Sacramento City Unified School District (PERB 0030EB)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE EDUCATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
ORDER
In the Matter of Petitions for Reconsideration:
SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Employer, Petitioner/Respondent,
and
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
CAMELLIA CHAPTER 560,
Employee Organization,
and
SACRAMENTO-SIERRA'S BUILDING AND
CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL,
Employee Organization, Petitioner,
and
Case Nos. S-R-8
S-R-234
S-R-355
S-R-429
EERB Decision No. 30
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 22,
AFL-CIO, Requests for
Reconsideration
Employee Organization, Petitioner/
Respondent,
and 	October 18, 1977
T UNION, DIVISION NO. 256,
STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF 	THE
	EDUCATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
In
	the 	Matter
	of
	Petitions
	for
	Reconsideration:
SACRAMENTO
	CITY
	UNIFIED
	SCHOOL
	DISTRICT,
Employer,
	Petitioner/Respondent,
and
CALIFORNIA
	SCHOOL
	EMPLOYEES
	ASSOCIATION,
CAMELLIA 	CHAPTER
	560,
Employee
	Organization,
and
SACRAMENTO-SIERRA'S 	BUILDING
AND
CONSTRUCTION
	TRADES
	COUNCIL,
Employee
	Organization,
	Petitioner,
and
SERVICE
	EMPLOYEES
	INTERNATIONAL 	UNION,
	LOCAL
	22,
AFL-CIO,
Employee
	Organization,
	Petitioner/
Respondent,
and
AMALGAMATED TRANSI
UNION,
	DIVISION
	NO.
	256,
Employee Organization, Petitioner,
and
SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION OF CLASSIFIED EDUCATIONAL
EMPLOYEES
Employee Organization,
and
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES,
Employee Organization.
Employee
COUNTY
)
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)
)
)
))
AJV"lALGAMATED
	TRANSIT
FEDERP~TION OF 	STATE,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case 	Nos. 	S-R-8
S-R-234
S-R-355
S-R-429
EERB
Decision
No.
	30
Requests
	for
Reconsideration
October 18, 	1977
ORDER
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)
)
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)
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)
& MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES,
Employee 	Organization.
Organization,
	Petitioner,
and
SACRAMENTO
	ASSOCIATION
	OF
	CLASSIFIED
	EDUCATIONAL
EMPLOYEES,
Employee
	Organization,
and
AMERICAN

The Educational Employment Relations Board hereby denies peti-
tioners' requests for reconsideration in the above-captioned matter.
Educational Employment Relations Board
by
STEPHEN BARBER
Executive Assistant to the Board
Jerilou H. Cossack, Member, concurring:
I concur in the decision to deny the requests for reconsidera-
tion filed by the Building Trades Council, the District and the
Transit Workers. I believe that an administrative agency, as
Justice Tobriner writing for the California Supreme Court stated,
"must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw
evidence and ultimate decision or order . .. . Among other functions a
findings requirement serves to conduct the administrative body to
sion; the intended effect is to facilitate orderly analysis and
minimize the likelihood that the agency will rand 	ap from
evidence to conclusions. ... They also serve a public relations
function by helping to persuade the
making is careful, reasoned, and equitable." Topanga Assn. v. County
of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974). This is
particularly true in a case such as this where there is a dissenting
-2-
The
	Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
	hereby
	denies
	peti-
tioners'
	requests 	for
	reconsideration 	in
	the 	above-captioned
	matter.
Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
by
STEPHEN
	BARBER
Executive
	Assistant
	to 	the
	Board
Jerilou
	H.
	Cossack,
	Member,
	concurring:
I
	concur
	in
	the 	decision 	to
	deny
	the
	requests 	for 	reconsidera-
tion
	filed
	by
	the 	Building
	Trades 	Council, 	the
	District
	and
	the
Transit
	Workers.
	I
	believe
	that
	an
	administrative
	agency,
	as
Justice
	Tobriner
	writing 	for 	the
	California
	Supreme
	Court
	stated,
"must
	set 	forth 	findings 	to
	bridge 	the
	analytic
	gap
	between
	the
	raw
evidence
	and
	ultimate 	decision 	or 	order
....
	Among
	other 	functions
	a
findings 	requirement 	serves 	to
	conduce
	the 	administrative
	body
	to
draw legally relevant subconclusions supportive of its ultimate deci-	
draw
	legally 	relevant
	subconclusions 	supportive 	of
	its
	ultimate
	deci-
sion; 	the 	intended
	effect 	is
	to
	facilitate
	orderly 	analysis
	and
minimize
	the 	likelihood 	that 	the
	agency omly le	
11
	randomly
	leap
	from
evidence 	to 	conclusions
....
	They
	also 	serve
	a
	public 	relations
function
	by
	helping 	to 	persuade parties that administrative decision-	
parties 	administrat 	decision-
making
	is 	careful, 	reasoned, 	and
	equitable."
	Topanga 	Assn.
	v.
	County
of
	Los 	Angeles,
	11
	Cal.3d 	506, 	113
	Cal.Rptr.
	836
	(1974). 	This 	is
particularly 	true 	in
	a
	case 	such 	as 	this
	where 	there 	is
	a
	dissenting
-2-

opinion. However, a majority of this Board has determined that in
cases of this type the majority will not set forth its findings of
fact and conclusions of law. It would be an exercise in futility for
me, as one member, to do so, since neither the parties nor any
reviewing court could rely upon one member's opinion as accurately
reflecting the reasoning of the Board as a whole.
Jerilou H. Cossack, Member
Reginald Alleyne,
	Chairman,
	dissenting:
I dissent from the order denying the requests for reconsideration of our
decision not to approve separate units of craft and transportation employees.
would grant the requests and allow the parties ten days to attempt to reach agreement
on these issues, failing which the order would be reinstated.
The
Requests
	of the
District,
	BCTC
and SEIU--The
Craft
Unit
The requests for reconsideration of our denial of a separate craft unit are
sought by the District, BCTC and SEIU, three of the four parties seeking approval of a
separate craft unit, and not objected to by a fourth party, CSEA, which sought to
represent craft employees as part of a wall-to-wall unit. No other parties directly
or indirectly sought to represent craft employees. 
1 With this consensus, I view the
requests for reconsideration as a clear signal that the parties concerned with craft
employees would now settle this case by consenting to the s
Reginald Alleyne, Chairman, dissenting:
The Requests of the District, BCTC
and SEIU--The Craft Unit
since no other 	ught a unit of craft employees or otherwise
sought to represent craft employees in any unit, other parties in the case need
not be party to an agreement to allow a separate craft unit.
-3-
that
opinion.
	a
	determined
	However,
	majority 	of
	this
	Board
has
	in
cases
	of
	this
	type
	the
	majority
will
	not
	set
	forth
	its
	findings 	of
an
	exercise
	in
	futility
	for
fact
	and
	conclusions
	of
	law.
	It
	would
	be
me,
	as
	one
	member,
	to
	do
	so,
	since
	neither
	the
	parties
	nor
	any
member's
	opinion
	as
	accurately
reviewing
	court
	could
	rely
	upon
	one
the 	reasoning
	of
	the
	Board
	as
	a
	whole.
reflecting
Member
requests
	our
I
	dissent
from
	the order
denying
	the 	for reconsideration of
transportation
employees.
	I
decision not
	to approve
separate units
of
	craft
and 	I
parties
	ten
days
	to attempt to
	reach
agreement
would
	grant
	the requests
and
allow the
on
these
	issues, 	failing
which
	the order
would
be
reinstated,
separate
The
	reconsideration
	a
	requests for 	of
our
denial
of
	craft unit
are
seeking approval of
	a
sought
by
	the
District,
	BCTC
and SEIU,
	three of the four
parties
objected 	to
by a
	fourth party,
	CSEA,
	which
	sought
	to
separate
craft
unit,
	and
not
parties
represent
	craft
employees
	part
of
a
wall-to-wall unit.
	No
other
	directly
as
or
	indirectly
sought to
represent
craft
employees.	
With
	this
	consensus,
	I view
the
the
requests 	for reconsideration as
	a
clear signal that 	parties
	concerned with
craft
consenting 	to the
	craft unit
employees would now
settle
	this
	case
by eparate craft unit
1	
of	since
no
	otherparties so
sought
a
unit 	craft
	employees
or otherwise
represent
craft
employees
	in
any
unit,
	other parties in the case
need
sought to
not
be
	party to
	an agreement to allow
a
	separate craft unit.
-3-

originally sought by BCTC and disallowed by our order of September 20, 1977. The
Board fails to read this signal, or, having read it, chooses to ignore it.
I believe now, as I did when we decided the unit aspect of this case, that
as a decision in a disputed case, our decision disallowing the separate craft unit
is substantively correct and consistent with a prior Board precedent." 	The
mistake (including my own) made by the Board was our decision to decide this and
other issues in advance of a settlement conference then scheduled to take place
shortly after we reached the decision eventually published on September 20. By
chance (and not by design), the decision was published the same day as the settlement
conference and not before. As intended, it was presented to the parties at the
outset of the settlement conference. 	Our decision should have been withheld until
it became evident that the parties would not settle all or part of the case at the
settlement conference.
The scheduled settlement conference was not simply a meeting called by the
parties. It was called at the request of the EERB's General Counsel, who, in
setting it up, was implementing a motion unanimously adopted by the Board at a public
meeting on September 6, 1977 . to make 	an active settlement attempt in this case,
even though it was on the docket of the Board itself and a decision might be pending.
See Fremont Unified School District, EERB Decision No. 6, December 16, 1976.
The motion offered by Member Cossack and unanimously adopted by the Board at its
public meeting of September 6, 1977 provides:
That the hearing officer contact all of the parties in
Sacramento City and see what, if any, of the outstanding
issues they would be prepared to agree upon and thus, with-
draw from Board consideration.
In addition, EERB Rule 33000 states our policy concerning settlements. It provides:
Voluntary Resolution of Dispute. It is the policy of the
Board to encourage the persons covered by the Act to resolve
questions of representation by agreement among themselves,
provided such agreement is not inconsistent with the purposes
and policies of the Act and the Board.
We have consistently approved settlement agreements not consistent with EERB precedents
in disputed cases, so long as the agreement "is not inconsistent with a clear and specific
mandate of the Act." See Tamalpais Union High School District, EERB Decision No. 1,
July 20, 1976. Gov. Code Sec. 3545 gives the EERB the discretion to deny a separate
craft unit in a disputed case. S.B. 839, effective in part January 1, 1978, and, in
other respects, July 1, 1978, will take away that discretion in respect to state employees
newly covered under that amendment. In these circumstances, it is impossible to say
that an agreement to allow a separate craft unit is "inconsistent with a clear and
specific mandate of the Act."
-4-
3
originally
sought
by
BCTC
and
disallowed
by
our
order
of
	September 20,
	1977.
	The
Board
	fails
	to read
	this signal, 	or,
	having
	read
	it,
	chooses
	to ignore
it.
I
	believe
now,
	as
	I
	did
when we
decided
	the
unit
aspect
of
	this
	case,
	that
as
	a
	decision in
a
	disputed
	case,
	our
decision
disallowing
	the
separate
	craft
unit
is
	substantively correct
and
	consistent
with
a
prior
Board
	precedent.
2 The
mistake
	(including
my
own) made
by
	the
Board
was
	our
decision
	to
	decide
	this
	and
other
	issues
	in
advance
of
a
	settlement
conference then scheduled
	to take
place
shortly
after
we
	reached
	the decision eventually
published
on
September
	20.
	By
chance
	(and
not
by
design),
	the
decision
was
	published the
	same
day
as
	the settlement
conference
and
not
before.
	As
	intended,
	it
was
	presented
	to
	the
parties
	at
	the
outset
of 	the
settlement
conference.
	Our
decision
should
have been
withheld
	until
it
became
evident
	that
	the
parties
would
	not
settle
all
or
	part
of 	the case
	at
	the
settlement
conference.
The
scheduled
	settlement
conference
was
	not
simply
a
meeting
	called
by
	the
parties.
	It
was
	called
at
	the request
	of 	the
EERB's
General Counsel,
	who,
	in
setting
	it
up,
	was
	implementing
a
	motion unanimously
adopted
by
	the
Board
	at
a
	public
meeting
on
September
6,
	1977
	to
make
	an
active settlement attempt
in
	this
	case,
even though
	it
was
	on
	the
docket of 	the
Board
	itself
and
a
	decision
might
be
pending.
3
2
See Fremont
Unified
	School
District,
	EERB
Decision
No.
	6,
	December
16,
	1976.
3 The
motion
offered
by Member
Cossack and
unanimously adopted
by
	the
Board
at
	its
public
meeting
of
	September
6,
	1977
provides:
That
	the hearing
officer
contact
all
of 	the
parties in
Sacramento
City
and
	see
what,
	if
any,
	of 	the outstanding
issues
	they
would
be prepared to agree
upon and
	thus,
	with-
draw from Board
consideration.
In
addition,
	EERB
Rule
33000
states
our
policy
concerning
settlements.
	It
	provides:
Voluntary Resolution of Dispute.
	It
	is
	the policy of 	the
Board to encourage the persons covered
by
	the
Act
	to
	resolve
questions of
	representation
by
agreement
among
	themselves,
provided such agreement
	is
	not inconsistent with the purposes
and
	policies of the
Act and
	the
Board.
We
have
	consistently
approved
settlement
agreements not consistent with
EERB
precedents
in disputed cases,
	so long as 	the agreement
"is
not inconsistent with
a
	clear
	and
	specific
mandate
of 	the Act."
	See Tamalpais Union High School
District,
	EERB
Decision
No.
	1,
July
20, 	1976. 	Gov. 	Code Sec. 	3545
gives the
EERB
	the discretion to deny a
	separate
craft unit in
a
	disputed case. 	S.B. 	839,
	effective in part
January 1, 1978, and,
	in
other respects, 	July
l,
	1978,
	will take
away
	that discretion in respect to 	state
employees
newly covered under 	that
amendment.
	In these circumstances,
	it is
impossible to say
that an agreement to allow a
	separate craft unit is "inconsistent with a
	clear
and
specific mandate of 	the Act."
-4-

An EERB hearing officer, representing the General Counsel, presided over the
September 20 settlement conference. But what was announced as a settlement
conference turned out to be a decision-announcement conference on a major
portion of the case. It is true that at the settlement conference, successful
efforts were made to settle those aspects of the case not covered by the Board's
order of September 20, but the point is that under the circumstances the parties
should have been allowed to attempt to settle the entire case in advance of a Board
decision on any aspect of it.
But for this extraordinarily postured request for reconsideration, the
Board might now rationalize that the craft-union issue would not have settled if
the parties had made the attempt at the settlement conference and before our craft-
unit decision issued. But the nature of these requests for reconsideration deprives
us of that luxury and makes self-evident our original mistake, now compounded by the
denial of these requests for reconsideration.
The Requests of ATU and SEIU--The Transportation Unit
The settlement message is not as clear for ATU's request for reconsideration.
The District has not joined in the request. Earlier, the District opposed ATU's
original petition for a separate transportation unit. Nonetheless, on viewing the
case as a whole, I am persuaded that the absence of objections to ATU's request for
reconsideration, while not the same as joinder in the request by other parties, means
that the District and CSEA might consent to ATU's requested unit.
Conclusion
Settlements in labor disputes have a unique value. Except in representation
disputes terminating in a "no representation" vote, labor disputants do not ordinarily
walk away from each other when their disputes end; they continue to have a working
relationship, the quality of which can be endangered by protracted litigation. In
labor disputes, more so than in other civil litigation, the early settlement is
better than a late settlement, and the late settlement is better than no settlement;
*The parties who sought the separate transportation unit were ATU and SEIU. Other
than CSEA, no other party sought to represent transportation employees in any unit. The
District, having opposed the petition for a separate transportation unit, would have to
be a party to any settlement concerning that unit. No other party in this case need be
a party to a settlement agreement on this proposed unit.
-5-
An
EERB
hearing
	officer,
	representing
	the
General Counsel,
	presided
over
	the
September
	20
	settlement
conference.
	But
what
was
	announced
	as
	a
	settlement
conference turned
out
	to be
a
	decision-announcement
	conference
on
a
	major
portion
of
	the case.
	It
	is
	true
	that
at
	the
settlement
conference,
	successful
efforts
were
made
	to
	settle
	those
aspects of the case
not
	covered
by
the Board's
order of
	September 20,
	but the point
	is
	that
under
	the
	circumstances
	the
	parties
should have been allowed
	to attempt to
	settle
	the
entire
case
in
advance
	of
	a
	Board
decision
on any
aspect of
	it.
But
	for
	this extraordinarily
postured request for reconsideration, 	the
Board
might
now
rationalize that
	the
craft-union issue
would
not
have
	settled
if
the
parties
had
made
	the attempt
at
	the
settlement
conference
and
before our
	craft-
unit
	decision issued.
	But
	the
nature
of these requests for reconsideration
deprives
us
	of
	that
	luxury
and
makes
	self-evident
our
original
mistake,
	now
compounded
by
	the
denial of 	these requests for reconsideration.
The
Requests
	of
ATU
and SEIU--The
Transportation
Unit
The
	settlement
message
	is
	not
	as
	clear
for
	ATU's
	request for reconsideration.
The
District
has
not joined
in
	the request.
	Earlier,
	the
District
opposed
ATU's
original
petition
for
	a
	separate transportation
unit.
	Nonetheless,
	on
viewing the
case as
	a
whole,
	I 	am
persuaded
	that
	the
absence
of
objections
	to
ATU's
	request
	for
reconsideration,
	while not 	the
	same
as
	joinder
in
the request
by
other
	parties,
	means
-
that
	the
District
and
CSEA
might
	consent to
ATU's
	requested
unit.·
. 	4
Conclusion
Settlements
	in
labor disputes
	have
a
	unique
value.
	Except
	in representation
disputes 	terminating
	in
a
	"no
	representation" vote, 	labor disputants
	do
not ordinarily
walk
away
from
each
other
when
	their
	disputes
	end; 	they continue to have
	a
	working
relationship,
	the
quality
of
which can be endangered by
protracted
litigation.
	In
labor disputes,
	more
so 	than
in other
civil litigation,
	the early settlement
is
better
	than
a
	late
settlement,
	and
	the
	late
settlement
	is better
	than
no
	settlement;
4
The
parties
who
	sought the separate transportation unit
were
ATU
and
	SEIU.
	Other
than
CSEA,
	no
	other party sought 	to represent 	transportation
employees
	in
any
unit.
	The
District,
	having opposed
	the
petition for
	a
	separate transportation unit,
	would have to
be
a
	party to
	any
settlement concerning
	that unit.
	No
	other party in this
	case need be
a
	party to
	a
	settlement agreement on
	this
proposed
unit.
-5-

settlement of a whole case is better than a partial settlement, and a partial
settlement is better than no settlement. With a craft-unit decision not
acceptable to three parties and of no apparent concern to a fourth, the possibility
of protracted litigation in the courts by way of an appeal from the Board's decision
is very high; the possibility of ensuing danger to future inter-party relations is,
consequently, high. Here, as in no other case that I know of or have heard of, the
possible harm to the parties' relations would stem totally from frustration with this
Board rather than contentiousness. For the anomaly of their appeals to the judiciary
would be that none of the parties to the appeal would be opposing each other; they
would all be opposing the EERB, all seeking the same remedy on the same issue. Only
to a possibly insignificant degree is all of this not true in the case of the ATU
request .
It might well be that my analysis of the possibilities of a settlement is
incorrect. Assuming that it is incorrect, I fail to see what the Board and the
parties will lose, beyond a little time and effort, if the Board proceeds as recommended
here. With so much to be possibly gained and so little to be lost, I find it easy to
determine that these requests for reconsideration should be granted.
I would grant the requests for reconsideration in respect to the requested craft
and transportation units only, let the Board order of September 20, 1977 stand on the
remainder of the operations-support services unit and all other units, stay the effect
of the transportation and craft-unit portions of the order for ten days and permit the
parties to attempt to reach an agreement, failing which the stay would automatically
dissolve and the order would become effective to the extent that no agreement was reached.
Reginald Alleyne, Chairman
It is not clear to me that the EERB would have standing as a party in an appeal
from an order under attack by all proper parties seeking the same result. Not having
reflected fully on that question, I simply assume, for the sake of discussion here,
that the EERB would have standing in such a case.
-6-
settlement of a whole case is better 	than a partial settlement, and a partial
settlement is better 	than no settlement. 	With a craft-unit decision not
acceptable to 	three parties and of no apparent concern to a 	fourth, 	the possibility
of protracted litigation in the courts by way of an appeal from the Board's decision
is very high; 	the possibility of ensuing danger 	to future 	inter-party relations is,
consequently, 	high. 	Here, 	as in no other case that I 	know of or have heard of, 	the
possible harm to 	the parties' relations would stem totally from frustration with this
Board rather 	than contentiousness. 	For the anomaly of their appeals to 	the judiciary
would be that none of 	the parties 	to 	the appeal would be opposing each other; 	they
would all be opposing 	the EERB, 	all seeking 	the same remedy on the same issue. 5 Only
to a possibly insignificant degree is all of 	this not 	true in the case of 	the ATU
request.
It might well be 	that my analysis of 	the possibilities of a settlement 	is
incorrect. 	Assuming 	that 	it is 	incorrect, 	I 	fail 	to see what the Board and 	the
parties will lose,beyond a 	little time and effort, 	if 	the Board proceeds 	as recommended
here. 	With so much to be possibly gained and so 	little to be lost, 	I 	find 	it easy to
determine 	that 	these requests 	for 	reconsideration should be granted.
I would grant 	the requests for reconsideration in respect to 	the requested craft
and 	transportation units only, 	let the Board order of September 20, 	1977 	stand on the
remainder of 	the operations-support services unit and all other units, 	stay the effect
of 	the 	transportation and craft-unit portions of 	the order for 	ten days and permit the
parties 	to attempt 	to reach an agreement, 	failing which the stay would automatically
dissolve and 	the order would become effective to 	the extent 	that no agreement was reached.
\ 	- 	~·•/i/)
- <. -::_~-s=,_r ,,__,~e;_ 	(_,12__)!_J1__J__) ~~
Reginald.Alleyne, 	Chairman
5 rt 	is not 	clear 	to me 	that 	the EERB would have stand 	as a par 	in an appeal
from an order under attack by all proper parties seeking 	the same result. 	Not having
reflected fully on that question, 	I 	simply assume, 	for 	the sake of discussion here,
that 	the EERB would have standing in such a case.
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