People v. Rodriguez

CourtListener 9987311Calctapp1 juil. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 7/1/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B328179
(Super. Ct. No. 16F-01984
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

RICHARD ANTHONY
RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2016, Richard Anthony Rodriguez pleaded guilty to
attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd., (a) 1) and
admitted a prior strike for assault with a deadly weapon with
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). In 2021, he petitioned for
resentencing (§ 1172.6 2). His petition was denied after an
evidentiary hearing.

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Section 1170.95 was recast as section 1172.6 without

substantive changes. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216,
223, fn. 3.)
Appellant contends the trial court: (1) failed to act as an
independent fact finder, (2) applied the wrong burden of proof,
and (3) these prejudicial errors violated his federal constitutional
due process rights. He asserts if the trial court had properly
weighed the evidence and held the prosecution to the correct
standard of proof there is a reasonable probability he would be
found not guilty of attempted murder because he lacked specific
intent to kill. We disagree.
Appellant’s guilty plea admitted every element of
attempted murder. “Indeed, it serves as a stipulation that the
People need introduce no proof whatever to support the
accusation.” (People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 748.)
Evidence contradicting his admission was, therefore, irrelevant.
The only issue that remained to be determined at the evidentiary
hearing was whether intent was imputed to him because he aided
and abetted an accomplice in the perpetration of a different
crime, or whether he was the sole perpetrator whose intent was
personal to him. Once it was shown appellant was the
undisputed sole perpetrator, the trial court correctly found his
intent to kill was personal (People v. Hurtado (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 887 (Hurtado)) and denied relief. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
About a month after breaking up with his girlfriend,
appellant saw her in the passenger seat of a car stopped at a red
light. He pulled alongside the car, leaned over, pointed a gun
towards the car’s driver’s side window, and fired one shot. He
immediately drove away. There was no damage to either car and
no one was injured.
Appellant was charged with four counts: (1) attempted
murder of two individuals with malice aforethought (§§ 664/187,

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subd. (a)), (2) stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a)), (3) assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and (4) felony criminal threats
(§ 422, subd. (a)). As to count 1, the complaint alleged a principal
personally used (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)) and discharged
(id., subds. (c), (e)(1)) a firearm. As to count 2, it alleged
appellant personally used a firearm (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1);
12022.5, subd. (a)). The complaint further alleged he had
suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction (§§ 667, subds.
(a), (d), (e), 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)).
Appellant waived a preliminary hearing and accepted a
plea deal. He pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder
(count one) and admitted the strike prior. The trial court
sentenced him to the middle term of seven years doubled for the
strike prior, for a total of 14 years. 3
After appellant petitioned for resentencing under section
1172.6, the trial court appointed counsel. The prosecution
conceded appellant’s petition set forth a prima facie case because
the plea occurred early in the proceedings and the record of
conviction was limited. The trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing. Eight witnesses testified, including appellant who
testified he was alone when he fired a gun into the air over the
roof of the car but did not aim at anyone.
The trial court received post-hearing briefing and heard
additional arguments, including defense counsel’s contention that

3 Although the abstract of judgment and reporter’s

transcript show a guilty plea to attempted second degree murder,
attempted murder is not divided into degrees. (People v. Favor
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 876-877.) Instead, because appellant did
not admit the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, or
premeditated, the sentencing triad was 5, 7, or 9 years rather
than life with the possibility of parole. (Ibid.; § 664, subd. (a).)

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a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing is “basically a trial de novo
where the People have to prove intent to kill.”
The trial court denied the petition. It explained, “I just
don’t think that I can retry what [appellant] want[s] me to retry,
which is what [appellant] actually did that day. I think the
question is whether [appellant] could have been convicted,
natural and probable consequences; that was not what this case
was about. It never was.” It found appellant was “the sole
perpetrator of the events that led to his conviction, which was by
his plea to a plea bargain, [and] that precludes [the trial court]
from making findings regarding what he actually did that day in
terms of [firing the gun] over the [vehicle] roof or not.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends “because [he] made no admissions at
the time of his plea other than pleading guilty, the prosecution
needed to prove [he] personally harbored malice, which it did not
do.” He asserts the denial of his petition must be reversed
because the trial court failed to retry the facts of the case to
determine whether the prosecution proved every element of
attempted murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The Attorney
General contends the judgment should be affirmed because
appellant admitted he was the sole perpetrator and any
misstatement by the trial court in describing its ruling was
necessarily harmless. We conclude the Attorney General is
correct.
Attempted murder is defined as a “‘specific intent to kill
and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.’” (People v. Falaniko (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1242-1243.) A specific intent to kill requires
express malice. (Zemek v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th

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535, 548.) Implied malice cannot support a conviction of
attempted murder. (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 327.)
Prior to the enactment of Senate Bills Nos. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) and 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), the natural and probable consequences
doctrine provided an avenue for finding an aider and abettor
acted with malice. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 290 (Clements).) Under this doctrine, an aider and abettor
who lacked a specific intent to kill could be found guilty of
attempted murder solely due to their participation in a different
target crime, if attempted murder was the natural and probable
consequence of the target crime. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 844.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated “natural and probable
consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and
abetting.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) The bill
also created a procedural mechanism for defendants who could
not be convicted of murder under the amended laws to seek
retroactive relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3); Lewis, at p. 957.)
Senate Bill No. 775 expanded the class of defendants entitled to
relief to those convicted of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); see
People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 223, fn. 3,
[identifying changes in Sen. Bill No. 775].)
Section 1172.6 permits a defendant convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
petition for resentencing. If the petitioner makes a prima facie
case for relief, the trial court issues an order to show cause and
holds an evidentiary hearing where the prosecutor and petitioner
may offer new or additional evidence. The trial court may

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consider evidence previously admitted “including . . . , stipulated
evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt the petitioner is guilty of attempted murder under the
amended law. (Ibid.; see also People v. Hill (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1065-1066.) The trial court acts as an
independent fact finder to determine whether the prosecution has
met its burden (id., at p. 1066) but the trial court’s factual
determinations are limited to “issues made relevant by the
changes to the law effected by [the amendments].” (Gomez v.
Superior Court (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 778, 787 (Gomez).)
A section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is a continuation
of the petitioner’s underlying criminal proceeding (Gomez, supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 787) and applies “only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) It
does not permit “‘litigat[ing] anew’ any trial issues or allowing ‘a
petitioner to challenge any aspect of the factfinding from the
original trial that [they] wish[] to revisit.’” (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 470.) It is not a “‘trial de novo on all the
original charges.’ . . . [I]t is a postconviction . . . “act of lenity” . . .
allowing for the retroactive application of the new law governing
accomplice liability . . . .’” (People v. Williams (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 652, 661.)
To determine “whether a trial court correctly denied a
section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing, ‘“‘we
review the factual findings for substantial evidence and the
application of those facts to the statute de novo.’”’” (People v.
Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383

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Appellant argues the trial court improperly declined to
make credibility determinations or factual findings regarding
whether he shot over the roof of the car or at his victims, and
whether this shows he had a specific intent to kill when he fired
the gun. But appellant pleaded guilty to attempted murder.
A guilty plea is a judicial admission. (People v. Chadd,
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 748.) It “amounts to an admission of every
element of the crime and is the equivalent of a conviction.”
(People v. Ward (1967) 66 Cal.2d 571, 574.) A guilty plea
“‘concedes . . . the prosecution possesses legally admissible
evidence sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, a plea of guilty waives any right to raise
questions regarding the evidence . . . .’” (People v. Gonzalez
(1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 707, 713; see also People v. Allison (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 449, 458, fn.7, disapproved of on other grounds by
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 [a guilty plea is equivalent
to and has the same effect as a jury finding].) The implied
admission of the guilty plea obviates “the need for the People to
come forward with any evidence.” (People v. Martin (1973) 9
Cal.3d 687, 694, italics omitted; see also People v. Jones (1959) 52
Cal.2d 636, 651 [“Thus after a plea of guilty properly received the
prosecution is under no duty to prove that defendants committed
the crime. That issue was resolved by the defendants’ plea.”].)
Appellant’s guilty plea admitted and established generally
the existence of “intent to kill.” However, it did not admit
whether the intent was personal to him or imputed to him.
(People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338.) Based on
the record of the guilty plea, it was theoretically possible an
accomplice intended to kill and the accomplice’s intent was
imputed to appellant under the natural and probable

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consequences doctrine. But once the theoretical possibility he
aided and abetted an accomplice was eliminated by evidence
received at the hearing, his guilty plea was an admission of his
personal intent to kill. Any other evidence contradicting his
admission by plea was irrelevant.
Appellant cannot use a section 1172.6 resentencing hearing
to relitigate facts already determined, whether by plea,
admission, or verdict. (See People v. Farfan (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 942, 947 [“‘The purpose of section [1172.6] is to give
defendants the benefit of amended sections 188 and 189 with
respect to issues not previously determined, not to provide a do-
over on factual disputes that have already been resolved’”].)
Parties at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing must focus on
“evidence made relevant by the amendments to the substantive
definition of murder.” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 298.) The amendments to sections 188 and 189 did not change
the requirement of intent to kill for attempted murder.
Indiscriminate relitigation of findings supporting murder
convictions are not permitted. (People v. Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 715.) “[F]actual findings should be given preclusive
effect. The point . . . is to identify what those factual findings are
and how they relate to the elements of [attempted] murder under
a valid theory.” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470.)
In light of appellant’s admission by plea of an intent to kill,
the sole issue at the evidentiary hearing was whether he acted
alone. His guilty plea precluded the trial court from making
factual findings regarding his conduct or credibility
determinations regarding his intent. The trial court found he
was the sole perpetrator albeit without expressly stating it had
been proved “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Yet, it was an

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undisputed fact. Even if the trial court erred in describing its
role or applying the burden of proof, the error was harmless
because it is not reasonably probable that absent the error
appellant would have achieved a more favorable result. (People
v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 716; People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see also Hurtado, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at
p. 892 [when an error is purely one of state law, the Watson
harmless error test applies].)
DISPOSITION
Judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

CODY, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P.J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Barry T. LaBarbera, Judge Presiding
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________

Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorney General,
and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

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