CourtListener 9987285•In re E.N. CA2/5
Texte intégral
Filed 7/1/24 In re E.N. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re E.N. et al., Persons Coming B332435 c/w B333367
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 21CCJP05572A-D)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOSE N.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed in part,
conditionally affirmed in part, and remanded with directions.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Father appeals from the orders denying his petitions under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 and terminating
parental rights to L.L. (minor).2 Father contends the court
abused its discretion when it summarily denied his section 388
petitions, and it erred in denying application of the parental
relationship exception to termination of parental rights under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Father also contends that
the court erroneously failed to ensure that the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) complied with requirements of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related
California statutes (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.). We affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14
[“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 On October 6, 2023, this court consolidated father’s two
appeals—the June 7, 2023 appeal of the orders summarily
denying father’s section 388 petitions and the July 17, 2023
appeal of the order terminating parental rights.
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constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)
DISCUSSION
A. Father’s Section 388 Petitions
Father contends the court’s September 14, 2023 summary
denial of his section 388 petitions without an evidentiary hearing
was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.
On receipt of a section 388 petition, the court may either
summarily deny the petition or order a hearing. (In re Lesly G.
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) The court may summarily
deny the petition unless the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing in his or her favor. (Ibid.; see also In re Marilyn H.
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310.) We review the summary denial of a
section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re G.B. (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158.)
A petition to change or modify a juvenile court order under
section 388 must factually allege that: (1) there are changed
circumstances or new evidence to justify the requested order, and
(2) the requested order would serve the minors’ best interests.
(In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.570(d)(1) & (2).) “ ‘A prima facie case is made if the
allegations demonstrate that these two elements are supported
by probable cause. [Citations.] It is not made, however, if the
allegations would fail to sustain a favorable decision even if they
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were found to be true at a hearing. [Citations.] While the
petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency
[citations], the allegations must nonetheless describe specifically
how the petition will advance the child’s best interests.’
[Citation.] In determining whether the petition makes the
required showing, the court may consider the entire factual and
procedural history of the case. [Citation.]” (In re K.L. (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 52, 61–62; see also In re Anthony W. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 246, 250 [“ ‘[S]pecific allegations describing the
evidence constituting the proffered changed circumstances or new
evidence’ is required”].)
When, as here, a section 388 petition is filed after family
reunification services have been terminated, the juvenile court’s
overriding concern is the child’s best interest. (In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) The parent’s interests in the care,
custody, and companionship of the child are no longer
paramount; and the focus shifts to the needs of the child for
permanency and stability. (Ibid.; In re Malick T. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1109, 1123.) Nonetheless, by showing that
circumstances have changed and that the best interest of the
child warrants further reunification services, a parent may rebut
the presumption that once family reunification services have
been terminated reunification is not in the best interest of the
child. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309; In re
Stephanie M., supra, at p. 317.) “[B]est interests is a complex
idea” that requires consideration of a variety of factors. (In re
Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530; see In re Jacob P.
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 819, 832–833.) In determining whether a
section 388 petitioner has made the requisite showing, the
juvenile court may consider the entire factual and procedural
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history of the case, including factors such as the seriousness of
the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the problem
was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s removal,
the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the
change of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made
sooner. (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616; In re
Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446–447; In re Justice P.
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188–189.)
Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it
summarily denied the section 388 petitions father filed with
respect to all four children, whose ages ranged from four to
seventeen years old. The family has a lengthy history of domestic
violence, dating back to 2017, when mother and father were
involved in a violent altercation. At that time, parents had only
two children, and both children were present during the
altercation (the older child was ten and the younger one still an
infant). The incident led to a dependency case, which the
juvenile court ended in April 2018 with an order granting mother
and father custody of the two children. From 2019 to 2021, the
Department continued to receive referrals alleging ongoing
domestic violence between the parents. The referrals did not
result in a new dependency proceeding until the Department filed
a petition in the current case in December 2021, alleging the four
children were at risk of harm based on the parents’ history of
engaging in domestic violence, father’s physical abuse of one
child, and mother and father’s history of substance abuse. The
2021 petition alleged mother was a current abuser of
methamphetamine and alcohol, and father was a current abuser
of alcohol.
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The record includes ample evidence that the relationship
between mother and father was tempestuous, with both mother
and father threatening to leave, or actually leaving the
relationship, only to return. At times, the parents deceived social
workers about the status of their relationship. During a
Department investigation in August 2021, mother denied any
domestic violence or drug use; however, father reported mother
was using methamphetamine and alcohol daily in the children’s
presence and was arrested for physically assaulting him. By
December 2022, mother and father had reconciled. While father
had been compliant with his court-ordered services, mother had
not, and father began missing visits with the children. By Easter
in 2023, tensions were again rising between the two, although
they reconciled again in the same month, April 2023. As
maternal grandmother, the children’s caregiver, explained,
parents always fought, broke up, and got back together.
In its six-month review report in August 2022, the
Department recommended six additional months of reunification
services, based on father’s compliance with services. In May
2023, the Department recommended terminating services.
Mother had missed ten drug tests, and while father was
participating in services, his on-again, off-again relationship with
mother meant he had not demonstrated a willingness to keep the
children safe. The court terminated reunification services on
May 18, 2023.
Just four months later, on September 13, 2023, father filed
four section 388 petitions, one for each child, seeking to have his
reunification services reinstated or the children placed with him.
Describing what circumstances had changed since termination of
reunification services, father’s petitions stated that the court had
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terminated services “due to father continuing to remain in a
relationship with mother, and cohabitate with her. Since [then],
father has reportedly moved away from mother and has ended
his relationship with her. He now resides in a separate home and
is able to receive the children into his custody without mother.”
Father attached a one-year lease agreement beginning
September 2023, a September 2023 letter from a service provider
stating he had continued participating in the program, and
documentation showing his participation in drug testing and
substance abuse programs prior to the May 2023 termination of
services.
Father’s petitions did not present a prima facie case of
changed circumstances, because the record demonstrated that
parents had an ongoing, repeated pattern of separating and
reconciling, and nothing in the petitions showed that this time
would be any different. Father filed his petitions just two weeks
after the lease took effect, and nothing in the lease precluded
mother and father from reconciling once again, this time with
mother moving into father’s new apartment. Father’s history of
saying he was fed up with mother’s drug use, only to return to
the relationship, works against him here, and he has not made a
prima facie case of changed circumstances.
Even assuming father met the changed circumstances
requirement by getting a separate apartment, father did not
make a prima facie case that his requested relief would be in the
children’s best interests. The petitions simply alleged the
children had a bond with father and would benefit from
continuing the relationship. On appeal, father’s only argument is
that the best interest question should be viewed in the context of
the denial of father’s section 388 petitions leading directly to the
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termination of his parental rights, and that such a termination
would necessarily cause trauma to the children. This conclusory
argument does not provide any factual basis to support that
reinstating reunification services would be in the children’s best
interests. The record supported the trial court’s determination
that father did not make out a prima facie case: father missed or
canceled many visits and the children’s behavior and their
statements to social workers demonstrated that they were either
uninterested in having a relationship with father, or saw their
relationship only as a superficial source of snacks and fun.
Moreover, reinstating reunification services, and thereby further
delaying permanency for minors, was not in their best interests.
Having failed to establish a prima facie case of either
changed circumstances or best interests, father was not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petitions.
B. Parental Relationship Exception
Father contends the juvenile court erred when it
determined that the parental relationship exception to adoption
did not apply. However, taking the applicable law and the
standard of review into account, father has failed to demonstrate
reversible error.
Once the juvenile court finds it is likely the child will be
adopted, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), requires termination
of parental rights unless a statutory exception applies. “The
statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45,
53.) In order to establish the parental relationship exception
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under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), a parent must prove
three elements: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child,
taking into account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) that
“the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) that
terminating the parent-child attachment “would be detrimental
to the child even when balanced against the countervailing
benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 636.)
The substantial evidence standard of review applies to the
first two elements of the parental relationship exception (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640), while the third element—
“whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Id.
at p. 640.)
Recognizing that the eldest child is close to 18 years old
and does not want to spend time with him, father focuses his
appellate argument on his three younger children. He contends
that his visits with the children “should be considered consistent
enough” to meet the first requirement of Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at pages 629 and 630, and that there was evidence of a
beneficial relationship between himself and his children.
Father’s argument misconstrues the operation of the
substantial evidence standard of review. The appealing party
“bear[s] the burden to show there was no evidence of a
sufficiently substantial nature to support those findings and
orders. [Citation.] We draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the juvenile court
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and review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
determinations; we do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.]
Thus, we do not consider whether there is evidence from which
the juvenile court could have drawn a different conclusion but
whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion
that the court did draw.” (In re M.R. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 101,
108.) While father points to specific pieces of evidence that would
support a finding in his favor, he does not argue and has not
established that the evidence mandates a reversal of the trial
court’s determination that the parental relationship exception
does not apply. He also has not demonstrated that the court
abused its discretion in determining that the benefits of adoption
outweighed any potential detriment associated with the
termination of parental rights.
C. ICWA
Father contends the Department failed to meet its initial
ICWA inquiry duties because it did not interview certain
relatives about possible Indian ancestry. The record
demonstrates that the Department asked mother, father,
maternal grandparents, a maternal uncle, and paternal
grandmother about Indian ancestry, and all denied any Indian
ancestry. Although the Department also spoke with two paternal
aunts, it did not ask them about possible Indian ancestry.
According to father, the Department failed to comply with
its continuing duty to interview extended family members
regarding ICWA despite having contact with several maternal
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and paternal family members, and others who were identified but
whose contact information was not provided. The Department
contends that because mother, father, maternal grandparents,
and paternal grandmother all denied any Indian ancestry, there
is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
determination that ICWA does not apply.
State law imposes on the Department a first-step inquiry
duty to “interview, among others, extended family members and
others who had an interest in the child.” (In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; see § 224.2, subd. (b).) Federal
regulations explain that the term “[e]xtended family member is
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s Tribe or, in the
absence of such law or custom, is a person who has reached
age 18 and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2017).)
The duty of initial inquiry includes making a meaningful effort to
interview available relatives. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
542, 552–553.) It does not include, however, a duty to search for
all possible extended relatives. (In re Levi U. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 191, 199 [child protective agency is not required to
conduct an extensive independent investigation or to “cast about”
for investigative leads]; see also In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
711, 721 [where “representatives from both sides of two
generational levels” of minor’s family denied Indian ancestry, but
not every extended relative was contacted, ICWA determination
supported by substantial evidence].)
We agree with father that the Department failed to comply
with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and related California
law when it failed to ask reasonably available relatives, including
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the two paternal aunts with whom the Department was in
contact, about possible Indian ancestry. (See In re H.V., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p 438; In re Charles W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
483, 489.) It therefore appears that the Department failed to
fulfill its initial duty of inquiry under ICWA. We will therefore
conditionally affirm and remand for further proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s September 14, 2023 order denying
father’s petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section
388 are affirmed. The juvenile court’s November 16, 2023 order
terminating parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 is conditionally affirmed and remanded for
proceedings required by this opinion. The court shall order the
Department to make reasonable efforts to (1) interview all
available extended family members about the possibility of the
child’s Indian ancestry, including those extended family members
that the Department had previous contact with, namely, the
paternal aunts A.N. and S.C.; and (2) report on the results of
those efforts. Nothing in this disposition precludes the court from
ordering the Department to make inquiry of the additional family
members identified in the record or others who may have an
interest in the children. Based on the information reported, if the
court determines that no additional inquiry or notice to tribes is
necessary, the order terminating parental rights is to be
reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is warranted, the court
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shall make all necessary orders to ensure compliance with ICWA
and related California law.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, Acting, P. J.
We concur:
KIM, J.
LEE, J.
Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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