Ford v. Deitz CA5

CourtListener 9986602Calctapp28 juin 2024

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Filed 6/28/24 Ford v. Deitz CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PATRICIA FORD,
F086236
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 21CECG03486)
v.

SHAWN DEITZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kristi Culver
Kapetan, Judge.
Shawn Deitz, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Coleman & Horowitt, Robert K. Ashley, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
The trial court granted summary judgment to Patricia Ford, plaintiff and
respondent, on her single-claim complaint for “action on judgment.” Shawn Deitz,
defendant and appellant, appealed. Deitz is self-represented on appeal. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 28, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
California (Fresno Division), issued a damages judgment in the amount of $386,092.76 in
favor of Wayne and Patricia Ford (Wayne Ford subsequently passed away) and against
Shawn Deitz. The judgment was “nondischargeable” pursuant to 11 United States Code
section 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6). The relevant provisions of 11 United States Code
section 523(a) provide that an individual debtor cannot be discharged from any debt
where money was obtained by fraud or embezzlement, or the debtor caused “willful and
malicious injury … to another entity or to the property of another entity.” (11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), (a)(6).)
Deitz appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling and judgment to the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and
thereafter, to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit issued its decision in
the matter on July 28, 2014. (See Deitz v. Ford, et al. (In re Deitz) (9th Cir. 2014) 760
F.3d 1038 (Deitz v. Ford).) The Ninth Circuit noted in its decision: “Chapter 7 debtor
Shawn Deitz seeks review of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (“BAP”) judgment
affirming the bankruptcy court’s judgment (1) awarding money damages to creditors
Wayne and Patricia Ford; and (2) ordering that the Fords’ claim be excepted from
discharge. We … affirm.” (Deitz v. Ford at p. 1039.) The Ninth Circuit further stated:
“In our review, we conclude that the well-reasoned majority opinion of the BAP, In re
Deitz, 469 B.R. 11 (9th Cir. BAP 2012), correctly sets forth the law and the application of
that law as appropriate in this case. We therefore adopt it as our own, and we attach it as
an appendix to this order.” (Ibid.)

2.
The BAP’s opinion, adopted by the Ninth Circuit as its own opinion, delineates the
facts of the dispute underlying the bankruptcy court judgment obtained by the Fords
against Deitz. As explained in the BAP’s opinion, when the Fords met Deitz, the latter
was “a sometime general building contractor in the Fresno area.” (Deitz v. Ford, supra,
760 F.3d at p. 1040.) Wayne Ford was a disabled U.S. Army veteran and Patricia Ford
was a registered nurse. (Ibid.) The Fords entered into a contract with Deitz, pursuant to
which Deitz was to build them a “handicap-assisted home.” (Ibid.) Although Deitz
represented on the contract that he was a licensed contractor, his license was suspended at
the time. (Ibid.)
The Fords paid Deitz a total of $511,800.00 to build the home. Deitz admitted he
failed to complete the construction. Deitz also did not provide the Fords with an
accounting. Deitz filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on June 20, 2008. The Fords
commenced an adversary proceeding against Deitz on September 9, 2008. The trial in
the adversary proceeding took place on April 4, 5, and 11, 2011. On July 28, 2011, the
bankruptcy court entered the money judgment that is at issue in this case. The money
judgment was in favor of the Fords and against Deitz in the amount of $386,092.76. The
bankruptcy court ordered that the judgment was excepted from discharge in Deitz’s
bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 United States Code section 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4) and
(a)(6). (See Deitz v. Ford, supra, 760 F.3d at p. 1041.) The appeals process followed,
culminating in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on July 28, 2014.
Years later, on September 8, 2021, the Fords filed a notice of renewal of judgment
(dated September 7, 2021) in the United States Bankruptcy Court in Fresno. The clerk of
the bankruptcy court signed and entered the notice of renewal on September 9, 2021.
Thereafter, on October 6, 2021, Deitz filed a motion to vacate renewal of judgment in the
bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court granted Deitz’s motion after a hearing. In a
written order filed on November 22, 2021, the bankruptcy court ordered: “The Notice of
Renewal of Judgment filed with, and signed by, the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy

3.
Court on September 9, 2021 … is vacated and of no further force or effect.” The
bankruptcy court further ordered: “Pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure section]
683.020 … the Judgment in favor of Wayne and Patricia Ford and against Defendant, in
the original amount of $386,092.76, dated July 28, 2011 … is no longer enforceable
against Defendant or his property on or after July 28, 2021.”
On November 22, 2021, the same day that the bankruptcy court vacated the notice
of renewal, Patricia Ford (Ford) initiated the instant matter by filing a complaint in the
Fresno County Superior Court, alleging one cause of action for “action on judgment”
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 683.050 and 337.5. The complaint stated:
“Code of Civil Procedure section 683.050 permits Plaintiff to bring this Action on the
Judgment, even after the expiration of the 10-year enforcement period set forth in [Code
of Civil Procedure] section 683.020, as the statute of limitations provided by Code of
Civil Procedure section 337.5 has not yet expired.” The complaint requested the
following relief: “[T]he issuance of judgment in favor of Plaintiff for an amount subject
to proof, but not less than $258,068.23, plus interest.”
Ford subsequently moved for summary judgment in the instant matter, in May
2022. On January 18, 2023, the trial court issued a tentative ruling. The trial court noted:
“The bankruptcy court’s November 22, 2021 [order] specifically addressed the same debt
alleged in plaintiff’s complaint filed with this court. Furthermore, the order was based on
the bankruptcy[ ] court’s analysis of the same California statutes which frame the issues
and pleadings. It also appears that the bankruptcy court’s decision is final.” The trial
court added: “Therefore, because it appears that res judicata and the preclusive effect of
the bankruptcy court’s November 22, 2021 order are potentially dispositive issues yet
insufficiently briefed, the court intends to continue the hearing on this matter to invite
further briefing on those issues.” The court then received the requested submissions from
the parties.

4.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its tentative ruling granting summary judgment in
favor of Ford in the instant matter. On March 1, 2023, the court’s tentative ruling became
the trial court’s order (as Deitz did not request oral argument). The court’s order stated:

“Plaintiff has plead one cause of action for recovery of a monetary
judgment for $386,092.76 granted on July 28, 2011 from the United States
Bankruptcy Court. [Citation.] Defendant – who was the debtor in the
bankruptcy proceeding – appealed the judgment, and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals published its final decision on July 28, 2014 (“2014
Decision”). (See In re Shawn Deitz (9th Cir. 2014) 760 F.3d 1038, 1039
[holding that the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) had correctly
affirmed the creditors’ claim as exempt from discharge and adopting the
BAP opinion as its own].) [¶ ] … [¶ ]

“Under well-settled authorities, the date the BAP [opinion as
adopted by the Ninth Circuit] became final was the date the Ninth Circuit
entered a final determination on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1049 [“An
action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its
final determination on appeal….”]; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. V.
Cunningham (9th Cir. 1958) 257 F.2d 731, 732; Rilcoff v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 503, 507.)

“In an application dated September 7, 2021, plaintiff applied for
renewal of the July 28, 2011 judgment [citation], which was granted two
days later on September 9th, pursuant to the clerk’s ‘automatic’ and
‘ministerial’ duties. (Rubin v. Ross (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 153, 165;
[citation].) On October 6, 2021, defendant filed a motion to vacate the
renewal on the basis that the clerk’s renewal occurred more than ten years
from July 28, 2011. [Citation.] Defendant’s motion to vacate neither
addressed nor mentioned the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision, and it does not
appear that the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision was considered by the
Bankruptcy Court.

“The Bankruptcy Court granted defendant’s unopposed motion to
vacate, and its order specified that ‘[p]ursuant to [California Code of Civil
Procedure] § 683.020, a) the Judgment in favor of Wayne and Patricia Ford
and against Defendant, in the original amount of $386,092.76, dated July
28, 2011 … is no longer enforceable against Defendant or his property on
or after July 28, 2021; b) All enforcement procedures pursuant to the
Judgment or to a writ or order issued pursuant to the Judgment shall
cease….’ [citation, emphasis added].) The order does not mention,
expressly or impliedly, the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision.

5.
“Under subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020 a
judgment may not be enforced after 10 years have expired from its
issuance. And the California Supreme Court notes that ‘ “[t]he normal
rules of Res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to the decisions of
bankruptcy courts.” ’ (Martin v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 758, 764.)

“Here, however, the Bankruptcy Court’s granting of defendant’s
motion to vacate the renewal did not invalidate the original, July 28, 2011,
judgment, because, even where an original judgment is no longer
enforceable under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section
683.020, it nevertheless remains valid. (Green v. Zissis (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 1219, 1222 (Zissis) [rejecting as ‘wholly unmeritorious’ a
contention that an order vacating a renewal invalidated the original
judgment].) In other words, although the Bankruptcy Court issued a final
decision regarding renewal, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment does
not seek renewal or enforcement of the July 28, 2011 judgment, but rather
seeks relief on the judgment rendered by the Ninth Circuit in 2014. (See
Martin v. Martin, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 759 [res judicata only applies to
those issues previously determined].)

“In addition, even if the July 28, 2011 judgment date is used, it
appears that the Judicial Council’s Emergency Rule no. 9 (See Cal. Rules of
Court, Appendix 1, rule 9), operates to toll enforcement by at least six
months. Plaintiff’s commencement of this case in November, 2021 – which
is three months outside the 10 year period – would be timely under
application of the Judicial Council’s emergency rule. (See Zissis, supra, 5
Cal.App.4th at p. 1223 [the plaintiff was entitled to judgment, despite
expiration of the 10 year period under Code Civ. Proc., § 683.020, because
statutory tolling principles applied].)

“Defendant’s liability on the judgment can be decided as a matter of
law, and therefore plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
(Code Civ. Proc. § 473c, subd. (c).)”
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Ford on March 7, 2023, to the effect
that “Plaintiff shall be entitled to $258,086.23, plus interest.” This appeal from Deitz
followed.

6.
DISCUSSION
I. Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment
A. Standard of Review
“Summary judgment is granted when there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (c).) This court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision to grant summary
judgment and we are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons or rationales.
[Citation.] [¶] In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we accept as undisputed
fact only those portions of the moving party’s evidence that are uncontradicted by the
opposing party. In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing
summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are
accepted as true.” (Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997,
1001 (Hersant).) “ ‘We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ”
(Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1249-1250.)
“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment
bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That is because of the general principle that a
party who seeks a court’s action in his favor bears the burden of persuasion thereon. (See
Evid. Code, § 500.) There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence
would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof…. [A] plaintiff
[moving for summary judgment] bears the burden of persuasion that ‘each element of’
the ‘cause of action’ in question has been ‘proved,’ and hence that ‘there is no defense’
thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(1).) A defendant [moving for summary
judgment] bears the burden of persuasion that ‘one or more elements of’ the ‘cause of
action’ in question ‘cannot be established,’ or that ‘there is a complete defense’ thereto.

7.
(Id., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).)” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850,
fns. omitted.)
B. Applicable Legal Framework
A money judgment is enforceable for 10 years from the date of its entry. (Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 683.020,1 683.030;2 Zissis, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222; Fidelity
Creditor Service, Inc. v. Browne (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 195, 200 (Browne).) However,
there are two alternative methods to extend the life of a money judgment. First, a
judgment creditor may renew a judgment for an additional 10 years. (§ 683.110 et seq.)
Alternatively, “a judgment creditor may file a separate action on the judgment.”
(Browne, supra, at p. 200.) “A judgment creditor may bring an independent action on a
judgment even after the 10-year enforceability period has expired if the 10-year statute of
limitations in section 337.5 has not yet run.” (Id. at pp. 200-201; Stuart v. Lander (1860)
16 Cal. 373 [action on judgment is appropriate when the time within which an execution
could be issued has expired and there is no means of enforcing the judgment except by
action].)
Section 683.050, which authorizes an action on judgment, provides in pertinent
part: “[N]othing in this chapter limits any right the judgment creditor may have to bring
an action on a judgment, but any such action shall be commenced within the period
prescribed by Section 337.5.” As for section 337.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it
authorizes within 10 years, “[a]n action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the
United States or of any state within the United States.” (§ 337.5, subd. (b), italics
added.)

1 Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020(a) provides: “Except as otherwise
provided by statute, upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of entry of a money
judgment … [¶ ] [t]he judgment may not be enforced.”
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

8.
The Law Revision Commission comments to section 683.050 specify: “Section
683.050 makes clear that the 10-year period of enforcement prescribed by Section
683.020 and the renewal procedure provided by [Section 683.110 et seq.] do not affect
the right to bring an action on judgment. The limitation period for commencing the
action is prescribed by Section 337.5. The 10-year [enforcement] period provided by
Section 683.020 and the 10-year statute of limitations provided by Section 337.5 are not
coterminous. The period prescribed in Section 683.020 commences on the date of entry
and is not tolled for any reason. The statute of limitations commences to run when the
judgment is final (See Turner v. Donovan [(1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 236]) and may be
tolled.” (See Browne, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 201 [citing Law Revision Commission
comment]; see also Pratali v. Gates (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 632, 637 [“The treatment of an
action on a judgment is distinguishable from the treatment of an application to renew the
prior judgment.”].)
Turner v. Donovon clarified that for purposes of an action upon a judgment cause
of action, the statute of limitations “ ‘begins to run only when the right of action has
accrued, and this … is after final determination on appeal, in the event that an appeal has
been taken, or after the passage of the time in which an appeal might be taken, in the
event that none has been.’ ” (Turner v. Donovan, supra, 52 Cal.App.2d at pp. 238-239;
see Zissis, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222 [“A cause of action on a judgment accrues
when ‘the judgment has become final either upon expiration of the period within which
an appeal may be taken, or, if an appeal is taken, upon the issuance of the remittitur when
the judgment has been affirmed.’ ”].)
“A plaintiff may bring suit at any time after the accrual of a cause of action prior to
the expiration of the applicable limitations period.” (Zissis, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p.
1223; § 312 [“Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the
periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued, unless where,
in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.”]; § 1049 [“An action is

9.
deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination
upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner
satisfied.”].) “If the judgment creditor began an action within [the limitations] period,
‘the creditor’s right to recover remain[ed] alive, even though the 10-year period …
subsequently expire[d].’ ” (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World
Markets Corp. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 185, 194.)
“An action upon a judgment may therefore be commenced after the period for
obtaining an execution of the original judgment has expired and there is no other means
of enforcing the judgment except by action.” (Zissis, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222.)
Further, the fact that a judgment creditor attempted but failed to renew the original
judgment does not preclude the judgment creditor’s ability to initiate an action upon a
judgment. (Ibid. [“The court’s order vacating the ‘renewed’ judgment had no effect on
the original judgment. The original judgment remained valid, although lacking renewal it
could not be enforced under section 683.020.”].) “ ‘A judgment creditor is entitled as a
matter of right to a judgment on the original judgment providing [an action] is
commenced within the 10-year statute of limitations period.’ ” (Zissis at p. 1223.)
Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Fiscus (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1232 summarizes the
applicable law as follows:

“In 1982, the Legislature enacted the Enforcement of Judgments
Law (EJL). (§ 680.010 et seq.) Prior to enactment of the EJL, the means
for renewal of a judgment in California was by filing an independent action
on the judgment within the 10-year statute of limitations. [Citation.]

“ ‘In the [EJL], the Legislature adopted an alternative summary
procedure for renewal [of judgments]. [Citations.] Under this procedure, a
money judgment is enforceable for 10 years from the date it is entered.
(§ 683.020.) To obtain a renewal of the judgment, the judgment creditor
must file an application for renewal with the clerk of the court that entered
the judgment before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability.
(§ 683.130, subd. (a); see § 683.140 [setting forth information to be
included in application].) “Upon the filing of the application, the court

10.
clerk shall enter the renewal of the judgment in the court records.”
(§ 683.150, subd. (a).)’ [Citation.]

“But nothing in the EJL limits a judgment creditor’s right to pursue
an independent action on the judgment. (§ 683.050.) An independent
action ‘ “based on a judgment is an action based on contract. The [original]
judgment becomes a debt which the judgment debtor is obligated to pay
and the law implies a contract on his part to pay it. [Citation.]” [Citation.]
Thus, when successful, an action on a judgment results in the entry of a
new judgment.’ ” (Calde Co. II, Inc. v. Fiscus, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1237-1238.)
C. Analysis
Here, the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of the Fords in the amount
of $386,092.76 and determined the judgment was not dischargeable. Deitz subsequently
appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit and, thereafter, to the
Ninth Circuit. In light of the authorities discussed above, upon issuance of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision on July 28, 2014, the judgment was rendered final. While the date of
the original entry of judgment by the bankruptcy court (that is July 28, 2011) is relevant
to the limitations period for renewal of judgment (§ 683.020), it is not relevant to the
limitations period for the instant action on judgment. (§§ 683.050 and 337.5.) The
statute of limitations for the instant action on judgment began running on July 28, 2014,
when the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was issued. The 10-year statute of limitations
applicable to an action on judgment is therefore set to expire on July 28, 2024. (§ 337.5.)
Patricia Ford filed the complaint initiating the instant action on judgment on November
22, 2021, well within the limitations period. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted
Ford’s motion for summary judgment.
Deitz’s principal claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in concluding that the
instant “action on judgment” cause of action accrued on July 28, 2014 (the date of
issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion), rather than July 28, 2011 (the date of entry of the
original judgment in the bankruptcy court). As discussed above, Deitz’s claim is
unavailing. Deitz also challenges the trial court’s determination that the Judicial

11.
Council’s Emergency Rule of Court No. 9 (related to the COVID-19 pandemic) tolled the
applicable statute of limitations for an action on judgment cause of action during the
pandemic. However, in light of our determination that the complaint initiating the instant
action was timely under section 337.5, we need not address Deitz’s contentions regarding
any tolling of the applicable statute of the limitations under the Judicial Council’s
Emergency Rule of Court No. 9.
Furthermore, to the extent Deitz contends summary judgment was precluded
because res judicata or collateral estoppel applies here (with respect to the bankruptcy
court’s order vacating the Fords’ notice of renewal), his contentions have no merit. The
action on judgment was not previously litigated in the bankruptcy court. On the contrary,
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment pertained to an action on judgment cause of
action that was separate and distinct from the renewal of judgment handled by the
bankruptcy court.
As far as Deitz’s remaining contentions are concerned, we have considered them
and find they are either waived as improperly raised or have no merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Patricia Ford shall recover her costs on appeal.

SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

DE SANTOS, J.

12.

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