Detamore v. Jain CA2/1

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Filed 7/3/24 Detamore v. Jain CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JASON A. DETAMORE et al., B319504

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 18SMCV00120)
v.

SURESH C. JAIN et al.

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
Fisher, Klein & Wolfe, David R. Fisher, Tom N. Yacko;
Jason A. Detamore and Lisa M. Detamore, in prop. per., for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
One LLP, Peter R. Afrasiabi; Law Office of Kathryn M.
Davis, Kathryn M. Davis for Defendants and Respondents.

___________________________________
In prior litigation among some dozen parties operating
cannabis dispensaries, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement wherein most of them agreed to go their separate
ways and operate separate dispensaries.
On one side stood Jason and Lisa Detamore, the owners
and principals of Advanced Pain Solutions, Inc., a cannabis
dispensary business (collectively Detamore) operated at 12320 W.
Pico Boulevard in Los Angeles (12320 Pico).
On another side stood Devon Wheeler, the Detamore’s
partner, who leased 12320 Pico from parties on yet a third side of
the dispute, Suresh C. Jain, the Suresh & Usha Jain Living Trust
2003, and Pico 12300, LLC. (Jain, the trust, and the LLC are
collectively “Jain.”)
In simplified terms, the settlement agreement obligated
Wheeler to cede his interest in Advanced Pain Solutions to
Detamore and transfer any partnership assets he still possessed.
Detamore understood it would continue operating a dispensary at
12320 Pico, without Wheeler.
Upending Detamore’s expectation, Jain evicted Wheeler,
whose name was still on the lease, effectively evicting the
dispensary and Detamore. Jain then immediately re-let the
premises to Wheeler, who opened his own, competing dispensary.
Detamore sued Jain for conspiracy to fraudulently induce
the settlement agreement, arguing Jain and Wheeler colluded to
oust Detamore from 12320 Pico.
Jain moved to strike the conspiracy cause of action as a
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), arguing
its affirmative defenses rendered Detamore unlikely to prevail.
The court granted the motion on a different ground:
Detamore could not likely prevail because nothing in the
settlement agreement, to which Jain was not a party, conveyed

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any leasehold rights to Detamore. Therefore, Jain did nothing
wrong in evicting Detamore.
We conclude Detamore failed to establish a reasonable
likelihood of prevailing because it offered no evidence suggesting
that Jain and the settling parties colluded to induce Detamore to
enter into the settlement agreement. Therefore, we affirm the
order granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
BACKGROUND
We take the facts from the third amended complaint.
A. Underlying Partnerships, Litigation, and Settlement
1. Partnerships
Detamore operated “Grace Medical,” a cannabis dispensary,
at 12320 Pico.
Wheeler partnered with Detamore to operate the
dispensary.
Wheeler (not Detamore) leased 12320 Pico from Jain, its
owner.
The lease between Jain and Wheeler provided that Wheeler
could not “assign [or] transfer” 12320 Pico without Jain’s prior
written consent. Despite never giving this consent, Jain accepted
rent from Detamore, a nonparty to the lease.
Lawrence Epstein owned Marina Caregivers, Inc., which
supplied cannabis products to dispensaries. (Epstein and Marina
Caregivers are collectively referred to as the Supplier
Defendants.)
In 2013, Detamore, Wheeler, and Epstein formed a
partnership to operate Marina Caregivers.
Also in 2013, Advanced Pain Solutions entered into a joint
venture agreement with Herbalcure Corp. to operate a medical

3
1
marijuana retail dispensary in Los Angeles. Herbalcure is not
directly relevant to this appeal but as will be seen, the joint
venture agreement between Advanced Pain Solutions and
Herbalcure is relevant.
Neither the agreement between Advanced Pain Solutions
and Wheeler nor the one between Advanced Pain Solutions and
Herbalcure obligated any party to contribute an interest in real
property to the venture, including any existing leasehold.

2. Litigation and Settlement
a. Litigation
In June 2016, Detamore sued Wheeler and Jain for breach
of the partnership agreement between Detamore and Wheeler
concerning operation of Grace Medical at 12320 Pico (the Grace
action).
In August 2016, Detamore sued Wheeler and the Supplier
Defendants regarding the operation of Marina Caregivers (the
Marina action). (Detamore named other defendants as well, but
they settled and are not part of this appeal.)
b. Settlement
In September 2016, Wheeler and the Supplier Defendants
settled Detamore’s claims against them in both the Grace and
Marina actions.
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Detamore ceded
outside business interests to Wheeler, who disclaimed any right
to Grace Medical, which continued to operate at 12320 Pico.

1
An arbitrator ultimately found the Advanced Pain
Solutions/Herbalcure joint venture agreement to be invalid.
(Herbalcure Corp. et al. v. Detamore (May 18, 2020, B290873,
B291497) [nonpub. opn.].)

4
Wheeler agreed to transfer all partnership assets to
Detamore, specifically: (1) Wheeler’s interest in Advanced Pain
Solutions; (2) his interest in the Advanced Pain Solutions/
Herbalcure joint venture; (3) his right to operate Grace Medical;
and (4) any assets Detamore “may be entitled to” under either of
the partnership agreements, i.e., the agreement between
Advanced Pain Solutions and Wheeler or that between Advanced
Pain Solutions and Herbalcure.
In return, Detamore agreed to dismiss the Marina action
altogether and to dismiss Wheeler from the Grace action.
The settlement agreement also provided that Detamore
would indemnify Wheeler, whose name was still on the 12320
Pico lease (with Jain as the landlord), for all rents and liabilities
arising from Detamore’s operation of Grace Medical on the
premises.
The settlement agreement contained no mention of an
obligation to transfer the lease, nor any express mention of
Wheeler ceding possession of 12320 Pico to Detamore, although
the parties agreed Detamore would operate Grace Medical there.
Detamore thereafter dismissed the Marina action and
dismissed Wheeler from the Grace action, leaving Jain as the last
defendant standing in the Grace action.
Jain was not a party to the settlement agreement.
B. Grace Medical’s Eviction and Wheeler’s
Reinstallment at 12320 Pico
According to Detamore’s third amended complaint, Wheeler
had no intention of fulfilling his obligations.
Detamore alleged that on September 20, 2016, Jain and the
Supplier Defendants conspired with Wheeler to fraudulently
enter into the 2016 settlement agreement, planning that Wheeler
would renege on his promise to allow Detamore to operate Grace
Medical at 12320 Pico.

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To further this conspiracy, after the Marina litigation
settled and the Grace litigation partially settled, Jain, in
collusion with Wheeler, filed a sham unlawful detainer action
against Wheeler, alleging Detamore was illegally operating a
dispensary at 12320 Pico without a license. Wheeler immediately
capitulated in that action and signed a stipulated judgment.
To forestall eviction, on November 16, 2016, Detamore filed
a prejudgment claim for possession of 12320 Pico and sought ex
parte relief, alleging a rental agreement existed between
Detamore and the landlord. Contending Wheeler and Jain
conspired to wrongfully deprive Detamore of its interest in the
lease and the subject premises and oust it from the dispensary
business it had operated since 2009, Detamore challenged the
stipulated judgment on grounds that Detamore, not Wheeler, was
the tenant-in-possession and was thus the only entity having
standing to stipulate to any unlawful detainer judgment.
The trial court denied Detamore’s possession claim, entered
judgment for Jain, and issued a writ of possession. Detamore did
not appeal this ruling.
On January 8, 2017, Jain evicted Wheeler (and thus Grace
Medical and Detamore) from 12320 Pico. The next day, Jain re-
let the premises to Wheeler (through his half brother, Gabriel
Dezio), and Wheeler opened a new dispensary, ERBA.
C. Instant Litigation
1. Complaint
Detamore sued Jain and the Supplier Defendants for
interference with prospective economic relations and conspiracy
to commit fraud in the inducement of the 2016 settlement
agreement that resolved the Marina action and partially resolved
the Grace action. After extensive law and motion practice,
including an appeal, the third amended complaint is operative.

6
In it, Detamore alleged that defendants and Wheeler
formed a conspiracy before the 2016 settlement in furtherance of
which Wheeler would perform none of his settlement obligations
but nevertheless reap the settlement benefits.
Detamore alleged:
1. “As memorialized in the Settlement Agreement, all
parties agreed that the Detamores would own and operate the
cannabis business at the location of Grace Medical, the original
dispensary, located at 12320 Pico Blvd., to the exclusion of
Wheeler.”
2. “Prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement,
Defendants and Wheeler agreed not to perform under the
Settlement Agreement.”
3. “Defendants and Wheeler intended to induce Plaintiffs
into the Settlement Agreement by the misrepresentations made
therein with respect to their intention to perform.”
4. “After the Settlement was executed, Wheeler failed to
perform his obligations under the Settlement Agreement[,] as
Defendants intended, and moved back into 12320 Pico Blvd.[,]
where he operated the Illegal Dispensary [ERBA], servicing
Plaintiffs’ customers, notwithstanding the contrary commitments
of the parties in the Settlement Agreement.”
5. “In furtherance of Wheeler’s breach of the Settlement
Agreement, Defendants gave substantial assistance to Wheeler to
take over Plaintiffs’ business including, but not limited to, the
following: 1) the Defendant Landlords overlooked Wheeler’s lack
of license, and they re-let the property to Wheeler through his
brother, notwithstanding their duties to Plaintiffs; and 2) the
Defendant Suppliers also assisted Wheeler by restocking the
location of ERBA, the Illegal Dispensary, notwithstanding their
obligations to Plaintiffs at that location.”

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In sum, Detamore alleged defendants and Wheeler
intended to induce Detamore to enter into the settlement
agreement by misrepresenting Wheeler’s intention to
“relinquish[] all rights to operate the marijuana dispensary” at
12320 Pico, and defendants wrongfully interfered with
Detamore’s contractual rights by permitting Wheeler to resume
occupation and operate a dispensary at the premises under
Dezio’s name.
2. Anti-SLAPP Motion
Jain and the Supplier Defendants specifically moved to
strike the eighth cause of action: conspiracy to commit fraud in
inducement of the 2016 settlement agreement, arguing the
agreement constituted a “written or oral statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review
by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law,” and the cause of action thus arose
from acts in furtherance of Jain’s petition rights. (Code Civ.
2
Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).) Defendants argued Detamore could
not prevail on the cause of action because the action was barred
by the litigation privilege and the applicable limitations period,
and Detamore could not establish reasonable reliance.
In opposition to the motion, Detamore made three
arguments. First, Detamore argued defendants failed to show its
alleged actions arose from protected activity because they failed
to provide any evidence Jain was involved in the 2016 settlement
agreement or, as a nonparty thereto, could have engaged in
protected activity. Detamore argued that the Supplier
Defendants engaged in non protected activity because they were

2
Undesignated statutory references will be to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

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mere signatories to the agreement, with no obligations
thereunder.
Second, Detamore argued it would likely prevail on the
merits because its cause of action for conspiracy to defraud was
adequately pleaded.
Finally, Detamore argued it would likely prevail on the
merits because the settlement agreement obligated Wheeler to
cede occupancy of 12320 Pico to Detamore.
Detamore supported its arguments with the settlement
agreement, Jason Detamore’s declaration interpreting the
agreement, and the stipulated unlawful detainer judgment
against Wheeler.
In a tentative ruling, the trial court found that Detamore’s
eighth cause of action for conspiracy for fraud in the inducement
sought to impose liability on Jain and the Supplier Defendants
for protected conduct, specifically a misrepresentation intended
to induce a litigation settlement.
However, the court found in its tentative ruling that
Detamore failed to adduce any evidence that Jain knew of the
settlement agreement, induced Wheeler to breach the agreement,
or made any misrepresentation to Detamore. The court found
that Detamore failed to establish even that Wheeler agreed to
cede occupancy of 12320 Pico to Detamore. The court said,
“[T]here seems to be a disconnect between what Plaintiffs
believed was owed to them under the terms of the settlement
agreement and what the settlement agreement actually states. . .
. The Court does not find any terms in the agreement giving
Plaintiffs physical possession of the property. . . . [¶] . . .
[Settlement] language does not appear to require Defendant
Wheeler to do anything or to transfer the property to Plaintiffs.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have not argued that . . . Wheeler’s lease was
to be transferred to Plaintiffs.”

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On January 27, 2022, after a hearing on the motion, the
court found that Detamore failed to show its claim had probable
merit. The court adopted its tentative ruling and granted
defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
3. Motion for Reconsideration
Detamore moved for reconsideration under section 1008.
On March 11, 2022, Detamore sought ex parte relief advancing
the hearing on its reconsideration motion, which the court
denied.
On March 16, 2022, Detamore appealed the denial of its ex
parte application. It ultimately withdrew the reconsideration
motion altogether.
4. New Trial Motion
On February 28, 2022, 32 days after the anti-SLAPP order
was entered and served, Detamore moved for “new trial” on the
grounds of improper notice, discovery of new evidence, and
insufficiency of evidence supporting the judgment. It argued it
lacked notice that the court would examine whether the
settlement agreement required transferring possession of 12320
Pico. In support of the motion, Detamore offered a pre-
settlement declaration by Wheeler in other litigation between the
parties stating that the 12320 Pico lease was “the lease pursuant
to which the Joint Venture continues to operate.”
The court held a hearing on Detamore’s new trial motion on
April 20, 2022, 83 days after the anti-SLAPP order was entered
and 45 days after Detamore had appealed the court’s denial of its
ex parte application to advance its section 1008 motion.
The court found no surprise existed because to prove the
likelihood of success Detamore always had the burden of proving
up its prima facie case, which required evidence supporting its
right to possess 12320 Pico. It had every opportunity to do so, the

10
court found, but failed to do so until after the hearing. Therefore,
the court denied Detamore’s motion for new trial.
Detamore appeals.
DISCUSSION
Detamore contends the trial court erred in (1) finding
defendants’ conspiracy arose from protected activity, (2) finding
Detamore failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the
merits, and (3) denying Detamore’s motion for a new trial. We
disagree.
A. Applicable Law
1. Anti-SLAPP Procedure
The “anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants
from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their
rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.”
(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883-
884.) Thus, a “cause of action against a person arising from any
act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition
or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be
subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines
that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
In evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion, courts conduct a two-
step analysis. First, the court decides whether a defendant has
met its “burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or
claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant has
engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) For these
purposes, protected activity “includes: (1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by

11
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in
connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right
of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e).)
Second, if a defendant meets its burden on the threshold
showing, the court decides if the plaintiff “has established that
there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff
“ ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient
and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to
sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the
plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.) At this stage of the proceedings, a
plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal
merit.’ ” (Ibid.) Although “ ‘the court does not weigh the
credibility or comparative probative strength of competing
evidence, it should grant the motion if, as a matter of law, the
defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s
attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim.’ ” (Ibid.)
“In making its determination, the court shall consider the
pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the
facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(2).)

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A plaintiff cannot rely solely on the allegations of the
complaint but must produce evidence that is admissible at trial.
(HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
204, 212.) If the plaintiff fails to do so, the motion to strike is
granted. (Argentieri v. Zuckerberg (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 768,
780.)
Further, “[a]nalysis of an anti-SLAPP motion is not
confined to evaluating whether an entire cause of action, as
pleaded by the plaintiff, arises from protected activity or has
merit. Instead, courts should analyze each claim for relief —
each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there
may be several in a single pleaded cause of action — to determine
whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they
give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the
motion.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th
995, 1010.) “[T]o the extent any acts are unprotected, the claims
based on those acts will survive.” (Id. at p. 1012.)
We review a trial court’s order granting an anti-SLAPP
motion de novo, applying that same two-step analysis. (Oasis
West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) We
independently review whether a moving party has made a
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from
protected activity. (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
977, 988.)
2. Fraud and Conspiracy
“The elements of promissory fraud (i.e., of fraud or deceit
based on a promise made without any intention of performing it)
are: (1) a promise made regarding a material fact without any
intention of performing it; (2) the existence of the intent not to
perform at the time the promise was made; (3) intent to deceive
or induce the promisee to enter into a transaction; (4) reasonable

13
reliance by the promisee; (5) nonperformance by the party
making the promise; and (6) resulting damage to the promisee.”
(Behnke v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
1443, 1453.)
“The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation of
a group of two or more persons who agreed to a common plan or
design to commit a tortious act; (2) a wrongful act committed
pursuant to the agreement; and (3) resulting damages.” (City of
Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 212.)
Civil conspiracy is not an independent tort, but “a legal doctrine
that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually
committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate
tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.
[Citation.] By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator
effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other
coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy. [Citation.] In
this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the
immediate tortfeasors.” (Id. at pp. 211-212.)
B. Application
1. Defendants’ Alleged Conduct Arose from
Protected Activity
As to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Detamore
acknowledges that a settlement agreement constitutes protected
activity as to the settling parties (see Cheveldave v. Tri Palms
Unified Owners Assn. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1213), but
argues sans authority that the same is not true as to nonparty
conspirators such as Jain, nor to mere signatories to the
settlement, such as the Supplier Defendants, who have no
performance obligations thereunder. We disagree.
“Courts ‘have adopted a fairly expansive view of what
constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section
425.16.’ [Citation.] A settlement agreement executed in the

14
context of active litigation is ‘made in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.’ ” (O&C
Creditors Group, LLC v. Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 546, 566.) When a challenged cause of action is
founded upon and would not exist in the absence of protected
settlement activity, the cause of action arises from and is based
on the settlement agreement, making it subject to the provisions
of the anti-SLAPP statute even where the defendant is not party
to the agreement. (Id. at p. 567 [when a nonparty to a settlement
agreement is alleged to have committed a tort respecting the
settlement, the nonparty’s actions arise from petitioning
activity].)
Here, Detamore alleged that defendants conspired with
Wheeler to corrupt the Grace and Marina litigation settlement.
In thus unifying the parties to allege conspiracy, Detamore
cannot separate them to avoid the anti-SLAPP statute. (See
Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1420
[attorney’s negotiation of stipulated settlement in unlawful
detainer action was protected conduct].)
2. Detamore Offered No Evidence Suggesting
Probable Merit
As to the second prong, Detamore argues its claims have
probable merit because the 2016 settlement agreement gave
Detamore the right to possess 12320 Pico, if not expressly then at
least as a matter of reasonable inference. This is so, Detamore
argues, because (1) the agreement acknowledged that Wheeler
ceded all Advanced Pain Solutions assets to Detamore, and
possession of 12320 Pico was an indispensable asset; (2) the
agreement’s indemnity provision obligated Detamore to
indemnify Wheeler for rent he paid to Jain, which Detamore
would not have to do if it was not occupying the premises; (3)
after the settlement, Detamore took over the property and began

15
paying rent to Jain, which Jain accepted; (4) Jain alleged in its
unlawful detainer action not that Detamore had no right to
possession but that it had no license to sell marijuana; and (5)
Jain failed to challenge Detamore’s claim of possession in its anti-
SLAPP motion. Detamore adduces as evidence of these facts the
declaration of Jason Detamore about the meaning of the
settlement agreement, arguing the court was required to accept
the declaration as true for anti-SLAPP purposes.
To satisfy its burden on the second prong, Detamore was
obligated to produce evidence both of Wheeler’s promissory
fraud—e.g., a promise, lack of intention to perform, intent to
deceive, and nonperformance—and defendants’ participation in a
conspiracy—e.g., agreement between two or more persons on a
common plan to commit a tortious act and a wrongful act
committed pursuant to the agreement.
Detamore produced no evidence supporting any of these
elements.
a. Promise
We must first identify exactly what Wheeler is alleged to
have promised Detamore in the settlement agreement.
(1) There was no Promise of Occupancy
Detamore alleged “Defendants and Wheeler intended to
induce Plaintiffs into the Settlement Agreement by the
misrepresentations made therein with respect to their intention to
perform.” (Emphasis added.) Perform what? Wheeler’s only
obligation under the settlement agreement was to transfer
specified rights and assets to Detamore. The only asset contested
here is the 12320 Pico lease.
But the settlement agreement did not identify the lease as
a partnership asset and said nothing about Detamore taking it
over.

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Detamore argues the settlement agreement gave Detamore
the right to possess 12320 Pico. This right was implied,
Detamore argues, by the facts that: The agreement obligated
Detamore to indemnify Wheeler for rent he paid to Jain, which
Detamore would not have to do if it did not occupy the premises;
Detamore took over the property and began paying rent to Jain,
which Jain accepted; Jain alleged in its unlawful detainer action
not that Detamore had no right to possession but that it had no
license to sell marijuana; and Jain failed to challenge Detamore’s
claim of possession in its anti-SLAPP motion.
None of these circumstances implies a right to occupy
12320 Pico. First, Detamore knew Wheeler had no authority to
grant such a right, as his lease agreement with Jain expressly
forbade transferring the property to a third party without Jain’s
written consent, which was never given. Second, that Detamore
paid rent to Jain indicated only that Jain allowed Detamore’s
occupancy, i.e., agreed to waive the lease’s nontransferability
clause, not that Detamore had a right to occupy the premises.
Any such right arose only from Detamore’s informal arrangement
with Jain, and extended only so far as Jain and our unlawful
detainer law permitted. Third, given that Jain ultimately evicted
Detamore, it seems clear that it granted Detamore no lasting
right to possess the premises. Finally, that an attorney fails to
make a particular argument during litigation does not suggest
the parties agreed to implied but unstated contract terms years
earlier.
(2) There was no “Agreement” Promise
Promissory deceit is “A promise, made without any
intention of performing it.” (Civ. Code, § 1710.) Detamore argues
the pertinent promise here was that Wheeler “agreed” Detamore

17
would operate Grace Medical at 12320 Pico. (We assume
Detamore means not that Wheeler promised to agree to
Detamore’s occupancy of 12320 Pico but to allow it, or at least to
do nothing to interfere with the occupancy.) As noted above,
Detamore alleged, “As memorialized in the Settlement
Agreement, all parties agreed that the Detamores would own and
operate the cannabis business at the location of Grace Medical,
the original dispensary, located at 12320 Pico Blvd. to the
exclusion of Wheeler.”
But Detamore knew Wheeler had no power to control Jain’s
administration of the lease. “ ‘[P]redictions as to future events, or
statements as to future action by some third party, are deemed
opinions, and not actionable fraud.’ ” (Nissan Motor Acceptance
Cases (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 793, 823.) Therefore, the pertinent
promise could only be Wheeler’s promise not to interfere with
Detamore’s occupancy of 12320 Pico.
b. Wheeler’s Lack of Intent to Perform;
Jain’s Agreement with Wheeler to Deceive
Detamore
As to this promise—Wheeler’s promise not to interfere with
Detamore’s occupancy—Detamore identified no evidence that
Wheeler intended not to perform on that promise, that Jain
agreed with Wheeler to commit a tortious act, or that Jain
committed any wrongful act.
The only evidence on these points was Detamore’s
speculation about the sequence of events as they unfolded after
the settlement: Detamore occupied 12320 Pico for only a few
months, after which Jain evicted Detamore, ostensibly for
operating without a license, then re-let the property to Wheeler,
who also had no license. But mere breach of a contract does not

18
establish a prior intention on Wheeler’s part not to perform his
obligations under the Grace/Marina settlement.
Moreover, nothing about this sequence of events ties Jain
to the Grace/Marina settlement negotiations in the first instance
or suggests Jain had any arrangement with any defendant
relating to the settlement. Nor does any evidence suggest Jain
wronged Detamore by evicting Wheeler and reletting the
premises to him through his brother.
c. Conclusion
Detamore adduced no evidence suggesting a reasonable
probability of prevailing at trial on its cause of action for
conspiracy to defraud. Therefore, the court properly granted
defendants’ special motion to strike the eighth cause of action.
C. New Trial
Detamore argues it was unfairly surprised by the trial
court’s decision to interpret the settlement agreement as
conveying no leasehold or possessory interest in 12320 Pico, as
defendants did not make that argument in their anti-SLAPP
motion. It argues that Wheeler’s declaration that the settlement
agreement conveyed a leasehold interest to Detamore constituted
new evidence justifying a new trial, and the trial court’s refusal
to consider the declaration rendered its ruling unsupported by
substantial evidence. On these three bases, Detamore argues the
court should have granted its motion for a new trial. We
disagree.
Section 657 governs motions for new trial, and provides, in
pertinent part: “The verdict may be vacated, and any other
decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a
new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the
application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes,

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materially affecting the substantial rights of such party: [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against[;] . . . [¶] . . . Newly discovered evidence,
material for the party making the application, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at
the trial[;] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [and] [i]nsufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other
decision is against law.”
Detamore moved for new trial under these provisions,
arguing that the court’s ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion raised
a new material issue addressing a concern not raised by the
parties (right to possession of the subject property), and therefore
constituted surprise, which deprived Detamore of the opportunity
to fully brief the issue of possession with, among other things,
Wheeler’s declaration. Detamore also argued that given the
court’s surprise sua sponte finding on the issue of possession, the
court should have permitted Detamore to introduce parol
evidence such as Wheeler’s declaration to clarify any ambiguity
in the settlement agreement found by the court.
We have discovered only one published case applying the
new trial procedure to an anti-SLAPP ruling, and in that case the
ruling disposed of the entire case, not merely one cause of action,
as here. (Aron v. WIB Holdings (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1069.)
But for present purposes we will assume a new trial may be had
when a special motion to strike results in the removal of one of
several causes of action. We will also, for argument’s sake,
overlook the procedural infirmities of Detamore’s motion.
Cutting to the chase, we conclude first that Detamore’s
burden under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis was
always to demonstrate a reasonable probability of prevailing on

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the merits, which it could hardly do without first establishing its
right to at least occupy 12320 Pico. That defendants did not
specifically argue lack of possessory rights in their motion did not
relieve Detamore of the obligation to prove up its case.
Second, pursuant to the discussion above, no evidence
Detamore offered, even in support of its motion for new trial,
established its right to occupy 12320 Pico other than at Jain’s
sufferance. Even were Wheeler’s declaration in other litigation
as to the meaning of the settlement agreement probative, and
even had Wheeler expanded substantially on Jason Detamore’s
declaration already offered in opposition to the anti-SLAPP
motion (which he did not), Wheeler declared only that the 12320
Pico lease was “the lease pursuant to which the Joint Venture
continues to operate.” That does not mean, and Wheeler did not
say and Detamore does not claim, the settlement agreement
transferred the lease to Detamore.
We therefore conclude: Wheeler’s declaration did not
constitute new evidence supporting a new trial; Detamore was
not unfairly surprised that the possession issue arose at the
hearing; and the anti-SLAPP ruling was not based on insufficient
evidence. Therefore, Detamore’s new trial motion was properly
denied.
D. Conclusion
Given this result, we need not reach Jain’s arguments that
Detamore’s claim was precluded by the applicable limitations
period and the litigation privilege, and Detamore failed to
establish reasonable reliance on Wheeler’s alleged fraud.

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DISPOSITION
The order granting defendants’ special motion to strike is
affirmed. Respondents are to recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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