CourtListener 9997492•People v. Williams CA4/3
Texte intégral
Filed 7/3/24 P. v. Williams CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G062272
v. (Super. Ct. No. 22NF1170)
AKKIA JUNICE WILLIAMS, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Jeffrey Ferguson, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Todd Spitzer, District Attorney, and Matthew O. Plunkett,
Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
Akkia Junice Williams was charged in 2022 with a single count of
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violating Penal Code section 25850, which prohibits the unlicensed public
carry of loaded firearms. Williams moved to dismiss the charge as
unconstitutional, citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen
(2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen), which held that the “proper cause” requirement in
New York’s public carry licensing regime violated the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments. Williams asserted that both section 25850 and California’s
entire firearm licensing scheme, which at the time allowed the issuance of a
concealed carry permit only upon a showing of ‘“good cause,”’ among other
requirements, were invalid under Bruen.
The trial court found section 25850 was unconstitutional as
applied to Williams and dismissed the charge. The People appealed. While
their appeal was pending, the California Legislature amended the relevant
licensing statutes to remove the “good cause” requirement to comply with the
Bruen decision.
We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the charge against
Williams. As other California appellate courts have already recognized,
Bruen invalidated the now-deleted “good cause” requirement in two of
California’s firearm licensing statutes; it did not invalidate the entire state
licensing scheme. Because the “good cause” requirement is severable from
California’s licensing scheme, the remainder of the licensing scheme as it
existed when Williams was charged, including section 25850, otherwise
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All further statutory references are to this code.
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remained constitutional. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order
dismissing the charge against Williams and remand this matter for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
We begin by summarizing the relevant statutes at play. As
noted, section 25850 makes it a crime to publicly carry a loaded firearm on
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one’s person or in a vehicle. “Although framed as a default prohibition,
section 25850 is in effect the enforcement mechanism of a regulatory regime
that grants licenses to those who may lawfully carry firearms and withholds
licenses from those who may not.” (In re T.F.-G. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893,
915 (T.F.-G.).) In isolation, section 25850 “appears broadly prohibitory, [but]
it exists within a framework of numerous express exemptions.” (Id. at
p. 908.) One such exemption is section 26010, which provides that
section 25850 does not apply to persons with concealed carry permits issued
under sections 26150 to 26235.
Until recently, those licensing provisions were discretionary in
that they required the applicant to prove, among other things, that “good
cause” existed for the issuance of the license and granted the issuing
authority discretion to issue the license. At the time Williams was charged,
section 26150 provided that “the sheriff of a county may issue a [concealed
carry] license to [an eligible applicant] upon proof of all of the following: [¶]
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Section 25850, subdivision (a), provides: “A person is guilty of
carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the
person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an
incorporated city, city or county, or in any public place or on any public street
in a prohibited area of an unincorporated area of a county or city and county.”
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(1) The applicant is of good moral character. [¶] (2) Good cause exists for
issuance of the license. [¶] (3) The applicant is a resident of the county or a
city within the county, or the applicant’s principal place of employment or
business is in the county or a city within the county and the applicant spends
a substantial period of time in that place of employment or business. [¶]
(4) The applicant has completed a course of training [relating to firearms
safety, handling, shooting, and permissible usage].” (Former § 26150, subd.
(a), italics added.) Section 26155 employed similar language. (See former
§ 26155, subd. (a) [“the chief or other head of a municipal police department
of any city or city and county” may similarly issue licenses]; see also former
§ 26202 [if the licensing authority determines good cause does not exist, it
must state the reason for that determination].)
The issue before us is whether the above-described licensing
criteria run afoul of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. We
therefore briefly summarize the decisions that led to the present case.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep
and bear arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and that a district
ban on handgun possession in homes was therefore unconstitutional.
(District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, 595, 630 (Heller).) But
the court also noted that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited” and does not include “a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Id. at
p. 626.) For example, “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill [and] laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” are
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” (Id. at pp. 626-627, fn. 26.)
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Following Heller, California courts rejected various Second
Amendment challenges to California firearms regulations. (See People v.
Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 309-314 (Yarbrough) [upholding
conviction for possessing concealed weapon on private property (§ 12025)];
People v. Flores (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [upholding convictions
for possessing firearm by person prohibited from possessing a firearm
(§ 12021), carrying a concealed firearm (§ 12025), and carrying a loaded
firearm in a public place (§ 12031)].)
In Yarbrough, the court observed “the Heller opinion specifically
expressed constitutional approval of the accepted statutory proscriptions
against carrying concealed weapons,” so “in the aftermath of Heller the
prohibition ‘on the carrying of a concealed weapon without a permit,
continues to be a lawful exercise by the state of its regulatory authority
notwithstanding the Second Amendment.’” (Yarbrough, supra,
169 Cal.App.4th at p. 314.)
Then, in 2022, the United States Supreme Court extended Heller
to recognize “an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside
the home.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 10, italics added.) After clarifying
the proper test for analyzing challenges under the Second Amendment (id. at
pp. 22-24), the Bruen court determined New York’s concealed carry licensing
scheme, which required applicants to demonstrate “proper cause” to get a
license, was unconstitutional because it prevented law-abiding citizens with
ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms
(id. at p. 71). In reaching its conclusion, the court contrasted the proper
cause requirement in ‘“may issue”’ concealed carry licensing regimes, such as
New York’s and California’s, with ‘“shall issue”’ jurisdictions, where
authorities must issue concealed carry licenses whenever applicants satisfy
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certain threshold requirements, without the ability to deny licenses based on
a perceived lack of need or suitability. (Id. at pp. 13-15.)
The day after the Bruen decision was issued, the California
Attorney General issued an alert recognizing that the “good cause”
requirements in former sections 26150 and 26155 were no longer enforceable.
The alert instructed local officials not to enforce the good cause requirement,
but to otherwise continue to apply and enforce all other statutory
prerequisites to obtaining a public carry license (e.g., the requirements of
showing good moral character, residency, training, fingerprinting, and a
background check).
Williams was arrested and charged with a single count of
violating section 25850, subdivisions (a) and (c)(6). She filed a demurrer and
nonstatutory motion to dismiss the charge as unconstitutional. In her
moving papers, Williams argued the “good cause” requirement for concealed
carry licenses in California is unconstitutional under Bruen, and since there
is no remaining constitutional path to public carry, section 25850 operates as
a total ban on public carry and is therefore also unconstitutional.
The trial court granted Williams’s motion and dismissed the
charge against her. Although the court declined to reach the issue of whether
California’s licensing scheme as a whole is constitutionally void, it concluded
that under the “expansive” Bruen decision, section 25850 was
unconstitutional as applied to Williams, whom the court described as “a
law-abiding adult in possession of [a] firearm for purposes of self defense.”
The People filed a notice of appeal. While their appeal was
pending, the California Legislature amended sections 26150 and 26155 to
remove the “good cause” and good character requirements and to make
issuance of a concealed carry license mandatory if certain requirements are
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met (“shall issue”), rather than discretionary (“may issue”). (See Stats. 2023,
ch. 249, § 10, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.)
DISCUSSION
The People begin by contending Williams lacks standing to
challenge California’s concealed carry licensing scheme since she never
applied for a concealed carry permit. We assume without deciding that
Williams does have standing to challenge the scheme’s constitutionality. (See
People v. Miller (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 935, 942 (Miller) [“We assume without
deciding that Miller had standing to raise the arguments she asserted in her
demurrer” on the constitutionality of California’s concealed carry
prohibitions]; cf. In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144, 161 (D.L.) [juvenile
who was subjected to a true finding that he unlawfully possessed a loaded
firearm had standing to bring facial challenge to the constitutionality of
section 25850].)
Next, the People contend the trial court misinterpreted Bruen,
which they assert explicitly endorsed states’ ability to require concealed carry
permits. The People concede the now-removed “good cause” requirement in
sections 26150 and 26155 of California’s concealed carry licensing scheme is
unconstitutional under Bruen, but assert the “good cause” requirement is
severable from the rest of the statutory scheme, which otherwise remains
constitutional. Williams counters that California’s entire concealed carry
licensing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to her, because she was
engaged in constitutionally protected activity (i.e., being a law-abiding citizen
who was publicly carrying a firearm) when arrested.
Williams’s facial challenge to the concealed carry licensing
scheme presents a pure question of law, which we review de novo. (D.L.,
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supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) After conducting a de novo review, we
conclude Williams’s constitutional challenge is without merit.
Bruen invalidated only one of California’s statutory prerequisites
for obtaining a public carry license—the “good cause” requirement in former
sections 26150 and 26155. It did not invalidate all public carry licensing
schemes or prohibit states from requiring individuals to submit to certain
licensing requirements in order to legally possess a firearm. Indeed, the
Bruen court confirmed that states may validly impose “reasonable, well-
defined restrictions” on the “right to bear commonly used arms in public.”
(Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 70.) It emphasized that nothing in the opinion
should be interpreted to suggest that ‘“shall-issue”’ licensing regimes, “which
often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms
safety course,” are unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 38, fn. 9; see also id. at
pp. 79-80 (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.) [noting the court’s “decision does not
prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun
for self-defense,” and explaining that “shall-issue regimes,” which often
require the applicant “to undergo fingerprinting, a background check, a
mental health records check, and training in firearms handling and in laws
regarding the use of force,” are “constitutionally permissible”].)
The issue we must resolve is what impact the unconstitutional,
now-deleted “good cause” licensing requirement has on the rest of California’s
licensing laws. Our sister courts have uniformly rejected the argument that
California’s licensing scheme is unconstitutional under Bruen. We agree.
(People v. Mosqueda (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 403 [“Bruen did not render
California's entire licensing scheme or the charges against them
unconstitutional” because “[t]he offending ‘good cause’ requirement is
severable from the remainder of the licensing statute, as is the ‘good moral
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character’ element”]; T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 899 [“Although
California’s ‘good cause’ licensing requirement is undisputedly
unconstitutional under Bruen, [that] . . . does not render section 25850
facially unconstitutional”]; D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp.147-148
[rejecting facial challenge to § 25850, subd. (a) (carrying a loaded firearm)
and concluding “[i]t remains constitutional to punish someone without a
license for carrying a loaded gun in public”]; Miller, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 943-946 [reversing order sustaining demurrer to charge of carrying a
concealed firearm in a vehicle under one’s control (§ 25400), finding charge
was constitutional].)
In D.L., for example, our colleagues in the First District found
that after severing the “good cause” licensing requirement from former
sections 26150 and 26155, “California’s firearm licensing framework—and
the criminal penalties under section 25850—remain valid.” (D.L., supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) The court reasoned that “the Bruen majority’s
actual holding was quite limited—that New York’s ‘proper-cause’ licensing
requirement was unconstitutional,” and “Bruen did not undermine regulation
of guns based on objective criteria.” (Ibid.)
In D.L. the defendant made arguments similar to those offered by
Williams here: that even if the “good cause” condition can be severed,
sections 26150 and 26155 are still unconstitutional under Bruen because
(1) they afford unfettered discretion to the relevant law enforcement official
who “may issue” a license under each statute, and (2) the statutes still
include a subjective condition that the applicant be of “good moral character.”
(D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.)
The D.L. court rejected those arguments and so do we. “D.L.’s
argument is not supported by the actual holding in Bruen. As described
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above, that holding was based on the ‘proper cause’ language in the New
York statute, not on its use of the phrase ‘may issue.’ [Citation.] Nor did
Bruen include any holding regarding the ‘good moral character’ condition.
[Finally,] D.L.’s new argument concerning the ‘may issue’ language in
sections 26150 and 26155 is an ‘as applied’ constitutional challenge and not a
facial challenge because the argument would not apply in all circumstances.”
(D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) “For all of these reasons,” the D.L.
court “conclude[d] that section 25850 is enforceable and is not
unconstitutional on its face. It does not pose a present total and fatal conflict
with applicable constitutional prohibitions.” (Id. at p. 167.) Again, we agree.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order dismissing the charge against Williams is
reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to reinstate the case
against her.
GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
GOODING, J.
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