement
	of
	employees
	to
	join
	one
	organization 	in
preference 	to 	another.
Government Code section 3519(d) is hereby dismissed.

Section 3530	3530
Government 	Code 	section 	3530 12
Government Code section 35 	is 	a 	provision 	of 	the 	George
Brown Act 	(Gov. 	Code 	sec. 	3525 	et 	seq.), 	a 	statute which 	covers
state 	employees 	not 	covered by 	SEERA. 	CCOA 	contends 	that 	the
PERB 	has 	authority 	to 	administer 	section 	3530 	of 	the 	George
Brown Act. 	Plainly, 	such 	is 	not 	the 	case.
Brown Act (Gov. Code sec. 3525 et seq. ), a statute which covers
302 is a provision of the George
I
The 	George 	Brown Act 	is 	codified 	as 	title 	1, 	division 	4,
chapter 	10.5 	of 	the 	Government 	Code. 	SEERA 	is 	codified 	as 	title 	1,
division 	4, 	chapter 	10.3 	of 	the 	Government 	Code. 	The 	PERB 	is 	given
the 	authority 	to 	administer 	the 	provisions 	of 	chapter 	10.3 	(SEERA)
by 	section 	3513(g). 	There 	is 	no 	provision 	giving 	the 	PERB 	the
authority 	to 	administer 	the 	provisions 	of 	chapter 	10.5 	(George
Brown 	Act)o 	Therefore, 	the 	PERB 	lacks 	jurisdiction over 	the
alleged 	violation 	of 	section 	3530.
The George Brown Act is codified as title 1, division 4,
PROPOSED 	ORDER	PROPOSED ORDER
Based 	upon 	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of
law 	and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	matter, 	the 	unfair 	practice
charge 	filed by 	the 	California 	Correctional 	Officers 	Association
against 	the 	State 	of California 	is 	hereby 	DISMISSED.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
12 Government 	Code 	section 	3530 	provides 	as 	follows:	2Government Code section 3530 provides as follows:
The state by means of such boards, commissions, admin
istrative 	officers 	or 	other 	representatives 	as 	may be
properly 	designated by 	law, 	shall meet 	and 	confer with
representatives 	of 	employee 	organizations 	upon 	request,
and 	shall 	consider 	as 	fully 	as 	such 	representatives 	deem
reasonable 	such 	presentations 	as 	are 	made by 	the 	employee
organization 	on behalf 	of 	its 	members 	prior 	to 	arriving
at 	a 	determination 	of 	policy 	or 	course 	of 	action.
The
state employees not covered by SEERA. CCOA contends that the
PERB has authority to administer section 3530 of the George
Brown Act. Plainly, such is not the case.
chapter 10.5 of the Government Code. 	SEERA is codified as title 1,
division 4, chapter 10.3 of the Government Code. The PERB is given
the authority to administer the provisions of chapter 10.3 (SEERA)
by section 3513(g). There is no provision giving the PERB the
authority to administer the provisions of chapter 10.5 (George
Brown Act) . Therefore, the PERB lacks jurisdiction over the
alleged violation of section 3530.
law and the entire record in this matter, the unfair practice
charge filed by the California Correctional Officers Association
against the State of California is hereby DISMISSED.
state 	by means 	of 	such boards, 	commissions,	- 	admin-
istrative officers or other representatives as may be
properly designated by law, shall meet and confer with
representatives of employee organizations upon request,
and shall consider as fully as such representatives deem
reasonable such presentations as are made by the employee
organization on behalf of its members prior to arriving
at a determination of policy or course of action.

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-,
&
Pursuant to California Administrative Code, title 8, part III,
section 	32305, 	this 	Proposed Decision 	and 	Order 	shall 	become 	final
on May 	17, 	1979 	unless 	a 	party 	files 	a 	timely 	statement 	of
exceptions. 	See 	Calif. 	Admin. 	Code, 	tit. 	8, 	part 	III, 	section
32300. 	Such 	statement 	of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting brief must
be 	actually 	received by 	the 	Executive Assistant 	to 	the 	Board 	at
the 	Headquarters 	Office 	in 	Sacramento before 	the 	close 	of business
(5:00 	p.m.) 	on May 	17, 	1979 	in 	order 	to 	be 	timely 	filed. 	See
Calif. 	Admin. 	Code, 	tit. 	8, 	part 	III, 	section 	32135. 	Any 	statement
of 	exceptions 	and 	supporting 	brief must 	be 	served 	concurrently
with 	its 	filing 	upon 	each 	party 	to 	this 	proceeding. 	Proof 	of
service 	shall 	be 	filed 	with 	the 	Board 	itself. 	See 	Calif. 	Admin.
Code, 	tit. 	8, 	sections 	32300 	and 	32305, 	as 	amended.
to
Dated: 	April 	27, 	1979	Dated: April 27, 1979
Ronald 	E. 	Blubaugh
Hearing Officer
Ronald E. Blubaugh
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California Administrative 	Code, 	title 	8, 	part 	III,
section 32305, this Proposed Decision and Order shall become final
on May 17, 1979 unless a party files a timely statement of
exceptions. See Calif. Admin. Code, tit. 8, part III, section
32300. Such statement of exceptions and supporting brief must
be actually received by the Executive Assistant to the Board at
the Headquarters Office in Sacramento before the close of business
(5:00 p.m. ) on May 17, 1979 in order to be timely filed. See
Calif. Admin. Code, tit. 8, part III, section 32135. Any statement
of exceptions and supporting brief must be served concurrently
with its filing upon each party to this proceeding. Proof of
service shall be filed with the Board itself. See Calif. Admin.
Code, tit. 8, sections 32300 and 32305, as amended.
Hearing Officer