CourtListener 9998486•People v. Mabon CA1/5
Texte intégral
Filed 7/8/24 P. v. Mabon CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A165624
v.
TROY DOMINIC MABON, (Alameda County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 144197)
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
AND DENYING REHEARING
NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT
THE COURT:*
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on June 18, 2024, be modified
as follows: On page 2, footnote 2, the words “and the record on appeal” are
inserted after the word “opinion” so that the sentence reads, “We grant
defendant’s motion, filed on May 5, 2023, for judicial notice of our prior
opinion and the record on appeal in Mabon I, supra, A109378.”
There is no change in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
Dated: 07/08/2024 Jackson, P.J. , P. J.
* Jackson, P. J.; Simons, J.; Burns, J.
1
Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Mabon CA1/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A165624
v.
TROY DOMINIC MABON, (Alameda County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 144197)
This is an appeal from a postjudgment resentencing order denying the
request of defendant Troy Mabon to strike a firearm enhancement pursuant
to Penal Code sections 1385, as amended by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81), and 12022.53, as amended by Senate Bill No. 620
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620).1 Defendant, convicted of first
degree murder in 2004, contends this ruling was an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion for several reasons, including that the court misinterpreted section
1385, relied on improper facts, and failed to consider applicable mitigating
factors. We affirm.
1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal
Code.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case is before us on appeal for the third time. In the name of
judicial efficiency, we decline to restate the full factual and procedural
background. Instead, we refer our readers to our prior nonpublished opinions
(People v. Mabon (Oct. 24, 2006, A109378) (Mabon I); People v. Mabon
(May 19, 2021, A159361) (Mabon II)), which together provide this
information.2
Briefly, in 2004 a jury convicted defendant, then 23 years old, of:
(1) first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) with an
enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing
death (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (c), (d)); (2) possession of a firearm by a
felon (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 2); and (3) evading a
police officer (Veh. Code, § 2900.2, subd. (a); count 4). Defendant was
sentenced to 51 years 4 months to life in prison, comprised of an
indeterminate term of 25 years to life on count 1 plus a consecutive 25-year
term on the firearm enhancement, and consecutive determinate terms of
eight months each for counts 2 and 4. This court affirmed the conviction in
Mabon I after defendant appealed on instructional grounds.
In 2019, the trial court purported to amend the abstract of judgment to
correct certain sentencing errors, resulting in a reduced sentence of 50 years
to life. After defendant appealed, this court concluded in Mabon II that the
trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence and reversed and remanded the
matter for a full resentencing.
On May 31, 2022, the trial court resentenced defendant to 50 years to
life, comprised of 25 years to life for count 1 and 25 years for the firearm
2 We grant defendant’s motion, filed on May 5, 2023, for judicial notice
of our prior opinion in Mabon I, supra, A109378.
2
enhancement, with concurrent determinate terms on counts 2 and 4. In
doing so, the trial court denied defendant’s request under recently amended
sections 1385 and 12022.53 to strike the firearm enhancement after
concluding aggravating circumstances in the case outweighed mitigating
circumstances. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion under section
1385 in declining to strike the firearm enhancement by: (1) relying
exclusively on the facts underlying his murder conviction without considering
his current dangerousness; (2) misinterpreting the mitigating circumstance
delineated in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C); (3) relying on uncredible
testimony from an in-custody informant in violation of section 1111.5;
(4) relying on facts in the supplemental probation report and our Mabon I
opinion without assessing whether each fact had sufficient evidentiary
weight; and (5) failing to consider his youth as a mitigating circumstance. In
addition, defendant contends the trial court’s multiple errors were
cumulatively prejudicial. We set forth the governing law before turning to
each claim.
I. Legal Framework.
“Section 1385 provides that a court may, ‘in furtherance of justice,
order an action to be dismissed.’ (Id., subd. (a).) Though section 1385
literally authorizes the dismissal of ‘an action,’ it has been construed to
permit the dismissal of parts of an action [citation], including a weapon or
firearm use enhancement [citations]. Further, the statute’s application is
broad: ‘Section 1385 permits dismissals in the interest of justice in any
situation where the Legislature has not clearly evidenced a contrary intent.’ ”
(People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 696 (Tirado).)
3
On January 1, 2018, while defendant was incarcerated, Senate Bill 620
went into effect. Relevant here, under this bill, the following language was
added to section 12022.53: “The court may, in the interest of justice pursuant
to Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an
enhancement otherwise required to be imposed by this section.” (§ 12022.53,
subd. (h); Stats. 2017, ch. 682.) This statutory framework also permits a
court to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement found true
by the jury and to impose a lesser included, uncharged statutory
enhancement authorized under section 12022.53 or elsewhere in the Penal
Code. (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 692, 696, 702; People v. McDavid
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1021.)
The factors that guide the trial court in deciding whether to strike or
lessen a section 12022.53 firearm enhancement pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (a) are the same as those factors the court must weigh in handing
down a sentence in the first instance. (People v. Pearson (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 112, 117 (Pearson); People v. Flores (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 368,
377.) “These factors include those listed in California Rules of Court, rule
4.410 (general objectives in sentencing), rules 4.421 and 4.423 (circumstances
in aggravation and mitigation), and rule 4.428(b) (discretion in striking an
enhancement and punishment for an enhancement under § 1385). These
rules refer to circumstances specific to the crime and the defendant’s criminal
history, as well as to broader societal objectives, such as ‘[d]eterring others
from criminal conduct by demonstrating its consequences’ and ‘[i]ncreasing
public safety by reducing recidivism through community-based corrections
programs and evidence-based practices.’ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.410(a)(4), (8).) The rules state the trial court ‘should be guided by statutory
statements of policy, the criteria in [the Rules of Court], and any other facts
4
and circumstances relevant to the case.’ (Id., rule 4.410(b).)” (Nazir v.
Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 497; accord, People v. Parra
Martinez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317, 322.)
On January 1, 2022, approximately five months before defendant’s
resentencing hearing, Senate Bill 81 went into effect. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721,
§ 1.) This bill, among other things, amended section 1385 to provide further
guidance for a trial court deciding whether to strike an enhancement.
Relevant here, new language in section 1385, subdivision (c) provides:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement
if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of
the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” Defendant contends one of
these mitigating circumstances exists here: “(C) The application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the
enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
Thus, the provisions of section 1385, “taken together, explicitly and
unambiguously establish[]: the trial court has discretion to dismiss
sentencing enhancements; certain circumstances weigh greatly in favor of
dismissal; and a finding of danger to public safety can overcome the
circumstances in favor of dismissal.” (People v. Anderson (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 233, 239, review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296 [“if the court finds that dismissal of
5
an enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’ then the court need not
consider the listed mitigating circumstances”].)
On appeal, we generally review a trial court’s sentencing decision for
abuse of discretion, meaning we affirm if the court exercised its discretion “in
a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious, that is consistent with the
letter and spirit of the law, and that is based upon an ‘individualized
consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest.’ ” (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) Under this standard, “ ‘ “[d]efendants
are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the ‘informed
discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is unaware of
the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that ‘informed
discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have been based on
misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record.”
[Citation.] In such circumstances, we have held that the appropriate remedy
is to remand for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the
trial court would have reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware
that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424.)
II. Application of the Law to the Facts.
At defendant’s resentencing hearing, the trial court identified a variety
of facts based on its review of the record, including the recently filed
supplemental probation report and our Mabon I opinion, that it deemed
significant. The court first noted defendant shot the victim four times in the
head after “verbally challeng[ing] him” and despite the victim’s begging for
his life. The court also noted “a theme running through the facts in this case
of witness intimidation and witness threats.” Finally, the court referred to
evidence that defendant committed additional shootings “related to a person
named Timothy Curry.” The court then walked through aggravating
6
circumstances identified in California Rules of Court, rule 4.421,3 and
mitigating circumstances identified in both rule 4.423 and newly amended
section 1385, subdivision (c), before ultimately determining aggravating
circumstances predominated.
Specifically, the court found the following 10 aggravating
circumstances supported by the record: (1) defendant’s crime involved great
bodily injury and evidenced a high degree of cruelty and callousness (rule
4.421(a)(1)); (2) defendant used a gun to commit his crime (rule 4.421(a)(2));
(3) the victim was particularly vulnerable, as he was socializing with friends
when defendant shot him (rule 4.421(a)(3)); (4) defendant threatened
witnesses or otherwise illegally interfered with the judicial process (rule
4.421(a)(6)); (5) defendant was convicted of other crimes for which consecutive
sentences could have been, but were not, imposed (rule 4.421(a)(7)); (6) the
crime was carried out in a manner indicating planning, sophistication, or
professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)); (7) defendant engaged in violent conduct
indicating a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); (8) defendant’s prior
convictions or sustained juvenile petitions were numerous or of increasing
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); (9) defendant was on probation at the time of
the crime (rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (10) defendant’s prior performance on
probation was poor (rule 4.421(b)(5)).4
With respect to mitigating circumstances under rule 4.423, the trial
court found just one applicable, to wit, defendant had a mostly insignificant
criminal record prior to committing this crime (rule 4.423(b)(1)).
3 Unless otherwise stated, all rule citations herein are to the California
Rules of Court.
4 The court also found defendant may have taken advantage of a
position of trust or confidence “if [he and the victim] were friends.” (Rule
4.421(a)(11).)
7
Lastly, the trial court found no applicable mitigating circumstances
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(3)(A)–(I). As such, the court was not
required to, and did not, make a finding that dismissing the enhancement
would “endanger public safety” before reimposing it. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
This record, we conclude, demonstrates the trial court considered the
appropriate factors and exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner in
declining to strike or lessen the firearm enhancement. (Pearson, supra, 38
Cal.App.5th at p. 118.)
A. Consideration of Current Dangerousness.
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion under section
1385 by relying exclusively on the facts underlying his murder conviction
without considering his current dangerousness. Even assuming for the sake
of argument the court was required to consider this factor, the record belies
his contention. (See People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299 [the
statutory language of § 1385, subd. (c) does not require the trial court to
consider any particular factors in determining whether dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety].)5
In a letter filed in anticipation of the resentencing hearing, the district
attorney’s office informed the trial court that it “must consider the
defendant’s post-sentencing conduct” in exercising its discretion to strike an
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), citing People v. Yanaga
(2022) 58 Cal.App.5th 619. As such, this letter described defendant’s
rehabilitative conduct while incarcerated, including his educational
endeavors, positive programming and efforts to help steer inmates away from
5 As stated ante (p. 8), the trial court did not make a finding that
dismissing the enhancement would “endanger public safety” because it found
that none of the mitigating circumstances delineated in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) applied.
8
gang activity. This letter also mentioned that defendant received a new
felony conviction while in prison for possession of a controlled substance that
resulted in an additional two-year term.
The supplemental probation report, prepared in May 2022, provided
even more detail regarding defendant’s postsentencing conduct. According to
this report, “defendant has made tremendous strides in preparation for the
day he will be awarded his freedom. Since his incarceration, [defendant] has
amassed an impressive resume . . . earn[ing] two college degrees and
start[ing] multiple businesses and non-profit organizations particularly
geared toward rehabilitating youth.”6
This report also noted defendant, when interviewed in May 2022,
maintained his innocence and claimed to have been set up for a crime he did
not commit. Defendant insisted he was unfairly treated by an unjust system
and that exonerating evidence was withheld from the jury.
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged defendant’s
postsentencing conduct, noting “the probation report does a very good job of
describing Mr. Mabon’s productive and positive things that he’s done in
prison.” The court also pointed to defendant’s drug conviction in prison,
adding, “I understand that had to do with a level of depression that you were
dealing with, and it looks like you have managed that in terms of addressing
that issue as well.” Ultimately, however, the trial court decided to reimpose
the full enhancement because the aggravating circumstances greatly
outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The court’s conclusion that
6 Defendant earned associate of arts degrees in personal finance and
business administration and paralegal studies, and was currently working on
a bachelor of arts degree in personal finance and business administration as
well as a degree in child psychology. Defendant also worked as a certified
paralegal and an entrepreneur.
9
dismissing the enhancement would not be “in furtherance of justice” (§ 1385,
subd. (a)), after considering the appropriate factors, was within the scope of
its broad discretion.
B. Interpretation of Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)(C).
Defendant also contends the trial court abused its discretion by
misinterpreting section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), the mitigating
circumstance added by Senate Bill 81 that applies where “application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years.” His contention
raises a question of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo on appeal.
(Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 694.)
“ ‘ “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to
determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We
first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense
meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences
the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than
one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ [Citation.]
‘Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire
statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to
every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 989–990.)
The trial court found this mitigating circumstance did not apply
because “the base charge [for murder] is over 20 years, and the enhancement
does not cause that sentencing number to cross the 20-year mark.” We agree.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) unambiguously applies if “application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years.” The usual and
10
ordinary meaning of the phrase “result in” is “to cause (something) to
happen” or “to produce (something) as a result.” (Merriam-Webster
Collegiate Dict. <http://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/collegiate/result%20in> [as of June 11, 2024]; see Hall v. Time
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 855 [The phrase “as a result of” in its plain and
ordinary sense means ‘caused by’ and requires a showing of a causal
connection or reliance”].) Here, imposition of the firearm enhancement did
not cause or produce a sentence over 20 years because defendant’s sentence
for the murder charge already exceeded 20 years.
Defendant argues “the Legislature’s intent was for the statute to apply
in any case involving a sentence of over 20 years, not just in cases where the
sentence would be under 20 years absent the enhancement.” His
interpretation, if accepted, would write the phrase “result in” out of section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), since it would obviate the need for a causal link
between the enhancement and a sentence of over 20 years. While we agree
with defendant the statute was enacted for the purpose of limiting unduly
lengthy sentences, we cannot adopt an interpretation that supports the
statute’s purpose yet nullifies its actual language. (City of Emeryville v.
Cohen (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 293, 304 [“ ‘ “If possible, significance should be
given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the
legislative purpose . . . ” [citation]; “a construction making some words
surplusage is to be avoided” ’ ”].)
Where, as here, there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the
Legislature meant what it said and need not resort to extrinsic aids such as
11
the legislative history or public policy.7 (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th
1210, 1215; People v. Reynoza, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 989–990.)
C. Reliance on In-custody Informant Testimony.
Next, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by giving
significant weight to the testimony of Jamall Baker, an in-custody informant,
in relying on certain aggravating factors. (See In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th
455, 470 [trial court abuses its discretion when it “gives significant weight to
an irrelevant or impermissible factor”].) Section 1111.5, which took effect
after defendant’s trial but before his resentencing hearing, prohibits a court
from using a fact in aggravation based on the testimony of an in-custody
informant unless the testimony is “corroborated by other evidence that
connects the defendant with . . . the evidence offered in aggravation to which
the in-custody informant testifies.” (§ 1111.5, subd. (a).) This corroboration
“is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the
special circumstance or the circumstance in aggravation.” (Ibid.)
The trial court relied on Baker’s testimony in finding two of the 10
aggravating circumstances: defendant threatened witnesses or otherwise
illegally interfered with the judicial process (rule 4.421(a)(6)) and his crime
was carried out in a manner indicating planning, sophistication, or
professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)). In doing so, the court did not violate
section 1111.5 because Baker’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by
other evidence in the record.
First, under rule 4.421(a)(6), the court referred to Baker’s testimony
that defendant asked him to deliver a letter to his cousin with instructions to
7 We deny the People’s motion, filed on August 25, 2023, for judicial
notice of the legislative history of Senate Bill 81.
12
kill witnesses8 and told him that defendant planned to have his mother and
sister falsely testify in his defense that he was in Sacramento during the
murder. Other evidence in the record supports Baker’s claims that defendant
had plans to undermine the judicial process in his case, even if violence was
required. For example, Ana F., the victim’s girlfriend who was at the murder
scene, testified that shortly after the murder, defendant drove by her
workplace, made eye contact with her, and nodded his head at her. Ana was
scared because, although she did not see him shoot the victim, she thought
that he was after her because of what she knew. Thereafter, when Ana and
her two friends were driving to the victim’s candlelight vigil, they were
chased by someone at high speeds for several blocks. At the preliminary
hearing, Ana identified defendant as the driver. However, at trial, Ana
testified that she could not clearly see the driver.
The supplemental probation report also described this car chase,
stating that about three weeks after the murder, “defendant engages in a
high speed chase of Witnesses #1 and #3 who were driving together through
East Oakland. The chase lasts approximately 15–20 minutes and ends when
the witnesses arrive at a highly populated location of a candlelight vigil.”
Similarly, eyewitness N.T. (aka Pua) testified that as she ran away
from the shooting, defendant caught up to her and warned that she “ ‘was
lucky that he had love for [her] because he would have killed [her] too’ ” and
that he also would have killed her sister, L.M. (aka Weezy). And N.W., who
8 The letter defendant purportedly gave Baker in jail was admitted as a
trial exhibit. According to Mabon I, while this letter was not in the appellate
record, “defense counsel quoted it as saying ‘ “She in the 50’s on 51st and
Bancroft or on 52nd and Wentworth, they’re the only place she can be.” ’
Sergeant Nolan testified that the letter said nothing about appellant’s
suggesting that anybody be killed.” (Mabon I, supra, A109378.)
13
was interviewed by the police after volunteering information about the case,
told officers that defendant told her he murdered someone. N.W. also told
them defendant had “tattoos of bullets [on his forearms], of all the murders
he said he did,” and that he warned her, “ ‘This is where you’ll be at if you
talk to anybody. . . . You’ll be another bullet. You and your baby.”
The trial court mentioned all of this evidence, not just Baker’s
testimony, in finding the aggravating circumstance under rule 4.421(a)(6)
applicable.
Second, under rule 4.421(a)(6), the court found that defendant
committed the murder in a manner indicative of planning, professionalism, or
sophistication. In doing so, the court referenced Baker’s testimony that
defendant told him defendant killed the victim because his uncle had placed a
“contract” on the victim’s life. However, this was not the only such evidence.
As the court further noted, “essentially, [defendant] located the victim; and in
the darkness of the night, approached the victim, shot him once, followed by
several other shots to ensure that the killing was full and complete.” This
was consistent with the supplemental probation report, which stated that
defendant told the victim before repeatedly shooting him, “ ‘I caught your
bitch-ass slippin,’ suggesting he had been waiting for an opportunity to accost
the victim.”
As this record reflects, the trial court did not violate section 1111.5
because there was other evidence connecting defendant to the aggravating
factors under rule 4.421(a)(6) and (a)(8) that corroborated Baker’s testimony.
(See People v. Davis (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491 [court’s failure to
instruct the jury on the corroboration requirements of § 1111.5 was harmless
error because other evidence “connect[ed] defendant with the murder . . . and
thereby corroborate[d] the testimony of [the] in-custody informant”].)
14
D. Reliance on Facts in the Appellate Opinion and
Supplemental Probation Report.
Defendant’s next two claims are related. He contends the trial court:
(1) abused its discretion by relying on aggravating facts taken from the
supplemental probation report and Mabon I without independently assessing
whether each such fact was established by a preponderance of the evidence
and (2) violated his due process rights by relying on aggravating facts that
were not supported by substantial evidence. The aggravating facts to which
he refers are: (1) the statement in the supplemental probation report that he
engaged in a lengthy car chase of Ana F. and Weezy on the day of the victim’s
vigil and (2) Baker’s testimony regarding defendant’s purported
incriminating jailhouse statements (ante, pp. 12–14). We conclude the trial
court appropriately used these facts.
The California Supreme Court has long held that a sentencing judge
may consider, in addition to evidence produced at trial, “ ‘responsible
unsworn or “out-of-court” information relative to the circumstances of the
crime and to the convicted person’s life and characteristics.’ ” (People v.
Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 754 (Arbuckle); accord, People v. Peterson
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 717, 725 [“Once guilt has been determined, evidence which
would be inadmissible on the issue of guilt may nevertheless be received as
bearing on the punishment to be imposed.”].) Consistent with this rule,
section 1170 authorizes the court to consider for sentencing purposes “the
record in the case, the probation officer’s report, other reports, including
reports received pursuant to Section 1203.03, and statements in aggravation
or mitigation submitted by the prosecution, the defendant, or the victim, or
the family of the victim if the victim is deceased, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(4); accord, rule
4.437(d).)
15
As the California Supreme Court explains, a probation report “has
inherent reliability because it was made pursuant to a court order by expert,
objective government personnel in pursuit of their official duties.” (Arbuckle,
supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 755; accord, People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089,
1096–1097 [statements in court-ordered probation report were “sufficiently
reliable hearsay to be admissible”].) Indeed, a probation report is required
following every felony conviction where the defendant is eligible for probation
and must be read and considered by the sentencing judge. (People v. Stevens
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 335; People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 212.)
Likewise, “if the resentencing court has discretion to alter the length of the
defendant’s imprisonment, it must obtain a new, updated probation report,
including information regarding the defendant’s behavior while incarcerated
during the pendency of any appeal, before proceeding with the
resentencing . . . .” (People v. Yanaga, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 625–626,
italics omitted.) “ ‘The Legislature does not require trial court judges to read
and consider “unreliable” documents as a prerequisite to the imposition of
sentence.’ ” (People v. Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 212–213.)
In addition to its inherent reliability, defendants have a statutory right
to review a presentence probation report and challenge any alleged
inaccuracies. (People v. Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 212, citing §§ 1170,
subd. (b), 1203, subd. (b)(2)(D), 1203d; rule 4.437(e).) Defendant does not
dispute that he was afforded an opportunity to review the supplemental
probation report and could have, but did not, challenge the accuracy of any
fact contained therein. Where, as here, “the defendant has had an
opportunity to review the postplea probation report and challenge its
contents, including its statement of the facts and circumstances of the
offense, the trial court is entitled to consider the information in that report”
16
in making a discretionary sentencing choice not to reduce the defendant’s
sentence. (See People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 889–890
[distinguishing cases involving “the establishment of facts necessary to
impose an increased punishment, [rather than] the consideration of facts to
reduce sentence”]; see also People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234 [failure
to object and make an offer of proof at the resentencing hearing concerning
alleged errors or omissions in probation report waived claim on appeal].)
An appellate opinion bears similar hallmarks of reliability.
“[A]ppellate opinions, in general, are part of the record of conviction that the
trier of fact may consider in determining whether a conviction qualifies under
the sentencing scheme at issue.” (People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448,
457.) Moreover, “[a]llowing consideration of the appellate opinion makes
practical sense,” since it “reflects what is in the trial record” and often “will
be more practical to obtain . . . than the trial record, especially when the
conviction is old and from a distant locale.” (Id. at p. 456.) “It’s true that
when introduced at trial to prove the defendant’s conduct, the contents of an
appellate court opinion are subject to the ordinary rules regarding the
admission of hearsay. [Citations.] However, in posttrial proceedings,
statements from prior appellate opinions are admissible as reliable hearsay
even if they would not be admissible at trial.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 291–292.)
As defendant notes, “a separate question” exists as to “[w]hether and to
what extent an [appellate] opinion is probative in a specific case.” (People v.
Woodell, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 457.) However, defendant questions the
probativeness of Mabon I based on its references to testimony from Baker,
the in-custody informant. We have already held the portions of Baker’s
testimony relied upon by the trial court were sufficiently corroborated by
17
other evidence that connected defendant to the aggravating circumstances to
be admissible under section 1111.5 (ante, pp. 12–14).
Defendant also questions the probativeness of the supplemental
probation report based on its reference to defendant’s engaging in a lengthy
car chase of Ana F. and her friends on the day of the victim’s vigil. Defendant
reasons that Ana testified at trial (contrary to her preliminary hearing
testimony) that she could not see the driver who chased her. Defendant
insists the trial court dismissed Ana’s trial testimony and deemed the
information in the supplemental probation report “conclusively established.”
We disagree. The trial court made clear at the sentencing hearing that
it conducted “a very comprehensive review of the facts and materials in this
case,” including the Mabon I opinion. The Mabon I opinion not only described
Ana’s being followed by a car that ran a stop sign and that did not have its
headlights on, it also accurately stated Ana’s trial testimony that “[s]he could
not see the driver.” (Mabon I, supra, A109378.) As such, the trial court was
aware that Ana changed her testimony identifying defendant as the driver of
the car that chased her. Defendant directs us to no authority that precluded
the trial court, after conducting a comprehensive review of the relevant
record for purposes of section 1385, from relying on the information in the
supplemental probation report to conclude defendant was the unidentified
driver involved in the chase. (See People v. Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp.
212–213 [“courts routinely rely upon hearsay statements contained in
probation reports to make factual findings concerning the details of the
crime. These findings, in turn, guide the court’s sentencing decision”].)
Defendant also cites the rule that “once a defendant is eligible for an
increased penalty, the trial court, in exercising its discretion to impose that
penalty, may rely on factors established by [the People by] preponderance of
18
the evidence.” (People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th
1279, 1305.) Here, the trial court did not rely on any factor to increase
defendant’s sentence or otherwise penalize him. Rather, after defendant
sought leniency on resentencing, the court exercised its discretion to consider
whether to strike the enhancement, an act that would have reduced his
sentence.
In any event, the rule stated in Kaulick does not, as defendant
suggests, obligate a resentencing court to apply a preponderance of the
evidence standard before using an aggravating factor or obligate a reviewing
court to apply a substantial evidence standard on appeal.9 As explained in
People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886 (Buford), a trial court’s ultimate
determination that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors “ ‘is not
equivalent to a factual finding.’ ” (Id. at pp. 900–901, citing People v. Black
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 814, fn. 4 [noting a jury trial is required only on a
“ ‘fact’ ” that increases the punishment for a crime beyond the statutory
maximum].) As such, the court need not find that an aggravating
circumstance is “more likely than not” true before relying on it to deny a
resentencing petition. (See Buford, supra, at p. 900 [discussing a court’s
9 The California Supreme Court has long held that a dismissal
pursuant to section 1385 does not necessarily hinge on the sufficiency of the
evidence of guilt. (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 273 [“section 1385
dismissals often are not based on the insufficiency of the evidence as a matter
of law”].) Rather, the statute allows a court to dismiss an action or an
enhancement in the “furtherance of justice,” a standard that “is quite broad
and permits dismissal under a variety of circumstances. For example, a court
may dismiss under section 1385 if it believes ‘the only purpose to be served by
a trial or a retrial is harassment of the defendant . . . notwithstanding the
fact that there is sufficient evidence of guilt, however weak, to sustain a
conviction on appeal.’ [Citation.] Thus, a section 1385 dismissal may not
even ‘involve a consideration of the merits of the cause.’ ” (People v. Hatch,
supra, at p. 273, fn. omitted.)
19
discretion to deny a petition for rehearing under the Three Strikes Reform
Act of 2012 based upon a finding the petitioner would pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety].) And, as stated ante, the court’s discretionary
resentencing decision is upheld on appeal so long as it does not constitute an
abuse of discretion, meaning it does not exceed “ ‘the bounds of reason, all of
the circumstances being considered. [Citations.]’ ” (Buford, supra, at p. 901.)
In reaching this conclusion, we agree with defendant that a trial court
abuses its discretion by making essential factual findings that are wholly
without record support. (Buford, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 901.) However,
defendant does not claim that occurred here. He does not seriously challenge
any of the 10 aggravating circumstances found true by the court in this case,
including the circumstances that his crime involved great bodily injury and
evidenced a high degree of cruelty and callousness (rule 4.421(a)(1)), he used
a gun to commit his crime (rule 4.421(a)(2)), he threatened witnesses in an
effort to subvert the judicial process (rule 4.421(a)(6)), he engaged in violent
conduct indicating a serious danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)), and his prior
performance on probation was poor and he was on probation at the time of
the crimes (rules 4.421(b)(4)–(5)).10
For these reasons, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court
abused its discretion or violated his due process rights by failing to “assess for
itself” whether the facts relied upon in aggravation were established by a
preponderance of the evidence or by relying on facts unsupported by
substantial evidence.
10 As we have discussed, defendant contends the court should not have
relied on some of the facts in Mabon I and the supplemental probation report,
but he does not argue any of the aggravating circumstances wholly lacked
evidentiary support.
20
E. Youth as a Mitigating Factor.
Defendant also contends the trial court failed to understand, much less
exercise, its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c) to strike or impose
a lesser firearm enhancement based on the fact that he was only 21 years of
age when he committed the murder. He correctly notes that rule 4.423 was
amended shortly before the resentencing hearing to add as a mitigating
circumstance the fact that a defendant was under age 26 at the time of the
commission of the offense. (Rule 4.423(b)(6), amended eff. Mar. 14, 2022.)
The court made no reference to this new mitigating circumstance in
reimposing the enhancement.
The People respond that defendant forfeited his challenge by failing to
object before the trial court under the rule set forth in People v. Scott (1994) 9
Cal.4th 331 (Scott). Alternatively, the People contend there was no abuse of
discretion, as the record supports the court’s decision not to strike the
enhancement. We conclude the People’s forfeiture argument need not be
considered because the unambiguous record on appeal establishes there is no
basis for reversal.
First, the trial court did consider defendant’s age in finding none of the
mitigating circumstances delineated in section 1385, subdivision (c) was
applicable. Specifically, the court found on the record that defendant was not
a juvenile, but 21 years old, when he committed the offense (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(G)). Further, while defendant claims the record suggests his youth was
“a contributing factor in the commission of the offense,” the court found no
evidence the offense was connected to his childhood trauma (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(E)).11
11 The same trial judge was presiding over defendant’s upcoming
hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283–284, and
21
More importantly, even assuming the trial court followed the former
version of rule 4.423, we can “ ‘say with confidence’ ” the court would have
reimposed the full enhancement even if it had considered defendant was
under age 26 at the time of the murder.12 (Cf. People v. Yanaga, supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 628, quoting Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.) The
record makes clear the trial court found that it would not be “in the
furtherance of justice” to dismiss or lessen the enhancement based on the
multitude of aggravating circumstances (10 total) which outweighed the
mitigating circumstance (one total). (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) Even if the court
had factored in the additional circumstance that defendant was not yet 26
years old when he committed the murder, the number and severity of
aggravating circumstances greatly predominated. As the court explained, “I
find that the factors in aggravation outweigh the factors in mitigation. I’ve
done, what certainly seems to me, to be a very comprehensive review of the
facts and materials in this case. [¶] So that’s the reason why I’m leaving the
big use in place, the 12022.53(d); and as to other factors, I’ve noted that the
probation report does a very good job of describing Mr. Mabon’s productive
and positive things that he’s done in prison. [¶] There is the matter of the
reminded defendant that at the upcoming hearing he would have the
opportunity to call a mitigation expert and present evidence and witnesses
from his childhood to make a record of factors relevant at his future youth
offender parole hearing.
12 Defendant’s reliance on People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354
(Gutierrez) and People v. Ochoa (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 841 is misplaced. In
those cases, the trial court was statutorily required under section 190.5,
subdivision (b) to consider youth-related mitigating circumstances before
sentencing the defendant to life without possibility of parole. (Gutierrez,
supra, at p. 1361; Ochoa, supra, at pp. 850–852; see People v. Mendoza,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299 [noting § 1385, subd. (c) does not require the
court to consider any particular factors in exercising its discretion].)
22
drug conviction in prison, and I understand that had to do with a level of
depression that you were dealing with, and it looks like you have managed
that in terms of addressing that issue as well. [¶] So taking all of those
factors into consideration, I come out by imposing the full gun enhancement
at this time.”
The trial court then allowed defendant to speak at length, and
defendant specifically asked: “From the ruling that you made today, was
there any evidence in mitigation that could have persuaded you either way,
because my original trial judge . . . stated it was the intention of the Court to
sentence me to 25 years to life, but he stated that he couldn’t because of the
mandatory sentencing laws, and his hands was tied. [¶] There’s a letter from
one of the jurors where he asked the judge for mercy because of my age at the
time that the alleged crime was committed. I understand that I have to do
time. . . . [¶] I’m asking the Court for mercy to give me a chance to go to the
board a little faster than what I would have.” Defendant then added, after
explaining his understanding of the new sentencing rules, “So if the Court
would amend the gun enhancement, take 25 years off . . . I would have been
four years over the time I had to serve.”
The court declined to alter its ruling and advised defendant of his right
to appeal. At that point, defendant directly asked whether the trial court
judge believed he was a threat to the public. The judge replied in no
uncertain terms: “Absolutely.· You are absolutely a danger to society.
There’s no question about that in reviewing these materials. I’m 100 percent
certain of that. You are guilty of this crime, which is what the paperwork
says.· That’s what the Court of Appeal said. That’s what the jury said.·
That’s what the sentencing judge said. That’s what the witnesses said, okay.
[¶] . . . [¶] . . . Anybody who goes around chasing people, you know, on a 15-
23
minute car chase because they’re witnesses to a crime, scaring the you-know-
what out of them. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . So, Mr. Mabon, what I’m saying is that’s
what I’m basing this decision on.”
On this record, there is no “reasonable chance” the trial court would
have exercised its discretion to strike or reduce the enhancement based on
defendant’s age. (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 944.) Indeed, “if
the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement ‘would endanger public
safety’ [citation], then it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which
dismissal would be ‘in the furtherance of justice,’ which the court must find in
order to dismiss.” (People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 296, fn. 4.)
Accordingly, we decline to reverse the resentencing order on this ground.
F. No Cumulative Error.
Lastly, defendant argues reversal is required because the trial court
made multiple errors that were collectively prejudicial. We disagree. The
cumulative error doctrine does not apply because there were very few errors
and none that were prejudicial. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted. (See
People v. Henrique (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 48 [“ ‘Defendant has demonstrated few
errors, and we have found each error or possible error to be harmless when
considered separately. Considering them together, we likewise conclude that
their cumulative effect does not warrant reversal’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Simons, J.
Burns, J.
A165624/People v. Troy Dominic Mabon
24
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.