CourtListener 9885652•People v. Merideth CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 6/26/24 P. v. Merideth CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B332708
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA154968)
v.
DARRYL JOSHUA MERIDETH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed in part;
reversed in part with directions.
Robert H. Derham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Tarlye and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________
A jury convicted Darryl Joshua Merideth of second degree
murder and found he personally used a firearm to commit the
murder within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5,
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subdivision (a). The trial court then found as an aggravating
circumstance that Merideth was armed with and used a weapon
during the commission of the murder.
The court sentenced Merideth to 15 years to life for the
murder. Turning to the firearm enhancement, a finding
pursuant to section 12022.5 generally carries a consecutive
prison term of three, four, or ten years. However, section 1170.1,
which governs enhancement sentencing, mandates the middle
term unless certain aggravating circumstances exist. The trial
court found that for purposes of the firearm enhancement,
Merideth’s use of a weapon was an aggravating circumstance
justifying the upper term. Accordingly, the court sentenced
Merideth to the upper term of 10 years for the firearm
enhancement, to run consecutive to 15 years to life for the
murder.
Merideth contends it was illegal to apply the facts of his
gun use both to prove the elements of the firearm enhancement
and to select the upper term under section 12022.5. Respondent
concedes the point, and we agree. Accordingly, we will reverse
the judgment for the limited purpose of resentencing.
BACKGROUND
On July 9, 2021, 25-year-old Merideth, a gang member,
initiated a gun battle outside a marijuana dispensary with rival
gang member Dequann Williams, who used crutches due to an
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Undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal
Code.
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ankle injury. After the two exchanged approximately two dozen
shots, Merideth killed Williams.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
Merideth with murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and alleged he personally
used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision
(a). The information alleged as aggravating circumstances that
Merideth was armed with and used a weapon during the
commission of the offense, that the victim was particularly
vulnerable, and that Merideth engaged in violent conduct
indicating a serious danger to society.
At trial, Merideth admitted shooting Williams but testified
he did so in self-defense because the victim told him outside the
marijuana dispensary that Merideth had “better be gone by the
time [Williams got] to his car or it’s bad,” which Merideth
interpreted as a death threat.
He also testified that from an early age he was
hypervigilant to danger. Beginning when he was only nine years
old, he saw many friends and people in his community get shot.
He had himself been shot twice, once when he was 15 and again
when he was 24. As a result, he was constantly on the alert and
carried a gun to protect himself.
Merideth’s girlfriend testified that Williams threatened
Merideth outside the dispensary.
During closing argument, defense counsel argued Merideth
acted in self-defense.
After being instructed on the lesser offense of voluntary
manslaughter, on imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571),
and on self-defense as a complete defense to murder (CALCRIM
No. 505), the jury convicted Merideth of second degree murder
and found true the gun use allegation.
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Turning to the alleged aggravating circumstances, the
court found true that Merideth used a gun. However, it found not
true that Merideth engaged in violent conduct indicating a
serious danger to society (the court rejected this allegation
because it believed it was duplicative of the gun allegation), and
not true that the crutch-using Williams was particularly
vulnerable.
The court sentenced Merideth to 15 years to life for the
murder and to a consecutive upper term of 10 years for the
firearm enhancement.
DISCUSSION
A. The Upper Term was Illegal
Merideth first contends that because the trial court applied
the fact of his gun use both to establish the section 12022.5
firearm enhancement and to elevate the sentence from the
presumptive middle to the upper term, the sentence was illegal.
Respondent concedes this point, and we agree.
Although a firearm finding pursuant to section 12022.5
generally carries a consecutive prison term of 3, 4, or 10 years,
section 1170.1, which governs sentencing for enhancements,
provides that when an enhancement finding “is punishable by
one of three terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” (§ 1170.1, subd. (d)(1).)
That paragraph provides: “The court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term
of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
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trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170.1, subd.
(d)(2); see People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038
[section 1170.1 makes the middle term the presumptive sentence
unless certain aggravating circumstances exist].)
“A fact is aggravating if it makes defendant’s conduct
distinctively worse than it would otherwise have been.” (People v.
Zamarron (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 865, 872.)
The same fact may not be applied to prove both the
elements of a sentence enhancement and the aggravating
circumstance necessary to depart from the presumptive middle
term. (People v. Lincoln (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 196, 203-204
[“Using an inherent feature of an enhancement as a justification
for imposing the high term on that enhancement would collapse
the sentencing scheme by making every occurrence of that
enhancement aggravated, undermining the purpose of an
aggravating factor”].)
Here, based solely on Merideth’s use of a firearm, the trial
court imposed the upper term of 10 years rather than the
presumptive middle term of four years, or lower term of three.
But Merideth’s use of a gun was an inherent feature of the
enhancement finding itself, not something which made the
firearm use distinctively worse; it thus failed to justify departing
from the presumptive middle term.
B. The Trial Court May Select the Middle or Lower
Term
Merideth next contended that because mitigating
circumstances existed—he had suffered childhood trauma and
was only 25 years old at the time of the offense—the four-year
middle term would be illegal as well, making only the lower
three-year term permissible. After Respondent contested this
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point in his opposition brief, Merideth’s counsel sent us a letter in
lieu of a reply brief, essentially withdrawing the contention and
acceding to remand for the trial court to select either the middle
or lower term. We agree with this course.
Section 1170 provides that “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [or] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] . . . The
person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence[; or] [¶] . . . [t]he person . . . was a youth . . . at
the time of the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6),
italics added.)
The presumption in favor of the lower term arises only if
the mitigating circumstance “was ‘a contributing factor’ in [the]
commission of the offense.” (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 984, 991.)
There is a threshold question whether the Legislature
intended the procedure set forth in section 1170 (applied to
offenses) governs sentencing under section 1170.1 (applied to
enhancements), and also whether the mitigating factors listed in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) apply to enhancement sentencing.
There is a further question whether lifelong exposure to gang
violence qualifies as a mitigating factor under section 1170. But
as Respondent has not briefed these issues and both sides accede
to remand for resentencing, the trial court may consider them in
the first instance.
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Here, although Merideth testified that he suffered
childhood trauma, there has been no finding on this fact or its
contribution to Williams’s murder. Similarly, although Merideth
was a youth at the time of the offense, nothing in the record
suggests, and there has been no finding, that his age contributed
to the murder. These matters may be explored upon
resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed for the limited purpose of
resentencing in harmony with this opinion. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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