In re E.M. CA4/2

CourtListener 9987726Calctapp2 juil. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 7/2/24 In re E.M. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re E.M., et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E082706

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J297939)

v. OPINION

C.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson,

Judge. Affirmed.

Tracy M. De Soto, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant, C.M.

Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Dawn M. Martin, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
I. INTRODUCTION

C.M. (Mother) appeals from a dispositional order denying her reunification

services with her infant child, E.M., under the “bypass” provisions set forth in Welfare

and Institutions Code1 section 361.5.2 The juvenile court denied reunifications services

after finding that (1) Mother was not receiving reunification services for E.M.’s half

siblings after they were removed as the result of either severe sexual or physical abuse

(§ 361.5, subd. (b)(7)); and (2) Mother had previously failed to reunify with E.M.’s half

siblings and had not subsequently made reasonable efforts to address the problems

resulting in the half siblings prior removal (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).)

On appeal, Mother argues that the order denying her reunification services should

be reversed because: (1) the juvenile court’s findings that section 361.5,

subdivisions (b)(7) and (b)(10) applied are not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the

juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard by purportedly requiring Mother to

disprove the application of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10); and (3) the best interests of

E.M. justified granting reunification services notwithstanding the application of any

bypass provision. We conclude that the record does not support Mother’s contention that

the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard to bypass reunification services and

that Mother has forfeited any claim that the juvenile court should have provided

reunification services notwithstanding the application of a bypass provision. We also

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 “The statutory exceptions to providing reunification services under § 361.5 have
been referred to as reunification ‘bypass’ provisions.” (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 845-846.)
2
conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s bypass findings under

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and affirm the dispositional order on this basis.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts and Dependency Petition

C.M. (Mother) is the biological mother and R.M. (Father)3 is the presumed father

of E.M. In July 2023, Mother and Father were involved in an altercation that resulted in

the arrest of both parents. As a result of this incident, E.M. was transported by

San Bernardino County Sheriff’s deputies to the hospital for a physical evaluation; a

referral was made to San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS); and a

petition was filed on behalf of E.M. pursuant to section 300 et seq. With respect to

Mother, the petition alleged she was unable to provide for or protect E.M. as the result of

substance abuse, domestic violence, and untreated mental health issues; was unable to

provide for E.M. as the result of her incarceration; and that there was a substantial risk of

harm to E.M. as the result of Mother’s past neglect or abuse of E.M.’s half siblings.

B. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing

On November 20, 2023, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional and

dispositional hearing on E.M.’s petition. At the time of hearing, CFS requested that the

juvenile court consider its detention report, a jurisdictional and dispositional report, and

an additional information report dated November 2023, and the juvenile court received

these reports into evidence without objection.

3 Father is not a party to this appeal.

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1. Detention Report

According to the detention report, E.M. was brought to the hospital by

San Bernardino County Sheriff’s deputies for a physical evaluation on July 23, 2023.

Mother and Father had each been arrested following an incident involving a physical

altercation between the two; an attempt by Mother to drive an automobile while

simultaneously holding E.M.; and E.M. being “dropped” by Mother.

A social worker interviewed Mother regarding the incident while Mother was still

incarcerated. According to Mother, on the night of the incident she accompanied Father

to his place of work at a casino and consumed a significant amount of alcohol while

Father was working. Father drove the two home and, after picking up E.M. from a

babysitter, Mother and Father began to argue. When they arrived at their apartment,

Mother took E.M. from a car seat located in the back of the vehicle and moved to the

driver’s seat of the vehicle with E.M. in her arms. She then started the vehicle’s ignition

in an attempt to repark the vehicle. Father reacted by jumping into the front passenger

seat of the vehicle and attempting to place the vehicle back into park. In response,

Mother punched Father and Father called 911. During this interview, Mother denied that

Father ever struck, pushed or otherwise harmed her or E.M. and further expressed that

she was unsure why Father had been arrested since she believed Father was only trying to

stop her from driving while intoxicated.

When the social worker asked Mother about prior dependency proceedings

involving two other children, Mother reported that she had been trying to escape a

domestic violence situation and was ultimately unable to reunify with her other children

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because she did not have a place to live. When asked about her alcohol consumption,

Mother reported that she did not drink often, but acknowledged that things often went

wrong when she did drink.

A social worker also interviewed Father at his home. Father confirmed that on the

night of the incident, Mother had become intoxicated while Father was working, Father

drove Mother to pick up E.M. from a babysitter, and he and Mother began to argue.

However, when they arrived home, Mother stated she no longer wished to live with

Father, carried E.M. into the driver’s seat of their vehicle, and started the vehicle’s

ignition. In response, Father got into the front passenger seat of the vehicle, told Mother

she could not drive because she was intoxicated. Mother repeatedly attempted to drive

the vehicle as Father repeatedly attempted to switch the vehicle’s gear back to park.

During this time, Father was on the phone with a 911 operator and Mother hit Father

several times. Father reported that he was initially arrested along with Mother because

sheriff’s deputies were uncertain whether Father had willingly permitted Mother to drive

while intoxicated. He expressed that he no longer had any desire to reunite with Mother,

intended to obtain a restraining order against Mother, and that he desired to regain

custody of E.M.

Father also provided the social worker with six videos taken from his cellphone

during the incident. The videos depicted (1) Mother intoxicated while in the driver’s seat

of a vehicle, simultaneously holding E.M. and attempting to drive; (2) Father attempting

to forcibly place the vehicle into park and pleading with Mother to stop; and (3) Mother

holding E.M. while simultaneously hitting, punching and biting Father.

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2. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Report

According to the jurisdictional and dispositional report, two of E.M.’s half siblings

had previously been removed from Mother’s custody in September 2019 as the result of

Mother’s substance abuse and domestic violence. The juvenile court terminated

Mother’s reunification services in that proceeding in February 2021; and the case was

closed after the half siblings were able to reunify with their father in November 2022.

A social worker conducted a second interview with Mother in August 2023.

During this interview, Mother denied having a substance abuse problem and claimed that

she rarely consumes alcohol; but also acknowledged that she consumes alcohol when she

feels overwhelmed and that consumption of alcohol impairs her judgment. Mother

admitted that on the night of the incident for which she was arrested, she was intoxicated;

attempted to drive a vehicle while holding E.M. in her arms; and physically struck Father

while still holding E.M. in her arms; and at some point, E.M. fell from her arms onto the

ground. Mother further admitted that her relationship with Father involved domestic

violence; the incident for which she was arrested was not an isolated incident of domestic

violence; and that she likely has unresolved mental health issues requiring treatment.

When asked about the prior dependency case involving E.M.’s half siblings, Mother

claimed that she had previously successfully completed all her reunification services, but

was unable to reunify due to her inability to obtain adequate housing.

A social worker also conducted a second interview with Father. In this interview,

Father denied committing any acts of domestic violence against Mother and accused

Mother of being the abuser in their relationship. Father stated he had already engaged in

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therapy and been taking parenting classes in preparation for seeking custody of E.M.

from Mother. Father stated he had obtained a restraining order against Mother; stated

that he does not intend to continue any relationship with Mother; and further stated that

his only interest was to regain custody of E.M.

3. Additional Information Report

According to the additional information report, Mother had been regularly

participating in a substance abuse program for approximately two months; had tested

negative on all drug screens during this program; and had obtained generally positive

feedback from the program counselor regarding her participation thus far. Social workers

had requested a progress report regarding Mother’s involvement in a domestic violence

program and individual therapy, but had not yet received a response from the service

provider.

The report also summarized an exchange between Mother and a social worker that

occurred approximately one week prior to the scheduled hearing date.4 During this

exchange, Mother was “hostile”; expressed the view that social workers were not

accurately reporting her progress in services; and complained that she was unable to work

full time as a result of the predisposition services and visitation schedule set by CFS. She

further complained that CFS failed to provide her with gas cards to reimburse her for the

cost of attending visits.

4 The documented exchange occurred on November 14, 2023, and the contested
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was conducted on November 20, 2023.
7
When the social worker attempted to address Mother’s complaints, Mother

repeatedly spoke over the social worker and would not allow the social worker to

respond. Mother expressed the view that it was the social worker’s job to make things

“easier” for Mother and that the social workers assigned to this case were not doing their

jobs. Mother expressed the same sentiment regarding the social workers in her previous

dependency case, claiming that her failure to reunify with E.M.’s half siblings resulted

from a social worker’s failure to secure adequate housing for Mother. When the social

worker attempted to explain that reunification required Mother to be proactive, Mother

began to angrily curse at the social worker. The social worker advised that she would

discontinue the call if Mother could not discuss matters respectfully and, in response,

Mother stated she no longer wished to speak with the social worker and abruptly ended

the call.

Finally, CFS provided documents from the dependency proceeding involving

E.M.’s half siblings. The documents included the petition filed on behalf of E.M.’s half

siblings alleging Mother’s inability to provide or protect as the result of Mother’s serious

substance abuse, untreated mental health issues, and permitting a boyfriend to perpetrate

acts of physical abuse on the children. The documents also included copies of minute

orders showing that: (1) the half siblings were removed from Mother’s custody after the

juvenile court found true the allegations of the petition; (2) the juvenile court terminated

reunification services after finding that Mother “failed to participate regularly and make

substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.”

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4. Mother’s Testimony

Mother testified at the hearing. Mother acknowledged that she was involved in a

prior dependency proceeding and explained that the reason for the dependency was

because she “was in a domestic violence situation.” Mother stated that she recently

completed two domestic violence courses in April and July 2023; had been participating

in individual therapy since July 2023; and had been participating in a substance abuse

program for approximately three months. Mother acknowledged that her substance abuse

program involved several additional months of engagement before completion, but stated

that she was committed to completing the program.

5. Findings and Disposition

Following the presentation of evidence, Mother argued that the bypass provision

of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) did not apply because she had made reasonable

efforts to treat the issues that led to removal of E.M.’s half siblings in the prior

dependency action.5 Mother did not address CFS’s recommendation that reunification

services be bypassed pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7); did not request the

trial court grant reunification services despite the application of any bypass provision;

and did not request any findings on these issues.

The juvenile court found true the allegations of the petition as to Mother; ordered

E.M. removed from parental custody; and denied reunification services to Mother upon a

5 Specifically, Mother’s counsel argued that the “issue is whether ultimately
[Mother] has made reasonable efforts to treat the issues that brought her before the Court
in Riverside County.”
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finding that the bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) and (b)(10)

applied. Mother appeals from this dispositional order.

III. DISCUSSION

A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Generally, “[t]he juvenile court has broad discretion in crafting a disposition

pursuant to a child’s best interest” (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179), and

a reviewing court “cannot reverse the juvenile court’s determination, reflected in the

dispositional order, of what would best serve the child’s interest, absent an abuse of

discretion.” (In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55, 64-65; In re A.E. (2019) 38

Cal.App.5th 1124, 1140-1141 (A.E.) [juvenile court’s decisions regarding provisions of

reunification services in dispositional order are generally subject to review for abuse of

discretion].) However, “[t]he abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the

deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review.

The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of

law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if

arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712;

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165.)

With respect to the denial of reunification services at the dispositional stage, the

juvenile court’s discretion is statutorily limited. Under section 361.5, subdivision (a),

“[r]eunification services must be provided to the mother and statutorily presumed father

of children who have been removed from their parents’ custody, unless a statutory

exception applies. [citations.]” (In re A.E., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1141; In re T.R.

10
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1148 (T.R.); § 361.5, subd. (a).) The enumerated statutory

exceptions include circumstances in which (1) a sibling or half sibling has previously

been removed from the parent’s custody as the result of severe sexual or physical abuse

and the parent is not receiving reunification services with respect to the sibling or half

sibling (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(7)); and (2) a sibling or half sibling has been removed from

parental custody in a prior dependency proceeding, a court has ordered termination of

reunification services as a result of the parent’s failure to reunify in that prior proceeding,

and the parent has not subsequently made reasonable efforts to address the problems that

led to removal of the sibling or half sibling (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).)

If the juvenile court determines that the bypass provisions set forth in

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) or (b)(10) applies, it is statutorily prohibited from

ordering reunification services unless it also makes a countervailing finding that

reunification is in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) The relevant

social services department bears the initial burden of proving the threshold issue of

whether a bypass provision applies by clear and convincing evidence, while the parent

bears the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that a bypass provision

should be overridden because reunification would be in the best interest of the dependent

child. (In re T.R., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1148; In re Jayden M. (2023) 93

Cal.App.5th 1261, 1272-1273 (Jayden M.).)

We proceed to consider each of Mother’s contentions on appeal. However, as we

explain, we find no abuse of discretion warranting reversal of the juvenile court’s

dispositional order denying Mother reunification services.

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B. The Record Does Not Show the Juvenile Court Applied an Incorrect Legal Standard

Initially, we address Mother’s argument that the juvenile court applied the wrong

legal standard in determining the application of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10).

Specifically, Mother argues that the evidentiary burden on this issue was improperly

placed upon her because she was required to show she had made progress since the

termination of reunification services as to E.M.’s half siblings. We conclude that this

argument is unsupported by the record.

We agree with Mother that under the plain language of section 361.5,

subdivision (b)(10), a showing that the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable

effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the . . . half sibling of that child” is a

prerequisite to application of the statutory bypass provision (§ 361.5, subd. (a)) and, as a

result, CFS bears the burden to present evidence in support of such a finding. (In re T.R.,

supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1148 [“the department bears the burden of proving the

threshold issue of whether a bypass provision applies”].) Thus, if the juvenile court had

placed the evidentiary burden upon Mother to show she had made reasonable efforts in

order to disprove the application of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), doing so would

have been an abuse of discretion. (L.C. v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1021,

1034-1035 [the juvenile court “abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal

standard”].) However, “[t]he general rule is that on a silent record the ‘trial court is

presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law’ when exercising its

discretion.” (Ruelas v. Superior Court (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 374, 383; In re Julian R.

(2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498.)

12
Here, Mother has not identified anything in the record to suggest the juvenile court

misunderstood the law regarding the parties’ respective burdens at the dispositional

hearing. Instead, Mother cites to the arguments made by CFS and E.M.’s counsel at the

time of hearing. However, merely showing that an incorrect legal argument was

advanced by counsel at the time of hearing is not dispositive of the inquiry. It is the

juvenile court and not the relevant child welfare agency that “maintains ultimate control

over the delivery of services.” (In re Z.C. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1287.) On a

silent record, we presume the juvenile court was aware of and followed the applicable

law and Mother has not met her burden on appeal to show the juvenile court abused its

discretion on this point.

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Order

We turn next to Mother’s contention that the juvenile court’s findings in support

of bypassing reunification services were not supported by substantial evidence.

Generally, “a trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its

decision find no support in the evidence.” (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150,

1154.) And in reviewing this aspect of the juvenile court’s order, “we ask whether there

is sufficient evidence in the record that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—when

viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s determination—for a reasonable

trier of fact to conclude that the Department carried its burden by clear and convincing

evidence.” (In re Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1273.) However, we conclude

that Mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) findings

have been forfeited and further conclude that, even in the absence of forfeiture, reversal is

13
not required because the juvenile court’s section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) finding is

supported by substantial evidence.

1. Forfeiture

“In dependency proceedings, as elsewhere, a litigant forfeits an appellate argument

by failing to raise it before the trial court.” (In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282,

1292-1293; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) The forfeiture rule has been

specifically applied where a parent fails to object to a recommendation that reunification

services be denied based upon a statutory bypass provision. (D.T. v. Superior Court

(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1034 [Because “[n]o party objected to the court’s use of

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)” to bypass reunification services, “any objection based

on the court’s use of the wrong statute has been forfeited”]; In re T.G. (2015) 242

Cal.App.4th 976, 984 (T.G.) [mother’s failure to object to application of bypass

provision at the time of disposition forfeited the issue on appeal].)

Here, the jurisdictional and dispositional report filed by CFS expressly

recommended that the juvenile court deny Mother reunification services based upon the

bypass provisions in both section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) and (b)(10). Despite this,

Mother did not object to the recommendation with respect to section 361.5,

subdivision (b)(7) and did not address this point at the time of the dispositional hearing.

Even after the juvenile court stated its findings on the record, Mother did not raise the

issue, despite requesting modification of other orders. Given this record, we conclude

that Mother has forfeited her claim that the juvenile court’s findings pursuant to

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) are not supported by substantial evidence.

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2. Merits

Even in the absence of forfeiture, we would conclude that reversal of the juvenile

court’s dispositional order is not warranted because its finding that the bypass provision

in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) is supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Under this bypass provision, the juvenile court is not required to order reunification

services if a sibling or half sibling of the dependent child has been removed from parental

custody, a court has ordered termination of reunification services as a result of the

parent’s failure to reunify with the sibling or half sibling, and the parent has not

subsequently made reasonable efforts to address the problems that led to removal of the

sibling or half sibling. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).)

Here, CFS submitted copies of the dependency petition and minute orders related

to the dependency proceeding involving E.M.’s half siblings. Mother admitted in her

interviews with social workers that two of E.M.’s half siblings had been removed from

her custody and she was unable to reunify; and Mother did not dispute any of these facts

at the time of the hearing in this case. Thus, the evidence was clearly sufficient to show

that two of E.M.’s half siblings had previously been removed from Mother’s custody in a

prior dependency proceeding and that Mother’s reunification services were terminated in

that proceeding.

With respect to whether Mother has made subsequent reasonable efforts to address

the problems that prevented her from reunifying with E.M.’s half siblings, the evidence in

this case showed that E.M.’s half siblings were removed from Mother’s custody as the

result of both substance abuse and domestic violence; and that Mother’s reunification

15
services were terminated with respect to E.M.’s half siblings after the juvenile court

found that Mother “failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a

court-ordered treatment plan”. However, even after the incident in which Mother was

arrested for attempting to drive a vehicle while intoxicated and holding E.M. in her arms,

Mother repeatedly denied to social workers that she struggled with substance abuse, and

instead repeatedly expressed her view that her inability to reunify in the prior dependency

proceeding was solely the result of her failure to obtain adequate housing. Further, while

the record shows that Mother voluntarily engaged in domestic violence classes and

individual therapy in April and July 20236, she did not participate in any programs

attempting to address the issue of substance abuse until more than two years after

reunification services were terminated in the prior proceeding and after E.M. was

detained in this proceeding, resulting in only three months of services related to this issue

by the time of the dispositional hearing.

In light of Mother’s failure to acknowledge substance abuse as one of the primary

reasons for the removal of E.M.’s half siblings from her custody; Mother’s repeated

denial that she struggles with substance abuse even during the course of the present

dependency proceeding; and Mother’s belated attempt to participate in a substance abuse

treatment program, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Mother had not

made reasonable efforts to address the problems that previously led to the removal of

E.M.’s half siblings from her custody. (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15

6 We observe that even then, these efforts occurred more than two years after
termination of reunification services as to E.M.’s half siblings.
16
Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121-1122 (Jennifer S.) [juvenile court may conclude that a parent has

not made sufficiently reasonable efforts to address the problem where no efforts were

made until after the birth and detention of the parent’s most recent child].) Thus, we

conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the bypass

provision in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) applied.

Further, “only one valid ground is necessary to support a juvenile court’s decision

to bypass a parent for reunification services.” (In re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th

308, 324; Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121 [“only one valid ground is

necessary to uphold the juvenile court’s bypass decision”]; In re T.G., supra, 242

Cal.App.4th at p. 986 [same].) Thus, even in the absence of forfeiture regarding

Mother’s claim that the juvenile court’s section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) finding is

unsupported by substantial evidence, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of Mother’s

contention regarding this finding7 and we would affirm the juvenile court’s order denying

reunification services to Mother.

D. Mother Has Forfeited Her Claim that Reunification Services Should Have Been

Granted in the Best Interests of E.M.

Finally, Mother contends that even if substantial evidence in the record supports a

finding that a bypass provision applies in this case, the juvenile court should have granted

7 We acknowledge that on appeal, CFS concedes that
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) is inapplicable. Ultimately, we need not reach the issue
because this concession does not impact the disposition in this case.
17
reunification services to her because doing so would be in the best interests of E.M. We

conclude that this argument has been forfeited for failure to raise the issue below.

Under section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2), the juvenile court may order reunification

services despite the application of a bypass provision if the juvenile court finds, by clear

and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child. (§ 361.5,

subd. (c)(2).) However, the parent bears the burden of showing the best interest of the

child triggering the application of this provision. (In re T.R., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at

p. 1148; In re Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1272-1273.) At least once Court

of Appeal has observed that “[t]his subdivision becomes relevant only if . . . the juvenile

court contemplates exercising its discretion to order services” and the juvenile court is

not required to make any findings related to this subdivision if it does not consider

provision of reunification services. (R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908,

913, fn. 3.)

Here, the record shows that the only argument advanced by Mother at the time of

the contested dispositional hearing was that the bypass provision of section 361.5,

subdivision (b)(10) did not apply. Mother did not request that the juvenile court consider

granting reunification services despite the application of a bypass provision; did not argue

that the evidence supported a finding that reunification services would be in the best

interest of E.M.; and did not request the juvenile court make any findings under section

361.5, subdivision (c)(2). Consequently, the juvenile court never reached the issue and

made no findings under this subdivision. Given this record, we must conclude that

Mother’s argument has been forfeited on appeal.

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Nor does this case present a circumstance in which we should exercise our

discretion to reach the merits of the issue. The determination of whether reunification

services should be offered despite the application of a statutory bypass provision is a

matter within the juvenile court’s discretion based upon weighing numerous factors. (See

In re Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1272-1273.) Review of this aspect of a

juvenile order requires a reviewing court to evaluate whether the juvenile court’s factual

findings are supported by substantial evidence (See In re A.E., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 1140-1145) and whether the juvenile court’s weighing of those factors in reaching its

ultimate determination was arbitrary and capricious. (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th

1153, 1166-1167 [juvenile court may order reunification services despite competing

evidence on the issue].) This court cannot conduct such an analysis where the juvenile

court was never asked to make any factual findings related to the matter and never asked

to exercise its discretion in the first instance. Thus, we decline to reach the merits of this

argument and instead apply the general rule of forfeiture to this claim on appeal.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL
J.

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