People v. Manrique CA2/7

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Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Manrique CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B331471

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA040557)
v.

JORGE LUIS MANRIQUE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Stefanie
Yee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________
Jorge Luis Manrique appeals from a postconviction order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6)1 with respect to his murder
conviction. In 2020 Manrique pleaded no contest to the first
degree murder of Byron Benito pursuant to a negotiated plea. As
part of the plea colloquy, Manrique admitted that he was at a
house where a plan was formulated to attack Benito, and
Manrique and other gang members participated in the attack
that led to Benito’s death. After appointing counsel and ordering
briefing, the superior court determined at the prima facie review
stage that Manrique was not entitled to relief because of his
admissions as part of the plea colloquy.
Manrique contends on appeal that notwithstanding his
admission that he was present during the formation of the plan
to attack Benito and participated in the attack, he was eligible for
relief because the prosecution could have proceeded under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Further, although
Manrique pleaded guilty to committing murder with malice
aforethought, his plea was to the generic charge of murder, and
did not constitute an admission that he had the intent to kill. We
agree and reverse the order denying Manrique’s petition and
remand with directions for the court to issue an order to show
cause and conduct further proceedings in accordance with
section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Shooting, the Information, and the Negotiated Plea
This case arises out of the killing of Byron Benito in
retaliation for the murder of Victor Flores, a member of the
Young Brown Familia gang.2 Following the murder of Flores,
Manrique and 16 other members of the Young Brown Familia
gang met at an apartment where they discussed luring Benito to
a remote location where the group would kill him in retaliation
for Flores’s murder. The group waited in a parking lot for an
accomplice to bring Benito to the location. Once Benito arrived,
the group attacked him. Manrique later admitted to Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Detective Gilbert Anderson that he was at the
scene and swung at the victim one time, but “his arm went out.”
Manrique later discovered that he had been stabbed in the back
four times. Benito sustained 33 stab wounds and died when one
stab punctured his lung.
Manrique and 16 codefendants were charged in an
amended information for the murder of Benito “with malice
aforethought” (§ 187, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and conspiracy to
commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The information
alleged the murder was committed by means of lying in wait
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and both offenses were committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
In 2003, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,
Manrique pleaded guilty to first degree murder, and the trial
court dismissed count 2 for conspiracy to commit murder, the

2 We provide a brief summary of the facts elicited at the
preliminary hearing for background purposes only.

3
lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation, and the gang
allegation. As part of the negotiated plea, the court sentenced
Manrique to 25 years to life in state prison.
During the plea colloquy, the prosecutor inquired of
Manrique: “Are you also entering your plea freely and
voluntarily because you, in truth and in fact, were at a house
where a plan was formulated to attack the victim in this case,
you drove to the attack location, and you, in fact, participated in
an attack with other Young Brown Familia gang members and
associates, that attack ultimately leading to the death of the
victim Byron Benito?” Manrique answered, “Yes, sir.”
Manrique waived his constitutional rights, and the
prosecutor inquired, “Mr. Manrique, with those rights and
consequences in mind, how do you now plead that on and
between January 15, 2002, and January 16, 2002, in the county
of Los Angeles, you committed the felony crime of murder, that
being murder in the first degree, and that with malice
aforethought, you murdered Byron Benito as named in count 1 of
this information?” Manrique responded, “Guilty, sir.” The
prosecutor asked defense counsel whether he “join[s] in the
waivers, concur[s] in the plea, and stipulate[s] to a factual basis
based on the discovery provided and the preliminary hearing
transcript.” Defendant counsel stated, “Yes.”

B. Manrique’s Petition for Resentencing
On June 22, 2022 Manrique, representing himself, filed a
form petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 on
the basis that he could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder under the changes made to sections 188 and
189, effective January 1, 2019. The superior court appointed

4
counsel for Manrique, the People filed a response and
supplemental response, and Manrique’s attorney filed a reply.
At the May 31, 2023 hearing on Manrique’s petition,
Manrique argued that although he admitted he had participated
in the plan to attack Benito, he never admitted he had the intent
to kill. Therefore, the prosecution could have tried him under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, specifically, that he
participated in an assault, the consequence of which was the
death of Benito. Further, citing People v. Rivera (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 217, 224 (Rivera), Manrique argued the fact the
plea used the generic words “malice aforethought” as part of the
description of the murder charge did not “foreclose the possibility
that he may have been tried under [the natural and probable
consequences] theory.” The prosecutor responded that Rivera
was distinguishable because in that case the petitioner was the
driver, but Manrique admitted the facts showing that he was a
“direct participant” and had the intent to kill.
The superior court agreed with the prosecutor and denied
the petition, finding on the “four corners of the plea and the
words uttered and responded to by the petitioner and the
questions propounded by the prosecution,” Manrique was
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
Manrique timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and significantly limited the scope

5
of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis);
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847-848
(Gentile); see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984.)
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice
based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime and
requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder, except
under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189,
subdivision (e). (Reyes, at p. 986; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
Section 189, subdivision (e), now requires the People to prove
specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual culpability:
The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although
not the actual killer, the defendant, with the intent to kill,
assisted in the commission of murder in the first degree (§ 189,
subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in an
underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted
with reckless indifference to human life as described in
section 190.2, subdivision (d) (the felony-murder special-
circumstance provision) (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong, at
p. 708.) Senate Bill No. 775, effective January 1, 2022, expanded
the scope of potential relief by applying Senate Bill 1437’s
ameliorative changes to individuals convicted of attempted
murder and voluntary manslaughter. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure, now codified in
section 1172.6, for an individual convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences theory to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if the individual could not
have been convicted of murder under Senate Bill 1437’s changes

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to sections 188 and 189. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959;
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner upon his or her request pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3). Further, upon the filing of a
facially sufficient petition, the court must direct the prosecutor to
file a response to the petition and permit the petitioner to file a
reply, and the court must determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Where a petitioner makes the requisite
prima facie showing the petitioner falls within the provisions of
section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)

B. The Superior Court Erred in Denying Manrique’s Petition
Without Issuing an Order To Show Cause
Manrique contends the superior court erred in finding he
was ineligible for relief at the prima facie review stage because he
could have been convicted of murder at the time of his plea under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The People
respond that under the negotiated plea, Manrique admitted to
facts showing he participated in the plan to attack (and kill)
Benito, and further, he admitted to committing the murder with

7
“malice aforethought,” making him ineligible for relief. Manrique
has the better argument.
As discussed, where a defendant makes a prima facie
showing of eligibility for relief under section 1172.6, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) Manrique averred in his
petition for resentencing that he pleaded no contest to murder in
lieu of going to trial; the People could have proceeded at trial
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; and he
could not now be convicted of murder or attempted murder under
the 2019 amendments to sections 188 and 189. These statements
under penalty of perjury establish a prima facie case of eligibility
for relief under section 1172.6, unless the “‘the record, including
the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition,” in which case “the court is
justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) Rather, the
court’s review at this stage is limited to “‘readily ascertainable
facts’” in the record, such as the jury instructions, the record of
the crimes committed, and jury findings on the enhancements.
(People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 [considering jury
instructions and verdicts to determine whether the record of
conviction conclusively established that defendant was actual
killer].) As the Supreme Court observed in Lewis, in holding
judicial factfinding is improper at the prima facie review stage,

8
the “‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very
low.’” (Lewis, at pp. 971-972.) We independently review whether
Manrique has made a prima facie case of eligibility for relief.
(Harden, at p. 52; see People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,
991 (Flores) [“it is now well-settled that the prima facie
determination is a question of law”].)
With respect to a conviction based on a negotiated plea, the
superior court must determine at the prima facie review stage, as
it does with respect to a conviction by a jury, whether the
defendant is ineligible for resentencing because the record of
conviction shows as a matter of law that the plea was not based
on a now-invalid theory of liability, in this case the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (See People v. Patton (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657, review granted June 28, 2023, S279670;
Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.)
Manrique’s admissions as part of the negotiated plea are
part of the record of conviction. (People v. Das (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 954, 960 [“The trial court also correctly
determined it could consider the record of conviction, including
the stated factual basis for defendant’s guilty plea, in
determining whether defendant made a prima facie case for
relief.”];3 People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1028 [“The

3 In People v. Das, the prosecutor stated as a factual basis for
the plea that the defendant and other gang members punched,
kicked, and hit the victim, and the defendant then attempted to
kill the victim by stabbing him in the head, neck, and chest area.
(People v. Das, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 957.) The Court of
Appeal, in reversing the superior court’s denial of the defendant’s
petition for resentencing, observed that although the superior
court accepted the prosecutor’s recitation of facts as the factual

9
trial court reviewed and relied upon the plea colloquy, which is
part of the record of conviction.”].) However, we agree with
Manrique that he did not admit either that he was the actual
killer or that he harbored the intent to kill.
As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 449, “‘[U]nder the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the
offense he or she directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target
offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct
perpetrator that was the “natural and probable consequence” of
the crime the accomplice aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget
offense). [Citation.] A nontarget offense is the natural and
probable consequence of a target offense “if, judged objectively,
the [nontarget] offense was reasonably foreseeable.” [Citation.]
The accomplice need not actually foresee the nontarget offense.
“Rather, liability ‘“is measured by whether a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position would have or should have known that
the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the act aided and abetted.”’”’ [Citation.] Thus, under prior law, a
defendant who aided and abetted an intended assault could be
liable for murder, if the murder was the natural and probable
consequence of the intended assault. [Citation.] The defendant
need not have intended the murder or even subjectively

basis for the plea, the defendant did not stipulate that the facts
were true, and therefore, there was no showing that the actual
basis for the plea was that he had stabbed the victim with the
intent to kill, and the conclusion by the superior court that the
defendant acted with an intent to kill was impermissible
factfinding. (Id. at p. 962.)

10
appreciated the natural and probable consequences of the
intended crime. [Citation.] Senate Bill 1437 ended this form of
liability for murder.” (Accord, Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 845
[“[U]ntil recently, when a person aided and abetted a
nonhomicide crime that then resulted in a murder, the natural
and probable consequences doctrine allowed him or her to be
convicted of murder without personally possessing malice
aforethought. So long as the direct perpetrator possessed malice,
and the killing was a natural and probable consequence of the
crime the defendant aided and abetted, it did not matter whether
the defendant intended to kill or acted with conscious disregard
for human life.”].)
Manrique admitted as part of the plea colloquy that he was
at the house where the plan was formulated “to attack the
victim,” he drove to the attack location, and he “participated in
an attack” that “ultimately [led] to the death of the victim Byron
Benito.” Manrique’s admissions were consistent with his theory
in petitioning for resentencing: He was present when the plan to
assault Benito was formulated; he intended the target offense of
assault; he participated in the assault, and the killing of Benito
by his accomplices was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the assault. It may well be that at an evidentiary hearing the
People will prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Manrique, in
knowing that 16 fellow gang members intended to attack Benito
in retaliation for the death of Flores, Manrique intended to kill
Benito in the attack. But at the prima facie review stage, this

11
requires factfinding as to Manrique’s intent beyond the
admissions he made as part of the negotiated plea.4
People v. Fisher, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, relied on by
the People, is distinguishable. There, the defendant admitted as
part of the plea colloquy that he entered an apartment, shot and
killed two victims, and shot and injured a third victim. (Id. at
pp. 1025, 1028.) The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s
contention on appeal that the superior court engaged in
impermissible factfinding in determining he harbored an intent
to kill, concluding the superior court had properly relied on the
defendant’s admission that he was the direct perpetrator who
shot and killed or injured the victims. (Id. at pp. 1028-1029.) In
contrast to Fisher, Manrique did not admit he was the actual
killer.
The People’s reliance on People v. Romero (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 145 is similarly misplaced. There, as part of a
negotiated plea to first degree murder, the defendant admitted
that “‘during the commission of this crime, [he] acted
intentionally, deliberately and with premeditation.’” (Id. at
p. 149.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant was

4 The People also point out that Manrique gave a statement
to Detective Anderson after being advised of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (recounted by Detective
Anderson at the preliminary hearing) that he was at the scene of
the killing and attempted to swing at Benito but was not
successful because his “arm went out.” Even if we were to
consider this admission, it only shows Manrique attempted to
assault Benito, not that he intended to kill Benito either by his
own assault or the assault of his fellow gang members.

12
ineligible for relief because the defendant’s admissions supported
his murder conviction under current law. (Id. at p. 152.) The
court distinguished the cases in which petitioners had admitted
to committing murder willfully, unlawfully, and with malice
aforethought, explaining the defendant’s “admission to
intentional, deliberate, and premeditated murder establishes
that he acted with actual malice sufficient to sustain the murder
conviction under the law as amended by Senate Bill No 1437.”
(Id. at p. 153.)5 Here, as discussed, Manrique did not admit he
committed murder intentionally, deliberately, and with
premeditation, but rather, only admitted to his intent to commit
an assault.
The People argue Manrique’s admission during the plea
colloquy made him ineligible for resentencing because the plan to
lure Benito to a remote location included a plan to “attack and
kill Benito.” We would agree with the People if Manrique had
admitted to taking part in a plan to kill Benito, but he did not. In
their respondent’s brief, the People rely not on Manrique’s
admission during the plea colloquy, but the testimony by
Detective Anderson at the preliminary hearing in which he
recounted statements made by Jackie Cuentas during a police
interview. Detective Anderson testified that Cuentas stated
during the interview that one of the 17 assembled gang members

5 People v. Saavedra (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 444, 448, also
relied on by the People,is likewise distinguishable because there
the defendant admitted as the factual basis for his plea to
attempted murder that “he ‘attempted to murder’ the three
victims ‘by personally discharging a firearm at the vehicle’ in
which the victims were riding,” thereby showing he was the
actual shooter and attempted to murder the victims.

13
(Daniel Carrillo) told her that during the meeting at her
apartment, the group of gang members formed a plan to lure
Benito to the remote location where the rest of the group would
attack him and “kill him.”
Thus, the People rely for their argument on two layers of
hearsay—what Cuentas told Detective Anderson about what
Carrillo told her. Even if we were to consider testimony from the
preliminary hearing (which we do not),6 hearsay statements

6 The People assert that although the superior court did not
rely on the preliminary hearing testimony for its decision, we
may do so because Manrique’s attorney stipulated that the
preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for the
plea. We decline to rely on the preliminary hearing transcript
because we find persuasive the reasoning in the cases finding the
preliminary hearing transcript may not be relied on to show a
defendant is ineligible for resentencing. (See Flores, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 991 [preliminary hearing transcript may not
be relied on to establish ineligibility for relief even with
stipulation that transcript provided factual basis for plea];
Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 238 [stipulation to grand jury
transcript as factual basis for plea did not constitute admission
by defendant that he committed murder with malice].) As the
court in Rivera observed, “Under section 1192.5, a trial court
taking a plea must make ‘an inquiry . . . of the defendant to
satisfy itself . . . that there is a factual basis for the plea.’ ‘The
factual basis required by section 1192.5 does not require more
than establishing a prima facie factual basis for the charges.’”
(Rivera, at p. 235, quoting People v. Holmes (2004)
32 Cal.4th 432, 441; accord, Flores, at p. 990.) The Supreme
Court will decide this question in People v. Patton, S279670, in
which it granted review to decide whether “the trial court
engage[d] in impermissible judicial factfinding by relying on the

14
presented at the preliminary hearing may not be considered at
the prima facie review stage. Under section 1172.6,
subsection (d)(3), at an evidentiary hearing on a resentencing
petition, “hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary
hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be
excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is
admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule.”7
Although section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), only applies at the
evidentiary hearing, it would be incongruous to allow the
superior court to rely on hearsay statements at the prima facie
review stage to deny a petitioner relief but bar the use of the
same evidence at the evidentiary hearing. (See People v. Patton,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 652, fn. 2 [“We consider only the
witness testimony ‘that is admissible under current law,’

preliminary hearing transcript to deny defendant’s Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.”
In any event, as Manrique points out in his reply brief, the
preliminary hearing testimony is not inconsistent with liability
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine—it only
shows that Manrique was one of 17 gang members who were
involved in the attack on Benito, and although Manrique swung
at Benito, he missed. The testimony does not show conclusively
that Manrique intended to kill Benito, as opposed to an intent to
attack him. To determine otherwise from the testimony would
require impermissible factfinding.
7 Under section 872, subdivision (b), a qualified investigative
officer may testify at a preliminary hearing about otherwise
inadmissible hearsay statements made to the officer by persons
the officer interviewed. (Correa v. Superior Court (2002)
27 Cal.4th 444, 451-452.)

15
disregarding any testimony that was admitted at the preliminary
hearing under Proposition 115, codified as subdivision (b) of
Section 872. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)”]; Flores, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at p. 988, fn. 9 [“[W]e fail to see how evidence that
cannot establish a petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for
resentencing could establish a petitioner’s ineligibility for
resentencing at the prima facie stage.”].)
The People also contend that Manrique’s admission that he
committed the crime of first degree murder, “and that with
malice aforethought, [he] murdered Byron Benito as named in
count 1 of this information” made him ineligible for relief because
his admission he possessed malice aforethought meant he had an
intent to kill. The People contrast Manrique’s plea to the one in
Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at page 225, in which the court
inquired of the defendant, “what is your plea to Count 1, that on
or about October 5, 2012, you did willfully, unlawfully[,] and with
malice aforethought murder [Baker] . . . in violation of Penal
Code section 187(a), a felony?” The defendant responded, “No
contest.” (Ibid.) The court in Rivera reversed the superior court’s
summary denial of the defendant’s petition for resentencing,
concluding “[t]he generic manner in which murder was charged
here did not limit the People to prosecuting Rivera on any
particular theories,” and further, “despite the fact that the
indictment charged Rivera with murder committed with malice
aforethought, it allowed the prosecution to proceed on any theory
of murder.” (Id. at p. 233; see People v. Eynon (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 967, 971 [reversing summary denial of petition for
resentencing where defendant pleaded guilty to committing first
degree murder “willfully, unlawfully, and with deliberation,
premeditation, and malice aforethought,” and as a factual basis

16
for the guilty plea “admitted that he did ‘what Count 1 of th[e]
Information says [he] did, when it says [he] did it.’”].)
Contrary to the People’s assertion, the court’s reasoning in
Rivera supports Manrique’s position. As in Rivera, the generic
manner in which the murder was charged here allowed the
prosecution to proceed on any theory—including the then-valid
theory of imputed malice based on Manrique’s participation in an
assault (under the natural and probable consequences doctrine).
Accordingly, Manrique’s plea of guilty to committing first degree
murder with malice aforethought could have been an admission
only of imputed malice. Manrique’s guilty plea therefore did not
render him ineligible for resentencing at the prima facie stage.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Manrique’s petition for resentencing is
reversed. On remand, the superior court is to issue an order to
show cause and to conduct further proceedings in accordance
with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J.

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