Westminster School District (PERB 0043E)

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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE EDUCATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 	BOARD
WESTMINSTER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATORS
GROUP (PEG) ,
Charging Party,
vs.
WESTMINSTER SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CE-106
EERB Decision No. 43
December 16, 1977
WESTMINSTER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATORS
GROUP 	(WPEG),
Charging Party,
vs.
WESTMINSTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION/
CTA/NEA,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CO-20
Appearances; 	Nancy Rudoff for Westminster Professional Educators Group;
John L. Bukey, Attorney (Biddle, Walters & Bukey)for Westminster School
District; Paul Crost, Attorney (Reich, Adell & Crost) for Westminster
Teachers Association/ CTA / NEA .
Before Alleyne, Chairman; Gonzales and Cossack, Members.
OPINION
This case is before the Educational Employment Relations Board upon
the appeal by Westminster Professional Educators Group of the General
Counsel's dismissal of its unfair practice charge against both the
Westminster School District and Westminster Teachers Association/CTA/NEA. 1
The General Counsel, in the attached Ruling on Motions to Dismiss, found
it was not an unfair practice under the Educational Employment Relations
Act for the District, at the request of the Association, to discontinue
membership dues deductions in favor of WPEG upon the certification of the
Association as the exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of
certificated employees of the District.
1 Hereinafter the Westminster Professional Educators Group will
be referred to as "WPEG;" the Westminster School District will be
referred to as "District;" and the Westminster Teachers Association/
CTA/NEA will be referred to as the "Association."
l/

The 	issue presented by this case 	is not 	the one addressed by the
Ruling on Motions 	to Dismiss 	in that 	the charge does not allege the District
in fact discontinued membership dues deductions 	in favor of WPEG . 	The
charge only states 	in relevant part 	that 	the District's superintendent
informed 	the president of WPEG that he had 	instructed the District's
payroll clerk to discontinue payroll privileges 	for WPEG. 	However, 	this
does not alter the result we 	reach . 	For the reasons 	stated in the Ruling
on Motions 	to Dismiss, 	we conc lude that once an employee ' organization becomes
the exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of e~ployees, 	it 	is not
an unfair practice 	for a 	school 	district 	to discontinue membership dues
deductions 	for another organization if 	that organization is an employee
organization within the meaning of Government Code Section 3540.1 {d) . 2
It 	follows 	that 	it was not an unfair practice for 	the superintendent to
instruct 	the payroll clerk to discontinue membership dues deductions 	in
favor of 	WPEG at 	the 	request of 	the Association upon its 	certification
as 	the 	exclusive representative of an appropriate unit 	of 	certificated
employees of 	the District.
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By: 	Raympnd J. 	Gonzales, 	Member Regina ld Al l e yn e, 	Chai rman
Jerilou H. 	Cossack, 	Member
2
Gov . 	Code Sec . 	3540 . 1 {d) 	provides as follows:
"Employee organization" means any organization which
includes employees of a 	public 	school 	employer and
which has 	as one of 	its primary purposes representing
such employees 	in their relations with that public
school 	employer. 	"Employee organization" 	shall also
include any person such an organization authorizes
to act on its behalf.
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EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In the Matter of
WESTMINSTER PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATORS GROUP (WPEG),
Charging Party,
vs.
WESTMINSTER SCHOOL DISTRICT
and WESTMINSTER TEACHERS
ASSOCIATION,
Respondents.
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Case Nos. LA-CE-106
LA-CO-20
RULING 	ON MOTIONS
TO DISMISS
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BACKGROUND
On April 7, 1977, the charging party filed simultaneous charges
against the respondents. 	The charging party alleges that the respondent
school district, at the request of the respondent teachers association,
discontinued membership dues deductions of the charging party upon the
certification of the Westminster Teachers Association as the exclusive
representative of an appropriate unit of certificated employees of the
Westminster School District.—1/ The charging party contends the respond-
ents have violated charging party's rights as found in Government Code
Section 3543.l(d), and thus, there has been an unfair practice based on
Sections 3543.5(b) and 3543.6(c).
Government Code Section 3543.l(d) provides as follows:
1/ 	The case files of the Educational Employment Relations Board, of
which the Hearing Officer takes official notice, show that the Westminster
Teachers Association was certified as the exclusive representative on
March 23, 1977.

All employee organizations shall have the right to have
membership dues deducted pursuant to Sections 13532 and
13604.2 of the Education Code, 	until such time as an em-
ployee organization is recognized as the exclusive re-
presentative for any of the employees in an appropriate
unit; 	and then such deduction as to any employee in the
negotiating unit shall not be permissible except 	to the
exclusive representative.
The charging party's contention is that Section 3543.l(d) 	states
that only a "recognized" exclusive representative is entitled to exclusive
membership dues deductions, 	and inasmuch as the Westminster Teachers As-
sociation was "certified" as the exclusive representative, 	then Section
3543.l(d) 	does not preclude membership dues deductions to be made for the
charging party.—
2/
The Westminster Teachers Association filed an answer and motion to
dismiss on May 4, 	1977. 	The Westminster School District filed its answer .
on May 12, 	1977. 	On May 23, 1977, the District joined the Westminster
Teachers Association in its motion to dismiss. 	No response to the motion
was filed by the WPEG in a timely manner.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue presented in this case is one of statutory interpre-
tation.
In analyzing this particular section of the Educational Employment
Relations Act, 	the exact phraseology used in a particular section is not as
significant as the general tenor and scope of the entire act. 	"While the
intention of the Legislature must be ascertained from the words 	used to
express it, 	the manifest reason and obvious design of the statute should not
2/ The 	pertinent 	Government 	Code 	sections 	are:
3540.l(b) : 	"Certified organization" or "certified employee organization"
means an organization which has been certified by the board
as the exclusive representative of the public school employees
in an appropriate unit after a proceeding under Article 5 	(com-
mencing with Section 3544).
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3540.l(e): 	"Exclusive representative" means the employee organization
recognized or 	certified as 	the exclusive negotiating 	repre-
sentative of certificated or classified employees 	in an ap-
propriate unit of a public school employer.
3540.1(1): 	"Recognized organization" or "recognized employee organiza-
tion" means 	an employee 	organization which has been recog-
nized by an employer as 	the exclusive representative 	pur-
suant to Article 5 	(commencing with Section 3544) .
be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such 	language." 	Los
Angeles v. Barrett, 	153 Cal. App. 	2d 776, 782 (1959). 	Thus, the
literal meaning of the words 	of a statute may either be disregarded to
give effect to the manifest purpose of the statute, 	Smith v. 	Mt. 	Diablo
Unified School District, 56 Cal. App. 	3d 412, 418 (1976), or, under the
rule of noscitur £ sociis, 	the meaning of a particular word may be en-
larged by reference to the object 	or purpose of the whole clause in which
it is used. People v. Stout, 18 Cal. App. 	3d 172 (1971).
The manifest purpose of the EERA, 	as stated in Government Code
Section 3540 and derived from reading the entire Act, 	is to allow em-
ployees, 	if they so choose, 	"to select one employee organization as the
exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate unit". 	And
the object 	of Section 3543.l(d) 	is 	clearly to provide to only an ex-
clusive representative the right 	to have membership dues 	deducted 	from
employees' payroll warrants. 	It is inconceivable that the Legislature
meant that an employee organization which became certified as 	the ex-
clusive representative by the EERB would not be entitled to the same 	rights
under the Act with respect 	to dues 	deductions 	as that accorded an exclusive
representative which was voluntarily recognized. 	To conclude otherwise
would render the express purpose of the Act meaningless and reduce 	to a
nullity Section 3543.l(d). 	Such a result was never intended by the
Footnote 2 	(continued)
— 3—

Legislature}/
Based on the 	foregoing, 	and considering the overall purpose and
policy of the Act, 	the statutory history of the Act, 	and public policy,
the respondents' 	motions to dismiss are GRANTED and the charges are hereby
dismissed.
The charging party may obtain a 	review of the dismissal by filing
an appeal to the Board itself within ten 	(10) 	calendar days after service
of this dismissal. 	Such appeal · must be in writing, 	signed by the party or
its agent, 	and contain the facts and arguments upon which the appeal is
based. 	EERB Regulation 35007(b).
Dated: 	May 24, 	1977.
WILLIAM P. 	SMITH, 	JR.
General Counsel
By:
------------------	Jeff Paule
Hearing Officer
JI 	Charging party's reliance on the 	literal definition of words and phrases
cuts against the charging party: 	The charging party stresses 	the word 	"re -
cognized" 	in the first phrase of Section 3543 .1 (d) , 	which states, 	"all em -
ployee organizations 	shall have the right 	to have membership dues 	deducted
... 	until such time as an employee organization is recognized as the exclu -
sive representative" . 	The charging party ignores, 	however, 	the subsequent
phrase, 	"and then such deduction as to any employee in the negotiating unit
shall not be permissible except 	to t~e exclusive 	representative" 	(emphasis
added) . 	Referring back to Section 3540 .1 (e), 	"exclusive representative" 	is
defined to mean the employee organization recognized or certified as 	the ex -
clusive representative.
Perhaps 	the most rational and sensible way in which to interpret 	this
section of the Act is to say that after an employee organization becomes the
exclusive representative by winning a 	representation el~ction, 	the employer
is then forced to recognize that employee organization as 	the exclusive
representative. 	In reality, 	this is precisely what occurs.
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