CourtListener 9986883•In re K.C. CA2/2
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Filed 6/28/24 In re K.C. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re K.C. et al., Persons B317202
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct.
No. 21CCJP02480A-D
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANDREW C. et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Robin R. Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Andrew C.
Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Ronald B.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Ronald B. and Andrew C. appeal from some of the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings and the dispositional orders
declaring minors R.B., B.B., C.B., and K.C. dependents of the
court and removing them from parental custody.1 Substantial
evidence supports the orders Andrew C. is unable to control his
violent impulses and Ronald B. has failed to put the children’s
safety above his drug use. Their challenges also fail because they
did not address the finding mother increased the risk of serious
harm to the children by failing to protect them from Ronald B.’s
drug use and Andrew C.’s physical abuse. As this independently
supports dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, we affirm.2
1 Nicole B. (mother) is not a party to the appeal.
Though we find the failure to challenge the final custody
orders at the time jurisdiction was terminated renders the appeal
moot, we exercise our discretion to discuss the issue in this
opinion.
2 All further unattributed statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Mother is the mother of all four children: R.B. (born
September 2013), B.B. (born October 2014), C.B. (born October
2017), and K.C. (born August 2020). Ronald B. is the presumed
father of R.B., B.B. and C.B. Andrew C. is the presumed father of
K.C.
In May 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) received a
referral Andrew C. intentionally burned C.B. with a cigarette.
This resulted in a petition alleging jurisdiction under section 300
for physical abuse by Andrew C. and neglect by mother. Included
were allegations Andrew C. physically abused C.B. by burning
his face with a cigarette, physically abused R.B. by striking and
kicking him, and, through this conduct, substantially increased
the risk of harm to their siblings. The Department alleged
Andrew C. pushed and choked mother and engaged in other
violent altercations in the children’s home. Included were
allegations Andrew C.’s current abuse of alcohol rendered him
unable to provide regular care for the children. Mother was
alleged to have failed to protect the children from the physical
and substance abuse of Andrew C.
Ronald B. is married to mother, but they have been
separated since 2017. Mother had legal and physical custody of
R.B., B.B., and C.B. under a family court order. Also, mother,
R.B., B.B., and C.B. were protected from Ronald B. by a 10-year
protective order issued on September 25, 2019. Ronald B. was
allowed visitation with the children as ordered by a family,
juvenile, or probate court.
When Ronald B. appeared in the case, a first amended
petition was filed, alleging his abuse of marijuana interferes with
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his ability to provide regular care of the children. The amended
petition also alleged Ronald B. had mental and emotional
problems for which he was not receiving treatment and interfered
with his ability to provide regular care for the children.
Department’s investigation
The children reported Andrew C. intentionally burned C.B.
with his cigarette. Andrew C. claimed it was an accident, and
C.B. had “fall[en]” into the cigarette.
There were also reports from the children Andrew C. would
hit them, prompting mother to argue with Andrew C. when she
found out. Both mother and Andrew C. denied he ever hit the
children.
Additionally, the children claimed mother and Andrew C.
screamed and pushed each other. During one fight, Andrew C.
tried to pull K.C. from mother’s arms, resulting in them pulling
the child “back and forth.” Mother said during other fights,
Andrew C. had pushed her into a dresser and choked her. Police
had been to their house numerous times due to the fights
between the couple. Andrew C. denied domestic violence,
claiming mother likes to call the police and exaggerate.
Regarding Ronald B., mother stated he had a long history
of marijuana and methamphetamine use. Ronald B. admitted
smoking marijuana daily, but denied using methamphetamine.
When asked about a methamphetamine pipe found on him while
R.B. and B.B. were in his care, Ronald B. claimed he found it on
the ground and put it in his pocket so other children would not
pick it up.
Ronald B. said he uses marijuana to treat his anxiety,
posttraumatic stress syndrome, and major depression. He
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reported a moderate level of depression and acknowledged his
issues with alcohol and marijuana.
Jurisdiction and disposition hearing
In December 2021, the court sustained the petition, finding
Andrew C. purposefully burned C.B. with a cigarette, had been
physically abusive to the children, and mother was aware of this
abuse. The court also found Andrew C. and mother engaged in
domestic violence in the children’s home. Ronald B. was found to
have posttraumatic stress syndrome and to use marijuana to
treat this condition.
Based on these findings, the children were declared
dependents of the court and were removed from the physical
custody of the parents. Reunification services were ordered, and
mother was directed to complete parental education classes and
to participate in a domestic violence support group and individual
counseling.
Termination and final custody orders
Less than one year later, in October 2022, the juvenile
court terminated jurisdiction over the children. Mother obtained
sole physical and legal custody of R.B., B.B., and C.B. Ronald B.
was allowed monitored visits. Mother and Andrew C. obtained
joint legal and physical custody over K.C.
Appeals
Ronald B., Andrew C., and mother filed separate notices of
appeal directed only at the December 2021 order finding
dependency jurisdiction over the children. None appealed from
the termination of jurisdiction or the final custody orders.
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Mother’s appeal was subsequently dismissed as
abandoned.3 This opinion resolves the appeals of Ronald B. and
Andrew C.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Ronald B. and Andrew C. argue their challenges to the
jurisdictional and dispositional findings are ripe, despite the
termination of dependency jurisdiction. Ronald B. contends the
jurisdictional and dispositional findings his substance abuse and
mental illness endangered the children are not supported by
substantial evidence. Andrew C. contends the finding he engaged
in physical abuse of his child’s half-siblings is insufficient to
establish jurisdiction over his child.
DISCUSSION
I. Ronald B. and Andrew C.’s appeals are moot
Ronald B. and Andrew C. did not challenge the termination
of dependency jurisdiction; instead, they appealed only the earlier
jurisdictional and dispositional orders. An order terminating
juvenile court jurisdiction generally renders an appeal from an
earlier order moot. (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481,
1488.) “[T]he critical factor in considering whether a dependency
appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can provide any
effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) Here, we cannot provide any effective relief
from the earlier jurisdictional and disposition orders because
dependency jurisdiction was terminated.
3 Mother’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to In re
Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835. No supplemental brief was
filed, and her appeal was dismissed on April 14, 2023.
6
Dismissal of a dependency appeal for mootness following
termination of jurisdiction “is not automatic, but ‘must be decided
on a case-by-case basis.’” (In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1488.) Here, unless the order terminating dependency is
reversed, the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to conduct further
hearings in the now-closed case. To obtain the relief they seek,
Ronald B. and Andrew C. were required to appeal the final
custody orders or the termination order. Since those orders were
not challenged, they are not before us or subject to appellate
review. As a result, the appeals directed to the earlier
jurisdictional and dispositional orders are moot.
We have discretion to reach the merits of a moot appeal,
especially when the challenged orders “‘could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings,’” or “‘“could have other consequences for
[the appellant], beyond jurisdiction.”’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14
Cal.5th 266, 283.) Ronald B. argues the findings regarding his
substance abuse and mental health issues might prejudice him in
future family law cases. He fails to identify any specific evidence
demonstrating such a case is likely or imminent.
Andrew C. argues the physical abuse findings could subject
him to inclusion in the Child Abuse Central Index (CACI).
However, he does not show his name has been submitted for
inclusion in CACI. He fails to show there is any possibility he will
be included in the index.
Their arguments are thus too speculative to support
exercising discretionary review over their moot appeals. Further,
as discussed below, neither addressed the findings showing
dependency jurisdiction existed independent of them. This
independent jurisdiction existed because mother endangered the
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children through her neglect of the risks created by Andrew C.’s
physical abuse of the children and Ronald B.’s substance abuse
and mental health issues. Even if Andrew C. and Ronald B.
successfully challenged the findings applicable to them, the
conclusion concerning mother’s neglect will remain. Under these
circumstances, we need not exercise our discretion and consider
their challenges. As the following shows, we will affirm the
juvenile court orders because, even if the appeals were not moot,
no reversible error has been identified.
II. Ronald B. and Andrew C. failed to address all bases
for jurisdiction
Ronald B. and Andrew C. failed to challenge all the
grounds for establishing jurisdiction over the children. The
“principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a child, not
to his or her parent’ [citation], means that ‘ “[a]s long as there is
one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that
another might be inappropriate” ’ [citation]. Thus, where
jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents but
only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered
moot. [Citation.] The same is true where there are multiple
findings against one parent; the validity of one finding may
render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283-284.) “As long as there is one
unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial that another
might be inappropriate.” (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th
968, 979.)
Here, the jurisdiction and disposition orders are based on
the juvenile court sustaining counts under three different
subdivisions of section 300: subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j). For
section 300, subdivision (a), the court found Andrew C. had
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physically abused C.B. by burning his face with a cigarette and
had physically abused the children through “spanking and
hitting.” Further, Andrew C. and mother had endangered the
children through domestic violence between them. For section
300, subdivision (b), the court found mother endangered the
children by failing to protect them from the physical abuse and
domestic violence. In addition, the court found mother failed to
protect the children from dangers created by Andrew C.’s and
Ronald B.’s substance abuse. It also found mother failed to
protect the children from Ronald B.’s mental health issues and
these issues rendered Ronald B. incapable of providing regular
care to the children. For section 300, subdivision (j), the court
found the physical abuse of C.B. and R.B. endangered the
siblings, B.B., and K.C. Mother abandoned her appeal, leaving
the court’s order intact.
Neither Ronald B. nor Andrew C. challenged the
jurisdictional findings concerning mother. Thus, mother’s failure
to protect the children from Andrew C.’s physical abuse of R.B.
and C.B., from the domestic violence between herself and
Andrew C., and from Andrew C.’s substance abuse remains bases
for dependency jurisdiction.
“[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good
against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the
actions of either parent bring [the minor] within one of the
statutory definitions of a dependent.” (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 393, 397.) Since the jurisdictional findings based on
mother’s neglect are unchallenged, the juvenile court has
jurisdiction over the children. Even if Ronald B. and Andrew C.
were successful in their appeals to the findings based on their
own conduct, they will not obtain a favorable result.
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“We will not reverse for error unless it appears reasonably
probable that, absent the error, the appellant would have
obtained a more favorable result.” (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 873, 876.) Because jurisdiction is proper on grounds
they did not address, they have not shown grounds to reverse.
Thus, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
III. Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings
regarding Andrew C. and Ronald B.
Even if we were to overlook the issues of mootness and
waiver, Ronald B.’s and Andrew C.’s appeals would fail because
substantial evidence in the record supports the court’s findings.
A. Standard of review
We review the parents’ challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders under the substantial evidence standard. (In
re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 145-146 [disposition]; In
re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450 [jurisdiction].) Under
that standard, “the issue is whether there is evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the finding. In making
that determination, the reviewing court reviews the record in the
light most favorable to the challenged order, resolving conflicts in
the evidence in favor of that order, and giving the evidence
reasonable inferences. Weighing evidence, assessing credibility,
and resolving conflicts in evidence and in the inferences to be
drawn from evidence are the domain of the trial court, not the
reviewing court. Evidence from a single witness, even a party,
can be sufficient to support the trial court’s findings.” (Alexis E.,
at pp. 450-451.)
10
B. Andrew C.’s physical abuse of C.B. and R.B.
placed the children at harm
In his appeal Andrew C. does not dispute the findings he
physically abused C.B. and R.B. His sole argument is these
findings do not support dependency jurisdiction as to K.C.
because C.B. and R.B. are not his biological or adoptive children.
Subdivision (a) of section 300 states in relevant part a child
comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court where “[t]he
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the
child by the child’s parent or guardian.” Subdivision (b) of section
300 states in relevant part a child comes within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court where “the child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of any of the following: [¶] (A) The failure or
inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise
or protect the child. [¶] (B) The willful or negligent failure of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has
been left.” The role of the juvenile court is to protect children who
have been harmed or are at risk of harm. (In re Nolan W. (2009)
45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233.)
The record shows Andrew C. purposely burned C.B. with
his cigarette and Andrew C. would hit the children, arguing with
mother when she found out. The children were living in the home
with Andrew C. and the juvenile court found he “occup[ies] a
parental role in these children’s lives living with the mother.”
Andrew C.’s physical abuse of two of the children in his
care increased the risk any of the children in his care, including
K.C., could be harmed by his conduct. His inability to control
11
himself increased the risk he could harm any of the children.
Thus, there was sufficient evidence to show dependency
jurisdiction exists under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), to
protect the children from the substantial risk of harm created by
Andrew C.’s physical abuse.
C. Ronald B.’s substance abuse placed the children
at harm
We conclude substantial evidence supports the findings
regarding Ronald B.’s substance abuse and the risk posed to the
children. Dependency jurisdiction for substance abuse is found in
section 300, subdivision (b), when there is excessive use of drugs
or alcohol that renders “a parent or guardian unable to provide
regular care for a child and either cause the child to suffer
serious physical harm or illness or place the child at substantial
risk of suffering such harm or illness.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15
Cal.5th 520, 531.) A professional diagnosis or satisfaction of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders criteria
can be relevant, but is not required. (Ibid.)
Ronald B. possessed a methamphetamine pipe when R.B.
and B.B. were in his care. At that time Ronald B. admitted using
methamphetamine one week earlier and a couple of times per
month. A source reported Ronald B. used methamphetamine
years ago, and he might be using again based on his behavior.
When high, Ronald B.’s eyes were dilated and red, he would not
make any sense when talking and he would become enraged and
angry. When he was coming down, Ronald B. would sleep all day.
It was reported he allowed homeless people to smoke inside his
home.
Ronald B. admitted to currently smoking marijuana twice
daily, but denied the methamphetamine pipe in his pocket in
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2019 was his, claiming he found it and denied using
methamphetamine. Mother, however, reported Ronald B. had a
long history of methamphetamine and marijuana use, prompting
her to end their relationship.
When viewed together, Ronald B.’s denial of
methamphetamine use, his risky conduct with strangers, and his
behavioral deterioration support a finding his drug use was
excessive and detrimental to the children. His conduct is not the
behavior of a parent who is responsibly managing a recreational
drug habit; rather, it is the behavior of someone in the grips of a
serious substance abuse problem that has a negative impact on
his life.
A source reported when the children were visiting
Ronald B. in 2019, a marijuana pipe, a glass pipe and marijuana
baggies were on the table in his home, filled with trash,
wrappers, clothing and papers strewn about the living room area.
Ronald B. refused to allow the source to see the rest of the living
conditions, but a broken back window was observed along with
shattered glass on the floor by the child’s room. A sheet had been
used to prevent the source from seeing any more of the inside of
the home. The same source saw the boys, one without a shirt,
with bruises on his arms. B.B. had a bruise on his stomach. C.B.
was not there because the last time mother allowed Ronald B. to
visit, he did not have any baby formula and he never changed
C.B.’s diaper.
These facts combine to show Ronald B.’s judgment was
impaired to the point he saw nothing wrong with exposing his
children to such obvious safety threats. It is reasonable to draw
an inference from Ronald B.’s behavior, the condition of his home,
the physical state of the children, and Ronald B.’s drug use was
13
creating a substantial risk of harm to the children when they
were in his care, indicating Ronald B. prioritized his drug use
above his children’s safety.
D. Ronald B.’s drug abuse supported the removal
order4
Ronald B.’s drug use also supports the removal order.
Section 361, subdivision (d) addresses removal of a dependent
child from parents with whom the child did not reside at the time
the dependency petition was filed. The statute prohibits removal
from such a parent in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence of a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child, and
no reasonable means to protect the child without removal. “A
removal order is proper if based on proof of parental inability to
provide proper care for the child and proof of a potential
detriment to the child if he or she remains with the parent.” (In
re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169.) “‘“The parent need not
be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed
before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on
averting harm to the child.” [Citation.] The court may consider a
parent's past conduct as well as present circumstances.’” (In re
John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126.) “We review a
4 Ronald B. also challenged the findings regarding his
mental and emotional issues. “[A] single jurisdictional finding
supported by substantial evidence is sufficient to support
jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to the other findings.”
(In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.) Since we find
substantial evidence supported dependency jurisdiction based on
his excessive drug use, we decline to consider his other
jurisdictional challenges.
14
dispositional order removing a child from parental custody for
substantial evidence.” (In re D.G. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1562,
1574.)
The evidence described above shows Ronald B.’s recent
past, excessive drug use created a substantial danger to the
physical health and safety of the children. Drug paraphernalia
was in his home, strangers were allowed to sleep there, shattered
glass was on the floor, and Ronald B. tried to conceal the inside of
his home with a sheet. The children had bruises. C.B. was not
there because his diaper had not been changed and there was no
formula to feed him. These facts constitute substantial evidence
supporting the juvenile court orders.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
________________________
LUI, P. J.
________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
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